(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, this Criminal Code does not apply to offenses committed prior to July 1, 1973. Prosecutions for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1973, shall be governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose, as if this Criminal Code were not in force. For the purpose of this section, an offense was committed prior to July 1, 1973, if any of the elements of the offense occurred prior thereto.
(b) In any case pending on or commenced after July 1, 1973, involving an offense committed prior to that date:
(1) Procedural provisions of this Criminal Code shall govern, insofar as they are justly applicable and their applicability does not introduce confusion, delay or manifest injustice;
(2) Provisions of this Criminal Code according a defense or mitigations shall apply, with the consent of the defendant.
(c) Provisions of this Criminal Code governing the treatment and the release or discharge of prisoners, probationers and parolees shall apply to persons under sentence for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1973, except that the minimum or maximum period of their detention or supervision shall in no case be increased, nor shall this Criminal Code affect the substantive or procedural validity of any judgment of conviction entered prior to July 1, 1973, regardless of the fact that appeal time has not run or that an appeal is pending.
11 Del. C. 1953,
§
102;
58 Del. Laws, c. 497,
§
1;
Notes of Decisions
United States v. Slawik, 408 F. Supp. 190 (D. Del. 1976).
· cites it 3× “11 Del.C. § 102(a) (Rev.1974) currently provides that “prosecutions for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1973, shall be governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose, as if this Criminal Code were not in force,” and that “an offense was committed…”
Weekley v. State, 222 A.2d 781 (Del. 1966).
“Defendants Weekley and Mayerhofer contend that the evidence did not justify a finding that they aided or abetted Winsett in committing the homicide and that their conviction under our accomplice statute (11 Del.C. § 102) cannot be upheld. They argue that the agreement among the…”
Grace v. State, 314 A.2d 169 (Del. 1973).
“The defendant was convicted under 11 Del.C. § 102(c) as an accomplice although indicted as a principal.”
Dalton v. State, 252 A.2d 104 (Del. 1969).
“Although Vitanza admittedly did the actual breaking, the State’s theory was that Dalton was an accomplice to Vitanza’s actions. We think the evidence does not support the breaking element of the burglary charge against Dalton.”
Hamilton v. State, 343 A.2d 594 (Del. 1975).
“Although the instant offense occurred before the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the defendant elected, as was his option under 11 Del.C. § 102(b)(2), to adopt defenses made available thereunder.”
Crawford v. State, 245 A.2d 791 (Del. 1968).
“Even if classified as an accomplice rather than a principal, Walker was guilty of the same crime as the principal and could be so convicted under the indictment charging him as a principal, by virtue of 11 Del.C. § 102. Johnson v. State, Del., 215 A.”
— 11 Del. C. § 102(a) — 1 case
United States v. Slawik, 408 F. Supp. 190 (D. Del. 1976).
“11 Del.C. § 102(a) (Rev.1974) currently provides that “prosecutions for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1973, shall be governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose, as if this Criminal Code were not in force,” and that “an offense was committed…”
— 11 Del. C. § 102(b)(2) — 2 cases
United States v. Slawik, 408 F. Supp. 190 (D. Del. 1976).
“11 Del.C. § 102(a) (Rev.1974) currently provides that “prosecutions for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1973, shall be governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose, as if this Criminal Code were not in force,” and that “an offense was committed…”
Hamilton v. State, 343 A.2d 594 (Del. 1975).
“Although the instant offense occurred before the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the defendant elected, as was his option under 11 Del.C. § 102(b)(2), to adopt defenses made available thereunder.”
— 11 Del. C. § 102(c) — 2 cases
Grace v. State, 314 A.2d 169 (Del. 1973).
“The defendant was convicted under 11 Del.C. § 102(c) as an accomplice although indicted as a principal.”
Dalton v. State, 252 A.2d 104 (Del. 1969).
“Although Vitanza admittedly did the actual breaking, the State’s theory was that Dalton was an accomplice to Vitanza’s actions. We think the evidence does not support the breaking element of the burglary charge against Dalton.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.