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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 52 — Civil ActionsChapter 910 — Committees, Auditors and Referees

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-425 (2025)

Appointment of a committee in civil actions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1959–2000 8citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 8 opinions since 1959.

(a) In any civil action pending in the Superior Court in which an issue of fact has been closed to the court, the court may, upon motion of any party to the record, appoint a committee of one, two or three disinterested persons to hear the evidence and report the facts to the court. A committee shall not be appointed without the consent of all parties appearing, unless the court, after a hearing upon the motion for appointment of a committee, is of the opinion that the questions involved are such as clearly ought to be sent to a committee.

(b) If the action has been brought solely for the recovery of a money demand, the committee may: (1) Report simply that it finds the issue in favor of the plaintiff and that he recover a certain sum, or that it finds the issue in favor of the defendant, as the case may be, or (2) report specifically the facts relevant to the issue and established by the evidence. In all other actions, the committee shall report specifically the facts relevant to the issue and established by the evidence.

(c) Upon the acceptance of any report, judgment shall be rendered thereon according to law and the facts found.

(1949 Rev., S. 8168; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 125; P.A. 74-183, S. 105, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 494, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 161.)

History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for municipal court; P.A. 74-183 removed actions pending in circuit court from purview of section, reflecting reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed actions pending in court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. and Subdiv. indicators.

Auditors may require the parties to furnish each other copies of their respective claims. 37 C. 428. May grant adjournments on terms. 26 C. 311. May grant a rehearing before filing report. 31 C. 368, 370. Ought not to stay at house of either party during trial. 39 C. 268. The report cannot be set aside because against the weight of evidence. 13 C. 563; 23 C. 541; 24 C. 585; 26 C. 312, but see 14 C. 362. Report may be set aside for mistake of law. 2 D. 120. Report should state facts, not evidence of facts. 20 C. 588; 23 C. 34; 26 C. 267; 30 C. 279. Certainty necessary in report. 13 C. 467, 468; 36 C. 473. Report may be set aside for admission of improper evidence; K. 353; 1 R. 268; 14 C. 71; 98 C. 562; but not if it worked no injury. 37 C. 429. Further hearing in court after return of report. 13 C. 396; 31 C. 380. Acceptance of report conditionally; 11 C. 368; or in part only. 17 C. 34; 36 C. 424. Report, if accepted, is a part of the record. 4 D. 374. Court cannot infer additional facts from the facts found and reported by the committee. 42 C. 517. Court cannot recommit the report on the ground that the finding is against the evidence. 43 C. 451. Adverse report; when party loses his right to withdraw. 47 C. 436. Certain questions of fact undecided by committee; court may recommit report for further finding upon the evidence already received. 49 C. 351. Report should not be rejected where the items allowed are so stated that the court can render an intelligible and just judgment. 51 C. 131. Court cannot find facts upon mere evidence reported by committee. 52 C. 427. Reappointment of committee not necessary at each term of court. 53 C. 328. Conclusiveness of report as to facts; 76 C. 367; Id., 484; Id., 567; Id., 654; 85 C. 237; Id., 390; 87 C. 41; Id., 70; 98 C. 566; 103 C. 283; 109 C. 216; but court may correct account where all items are found; 86 C. 199; 87 C. 241; but failure of committee properly to weigh evidence no ground for recommittal. 82 C. 460; 87 C. 241. Misconduct of committee as ground to reject report; 67 C. 347; use of form of report furnished by counsel; 74 C. 189; employing party's surveyor. 67 C. 345. Report is sufficient if necessary facts are found; surplusage will be rejected. 68 C. 113; 87 C. 70. Including in report rulings of committee and facts upon which they are made. 70 C. 429; 76 C. 84; 85 C. 237; 87 C. 241; 88 C. 431. Report of majority as report of committee. 82 C. 464. Remonstrance, its use, and procedure upon it. 76 C. 567; 80 C. 248; 85 C. 237; 87 C. 42; Id., 241; 98 C. 566. Members of committee may testify as to their doings. 76 C. 567, see 75 C. 248. Use of stenographer's notes of evidence before them discountenanced. 76 C. 567; 87 C. 241. Referring report back for failure to properly consider testimony; 82 C. 460; for error in evidence as to value. 81 C. 63. Effect of referring matter to committee before issues closed. 74 C. 189. Committee cannot pass on demurrer to complaint. 92 C. 193. Remonstrance merely stating that conclusion is against evidence is demurrable. 93 C. 146. Presumption that action of committee is proper in absence of showing to the contrary. Id., 149. Remonstrance does not lie on ground that committee mistook the weight of the evidence; when report may be recommitted. 96 C. 501; 98 C. 565. Held that legislature intended references to attorney referees under Sec. 52-434(a)(4) to conform to procedure set forth in this section to require consent of all parties. 199 C. 496. Cited. Id., 518; 210 C. 705.

Cited. 11 CA 1.

Where complaint and counterclaim contain not numerous questions of law but numerous questions of fact, the questions involved ought to be sent to a committee. 5 CS 376. Cited. 16 CS 460.

The 8 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-425 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSeal Audio, Inc. v. Bozak, Inc., 508 A.2d 415 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 52-425 16×cited by 110 cases
Where it cites § 52-425
“most reasonable explanation for this omission is not that such attorney referees were to exercise judicial powers, which under subdivision (1), implementing article fifth, § 6, of our state constitution, may be delegated only to state constitutional referees, but that the…”
The case’s holding
An attorney referee acts as a factfinder rather than a judge because the referee lacks the power to render judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“an attorney referee is simply a factfinder whose determination of the facts is reviewable in accordance with well established procedures prior to the rendition of judgment by the court” · 5 citing courts
cites § 52-425 5×cited by 221 cases
Where it cites § 52-425
“*482 Subsequent to the filing of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the parties agreed, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-425, 1 to submit their case to a committee of the Superior Court, which would hear evidence, find facts and offer its legal recommendations to the court.”
The case’s holding
Courts presume that contractual language used by sophisticated commercial parties reflects their intent and interpret unambiguous commercial contracts as questions of law.
Later courts cite it for
“especially in the context of commercial contracts, we assume that definite contract language is the best indication of the result anticipated by the parties in their contractual arrangements.” · 6 citing courts
3
GREENDills v. Town of Enfield, 557 A.2d 517 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 52-425 2×cited by 164 cases
Where it cites § 52-425
“9 We concluded that, although attorney trial referees could act as fact-finders, in the same manner as committees appointed pursuant to General Statutes § 52-425; id., 504-505; they lacked the power to render judgments.”
The case’s holding
The doctrine of commercial impracticability does not discharge a contractual duty if the nonoccurrence of the event was a foreseeable contingency or a risk expressly assigned by the contract.
Later courts cite it for
“fact-finding contrary to the report of the referee.” · 24 citing courts
4
GREENMidland Ins. v. Universal Tech., Inc., 508 A.2d 427 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 52-425 4×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 52-425
“We concluded that attorney referees appointed pursuant to § 52-434 (a) (4) were limited to the role of factfinders, like committees appointed under General Statutes § 52-425, “to hear the evidence and report the facts to the court.”
5
GREENCecio Bros. v. Feldmann, 287 A.2d 374 (Conn. 1971).
cites § 52-425 2×cited by 117 cases
Where it cites § 52-425
“1 The record does not disclose a reference under General Statutes $ 52-434, following the appointment of the referee in 1966 as a committee pursuant to General Statutes § 52-425, an appointment which was never revoked.”
The case’s holding
Interest is recoverable for the detention of money after it becomes payable if the detention of the funds is wrongful under the circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“the real question in each case is whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances.” · 11 citing courts
6
GREENJanow v. Town of Ansonia, 525 A.2d 966 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
cites § 52-425 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 52-425
““Although General Statutes § 52-425, authorizing the appointment of committees ‘to hear the evidence and report the facts to the court,’ makes no reference to any additional duties, our rules of practice allow a committee to express his views upon questions of law.”
7
GREENNat'l Folding Box Co. v. City of New Haven, 153 A.2d 420 (Conn. 1959).
cites § 52-425 1×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 52-425
“The defendant now claims that the report of the *582 committee does not conform to the statutes and rules of procedure because the subordinate facts contained in it are not sufficient to support the ultimate facts found by the committee or to enable the trial court properly to…”
The case’s holding
The acceptance or rejection of a qualified expert's opinion is a matter for the trier of fact unless the opinion is so unreasonable as to be unacceptable to a rational mind.
Later courts cite it for
“the acceptance or rejection of an opinion of a qualified expert is a matter for the trier of fact unless the opinion is so unreasonable as to be unacceptable to a rational mind.” · 5 citing courts
8
NEUTRALHealth Plan. Assocs., Inc. v. Whitlock, 529 A.2d 1352 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
cites § 52-425 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 52-425
“, limiting the role of an attorney referee to that of a factfinder or committee governed by the provisions of § 52-425 and Practice Book §§ 428 and 434, is a sufficient response to this claim.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
195919792000

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1986. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.6Conn. App. Ct.2
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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