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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54b (2025)

Murder with special circumstances

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1982–2026 219citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 219 opinions since 1982, 25 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (8) (5 cases).

A person is guilty of murder with special circumstances who is convicted of any of the following and was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection under the provisions of section 26-5, an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of such employee's or person's employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility, or any firefighter, while such victim was acting within the scope of such victim's duties; (2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit the same for pecuniary gain; (3) murder committed by one who has previously been convicted of intentional murder or of murder committed in the course of commission of a felony; (4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the murder, under sentence of life imprisonment; (5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be returned to safety; (6) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree; (7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction; or (8) murder of a person under sixteen years of age.

(P.A. 73-137, S. 3; P.A. 77-604, S. 39, 84; 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-335; P.A. 85-144; P.A. 92-260, S. 27; P.A. 95-16, S. 4; P.A. 98-126, S. 1; P.A. 00-99, S. 120, 154; P.A. 01-84, S. 10, 26; 01-151, S. 3, 5; P.A. 11-51, S. 134; 11-80, S. 1; P.A. 12-5, S. 1; P.A. 15-84, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 77-604 substituted “chief inspector or inspector in the division of criminal justice” for “county detective” in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-335 added Subdivs. (7) and (8) making murder in course of committing sexual assault in first degree and murder of two or more persons at same time a capital felony; P.A. 85-144 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding “economic” and deleting the proviso that the seller was not, at the time of such sale, a drug-dependent person; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subdivs. (1) and (3); P.A. 95-16 added Subdiv. (9) re murder of a person under 16 years of age; P.A. 98-126 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace “an official of the Department of Correction authorized by the Commissioner of Correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility” with “an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of his employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility”; P.A. 00-99 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace reference to sheriff and deputy sheriff with provision re state marshal exercising statutory authority and judicial marshal in performance of duties, effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-84 replaced “fireman” with “firefighter” and made other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 01-151 amended Subdiv. (1) to include the murder of a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Environmental Protection under the provisions of Sec. 26-5, deleted former Subdiv. (6) re the illegal sale, for economic gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to a person who dies as a direct result of the use of such cocaine, heroin or methadone, redesignating existing Subdivs. (7), (8) and (9) as Subdivs. (6), (7) and (8), and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Department of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection”, effective July 1, 2011; pursuant to P.A. 11-80, “Commissioner of Environmental Protection” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection”, effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 12-5 substituted “murder with special circumstances” for “capital felony”, effective April 25, 2012, and applicable to crimes committed on or after that date; P.A. 15-84 added provision re person 18 years of age or older at time of offense, effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after that date.

See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.

See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.

See Sec. 53a-54e re construction of statutes re capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012.

Cited. 194 C. 416; 198 C. 92; 199 C. 163; 201 C. 276; 211 C. 289; 215 C. 570; 216 C. 699; 218 C. 486; 230 C. 183; 234 C. 324; Id., 735; 235 C. 206; 237 C. 332; 238 C. 389; Id., 828; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 702; 242 C. 409. Murder in the course of kidnapping does not require ransom; murder in the course of sexual assault includes murder to prevent victim from becoming a witness; denial of a bill of particulars on aggravating factors did not deny fair hearing; meaning of “heinous” and “depraved” discussed; “heinous, cruel or depraved” as a unitary rather than three separate factors discussed; statute complies with the eighth and fourteenth amendments; statutory construction and precedent support conclusion that the burden of persuasion applies to both elements of mitigation; proportionality review still available in this case despite repeal of requirement. 251 C. 285. Trial court properly instructed jury that it could convict defendant of capital felony based upon a theory of conspiratorial liability even though defendant did not pull trigger of gun that killed victims and was not present when the shootings occurred. 271 C. 338.

Cited. 32 CA 38; 36 CA 364; 41 CA 604; 42 CA 348; 43 CA 549; 45 CA 207; Id., 390.

Cited 42 CS 426.

Subdiv. (1):

Conviction for felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c cannot serve as the predicate murder for the crime of capital felony under this section; term “murder” in capital felony statute may be applied only to intentional murder. 241 C. 702. In order to satisfy the element that police officer had been “acting within the scope of his duties”, the state was only required to prove that police officer was acting in the good faith discharge of his official duties when he stopped defendant and attempted to subdue him. 264 C. 1.

Subdiv. (2):

Capital felony murder discussed. 199 C. 163. Cited. 203 C. 420. Evidence that codefendant said “I've got a job for you” and that defendant made preparations for the murder and received a snowmobile after the victim was killed was sufficient to support finding of probable cause that defendant committed murder for pecuniary gain; defendant, having been hired to kill the victim, could be held accessorily liable for capital felony under Subdiv. even if jury found that codefendant, who was not a party to any hiring relationship, was the principal actor who killed the victim; hiring element contemplates a bargained for exchange involving pecuniary gain as consideration for the commission of the murder, and the mere receipt of money or property before or after the murder is not sufficient to hold defendant liable under Subdiv. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Cited. 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538.

Subdiv. (5):

Cited. 197 C. 436; 213 C. 388. Provision does not require that kidnapping be accompanied by a demand for ransom. 249 C. 645. Trial court properly instructed jury that its verdict of guilty on charge of intentional murder would provide the predicate for criminal liability under Subdiv. 263 C. 478.

Subdiv. (6):

Cited. 233 C. 174. State need only prove that the murder in a kidnap-murder or sexual-assault murder was aggravated in order to establish the aggravating factor. 269 C. 213.

Subdiv. (7):

Cited. 205 C. 298; 237 C. 694. Double jeopardy clause not violated where defendant convicted for two counts of capital felony; evidence indicated that the murders occurred in two sets, at distinctly separate times. 260 C. 339.

Subdiv. (8):

Cited. 206 C. 213; 207 C. 374; 208 C. 125; 209 C. 225; 212 C. 258; 213 C. 708; 218 C. 349; 221 C. 430; 229 C. 125; 233 C. 813. Only an intentional murder can be a predicate murder to capital felony charge under section. 238 C. 828. Cited. 241 C. 322; Id., 702; 242 C. 93. Proper construction to be given to term “in the course of a single transaction” is that there need only be some nexus between murders, that the murders be connected by a common purpose or plan in order to be “in the course of a single transaction”; does not require murders to be at the same time in order to constitute “in the course of a single transaction”; temporal relationship between murders is not an absolute prerequisite to prosecution under Subdiv. 254 C. 578. Read together, Sec. 53a-54(a) and this Subdiv. provide that conviction of intentional murder under doctrine of transferred intent may be the predicate for conviction of capital felony under this Subdiv. when victim is under 16, regardless of defendant's subjective state of mind; knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of Subdiv.; to limit applicability of Subdiv. to cases in which state can prove that defendant knew or reasonably should have known the age of his victim would be both impracticable and inconsistent with the legislative intent. 265 C. 35. Legislature had rational basis for classifying intentional murder of a person under the age of 16 as a capital felony. 272 C. 106.

Cited. 38 CA 581.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54b most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-54b 95×cited by 202 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“to 1997) § 53a-54b (8), as amended by No. 98-126, § 1, of the 1998 Public Acts (P.”
The case’s holding
The rule of lenity does not apply whenever a defendant merely presents a plausible interpretation of a criminal statute (State v. Courchesne).
Later courts cite it for
“the language of the statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered.” · 5 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-54b 35×cited by 250 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“” We note that, based on the facts of the defendant’s hypothetical, the second proprietor could receive the death penalty; see General Statutes § 53a-54b (8) (murder of two or more persons at same time or in course of single transaction is capital felony for which accused may be…”
The case’s holding
A seizure occurs without a federal constitutional requirement of physical force or submission to authority, and consent is voluntary if officers request permission without using threatening language.
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of a showing that the jury failed or declined to follow the court's instructions, we presume that it heeded them.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Campbell, 180 A.3d 882 (Conn. 2018).
cites § 53a-54b 29×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“…a jury trial, from the judgment of conviction of capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-54b (8), two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2)…”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in finding a defendant competent when evidence shows a refusal to cooperate is volitional rather than caused by a mental disorder.
4
GREENState v. Higgins, 826 A.2d 1126 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-54b 46×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“The defendant, Sheldon Higgins, appeals 1 from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of capital felony in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54b (8) 2 and 53a-8, 3 two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (l) 4…”
The case’s holding
Failure to brief a claim under the state constitution separately limits judicial review to the federal constitution.
Later courts cite it for
“because this case does not involve the death penalty, any constitutional limitations on the doctrine in that context are left for another day.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Jones, 662 A.2d 1199 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 53a-54b 47×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“The principal issue on appeal is whether under the facts of this case, the defendant, charged with capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (3), was entitled to be tried in a bifurcated proceeding.”
The case’s holding
Trial proceedings in capital felony cases must be bifurcated when a prior conviction is used solely to enhance the penalty to death to prevent undue prejudice.
Later courts cite it for
“that which the law allows and even encourages.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 53a-54b 28×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“Ross, was charged in three cases 1 with eight counts of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b. The trial court dismissed two counts for lack of territorial jurisdiction and, after a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of four counts of capital felony in…”
The case’s holding
A defendant implicitly waives statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege when counsel is aware that psychiatric examination results may be used in rebuttal regarding mental state (State v. Ross).
Later courts cite it for
“the essence of the preservation requirement is that fair notice be given to the trial court of the party's view of the governing law and of any disagreement that the party may have had with the charge actually given” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318 (Conn. 1994).
cites § 53a-54b 27×cited by 229 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“1 After a trial to *188 determine guilt, a jury convicted the defendant of six counts of capital felony 2 in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b. 3 At a separate sentencing hearing pur *189 suant to General Statutes § 53a-46a, 4 the same jury considered further evidence and…”
The case’s holding
A state possesses territorial jurisdiction to prosecute a capital felony if the kidnapping commenced within the state, regardless of where the subsequent murders occurred.
Later courts cite it for
“in our assessment of whether the statute passes constitutional muster, we proceed from the well recognized jurisprudential principle that ' the party attacking a validly enacted statute . . . bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality.” · 5 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Courchesne, 998 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 53a-54b 21×cited by 87 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“to 1997) § 53a-54b (8) 4 for the murder of two or more persons in the course of a single transaction, and one count of capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (9) 5 for the murder of a person under sixteen years of age, namely, Antonia.”
The case’s holding
The state must prove a newborn was not brain dead at the time of birth to establish the victim was a person for purposes of murder charges.
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that those who promulgate statutes . . . do not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Cobb, 743 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 53a-54b 21×cited by 167 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“The defendant, Sedrick Cobb, appeals 1 from the judgment of the trial court, after a trial to a three judge court, of conviction of two counts of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (5) and *297 (7), 2 and one count of robbery in the third degree in…”
The case’s holding
A defendant's waiver of a jury trial is valid when the defendant possesses sufficient maturity and education to understand the nature of the waiver (validity of jury waiver).
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that the fact finder may infer intent from the natural consequences of one's voluntary conduct.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Gibbs, 758 A.2d 327 (Conn. 2000).
cites § 53a-54b 28×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“, 1 and one *580 count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (8). 2 The trial court, Spada, ■/.”
The case’s holding
A state interest in ensuring jurors can understand proceedings justifies English proficiency requirements for jury service under the equal protection clause.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant either may exercise his right to be represented by counsel ... or his right to represent himself . . . but he has no constitutional right to do both at the same time” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 53a-54b 17×cited by 214 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“The defendant appeals, following a jury trial, from the judgment of conviction of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (5), 2 of murder *393 in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, 3 of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, 4 of…”
The case’s holding
The social compact clause does not confer an unenumerated absolute right to life and separate public defender units do not constitute a single firm for imputed disqualification.
Later courts cite it for
“even in the absence of actual bias, a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, because the appearance and the existence of impartiality are both essential elements of a fair exercise of judicial authority.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Colon, 864 A.2d 666 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 53a-54b 10×cited by 227 cases
The case’s holding
The state constitution does not guarantee a defendant the right to allocution during a capital sentencing hearing (rejecting claim that state constitution provides for right of allocution at capital sentencing hearing).
Later courts cite it for
“defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning at trial on the basis of the attorney-client privilege, suggesting that he did not view the line of questioning to be seriously prejudicial at the time” · 1 citing court
13
GREENState v. King, 735 A.2d 267 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 53a-54b 24×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“See General Statutes § 53a-54b (2) (designating as capital felony “murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit the same for pecuniary gain”).”
The case’s holding
The capital felony of kidnap-murder does not require proof of a ransom demand because the statute encompasses all forms of kidnapping.
Later courts cite it for
“if the legislature had sought to distinguish between the different degrees of kidnapping for purposes of 53a-54b , it knew how to do so” · 1 citing court
14
GREENState v. Breton, 824 A.2d 778 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-54b 19×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“Practice Book § 67-6 provides: “(a) When a sentence of death has been imposed upon a defendant, following a conviction of a capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b and the hearing upon imposition of the death penalty pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-46a, the…”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance to introduce mitigating evidence that is merely cumulative or speculative.
Later courts cite it for
“pervasive and insidious influence of race and poverty in the administration of the death penalty.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 53a-54b 18×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“Ross, and as a party in interest, an intervenor or amicus curiae in postconviction judicial proceedings in the three criminal cases against the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”
The case’s holding
The next friend doctrine applies to post-conviction proceedings under common law (applying next friend to post-conviction proceedings under common law).
Later courts cite it for
“defendant's decision to take control of his fate by forgoing further legal challenges to his death sentences and his ambivalent feelings over the consequences of that decision are, in and of themselves, evidence of his incompetence” · 1 citing court
16
GREENState v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 53a-54b 9×cited by 157 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“to 1999) § 53a-54b (8) and (9), respectively, 2 and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-48 (a) 3 in connection with the shooting death of a woman and her young son.”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by instructing a jury that a deadlocked verdict results in a mandatory life sentence, as this improperly shifts sentencing responsibility away from the jury.
Later courts cite it for
“the first two prongs of golding involve a determination of whether the claim is reviewable; the second two . . . involve a determination of whether the defendant may prevail.” · 10 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Johnson, 699 A.2d 57 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 53a-54b 27×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“Johnson, was charged in an amended information with felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, 1 capi *705 tal felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (1), 2 burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-101 (a) and 53a-8, 3…”
The case’s holding
The term murder in the capital felony statute applies only to intentional murder and does not encompass felony murder.
Later courts cite it for
“the defendant has the burden of proving custodial interrogation . . . before the state must prove that adequate warnings of the rights that inhere in the privilege against self-incrimination were given to the defendant and that the defendant's waiver of his rights was constitutionally valid . . . .” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Harrell, 681 A.2d 944 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 53a-54b 24×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“The sole issue in this appeal is whether the term “murder” as used in the capital felony statute, General Statutes § 53a-54b, 1 includes unintentional mur *830 der in addition to intentional murder.”
The case’s holding
Ambiguity regarding the definition of murder in a capital felony statute must be construed in favor of the defendant.
19
GREENState v. Leniart, 140 A.3d 1026 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 53a-54b 10×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“to 1995) § 53a-54b (5), (7) and (9), as amended by Public Acts 1995, No.”
The case’s holding
The corpus delicti rule is a hybrid rule that governs the admissibility of confession evidence and imposes a substantive requirement.
20
GREENState v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-54b 11×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 53a-54b
“The defendant, Jamaal Coltherst, appeals 1 from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of capital felony in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54b (5) 2 and 53a-8 (a), 3 murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) 4 and 53a-8 (a), felony murder in…”
The case’s holding
Due process permits imputing a coconspirator's intent to a defendant under the Pinkerton doctrine if the state proves that intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“due process requires the state to prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 2 citing courts

Show all 219 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198220042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 14 cases in 2016. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.113Conn. App. Ct.99D. Conn.4Conn. Super. Ct.1Ky.1SCOTUS1
By subsection
(7)3 cases
State v. Kendall, 2 A.3d 990 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
Daniels v. Bronson, 736 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1990).
Kendall, No. 3:24-cv-02028 (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2025).
(8)5 cases
State v. Kendall, 2 A.3d 990 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
Small v. Comm'r of Corr., 909 A.2d 533 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
State v. Davis, 175 A.3d 71 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Daniels v. Bronson, 736 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1990).
Kendall, No. 3:24-cv-02028 (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2025).

Show all 219 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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