In any action brought by any person for personal injuries received while being transported to or from school in a vehicle owned, leased or hired by, or operated under contract with, any town, school district or other municipality, it shall be no defense that such transportation is in the line of governmental duty or is mandated by the state. In any such action brought against any town, school district or other municipality, the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be available and it shall be no defense that the transportation was being provided by an independent contractor.
(1949 Rev., S. 8298; P.A. 00-133.)
History: P.A. 00-133 barred the defense that the transportation is mandated by the state and the defense of sovereign immunity.
See Sec. 52-557c re standard of care applicable to school bus owners and operators.
Cited. 203 C. 317.
Cited. 42 CA 624.
Cited. 41 CS 402; 44 CS 527. Section eliminates defense of governmental immunity for personal injuries student received due to harassment on school bus. 52 CS 42; judgment affirmed, see 129 CA 682.
Subsec (a):
Subdiv. (2): City police officer's decision to drive her cruiser into the oncoming traffic lane that the plaintiff was traveling was a discretionary act that violated both city and state policies that imposed ministerial duties regarding roadblocks, the operation of police vehicles and pursuits. 337 C. 326.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
20
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1987–2025 · leading case:
Grady v. Town of Somers, 984 A.2d 684 (Conn. 2009).
Grady v. Town of Somers, 984 A.2d 684 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 2× “Thereafter, along with its answer, the defendant filed numerous special defenses, including that it: (1) “was engaged in and was performing a governmental function requiring the exercise of judgment and/or discretion and as such is immune from liability under the theory of…”
Conroy v. Caron, 275 F. Supp. 3d 328 (D. Conn. 2017).
· cites it 2× “And because plaintiffs’ negligent emotional distress claim survives summary judgment, plaintiffs’ corresponding municipal liability claims against the Town of Glastonbury pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557 and 7-465 (Counts Nine and Ten of the Complaint) survive as well.”
Smith v. Plan. & Zoning Bd. of Milford, 524 A.2d 1128 (Conn. 1987).
· cites it 2× “See General Statutes § 52-557. Other cases, however, indicate that “[t]he word ‘owner’ has no fixed meaning but must be interpreted in its context and according to the circumstances in which it is used.”
Trinity Christian Sch. v. Comm'n on Human Rights, 189 A.3d 79 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 2× “, General Statutes § 52-557b (a) (qualified medical personnel who voluntarily render first aid "shall not be liable" for ordinary negligence); General Statutes § 52-557 l (a) (persons who donate food and nonprofit organizations or corporations that distribute donated food "shall…”
Conway v. Town of Wilton, 680 A.2d 242 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 2× “Although that decision is not binding on this court and we take no position as to its propriety, we note that §§ 52-557j *674 and 52-557g serve different purposes: § 52-557g offers immunity as an incentive for private landowners to open up their land to free public use, while…”
Todd M. v. Richard L., 696 A.2d 1063 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995).
· cites it 5× “One of the statutes which falls under the exception is General Statutes § 52-557 entitled “Injury to children being transported to school,” which provides in pertinent part that “it shall be no defense that such transportation is in the line of governmental duty.”
Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Bridgeport, 174 A.3d 137 (Conn. 2017).
“In my view, it is significant that § 52-557 (b) (8) provides two circumstances under which liability can arise from a municipality's failure to conduct a mandated inspection.”
Letowt v. City of Norwalk, 579 A.2d 601 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989).
· cites it 2× “For example, General Statutes § 52-557, which pertains to liability for injuries to children being transported to school.”
Hughes v. City of Hartford, 96 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D. Conn. 2000).
· cites it 2× “Governmental Immunity Counts Six and Seven of plaintiffs second amended complaint assert the City’s liability for the actions of defendants Foley and Polletta under Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-557 and respondeat superior.”
Palosz v. Town of Greenwich, 194 A.3d 885 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
“The second, third, and fourth grounds, which contested the legal sufficiency of the complaint based upon §§ 52-557 and 10-222d, are not at issue on appeal.”
Violano v. Fernandez, 868 A.2d 69 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
“[15] In our view, count four of the complaint raised allegations of negligence that occurred after the eminent domain proceeding, namely, that city employees, including Fernandez, failed to take the appropriate steps to ensure the security of the property after the city took…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557(b)(5) — 1 case
Violano v. Fernandez, 868 A.2d 69 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
“[15] In our view, count four of the complaint raised allegations of negligence that occurred after the eminent domain proceeding, namely, that city employees, including Fernandez, failed to take the appropriate steps to ensure the security of the property after the city took…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557(g)(a) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557(n)(a)(2) — 1 case
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