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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 54 — Criminal ProcedureChapter 960a — Youthful Offenders

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-76b (2025)

Youthful offenders: Definitions; applicability of interstate compact

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1972–2012 31citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 31 opinions since 1972.

(a) For the purposes of sections 54-76b to 54-76n, inclusive:

(1) “Youth” means (A) a minor who has reached the age of sixteen years but has not reached the age of eighteen years at the time of the alleged offense, or (B) a child who has been transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to section 46b-127; and

(2) “Youthful offender” means a youth who (A) is charged with the commission of a crime which is not a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or section 14-222a, subsection (a) or subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 14-224, section 14-227a, 14-227g or 14-227m, subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, except a violation involving consensual sexual intercourse or sexual contact between the youth and another person who is thirteen years of age or older but under sixteen years of age, and (B) has not previously been convicted of a felony in the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court or been previously adjudged a serious juvenile offender or serious juvenile repeat offender, as defined in section 46b-120.

(b) The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision under section 54-133 shall apply to youthful offenders.

(1971, P.A. 72, S. 1; P.A. 79-581, S. 9; P.A. 81-472, S. 94, 159; P.A. 89-383, S. 15, 16; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 7; P.A. 95-142, S. 5; 95-225, S. 33; P.A. 01-84, S. 20, 26; 01-211, S. 18; P.A. 03-243, S. 4; P.A. 05-232, S. 1; P.A. 08-32, S. 10; P.A. 14-130, S. 35; P.A. 16-126, S. 33; P.A. 19-189, S. 26.)

History: P.A. 79-581 specified that those who have “been afforded a pretrial program for accelerated rehabilitation under section 54-76p” are not to be considered as youthful offenders; P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 89-383 revised in part definition of “youthful offender” by replacing “a youth who has committed a crime or crimes which are not class A felonies” with “a youth who is charged with the commission of a crime which is not a violation of section 53a-70a or a class A felony”; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 included in the definition of “youth” a child who has been transferred to the regular criminal docket pursuant to Sec. 46b-127(a)(2); P.A. 95-142 redefined “youthful offender” to exclude a youth who is charged with the commission of a violation of Sec. 53-21(2) or of Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 95-225 redefined “youthful offender” to exclude a youth who has previously been adjudged a serious juvenile offender or a serious juvenile repeat offender and made a technical change; P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to “subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 01-211 inserted Subdiv. indicators and amended Subdiv. (1) to replace reference to “subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21” and to add exception re violation involving consensual sexual intercourse or sexual contact between the youth and another person who is 13 years of age or older but under 16 years of age; P.A. 03-243 replaced provision re Interstate Compact on Juveniles with provision re Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision under Sec. 54-133 and deleted “to the same extent as to minors below sixteen years of age”; P.A. 05-232 designated definitions as Subsec. (a) and made technical changes therein, redefined “youth” in Subsec. (a)(1) by adding provisions re age at time of the alleged offense and re docket of the Superior Court, redefined “youthful offender” in Subsec. (a)(2) by adding provision re felony conviction in regular docket of the Superior Court and deleting provisions re adjudication as a youthful offender and prior accelerated rehabilitation, and designated provision re applicability of interstate compact as Subsec. (b), effective January 1, 2006; P.A. 08-32 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to redefine “youthful offender” by excluding a youth who is charged with a violation of Sec. 14-222a, 14-224(a), 14-227a or 14-227g, effective August 1, 2008; P.A. 14-130 amended Subdiv. (2)(A) by adding reference to Sec. 14-224(b)(1); P.A. 16-126 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by adding references to Secs. 14-227m and 14-227n(a)(1) and (2); P.A. 19-189 redefined “youthful offender” in Subsec. (a)(2).

Cited. 173 C. 414; 179 C. 98. Overruled 179 C. 98 in determining that an order denying youthful offender status is not an appealable final judgment. 192 C. 85. Cited. 205 C. 638; 240 C. 743.

Cited. 6 CA 505; 8 CA 607; 20 CA 101.

Cited. 30 CS 71. Since motor vehicle violations are specifically excluded from definition of an offense, and, therefore, from definition of a crime, negligent homicide with a motor vehicle is not a crime to which youthful offender status may be applied. 49 CS 170.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-76b most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Matos, 694 A.2d 775 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 54-76b 11×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“to 1991) § 54-76b 1 from applying for treatment as a youthful offender because he was charged with, although not convicted of, the class A felony of murder.”
The case’s holding
The legislature may rationally exclude certain serious crimes from youthful offender eligibility without violating due process or equal protection rights.
Later courts cite it for
“in order to prevail on his due process claim, the defendant must prove that: (1) he has been deprived of a property or liberty interest cognizable under the due process clause; and (2) the deprivation of the property or liberty interest has occurred without due process.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 54-76b 6×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“See General Statutes § 54-76b et seq., set forth in footnote 6 of this opinion; State v.”
The case’s holding
A juvenile possesses no constitutionally cognizable liberty interest in juvenile status because any special treatment based on age results from statutory authority rather than an inherent right.
Later courts cite it for
“any special treatment accorded to a juvenile because of his or her age with respect to proceedings relative to a criminal offense results from statutory authority, rather than from any inherent or constitutional right.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Bell, 425 A.2d 574 (Conn. 1979).
cites § 54-76b 6×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“[1] See General Statutes §§ 54-76b to 54-76p. Following a hearing, the defendant's application to be adjudged a youthful offender was denied.”
The case’s holding
Denial of youthful offender status constitutes a final appealable judgment because it deprives the defendant of the statutory right to a private hearing and sealed records.
Later courts cite it for
“subsequent criminal proceedings, no matter what the eventual outcome, cannot regain for the defendant the privacy lost through the denial of his application and consequent public trial.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Jason B., 729 A.2d 760 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 54-76b 3×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“to 1993) § 54-76b. 2 The defendant claims that: (1) at the time of the incident, he was not more than two years older than the victim within the meaning of § 53a-71 (a) (1); (2) § 53a-71 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague *546 and violates his right to equal protection as…”
The case’s holding
The difference in age between two individuals is determined by reference to their respective birth dates.
Later courts cite it for
“common sense dictates that in comparing the relative ages of individuals, the difference in their ages is determined by reference to their respective birth dates.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Eric T., 513 A.2d 1273 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
cites § 54-76b 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“Once a defendant is adjudicated to have the status of youthful offender for one or more underlying criminal acts, the criminality of his conduct is extinguished and he falls within the shelter of the Youthful Offender Act, General Statutes §§ 54-76b through 54-76o, for treatment…”
Later courts cite it for
“a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more appropriately pursued by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Mapp, 984 A.2d 108 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 54-76b 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“to 2001) § 54-76b, the defendant pleaded guilty, as a youthful offender, to the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a)(4) and 53a-48.”
7
GREENState v. Longo, 469 A.2d 1220 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 54-76b 3×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“The defendant was charged by substitute information on November 5,1981, with the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes *87 § 53a-55, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a, and carrying a…”
The case’s holding
An interlocutory order is appealable only if it threatens the preservation of a right that exists independently of the order itself.
Later courts cite it for
“the right itself must exist independently of the order from which the appeal is taken.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Salmond, 797 A.2d 1113 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 54-76b 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“See General Statutes § 54-76b. 4 After receiving the results of the investigation, the court, Thompson, J.”
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“92 -93 (order denying youthful offender status pursuant to General Statutes § 54-76b did not constitute appealable final judgment because statute vested discretion in trial court to determine whether youthful offender status should be granted).”
The case’s holding
An order denying a motion for prepleading security is an appealable final judgment if it threatens a statutory right that will be irretrievably lost without immediate review.
10
GREENState v. JAMAR D., 18 A.3d 582 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 54-76b 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“5 General Statutes § 54-76b (a) provides in relevant part: “(1) ‘Youth’means (A) a minor who has reached the age of sixteen years but has not reached the age of eighteen years at the time of the alleged offense, or (B) a child who has been transferred to the regular criminal…”
11
GREENState v. Jones, 534 A.2d 1199 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“At the trial, the state made a motion in limine asking for a ruling that the defendant be unable to use, for impeachment purposes, the earlier felony committed by Mohagel for which he had been adjudicated a youthful offender.”
The case’s holding
A defendant validly waives the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if he initiates further communication with police after invoking that right.
12
GREENRobinson v. Comm'r of Corr., 771 A.2d 952 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 54-76b 5×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“to 1985) § 54-76b. 3 Minors who have committed offenses similar to those that the petitioner had committed have been adjudicated youthful offenders by the courts.”
13
GREENIn re Juv. Appeal (85-AB), 488 A.2d 778 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“In this respect it must be conceded that the situation of a juvenile is distinguishable from that of a seventeen year old charged with a crime, whose status as a “youthful offender” entitled to the special procedures available under General Statutes §§ 54-76b through 54-76o…”
The case’s holding
An interlocutory order is appealable only if it terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or concludes the rights of the parties such that further proceedings cannot affect them.
Later courts cite it for
“that further proceedings cannot affect them.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENState v. BB, 17 A.3d 30 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“General Statutes § 54-76b explains when the status vests.”
15
GREENState v. B.B, 300 Conn. 748 (2011).
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“General Statutes § 54-76b explains when the status vests.”
16
GREENState v. Keiser, 491 A.2d 382 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“See General Statutes §§ 54-76b through 54-76o.”
17
GREENState v. Ellis T., 884 A.2d 437 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“On April 24, 2000, the defendant pleaded guilty to various charges and was adjudicated a youthful offender as defined by General Statutes § 54-76b. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, suspended after one year, with three years probation.”
Later courts cite it for
“if a violation of probation is found, a court must next determine whether probation should be revoked because the beneficial aspects of probation are no longer being served.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENState v. Potter, 867 A.2d 158 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004).
cites § 54-76b 9×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 54-76b
“Youthful offender status is governed by General Statutes §§ 54-76b through 54-76n.”
19
GREENIn re Christopher G., 564 A.2d 619 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“The defendant appeals from the judgment adjudicating him to be a youthful offender pursuant to General Statutes § 54-76b 1 by reason of having committed the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree; General Statutes § 53a-70 (a); assault in the third degree; General Statutes…”
20
GREENState v. Adam H., 735 A.2d 839 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 54-76b 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 54-76b
“to 1995) § 54-76b 2 and pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (l).”

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Citing cases by year
197219922012

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1999. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn.14Conn. App. Ct.13Conn. Super. Ct.4
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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