Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-39 (2026)

Reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant by sentencing court or judge. Statement by victim

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, at any time during an executed period of incarceration, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.

(b) On and after October 1, 2021, at any time during the period of a sentence in which a defendant has been sentenced prior to, on or after October 1, 2021, to an executed period of incarceration of more than seven years as a result of a plea agreement, including an agreement in which there is an agreed upon range of sentence, upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.

(c) If, after a hearing pursuant to this section, the sentencing court or judge denies or grants in full a motion to reduce a defendant's sentence or discharge the defendant, the defendant may not file a subsequent motion for relief under this section until five years have elapsed from the date of the most recent decision denying such defendant relief pursuant to this section. If, after a hearing pursuant to this section, the sentencing court or judge grants in part a motion to reduce a defendant's sentence, the defendant may not file a subsequent motion for relief under this section until three years from the date of the most recent decision granting such defendant relief pursuant to this section.

(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(e) At the time the defendant files a motion with the court, the defendant shall provide the state with a copy of the motion and any materials and documentation filed with the court in support of such motion.

(f) At a hearing held by the sentencing court or judge under this section, such court or judge shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the court or judge for the purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence of the defendant should be reduced, the defendant should be discharged or the defendant should be discharged on probation or conditional discharge pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the court or judge and the court or judge shall make such statement a part of the record at the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, “victim” means the victim, the legal representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 39; P.A. 82-428, S. 1, 4; P.A. 84-505, S. 3, 6; P.A. 85-354, S. 1, 3; P.A. 87-538, S. 1, 3, 5; P.A. 90-261, S. 7, 19; P.A. 94-119; P.A. 95-175, S. 3; P.A. 10-36, S. 20; P.A. 21-102, S. 25; P.A. 21-104, S. 63; P.A. 22-36, S. 1; P.A. 23-47, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 82-428 specified applicability to definite sentences “of three years or less”; P.A. 84-505 authorized the sentencing court or judge to order certain defendants discharged on intensive probation, effective June 13, 1984, to July 1, 1987; P.A. 85-354 added provisions to require applications for the intensive probation program to be referred to the office of adult probation for assessment and recommendations, to specify that the period of intensive probation shall not exceed the unexpired portion of the sentence, to authorize the court or judge to place on regular probation a defendant who successfully completes intensive probation, to specify the period of such regular probation, and to require a defendant discharged on intensive probation to comply with the probation conditions ordered by the court or required by the office of adult probation; P.A. 87-538 prohibited the discharge on intensive probation of a defendant sentenced for a class A felony, authorized the placement in the intensive probation program of a defendant with a definite sentence which includes suspension of incarceration after a period of at least two years but not more than five years, followed by a period of probation, if he has served at least one-half of the unsuspended portion of his sentence prior to release, and reenacted and continued in effect on and after July 1, 1987, the provisions of this section previously effective from June 13, 1984, until July 1, 1987; P.A. 90-261 deleted all provisions re the discharge of a defendant on intensive probation; P.A. 94-119 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added Subsec. (b) authorizing the sentencing court or judge at any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years to reduce the sentence or order the defendant discharged and added Subsec. (c) making the section inapplicable to any sentence imposed for an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence; P.A. 95-175 added Subsec. (d) re statement by victim re reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (d) to make technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 21-102 amended Subsec. (a) by adding an exception as provided in Subsec. (b), replacing “the period of a definite sentence of three years or less” with “an executed period of incarceration”, amended Subsec. (b) by replacing language re a definite sentence of more than 3 years with language re a sentence to an executed period of incarceration of more than 7 years as a result of a plea agreement, added new Subsec. (c) re a denial of a motion to reduce a defendant's sentence and redesignated existing Subsecs. (c) and (d) as Subsecs. (d) and (e), effective June 30, 2021; P.A. 21-104 changed effective date of P.A. 21-102, S. 25, from date of passage to October 1, 2021, effective June 28, 2021; P.A. 22-36 amended Subsec. (b) to add language referencing October 1, 2021, effective May 17, 2022; P.A. 23-47 amended Subsec. (c) by making existing provision applicable in case of full denial or granting of motion and adding provision re subsequent motions after 3 years following partial granting of motion, added new Subsec. (e) re supplying state with copy of motion, materials and documentation and redesignated existing Subsec. (e) as Subsec. (f).

See Sec. 51-195 re sentence review by review division.

Cited. 184 C. 366; 187 C. 109; 200 C. 664; 208 C. 420; 210 C. 519; 214 C. 717. Does not confer continuing jurisdiction on trial court to entertain a motion for judgment of acquittal. 230 C. 427. Cited. 240 C. 708.

Cited. 3 CA 497; 9 CA 686; 12 CA 32. Term “sentence” refers to the aggregate or total effective sentence. 19 CA 631. Cited. 20 CA 467; 21 CA 557; 22 CA 601; 23 CA 201. Nothing in section or any other statute confers on trial court jurisdiction to entertain a motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced. 32 CA 1. Section does not violate separation of powers doctrine. 39 CA 632. A definite sentence includes both its executed and suspended portions. 54 CA 387.

When the original sentence was defective, commitment for violation of probation is illegal. 31 CS 350. Cited. 40 CS 238; 41 CS 229.

Subsec. (a):

“Definite sentence” is intended to have same meaning in both this Subsec. and Sec. 54-125e and does not include a period of special parole. 272 C. 72.

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 56 cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1974–2026 · leading case: State v. Boyd, 861 A.2d 1155 (Conn. 2004).

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State v. Boyd, 861 A.2d 1155 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 28× “The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction under General Statutes § 53a-39 1 to consider the motion filed by the defendant, Wayne Boyd, for modification of his sentence.”

State v. Millhouse, 490 A.2d 517 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). · cites it 30× “1 The court based its denial on its lack of jurisdiction under General Statutes § 53a-39 to modify sentences in excess of three years.”

State v. Lombardo, 563 A.2d 1030 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). · cites it 27× “The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify the defendant’s sentence pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-39. We find error.”

State v. Luzietti, 646 A.2d 85 (Conn. 1994). · cites it 9× “We next consider the defendant’s claim that General Statutes § 53a-39 7 conferred continuing jurisdiction on *433 the trial court to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal six weeks after he had begun serving his sentence.”

State v. Adam H., 735 A.2d 839 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 23× “The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction under General Statutes § 53a-39 1 to modify á sentence of nine years imprisonment, execution suspended after three years, when the state did not agree to seek review of the sentence.”

Mainiero v. Liburdi, 573 A.2d 1207 (Conn. 1990). · cites it 15× “The writ was denied because of the habeas court’s finding that the petitioner had failed to sustain the burden of proof on his claim that General Statutes § 53a-39 1 was unconstitutional, *719 and on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the time that he pleaded…”

State v. Barnes, 227 Conn. App. 760 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024). · cites it 42× “In 2017, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree in 1 General Statutes § 53a-39 (a) provides: ‘‘Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, at any time during an executed period of incarceration, the sentencing court or judge may,…”

State v. Reid, 894 A.2d 963 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 4× “, General Statutes §§ 53a-29 through 53a-34 (permitting the trial court to modify terms of probation after sentence is imposed); General Statutes § 52-270 (granting jurisdiction to trial court to hear a petition for a new trial after execution of original sentence has…”

State v. Tuszynski, 579 A.2d 1100 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990). · cites it 11× “The trial court’s jurisdiction to modify a lawful sentence is derived from Practice Book § 934 and the essentially identical language of General Statutes § 53a-39. Section 53a-39 provides in pertinent part that “[a]t any time during the period of a definite sentence of three…”

State v. Morrison, 665 A.2d 1372 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). · cites it 15× “Prior to 1982, General Statutes § 53a-39 and Practice Book § 934 both provided that a sentencing court had the discretion to reduce any definite sentence.”

Nelson v. Comm'r of Corr., 167 A.3d 952 (Conn. 2017). · cites it 4× “In that memorandum of law, the petitioner explained that, while his previous habeas petitions were pending, he had testified as a state's witness in a murder trial in exchange for the state's promise to support a modification of his sentence from a fifty-five year term of…”

State v. Dupas, 970 A.2d 102 (Conn. 2009). · cites it 9× “This appeal concerns the scope of the trial court’s discretion to modify a sentence pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-39 (b). 1 The defendant, DeanEric Dupas, appeals directly 2 from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for modification of his sentence pursuant to…”

Show all 56 citing cases →

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-39(b) — 1 case

Diaz v. Comm'r of Corr., 166 A.3d 815 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).

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