Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-31 (2026)

Calculation of periods of probation and conditional discharge. Compliance with conditions during interrupted period

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) A period of probation or conditional discharge commences on the day it is imposed, unless the defendant is imprisoned, in which case it commences on the day the defendant is released from such imprisonment. Multiple periods, whether imposed at the same or different times, shall run concurrently.

(b) The issuance of a warrant or notice to appear, or an arraignment following an arrest without a warrant, for violation pursuant to section 53a-32 shall interrupt the period of the sentence until a final determination as to the violation has been made by the court. In the absence of a warrant, a notice to appear or an arrest for violation pursuant to section 53a-32, if the defendant has failed to comply with any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, such failure shall not relieve the Court Support Services Division from the responsibility of supervising the defendant.

(c) Notwithstanding the issuance of a warrant or notice to appear or an arrest without a warrant for violation pursuant to section 53a-32, the defendant shall continue to comply with the conditions with which the defendant was previously required to comply pursuant to section 53a-30. The Court Support Services Division shall make reasonable efforts to inform the defendant of the defendant's obligation to continue to comply with such conditions and to provide the defendant with a copy of such conditions.

(d) In any case where a person who is under a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is also under an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, or a sentence authorized under section 18-65a or 18-73, imposed for some other offense by a court of this state, the service of the sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge unless the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is revoked prior to parole or satisfaction of the sentence of imprisonment.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 31; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 11; P.A. 87-282, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 13; P.A. 97-151, S. 1; P.A. 02-132, S. 32; P.A. 03-278, S. 103; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 36; P.A. 08-102, S. 5, 6; P.A. 11-155, S. 1; P.A. 15-211, S. 1.)

History: 1971 act substituted sentences “authorized under section 18-73 or 18-75” for “reformatory” sentences in Subsec. (c); P.A. 87-282 amended Subsec. (c) to delete obsolete reference to repealed Sec. 18-75; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add reference to Sec. 18-65a; P.A. 97-151 amended Subsec. (b) to authorize the court to impose any of the conditions of release set forth in Sec. 54-64a during the interrupted period and provide that, in the absence of a warrant or notice to appear for violation, the failure of the defendant to comply with any conditions of probation or conditional discharge does not relieve the Office of Adult Probation from the responsibility of supervising the defendant; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “Office of Adult Probation” with “Court Support Services Division”; P.A. 03-278 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective July 9, 2003; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that during interrupted period “the court may impose any of the conditions of release set forth in section 54-64a” with provision that during such period “unless otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall comply with any conditions imposed or with any conditions he or she was previously required to comply pursuant to section 53a-30”, effective January 25, 2008; P.A. 08-102 amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that during interrupted period “unless otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall comply with any conditions imposed or with any conditions he or she was previously required to comply pursuant to section 53a-30” with provision that during such period “the court may impose any of the conditions of release set forth in section 54-64a”, thereby reversing the change made by Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, effective May 27, 2008, and further amended Subsec. (b) to delete “During the interrupted period, the court may impose any of the conditions of release set forth in section 54-64a”, added new Subsec. (c) to require defendant to continue to comply with previously imposed conditions notwithstanding issuance of a warrant or notice to appear for a violation and require Court Support Services Division to make reasonable efforts to inform defendant of defendant's obligation to continue to comply with such conditions and provide defendant with copy of such conditions, and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d), effective October 1, 2008; P.A. 11-155 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that “an arraignment following an arrest without a warrant” for violation pursuant to Sec. 53a-32 interrupts period of sentence and make conforming changes and amended Subsec. (c) to add reference to an arrest without a warrant, effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (a) to replace provision re sentence of imprisonment with execution suspended with provision re case in which defendant is imprisoned.

Cited. 170 C. 128; 222 C. 299.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1. Term “release” as used in section includes physical release from custody whether by mistake or not and probation commences by operation of law on date of actual release from imprisonment. 36 CA 440.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 24 CA 575; 39 CA 722. Although probation may continue during a period of incarceration, it does not commence pursuant to section unless defendant is released from imprisonment. 60 CA 515.

Subsec. (b):

Arrest warrant issued “pursuant to section 53a-32” for violation of probation interrupts probation sentence simply by its issuance and exceeding the 120 day limit under Sec. 53a-32(c) for resolution of such violation charge, even without a finding of good cause, does not impact such interruption. 326 C. 731.

Cited. 9 CA 59; 37 CA 72; 39 CA 722. Defendant is not excused from complying with conditions of probation simply because a probation officer informs him that he is in violation of that probation. 75 CA 643. It is the issuance of the warrant that tolls the period of probation and whether the period is tolled is not dependent on the outcome of the violation of probation proceedings. 114 CA 295.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1986–2025 · leading case: State v. Kelley, 167 A.3d 961 (Conn. 2017).
State v. Kelley, 167 A.3d 961 (Conn. 2017). · cites it 29× “We conclude that the defendant's probation sentence had not expired at the time the trial court decided the violation charge because, pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-31 (b), 1 the running of his sentence had been interrupted while the violation charge was pending.”
State v. Gibson, 969 A.2d 784 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). · cites it 14× “Under General Statutes § 53a-31 (b), "[i]ssuance of a warrant or notice to appear for violation pursuant to section 53a-32 shall interrupt the period of the sentence as of the date of such issuance until a final determination as to the violation has been made by the court.”
State v. Brown, 34 A.3d 1007 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 12× “In this vein, the state urges us to consider that, in the context of probation, General Statutes § 53a-31 (a) provides that "[m]ultiple periods [of probation], whether imposed at the same or different times, shall run concurrently.”
State v. McFarland, 651 A.2d 285 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). · cites it 13× “1 The defendant argues that his probation could not have commenced at the time he allegedly violated probation because he had not yet been “released” from imprisonment as required by General Statutes § 53a-31. 2 Certain facts are relevant to this appeal.”
State v. Outlaw, 760 A.2d 140 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000). · cites it 12× “7 In support of his position, the defendant cites the portion of General Statutes § 53a-31 (a) that provides: “A period of probation or conditional discharge commences on the day it is imposed, except that, where it is preceded by a sentence of imprisonment with execution…”
State v. Johnson, 817 A.2d 708 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 5× “” Therefore, the defendant argues, once Pleckaitis informed him that he was in violation, he had no obligation to adhere to the curfew by application of General Statutes § 53a-31 (b). We find no merit to the argument that a defendant is excused from complying with conditions of…”
State v. Moore, 855 A.2d 1006 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 7× “for the burglary conviction in violation of General Statutes § 53a-31 (a) by ordering that his probation commence after his release from prison on an unrelated drug conviction.”
State v. Widlak, 812 A.2d 134 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 4× “” The defendant posits that General Statutes § 53a-31 (b) 3 stops for all purposes, not merely for the purpose of the statute of limitations, the running of his probationary term.”
State v. Strickland, 667 A.2d 1282 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). · cites it 7× “General Statutes § 53a-31 (a) provides that a period of probation commences on the day it is imposed, except that, where it is preceded by a sentence of imprisonment with execution suspended after a period of imprisonment set by the court, it commences on the day the defendant…”
State v. Galberth, 170 A.3d 132 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 13× “Pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-31 (a), "[a] period of probation or conditional discharge commences on the day it is imposed, unless the defendant is imprisoned, in which case it commences on the day the defendant is released from such imprisonment." 5 (Emphasis added.) As…”
State v. Klinger, 718 A.2d 446 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). · cites it 6× “He argues that the court’s control over him as a probationer continues because the period of probation is tolled once a warrant is issued for the arrest of a probationer under General Statutes § 53a-31 (b). 4 On the other hand, the state argues that the defendant’s claims…”
Coleman v. Comm'r of Corr., 231 Conn. App. 223 (Conn. App. Ct. 2025). · cites it 44× “The petitioner argued that, because he had remained continuously in either state or federal custody since he was arrested on Sep- tember 9, 2014, his period of conditional discharge aris- ing from the New Haven conviction never commenced within the meaning of General Statutes §…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-31(a) — 1 case
Alexander Rose v. State of Rhode Island, 92 A.3d 903 (R.I. 2014).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-31(b) — 1 case
State v. Gibson, 969 A.2d 784 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). “Under General Statutes § 53a-31 (b), "[i]ssuance of a warrant or notice to appear for violation pursuant to section 53a-32 shall interrupt the period of the sentence as of the date of such issuance until a final determination as to the violation has been made by the court.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.