Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-575 (2026)

Entry upon land to be made within fifteen years

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) No person shall make entry into any lands or tenements but within fifteen years next after his right or title to the same first descends or accrues or within fifteen years next after such person or persons have been ousted from possession of such land or tenements; and every person, not entering as aforesaid, and his heirs, shall be utterly disabled to make such entry afterwards; and no such entry shall be sufficient, unless within such fifteen-year period, any person or persons claiming ownership of such lands and tenements and the right of entry and possession thereof against any person or persons who are in actual possession of such lands or tenements, gives notice in writing to the person or persons in possession of the land or tenements of the intention of the person giving the notice to dispute the right of possession of the person or persons to whom such notice is given and to prevent the other party or parties from acquiring such right, and the notice being served and recorded as provided in sections 47-39 and 47-40 shall be deemed an interruption of the use and possession and shall prevent the acquiring of a right thereto by the continuance of the use and possession for any length of time thereafter, provided an action is commenced thereupon within one year next after the recording of such notice. The limitation herein prescribed shall not begin to run against the right of entry of any owner of a remainder or reversionary interest in real estate, which is in the adverse possession of another, until the expiration of the particular estate preceding such remainder or reversionary estate.

(b) If any person who has such right or title of entry into any lands or tenements is, at the time of the first descending or accruing of such right or title, a minor, non compos mentis or imprisoned, he and his heirs may, notwithstanding the expiration of such fifteen years, make such entry and serve and record such notice at any time within five years next after full age, coming of sound mind or release from prison, or his heirs shall, within five years after his death, make such entry and serve and record such notice, and take benefit of the same.

(1949 Rev., S. 8314; P.A. 96-249, S. 13, 14.)

History: P.A. 96-249 divided section into Subsecs. and in Subsec. (a) added provision re interruption of possession, effective June 6, 1996.

Section is substantially copied from the English statute, 21 Jac. 1, Ch. 6, Sec. 1, except that it reduces the time for reentry from 20 to 15 years; history of statute. 75 C. 533. Right of entry does not accrue to, nor statute begin to run against, the heirs of a femme covert, during the life of her husband, if tenant by the curtesy. 3 C. 193; 5 C. 235, 236; 29 C. 136, see 1 R. 547. In barring rights of entry, actions of ejectment are barred; 2 R. 512; and also bills to redeem a mortgage. 2 R. 512. If one of the several tenants who are disseized is within the statutory exceptions, it does not avail the others. 4 D. 273; Id., 466; 5 D. 218. Disabilities accruing after right of entry accrues are not within the exceptions. 2 C. 27. The 5 years, allowed in case of disability, may sometimes be part of the 15 years. 3 C. 244. Statute runs against private right of owner of land within an alleged highway. 50 C. 213, 214. A statute of limitation does not run against the state. 56 C. 517. Statute begins to run when owner is in fact disseized whether under a disability or not, but additional time is allowed after removal of disability. 74 C. 111, 112. When right to redeem a mortgage barred. 76 C. 146; Id., 227; 81 C. 442; 84 C. 56. Applied by analogy to right of administrator to sell land under order of court. 7 Wheat. 59. Section will ordinarily be followed, by analogy, in foreclosure actions. 131 C. 39. Cited. 112 C. 368; 132 C. 622; 182 C. 272; 214 C. 464.

Adverse possession. Rules strictly construed. 29 C. 398. Gives fee simple after 15 years, unless one of exceptions of statute apply. 5 C. 298; 14 C. 290; 19 C. 475. Constructive possession will not satisfy requirement of actual possession; 8 C. 443; as where it is by license; 5 D. 187; 38 C. 520; or under a contract. 1 R. 245. As between husband and wife; 76 C. 223; mortgagor and mortgagee; 47 C. 496; 76 C. 146; Id., 223; principal and agent; 77 C. 578; life tenant and reversioner; 70 C. 349; 76 C. 595; one entitled to dower, to whom it is not assigned, and heirs. 90 C. 133. Disability from infancy. 74 C. 111. Does not run against the state; 56 C. 517; but that state has claim to land of no consequence between individual claimants; 95 C. 619; nor against assessment lien; 79 C. 38; nor against public, but public may abandon right; 73 C. 581; and the same rule applies to railroad right-of-way. 86 C. 275. Necessary elements. 74 C. 107; 84 C. 569; 101 C. 412; 104 C. 605; 105 C. 355; 119 C. 287; 137 C. 40; 142 C. 398; 148 C. 158. If title of another is recognized, possession no longer adverse. 81 C. 547. Adverse user is use as one's own. 83 C. 627. Possession under belief that one is owner may suffice. 81 C. 133. No necessity of claiming title. 74 C. 111; 84 C. 569; 108 C. 5. Presumption of knowledge by owner from possession. 74 C. 107; 82 C. 437. Mere exclusive possession not enough. 78 C. 128; 75 C. 522; 82 C. 653. When possession under oral gift is sufficient. 13 C. 235; 21 C. 416; 39 C. 96; 103 C. 354. Effect of deed subsequently given, conveying less than fee. 81 C. 539; 83 C. 360. Possession under void deed; 3 C. 246; 35 C. 437; 39 C. 97; 90 C. 241; effect of terms of deed. 81 C. 546. Possession under oral exchange. 82 C. 437. As applied to cornice jutting over land; 75 C. 663; 78 C. 405; to division wall. 79 C. 457. Occupation and use of land as evidence; 74 C. 107; 77 C. 28; 85 C. 159; erection of building, fence or wall; 69 C. 15; 71 C. 254; 86 C. 545; 88 C. 688; 109 C. 452; payment of taxes; 80 C. 338; color of title; ancient deeds. 71 C. 555; 88 C. 521. Accepting lease as rebutting claim of adverse user. 79 C. 493. Tacking together rights of successive disseizors; 3 D. 259; 31 C. 531; but they must be in same chain of title. 86 C. 699. A casual or stealthy reentry will not avail owner. 32 C. 498. Is ordinarily a question of fact. 83 C. 500; 89 C. 359; 90 C. 133; 99 C. 67; 105 C. 725, but see 95 C. 619. By an heir, as against right of administrator to sell land under order of court. 7 Wheat. 59. Disclaimer. 92 C. 546. By one cotenant against others; of island little visited. 95 C. 619. Possession under subsisting contract for purchase of title, when adverse. 106 C. 301. Adverse possession of fee must be against everyone; of easement, only against general public. 105 C. 728. Church society maintaining horse sheds on disputed land held to have acquired it by adverse possession. 103 C. 336. Applies only to the acquiring of title to land by adverse possession. 136 C. 277. Claim of right and an intent by possessor to use property as his own are among essential elements. 137 C. 40. Entry must be made within 15 years and an action must be commenced and prosecuted to effect within 1 year after entry. Id., 205. Plaintiff alleged title by adverse possession; defendant's demurrer stated cause of action barred by statute; demurrer without merit because plaintiff alleged he remained in possession to date of complaint. 138 C. 102. Conclusion of court that title by adverse possession had not been proved, sustained. Id., 690. Cited. 139 C. 220; 141 C. 198. Exclusive possession not met if dominion over property is shared with other users. 154 C. 194. Where deeds of claimant and his predecessors in title expressly excepted strip of land claimed and neither his grantor nor predecessor grantor had orally conveyed excepted strip, connection between successive adverse claimants necessary to successful acquisition of title by tacking successive adverse possessions held lacking. 155 C. 327. Sporadic trespasses should not be construed as ousting the owner-neighbor of possession, especially where there was no open and notorious possession. 158 C. 510. Adverse possession against cotenants and daughters; may be based on fraudulently obtained, void probate decree; nature of possession required, role of “color of title”; section discussed. 171 C. 149. Two permits granted to defendant authorizing construction of a dock did not vest title in defendant or defendant's predecessors or allow defendant to bypass the requirements of adverse possession in section, nor did they render futile defendant's ability to assert a claim of right to adversely possess plaintiff's littoral area. 300 C. 297.

Prescription. Statute applies by analogy; nature of prescriptive right. 2 C. 607; 75 C. 522. Cannot give right to maintain nuisance. 69 C. 668; 72 C. 531; 83 C. 417. Community cannot acquire, to right-of-way. 78 C. 130. By city for sewer. 81 C. 137. Implies grant. 78 C. 132. User under deed cannot be basis for; 72 C. 188; but user may originate in contract or equitable right. 8 C. 137; 90 C. 241. Whether user is under license or claim of right question of fact. 78 C. 156; 89 C. 359; 96 C. 680; 105 C. 725. Must be reasonable. 83 C. 424. Elements. Id., 624; 90 C. 241; 105 C. 725. Imputing knowledge to owner. 81 C. 137; 87 C. 31. Building or eaves jutting over land. 75 C. 664; 78 C. 401; 87 C. 31; 89 C. 359. Diversion of water. 69 C. 668; 83 C. 611. Right to discharge surface water, not lost by 10 years' use of intercepting ditch. 83 C. 59. Right to acquire lateral support by, quaere. 82 C. 126. Cannot be acquired as to secret tunnel beneath way. 87 C. 31. Fire escapes jutting over line. 92 C. 546. Underground sewer. 96 C. 676. Loss of easement by prescription; elements. 104 C. 140, 596. Abutter on highway cannot acquire prescriptive right to maintain encroachments therein. Id., 619. Right-of-way cannot be acquired over route of public highway unless discontinued or abandoned. Id., 391. Adverse user need be only exclusive as against public; change of user from horse-drawn to motor driven vehicles does not break period. 105 C. 728. User must be sufficiently open to put owner on notice. 108 C. 24. Lessee in possession cannot prescribe in himself; unless lease is effective to cover right-of-way, lessee's adverse use of the way cannot enure to lessor's benefit. 121 C. 638.

Cited. 3 CA 602; 6 CA 187; 10 CA 669; 13 CA 518; 15 CA 458; 35 CA 398. When not claimed under color of title, adverse possession is limited to the area of land actually possessed; it can only extend as far as the claimant has actually occupied and possessed the land in dispute. 121 CA 748.

Cited. 15 CS 467.

Driveway openly used in common by adjoining property owners for more than 15 years resulted in prescriptive right of plaintiff to such use and defendants were ordered to remove a newly installed fence. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 360.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 49 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1964–2026 · leading case: O'Connor v. Larocque, 31 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2011).
O'Connor v. Larocque, 31 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2011). · cites it 16× “14 General Statutes § 52-575 (a) 15 establishes a fifteen year statute *579 of repose on an action to oust an adverse possessor.”
Vaccaro v. Shell Beach Condo., Inc., 148 A.3d 1123 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 10× “20 Arguing that the appropriate limitations period therefore must be grounded in property law and asserting that his claims are similar to adverse possession claims, the plaintiff contends that the only potentially applicable limitations period is the fifteen year period…”
Brander v. Stoddard, 164 A.3d 889 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 8× “PARTIES' POSITIONS Plaintiff's Position The plaintiff argues that he acquired the entire disputed property through adverse possession pursuant to General Statutes § 52-575. In support of this argument, the plaintiff alleges that from 1984 to the present he has used the disputed…”
Caminis v. Troy, 12 A.3d 984 (Conn. 2011). · cites it 12× “We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on the alternative ground that the defendants successfully proved at trial that they adversely possessed the contested littoral area, and the plaintiffs’ claims are barred because they were brought outside the fifteen year…”
Matto v. Dan Beard, Inc., 546 A.2d 854 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988). · cites it 11× “The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred (1) in holding that the defendants established adverse possession of the disputed land, (2) in holding that the plaintiff’s action was barred by General Statutes § 52-575, (3) in leaving title to portions of the subject property…”
Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen's Ass'n, 797 A.2d 18 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 4× “2d 137 (2001); see also General Statutes § 52-575 (a). 3 The key issue here is whether the defendant’s use of the property after Galbraith’s death in 1967 was under a claim of right.”
Durkin Vill. Plainville, LLC v. Cunningham, 905 A.2d 1256 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 4× “See General Statutes § 52-575 (establishing fifteen year period to demonstrate adverse possession).”
New York Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church v. Fisher, 438 A.2d 62 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 4× “Burrows v. Holt, 20 Conn. 459, 465 (1850); Camp v.”
Ruick v. Twarkins, 367 A.2d 1380 (Conn. 1976). · cites it 4× “General Statutes § 52-575. This they failed to do.”
Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., 960 A.2d 1083 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 4× “[C]lear and convincing proof denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution.”
Lacasse v. Burns, 572 A.2d 357 (Conn. 1990). · cites it 2× “) Compare General Statutes §§ 52-575 (“commenced” and “bring”), 52-575a (“brought” and “commenced”), 52-576 (“brought”), 52-577 (“brought”), 52-577a (“brought”), 52-577b (“commenced”), 52-577c (“brought”), 52-577d (“brought”), 52-578 (“brought”), 52-579 (“brought”), 52-581…”
Boccanfuso v. Conner, 873 A.2d 208 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 2× “Second, insofar as the defendants did not actually use the term “adverse possession” or cite the statutory provision applicable to an adverse possession claim; see General Statutes § 52-575; it cannot be said that their factual allegations unequivocally contemplated that cause…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-575(a) — 1 case
O'Connor v. Larocque, 31 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2011). “14 General Statutes § 52-575 (a) 15 establishes a fifteen year statute *579 of repose on an action to oust an adverse possessor.”
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