When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and to the undischarged term or terms in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence. The court shall state whether the respective maxima and minima shall run concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other, and shall state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed. When a person is sentenced for two or more counts each constituting a separate offense, the court may order that the term of imprisonment for the second and subsequent counts be for a fixed number of years each. The court in such cases shall not set any minimum term of imprisonment except under the first count, and the fixed number of years imposed for the second and subsequent counts shall be added to the maximum term imposed by the court on the first count.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 37; P.A. 73-639, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 73-639 added provisions clarifying court's sentencing powers in cases where person is to be sentenced for two or more counts each of which constitutes a separate offense.
Cited. 178 C. 427. Statute provides for three sentencing options where multiple sentences are imposed at same time. Id., 634. Section authorizes multiple sentences with consecutive minimum and maximum terms. 179 C. 381. Cited. 184 C. 366; Id., 434; 185 C. 473; 190 C. 327; 192 C. 471; 197 C. 413; Id., 485; 206 C. 40; Id., 685; 207 C. 270; Id., 276; 208 C. 420; 217 C. 568. Does not impose limits on trial court's common law inherent sentencing power to stay execution of a criminal sentence. 225 C. 46. Cited. 228 C. 384. Court was not prohibited from imposing a term of incarceration consecutive to a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release. 249 C. 645.
Cited. 7 CA 131; Id., 367; 9 CA 365; Id., 686; 17 CA 307; 20 CA 572; 26 CA 10; 34 CA 503. Application of section is limited to “offenses” and since criminal contempt is not a criminal offense, it is not a matter within section's scope; however, legislature did not intend to change existing common law in enacting section and therefore trial court had inherent authority to impose criminal sentence that ran concurrently with previous sentence for criminal contempt. 59 CA 145.
Cited. 30 CS 71; 36 CS 168.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
50
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1972–2024 · leading case:
State v. Brown, 192 Conn. App. 147 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
State v. Brown, 192 Conn. App. 147 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
· cites it 14× “1 General Statutes § 53a-37 provides: ‘‘When multiple sentences of impris- onment are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional…”
Copeland v. Warden, State Prison, 621 A.2d 1311 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 9× “The petitioner, adopting the position of the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Court, argues that even if the trial court historically had the power to impose a criminal sentence to begin at the conclusion of his psychiatric commitment, the trial court’s inherent sentencing…”
Green v. Warden, 425 A.2d 128 (Conn. 1979).
· cites it 14× “In his petition to the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus, the plaintiff claimed that the sentence imposed was in violation of General Statutes § 53a-37, 1 and that, in imposing consecutive sentences under that statute, the court was required to set a minimum and maximum…”
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
· cites it 2× “, Connecticut (Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-37 (2005)); Idaho ( Idaho Code § 18-308 (Lexis 2004)); Nebraska (Neb.”
State v. Williamson, 539 A.2d 561 (Conn. 1988).
· cites it 5× “General Statutes § 53a-37; Redway, v. Walker, supra, 306 .”
Copeland v. Warden, 596 A.2d 477 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
· cites it 8× “The petitioner first claims that the habeas court improperly refused to find that imposition of the consecutive criminal sentence subsequent to his psychiatric commitment was illegal.”
State v. Wilcox, 758 A.2d 824 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 5× “6 On appeal, 7 the defendant claims that: (1) the state improperly suppressed exculpatory evidence; (2) the *444 trial court improperly imposed a fixed term of incarceration for the kidnapping conviction in violation of General Statutes § 53a-37; 8 and (3) the state failed to…”
State v. Leak, 998 A.2d 1182 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 7× “) See footnote 1 of this opinion. This language does not explicitly indicate whether the “total period of confinement” may include consecutive confinements for multiple offenses.”
State v. Banks, 763 A.2d 1046 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
· cites it 13× “On September 19, 1997, pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22 and General Statutes § 53a-37, the state filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, seeking clarification on whether the *148 sentences were to be concurrent or consecutive.”
State v. Koslik, 977 A.2d 275 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 4× “Although these cases indicate a somewhat circular analysis, namely, that the merits of a claim raised in a motion to correct must be addressed before jurisdiction is found, the analysis was born out of the common law and thus arose to create only a narrow exception pursuant to…”
State v. Brown, 34 A.3d 1007 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 8× “) Furthermore, General Statutes § 53a-37 provides: "When multiple sentences of imprisonment *1022 are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced…”
State v. Gordon, 497 A.2d 965 (Conn. 1985).
· cites it 4× “He contends first that the language of General Statutes § 53a-37 authorizes a sentencing court to add a subsequent definite sentence to the maximum term imposed on a prior count.”
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