Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 55-3 (2026)

Limitation of effect of certain acts

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section CT-CGAcga.ct.gov (official) JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a retrospective effect.

(1949 Rev., S. 8896.)

Not applicable to new statute which is merely procedural in its character and does not impose new obligations nor affect substantive rights. 118 C. 536; 129 C. 131; 125 C. 147. Statutes should be construed retrospectively only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. 148 C. 447. Obligation referred to in section means one of substantive law and section does not apply to new statutory provision for service on foreign corporation under certain circumstances by service on Secretary of the State. 157 C. 92. Cited. 163 C. 478. Taxation of the exercise and nonexercise, after enactment of tax, of a power of appointment created prior to enactment of tax does not violate section and is valid. 166 C. 581. There is a general presumption that legislation affecting substantive rights is intended to apply prospectively only. 173 C. 328. Cited. 178 C. 180. Amendments to a statute which affect substantive rights will be given prospective application only. 180 C. 720. Cited. 182 C. 40; 184 C. 569; 187 C. 451; 190 C. 77. Statute establishes a rule of presumed legislative intent, rather than a rule of law. 194 C. 165. Cited. Id., 187; 196 C. 53; 200 C. 734; 204 C. 212; 208 C. 480; 210 C. 462; 216 C. 523; 218 C. 170; 219 C. 520; 232 C. 780; 233 C. 474. Section precludes a retroactive application of 1994 amendment to Sec. 46b-127. 237 C. 364. Cited. 239 C. 676; 241 C. 282. Amendment to Sec. 29-32 re pistol permits affected defendant's substantive right to bear arms and thus this section applies, but its presumption in this case is rebutted by unequivocally expressed legislative intent. 243 C. 250. Cited. 247 C. 638. Retroactive effect of P.A. 00-174, Sec. 71, discussed. 255 C. 498. The promulgation of Sec. 17b-812-13(9) of the regulations of Connecticut state agencies imposes a “new obligation” under section, and legislature did not authorize retroactive application of said section. 322 C. 191. The promulgation of Sec. 17b-812-13(9) of the regulations of Connecticut state agencies imposes a “new obligation” under section and legislature did not authorize retroactive application of said section. 322 C. 191.

Cited. 3 CA 697; 22 CA 285; 27 CA 800; 34 CA 833; 35 CA 31; 42 CA 542; 44 CA 598.

Not applicable to recovery of state's contribution from the estate of a person who was a public charge. 11 CS 295. Legislation regulating credit unions prospective in nature. 15 CS 48. A statute will not be given retroactive construction by which it will impose liabilities not existing prior to its passage. 18 CS 161. Cited. 30 CS 596; 35 CS 603; 39 CS 321; 44 CS 207; Id., 297. Section establishes a rule of presumed legislative intent rather than a rule of law. 45 CS 586.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 107 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1968–2026 · leading case: D'ERAMO v. Smith, 872 A.2d 408 (Conn. 2005).
D'ERAMO v. Smith, 872 A.2d 408 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 24× “Our point of departure is General Statutes § 55-3, which states: No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have retrospective effect.”
Walsh v. Jodoin, 925 A.2d 1086 (Conn. 2007). · cites it 24× “2d 408 (2005), and General Statutes § 55-3, [7] the trial court, Swienton, J.”
Peck v. Jacquemin, 491 A.2d 1043 (Conn. 1985). · cites it 8× “The defendant argues to the contrary; he maintains not only that the statute is substantive and cannot be applied retroactively because of our decisional law, but also that the application of § 52-216a as amended in this case would run afoul of General Statutes § 55-3, which…”
Shannon v. Comm'r of Hous., 140 A.3d 903 (Conn. 2016). · cites it 28× “13 General Statutes § 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a retrospective effect.”
State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 5× “After noting that, under General Statutes § 55-3, 36 substantive changes to the law presumptively have prospective application only; id.”
State v. Bischoff, 337 Conn. 739 (Conn. 2021). · cites it 7× “was whether the presumption against retroactivity under General Statutes § 55-3, which applies only to substantive changes in the law, applied to the juvenile transfer amendment.”
In re Daniel H., 678 A.2d 462 (Conn. 1996). · cites it 9× “In support of this claim, the respondents rely on the common law presumption against retroactive application of substantive changes in the law, as well as General Statutes § 1-1 (t) and (u), 8 and General Statutes § 55-3. 9 The *371 state relies on two arguments in support of…”
Hall v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 695 A.2d 1051 (Conn. 1997). · cites it 8× “2d 297 (1991); see also General Statutes § 55-3; Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn.”
State v. Faraday, 842 A.2d 567 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 4× “Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”
McKay v. Longman, 211 A.3d 20 (Conn. 2019). · cites it 4× “2d 408 (2005) (‘‘we have uniformly interpreted [General Statutes] § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Spector Motor Service, Inc.”
Gormley v. State Employees Ret. Comm'n, 582 A.2d 764 (Conn. 1990). · cites it 12× “ly determined that the application to the plaintiff of General Statutes § 51-287 (e), 1 which provides for the suspension of pension benefits to a retired state’s attorney who is receiving benefits under the state’s attorney’s retirement fund (SARF) and who is subsequently…”
Darak v. Darak, 556 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1989). · cites it 4× “We are unpersuaded by any of these claims. A The rules of statutory construction that govern the applicability of new legislation to preexisting transactions are well established.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.