In any action for a libel, the defendant may give proof of intention; and unless the plaintiff proves either malice in fact or that the defendant, after having been requested by the plaintiff in writing to retract the libelous charge, in as public a manner as that in which it was made, failed to do so within a reasonable time, the plaintiff shall recover nothing but such actual damage as the plaintiff may have specially alleged and proved.
(1949 Rev., S. 7983; P.A. 03-19, S. 118.)
History: P.A. 03-19 made technical changes, effective May 12, 2003.
“Malice in fact” defined. 27 C. 27, 28; 106 C. 132. Publishing a false charge of crime against another, in a newspaper, proves such malice. 30 C. 419. Evidence of special damage. 27 C. 26; 30 C. 419. “Malice in fact” is not malignity or personal ill will, but an improper and unjustifiable motive. 57 C. 73; 85 C. 24; 88 C. 251. What evidence admissible as a justification under “proof of intention”. 57 C. 92. Circumstances held to justify a finding of “malice in fact”. 60 C. 491. Existence of malice in fact is for the trial court. Id., 493; 87 C. 222. Proof of malice considered in reference to claim of a privileged communication. 66 C. 175; 67 C. 510; 81 C. 293; 85 C. 24; 87 C. 220; 91 C. 430; 106 C. 132. Rule of damages where no special damages proved. 85 C. 23; 79 C. 523; 107 C. 123. Repetition of words as evidence of actual malice. 86 C. 261. When exemplary damages proper. 72 C. 731. Privilege. 64 C. 223; 72 C. 335; 78 C. 365; 88 C. 247. Defendant may testify to motive or feeling prompting his conduct. 91 C. 432. Words libelous per se; presumption of malice and damages; compensatory and punitive damages where actual malice shown; 92 C. 236; 107 C. 123; effect of privileged occasion as to malice; actual malice question of fact. 92 C. 331. Cited. 97 C. 38; 106 C. 129. Libel per se against attorney. Id., 131. Words slanderous per se will support substantial recovery without proof of special damage. 107 C. 123. A charge of a person having committed a crime is libelous per se, from which the law presumes damage without special proof. 113 C. 580. When a libel is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms, the question whether it is libelous per se is one of law for the court. 136 C. 557. No basis for appeal where plaintiff failed to make clear objections to charge by court below concerning effect of statute. 157 C. 507. Cited. 162 C. 388.
Cited. 11 CA 584; 25 CA 16. Televised news broadcasts could give rise to claim of defamation sounding in libel. 110 CA 283.
If special damages are not alleged, malice in fact must be proved. 15 CS 448. A libel is actionable per se if it charges improper conduct or lack of skill or integrity in one's profession or business and is of such a nature that it is calculated to cause injury to one in his profession or business; the essential elements of a qualifiedly privileged communication are good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to that purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner to proper parties. 22 CS 248. Cited. 33 CS 4.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
15
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1960–2021 · leading case:
Miles v. Perry, 529 A.2d 199 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
Miles v. Perry, 529 A.2d 199 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
· cites it 10× “The defendants next argue that the plaintiff may not recover general damages because she failed to demand a retraction as mandated by General Statutes § 52-237. That statute provides that a plaintiff in a libel action is entitled to recover only alleged and proven special…”
Mercer v. Cosley, 955 A.2d 550 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 5× “In response, the plaintiff filed the present action against the defendants claiming, in relevant part, 2 libel per se, 3 pursuant to General Statutes § 52-237. 4 The complaint alleged, inter alia: “1.”
Grossman v. Comput. Curriculum Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D. Conn. 2000).
· cites it 6× “The court notes that the state law upon which the plaintiff relies for the invocation of the public policy exception, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-237, simply sets forth the remedies available in libel actions.”
Haxhi v. Moss, 591 A.2d 1275 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 52-237 provides: “In any action for a libel the defendant may give proof of intention; and unless the plaintiff proves either malice in fact or that the defendant, after having been requested by him in writing to retract the libelous charge, in as public a…”
Moriarty v. Lippe, 294 A.2d 326 (Conn. 1972).
· cites it 2× “3 This is a sufficient showing to prevent a directed verdict pursuant to General Statutes § 52-237 where, as here, no retraction was requested, and no special damages were alleged.”
Corbett v. Register Publ'g Co., 356 A.2d 472 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975).
· cites it 4× “General Statutes § 52-237 provides as follows: “In any action for a libel the defendant may give proof of intention; and unless the plaintiff proves either malice in fact or that the defendant, after having been requested by him in writing to retract the libelous charge, in as…”
Kloth v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 33 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Conn. 1998).
· cites it 4× “Plaintiff alleges that defendant: (1) libeled, slandered and defamed plaintiff by ruining her credit, pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 52-237 (damages in actions for libel), and 52-238 (damages in actions on penal bonds) 4 ; (2) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; (3)…”
Prystash v. Best Medium Publ'g Co., 254 A.2d 872 (Conn. 1969).
· cites it 2× “In connection with the cause of action for libel, and because of the evidence offered by the defendant concerning the published retraction, it charged the jury concerning the effect of § 52-237 of the General Statutes, the statute on damages in libel actions.”
Urbano v. Sondern, 41 F.R.D. 355 (D. Conn. 1966).
· cites it 2× “Under the applicable Connecticut statute, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-237 (1958), unless such a demand is made within a reason *358 able time, there can be no recovery for anything but special damages unless the plaintiff can prove actual malice.”
Hogan v. New York Times Co., 211 F. Supp. 99 (D. Conn. 1962).
· cites it 4× “Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-237 (1958). 4 . It has been settled law in Connecticut for many years that whether a publication was libelous per se and whether it was published on an occasion of privilege, are questions of law for determination by the court; and that whether the privilege…”
LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 745 F. Supp. 812 (D. Conn. 1990).
· cites it 2× “The Connecticut libel statute, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-237, requires plaintiffs to prove either malice in fact or a refusal by the defendant to retract the libelous charge after a request in writing.”
Wolinsky v. Stand. Oil of Connecticut, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D. Conn. 2010).
· cites it 2× “See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-237 (“[U]nless the plaintiff proves either malice in fact or that the defendant [failed to retract the allegedly-libelous statement], the plaintiff shall recover nothing but such actual damage as the plaintiff may have specially alleged and proved.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.