Delaware Code

12 Del. C. § 3585 (2026)

Limitation of action against trustee following trustee's report [For application of this section, see 81 Del. Laws, c. 320, § 8]

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) A person may initiate a judicial proceeding against a trustee for breach of trust or other claim until the first to occur of:

(1) One year after the date the person was sent a report that adequately disclosed the facts constituting a claim provided, however, that if the governing instrument provides that claims shall survive for a period longer than 1 year after such date, then claims shall survive for the period specified in the governing instrument;

(2) In the case of any trustee who is resigning, has resigned, is being removed, has been removed, is ceasing to serve, or has ceased to serve as trustee for any other reason (including on account of the termination of the trust by reason of liquidation or by reason of a merger or similar transaction described in § 3341 of this title), 120 days after the date the person was sent a report that:

a. Notifies the person that the trustee is resigning, has resigned, is being removed, has been removed, is ceasing to serve, or has ceased to serve;

b. Adequately discloses the facts constituting a claim; and

c. Adequately discloses the time allowed under this section for initiating proceedings against the former trustee;

provided that the trustee transfers the trust property to the appropriate successors in interest within a reasonable period of time following the expiration of the 120-day period; or

(3) The date the proceeding was otherwise precluded by adjudication, release, consent, limitation or pursuant to the terms of the governing instrument.

(b) For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section, a report adequately discloses the facts constituting a claim if it provides sufficient information so that the person knows of the claim or reasonably should have inquired into its existence. Also, for the purpose of commencing the 1-year period in paragraph (a)(1) of this section or the 120-day period in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, either period shall begin when the report is received by the person to whom the report was sent. Absent evidence to the contrary, it shall be presumed that the report was received by the person 7 days after it was sent to such person in accordance with § 3534 of this title.

(c) For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section, a person is deemed to have been sent a report if:

(1) In the case of a person having capacity, it is sent to the person;

(2) In the case of a person who is a beneficiary and who under § 3547 of this title may be represented and bound by another person, it is sent to the other person; or

(3) In the case of a person who is a beneficiary and who under § 3339 of this title is represented and bound by a designated representative, it is sent to the designated representative.

(d) For the purpose of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section, a person who has been sent a report (including a person described under paragraph (c)(2) or (c)(3) of this section who is sent a report on behalf of another) may waive the period specified in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section (or any portion remaining of such period) by an instrument in writing executed by such person and delivered to the trustee who sent the report. Upon delivery of such instrument to the trustee who sent the report, the period under paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section, as applicable, shall be deemed to have expired with respect to the person to whom the report was sent (or was deemed to have been sent pursuant to subsection (c) of this section).

(e) If subsection (a) of this section does not apply, a judicial proceeding by a person against a trustee for breach of trust or other claim must be commenced within 5 years after the first to occur of:

(1) The removal, resignation, or death of the trustee;

(2) The termination of the person’s interest in the trust; or

(3) The termination of the trust.

(f) This section does not preclude an action to recover for fraud or misrepresentation related to the report or an action related to a trustee’s administration of assets during or following expiration of any period provided in this section.

(g) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary within this section, nothing within this section shall expand any period during which any claims may be brought against the estate of a deceased individual fiduciary, or trust of such fiduciary that was revocable by such fiduciary immediately before such fiduciary’s death, under any law of such deceased fiduciary’s domicile that governs claims against such deceased fiduciary’s estate or such trust.

72 Del. Laws, c. 388, §  776 Del. Laws, c. 254, §  1581 Del. Laws, c. 149, § 281 Del. Laws, c. 320, § 582 Del. Laws, c. 278, § 283 Del. Laws, c. 343, § 584 Del. Laws, c. 182, § 10
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 2015–2026 · leading case: Erick Rohl v. Stephen Rohl, Tr. of the Adolph E. Rohl Trust (Del. Ch. 2026).
Erick Rohl v. Stephen Rohl, Tr. of the Adolph E. Rohl Trust (Del. Ch. 2026). · cites it 3× “3 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by 12 Del. C. § 3585 (“Section 3585”) because in Defendant’s view, Plaintiff received disclosures sufficient to trigger the statute’s one-year period.”
Ralph Paul Deputy v. Jay Christian Deputy (Del. Ch. 2020). “First, Paul contends that 12 Del. C. § 3585 grants a beneficiary five years to sue for breach of trust, and that because 135 limitations when determining whether Paul unreasonably delayed in bringing his claims against Jay.”
Frieda Rogers v. Wilmington Trust Co. (3rd Cir. 2022). “12 Despite this, we affirm the District Court’s alternative finding that the statute of limitations in 12 Del. C. § 3585 barred the excessive fees claim.”
Rogers v. Wilmington Trust Co. (D. Del. 2021). “This suit was not filed until March 2017; and thus any claim based on Wilmington Trust’s fees is barred by 12 Del. C. § 3585, which precludes claims brought more than two years after a “beneficiary was sent a report that.”
Pimpaktra A. Rust v. Vina Elise Rust, Chakdhari Anissa Rust, & The Bryn Mawr Trust Co. of Delaware (Del. Ch. 2025). “The notice advised Pim of the 120-day period in which she could bring a claim against Bryn Mawr under 12 Del. C. § 3585(a)(2). Am. Compl., Ex. U.”
Margaret C. Ughetta v. Mary Harding Cist, individually, as of Est. of John David Cist, & as Tr. of the Supp Trust Agreement of John David Cist (Del. Ch. 2015). “136 12 Del. C. § 3585 provides: “In a judicial proceeding involving a trust, the court, as justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the trust that is the subject of the…”
— 12 Del. C. § 3585(a)(1) — 1 case
Erick Rohl v. Stephen Rohl, Tr. of the Adolph E. Rohl Trust (Del. Ch. 2026). “3 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by 12 Del. C. § 3585 (“Section 3585”) because in Defendant’s view, Plaintiff received disclosures sufficient to trigger the statute’s one-year period.”
— 12 Del. C. § 3585(a)(2) — 1 case
Pimpaktra A. Rust v. Vina Elise Rust, Chakdhari Anissa Rust, & The Bryn Mawr Trust Co. of Delaware (Del. Ch. 2025). “The notice advised Pim of the 120-day period in which she could bring a claim against Bryn Mawr under 12 Del. C. § 3585(a)(2). Am. Compl., Ex. U.”
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