(a) A person is guilty of larceny in the third degree when such person commits larceny, as defined in section
53a-119, and: (1) The value of the property or service exceeds two thousand dollars; (2) the property consists of a public record, writing or instrument kept, held or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; or (3) the property consists of a sample, culture, microorganism, specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any other article, material, device or substance which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects or records a secret scientific or technical process, invention or formula or any phase or part thereof. A process, invention or formula is “secret” when it is not, and is not intended to be, available to anyone other than the owner thereof or selected persons having access thereto for limited purposes with his consent, and when it accords or may accord the owner an advantage over competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof.
(b) Larceny in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 126; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 27; P.A. 73-639, S. 9; P.A. 81-248, S. 3; P.A. 82-271, S. 3; P.A. 88-170; P.A. 92-260, S. 52; P.A. 00-103, S. 3; P.A. 09-138, S. 3; P.A. 22-115, S. 10.)
History: 1971 act deleted former Subsec. (a)(5) which classified obtaining property or service, regardless of its nature or value, by extortion as third degree larceny; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subsec. (a)(4) which classified taking property from the person of another, regardless of its nature or value, as third degree larceny; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 82-271 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by increasing from $50 to $1,000 the value of the property or service obtained and amended Subsec. (c) by changing the classification from a class B misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 88-170 amended Subsec. (a) by adding property consisting of a motor vehicle, the value of which is $5,000 or less and inserted new Subsec. (b) stating that in any prosecution under Subsec. (a)(1), evidence of forcible entry, forcible removal of ignition or alternation, mutilation or removal of vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence of larcenous intent, relettering former Subsec. (b) as (c); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining “motor vehicle” and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent; P.A. 09-138 amended Subsec. (a) to increase in Subdiv. (1) the maximum value of a motor vehicle obtained from $5,000 to $10,000 and increase in Subdiv. (2) the value of the property or service obtained from in excess of $1,000 to in excess of $2,000; P.A. 22-115 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change, delete Subdiv. (1) re property consisting of a motor vehicle and redesignate existing Subdivs. (2) and (3) as Subdivs. (1) and (2), deleted former Subsec. (b) defining “motor vehicle” and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b).
See Sec. 53a-212 re stealing a firearm.
Cited. 184 C. 95; Id., 258; Id., 434; 185 C. 260; 187 C. 292; Id., 444; 189 C. 364; 190 C. 715; 191 C. 180; 194 C. 198; Id., 233; Id., 623; 197 C. 247; 200 C. 586; 207 C. 109; 213 C. 233; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 241 C. 439.
Cited. 3 CA 503; 7 CA 326; 8 CA 13; Id., 342; Id., 478; Id., 667; 9 CA 141; 10 CA 258; 12 CA 196; 14 CA 159; Id., 272; 18 CA 368; 19 CA 48; 20 CA 810; 23 CA 201; 25 CA 298; 29 CA 843; 32 CA 476; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; Id., 368; 38 CA 643; 41 CA 751; 46 CA 691.
Cited. 36 CS 578; Id., 583; Id., 603; 37 CS 678; Id., 796.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 169 C. 161; 176 C. 239; 178 C. 287; 179 C. 576; 182 C. 397; 186 C. 222; 189 C. 461; 190 C. 104; 195 C. 567; 199 C. 88; 214 C. 132; 221 C. 685; 230 C. 351; 232 C. 740; 235 C. 502; 239 C. 235; 241 C. 702.
Cited. 6 CA 697; 10 CA 486; 12 CA 1; 14 CA 256; 15 CA 122; 19 CA 521; 21 CA 431; 24 CA 697; 26 CA 279; 28 CA 306; 33 CA 603; 37 CA 219; Id., 482; 39 CA 579; 41 CA 695; 43 CA 613; 46 CA 269. Subdiv. (2): Defendant's conviction of and sentencing under this Subdiv. and Secs. 53a-48(a) and 53a-123(a)(3) constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and violate defendant's right against double jeopardy. 176 CA 687.
Cited. 33 CS 669; Id., 706; 34 CS 603; Id., 656.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
217
cases (
12 in the last 5 years), 1974–2026 · leading case:
State v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288 (Conn. 1995).
State v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288 (Conn. 1995).
· cites it 9× “General Statutes § 53a-124 (a) (2). 14 The state consistently has argued that the applicable provisions of the penal code permitted the jury to aggregate the amounts of the two checks and to return a guilty verdict against the defendant for attempted larceny in the third degree.”
State v. Chemlen, 140 A.3d 347 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 10× “The defendant, Keith Chemlen, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of forgery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-139 (a)(3), and larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124 (a)(2).”
State v. Adams, 662 A.2d 1327 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
· cites it 19× “” General Statutes § 53a-124 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of larceny in the third degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and .”
State v. Browne, 854 A.2d 13 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
· cites it 7× “In one information, the defendant was charged with violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-124 (a) (2) and 53a-119, larceny in the third degree, and, in another, with violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2), 53a-124 (a) (2) and 53a-119, attempt to commit larceny in the…”
Ajadi v. Comm'r of Corr., 911 A.2d 712 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 4× “Thereafter, on November 5,1997, in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, geographical area number twenty, located in the city of Norwalk, the petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine 5 to one count of larceny in the third degree in violation of General…”
State v. Megos, 170 A.3d 120 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 6× “On August 4, 2015, as a result of the incident with Foster, the defendant was arrested for larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124, 3 and criminal impersonation in violation of General Statutes § 53a-130.”
State v. Kitt, 513 A.2d 731 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
· cites it 10× “The defendant has appealed from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of one count each of burglary in the third degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103; conspiracy to commit burglary in the third degree, in violation of General Statutes *480 § 53a-48;…”
State v. Caballero, 160 A.3d 1103 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 11× “As in Beaulieu , however, the prosecutor in this case gave the defendant sufficient notice by means of his oral statement on the record at the March 19, 2014 pretrial hearing.”
State v. Spillane, 770 A.2d 898 (Conn. 2001).
· cites it 5× “Spillane, was convicted, following a jury trial, of the crime of larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124 (a). 1 The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming “that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion for acquittal at the end…”
State v. Spillane, 737 A.2d 479 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
· cites it 13× “The first count charged that on April 27, 1996, on Farmington Avenue in Hartford, the defendant committed the offense of larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124 1 “when [he], with intent to appropriate a motor vehicle to himself, wrongfully…”
State v. Crosby, 190 A.3d 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 5× “2 On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss and his motion to suppress, and improperly concluded that (1) the state and the Massachusetts Department of Correction did not violate his rights under article IV, § 2, clause 2, of…”
Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 523 A.2d 1356 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
· cites it 4× “The charge falls within the legislative definition of larceny by theft of services in the third degree, in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-124 (a) (1) and 53a-119 (7) (4), 4 a class D felony punishable by one to five years imprisonment.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-124(a) — 2 cases
State v. Caballero, 160 A.3d 1103 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
“As in Beaulieu , however, the prosecutor in this case gave the defendant sufficient notice by means of his oral statement on the record at the March 19, 2014 pretrial hearing.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-124(a)(1) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-124(a)(3) — 1 case
State v. Caballero, 160 A.3d 1103 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
“As in Beaulieu , however, the prosecutor in this case gave the defendant sufficient notice by means of his oral statement on the record at the March 19, 2014 pretrial hearing.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.