The court or sentencing judge may at any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, terminate a sentence of probation or conditional discharge before the completion thereof, except a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section
53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000, section
53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section
53-21 or section
53a-70,
53a-70a,
53a-71,
53a-72a or
53a-72b.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 33; P.A. 92-260, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 11; P.A. 01-84, S. 17, 26; P.A. 19-189, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 added “a sentence of”; P.A. 95-142 specified that a sentence of probation or conditional discharge may be terminated “before the completion thereof” and precluded termination of a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of Sec. 53-21(2) or Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000,” and included a violation of “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 19-189 replaced “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.
Cited. 165 C. 73; 170 C. 128; 219 C. 752; 222 C. 299; 225 C. 46.
Cited. 9 CA 686; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1; 36 CA 440.
Notes of Decisions
Liistro v. Robinson, 365 A.2d 109 (Conn. 1976).
· cites it 4× “" General Statutes §§ 53a-33, 54-129. *134 The only real distinction in status between a probationer and parolee alluded to by the majority is that different persons administrate the systems under which their liberty is determined.”
State v. Tucker, 595 A.2d 832 (Conn. 1991).
· cites it 5× “” Notwithstanding the fact that the court did not explicitly refer to this provision at the dismissal hearing, we presume that the court was aware of it, as well as its statutory authority under General Statutes § 53a-33, 9 to terminate the defendant’s probation “at any time”…”
State v. Perez, 438 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 1981).
· cites it 2× “1 General Statutes §53a-33 provides: “insanity as defense.”
State v. Gradzik, 475 A.2d 269 (Conn. 1984).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 53a-33. Much of the discussion on the record regarding plea negotiations took place after defense counsel claimed that the judge’s supplemental jury instructions; part IV, supra; were made in bad faith because the judge had allegedly participated in plea…”
State v. Roberson, 327 A.2d 556 (Conn. 1973).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 53a-33. This was also true before the adoption of the Penal Code which became effective October 1, 1971.”
State v. Thompson, 991 A.2d 661 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 4× “*290 On January 2, 2008, the defendant filed an amended motion to terminate probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-33. 2 On January 14, 2008, following a hearing, the court denied the defendant’s motion and found him in violation of probation.”
State v. Kevalis (Conn. 2014).
“2d 832 (1991) (applying General Stat- utes § 53a-33, which provides for termination of postconviction probation for good cause prior to completion, to accelerated rehabilitation case).”
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