(a) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the accused engaged in the proscribed conduct because the accused was induced by a law-enforcement official or the law-enforcement official’s agent who is acting in the knowing cooperation with such an official to engage in the proscribed conduct constituting such conduct which is a crime when such person is not otherwise disposed to do so. The defense of entrapment as defined by this Criminal Code concedes the commission of the act charged but claims that it should not be punished because of the wrongdoing of the officer originates the idea of the crime and then induces the other person to engage in conduct constituting such a crime when the other person is not otherwise disposed to do so.
(b) The defense afforded by subsection (a) of this section is unavailable when causing or threatening physical injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152 (Del. 1975). · cites it 3ד§ 432 provides as follows: “(1) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the accused engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement officer or by a person acting in cooperation with a law…”
Harrison v. Baylor, 548 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Del. 1982). “Petitioner relied on 11 Del.C. § 432 which provides that the affirmative defense of entrapment is available where there exists “wrongdoing of the officer [who] originates the idea of the crime and then induces the other person to engage in conduct constituting such a crime when…”
State v. Hunt (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). · cites it 3דMurray was ineffective because he did not raise the defense of entrapment pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 432. Section 432 states in relevant part: (a) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the accused engaged in the proscribed conduct because the accused…”
Gordon v. Taylor, 824 F. Supp. 492 (D. Del. 1993). “The Delaware courts have not passed on the question of whether Mathews abrogates that prong of the entrapment statute which requires the concession of the crime charged.”
— 11 Del. C. § 432(2) — 1 case
Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152 (Del. 1975). “§ 432 provides as follows: “(1) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the accused engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement officer or by a person acting in cooperation with a law…”
— 11 Del. C. § 432(a) — 2 cases
State v. Hunt (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). “Murray was ineffective because he did not raise the defense of entrapment pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 432. Section 432 states in relevant part: (a) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the accused engaged in the proscribed conduct because the accused…”
Gordon v. Taylor, 824 F. Supp. 492 (D. Del. 1993). “The Delaware courts have not passed on the question of whether Mathews abrogates that prong of the entrapment statute which requires the concession of the crime charged.”
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