Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991). · Go Syfert
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Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“aggravated battery with the use of a deadly weapon, section 784.045(1)(b), is not subject to reclassification pursuant to section 775.087(1) because the use of a weapon is an essential element of the crime.”
79 citation events (40 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Delmoral v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Polk County) (flmd, 2020-12-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Delmoral v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Polk County)
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
aggravated battery with the use of a deadly weapon, section 784.045(1)(b), is not subject to reclassification pursuant to section 775.087(1) because the use of a weapon is an essential element of the crime.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lateef Garnes v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Thus, “the crime of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm is subject to enhancement under section 775.087(1) while the crime of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon is not.” Harrell v. State, 150 So. 3d 858, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citing Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yegge v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Consequently, we conclude that Mendenhall was properly sentenced to thirty-five years with a thirty-five-year mandatory minimum, notwithstanding the statutory maximum of thirty years contained in section 775.082 for Mendenhall’s offense.”); Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991) (explaining that the defendant’s “maximum guideline sentence” included the section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1985), enhancement).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“Aggravated battery with a firearm is not subject to reclassification pursuant to section 775.087(1) because the use of a firearm is an essential element of the crime.” Jacobs v. State, 954 So.2d 1268,1269 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991); Dozier v. State, 677 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) O'Meara v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Our holding is entirely consistent with the legislative goals of the aggravated battery statute: “[T]he legislative intent [of the aggravated battery statute is] increasing punishment as the degree of actual injury or 'potential for serious injury becomes great..." Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Honeycutt v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
For purposes of enhancement, a special interrogatory asked the jury to determine whether the appellant used a knife during the incident, to which it answered “yes.” Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991), states: “[Ejection 775.087(1) permits reclassification and the consequential enhancement of penalties for the crime of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, section 784.045(l)(a), when a weapon is used to commit the crime.” That is what occurred in this case.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jacobs v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991); Dozier v. State, 677 So.2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hazen v. Allstate Ins. Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991) ("[W]hen two conflicting or ambiguous provisions of the same legislative act were intended to serve the same purpose, they must be read in pari materia to ascertain the overall legislative intent and to harmonize the provisions so that the fullest effect can be given to each.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
The offense of aggravated battery is reclassified as a first-degree felony pursuant to 775.087(1)(b) when the crime involves a deadly weapon or firearm, unless "the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element" of the charge. § 775.087(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000); Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 814 (Fla.1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Robbins (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Id. at 814-15 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
In the context of whether this information properly charges an aggravated battery, however, the following explanation from Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991), is instructive: Under this statutory interpretation, the punishment for battery increases as the degree of actual injury or potential for serious injury becomes greater.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cargle v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 814-15 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nathan v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
See id.; Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435, 438-39 (Fla.1992); Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 814-15 (Fla.1991); Lafleur v. State, 661 So.2d 346, 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Grant v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
See id.; Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435, 438-39 (Fla.1992); Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 814-15 (Fla.1991); Lafleur v. State, 661 So.2d 346, 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McNeal v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
We conclude that, as in Isaac v. State, 620 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), and Brown v. State, 583 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the use of a weapon became an essential element of the offense in this case, even though use of a weapon is not always an essential element of aggravated battery, Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The jury found appellant guilty of "aggravated battery causing great bodily harm with a weapon." [1] We affirm on the authority of Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991) [2] ("section 775.087(1) permits reclassification and the consequential enhancement of penalties for the crime of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, section 784.045(1)(a), *600 when a weapon is used to commit the crime."); Hayward v. State, 590 So.2d 976 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); cf. Randolph v. State, 591 So.2d 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), rev. denied, 634 So.2d 626 (Fla. Jan. 24, 1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Torris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991) (aggravated battery with the use of a deadly weapon not subject to reclassification pursuant to section 775.087(1) because the use of a weapon is an essential element of the crime); State v. Brown, 476 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1985); § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991); see Watson v. State, 591 So.2d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hayward v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991).
cited Cited "see" SECRET JACKSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 1991); see also Stoute v. State, 915 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (same).
cited Cited "see" Harrell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991).
cited Cited "see" Oliver v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 814-15 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited "see" Aroche v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991).
cited Cited "see" Howard v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Collins v. State, 800 So.2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).- Consequently, the imposed PRR sentence of thirty years in prison is not illegal as Howard claims.
cited Cited "see" Perry v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Cargle v. State, 829 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (1991).
cited Cited "see" Crawford v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Bogdanon v. State, 763 So.2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
discussed Cited "see" Young v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991) (finding that aggravated battery predicated on use of a deadly weapon is not subject to reclassification pursuant to section 775.087(1) because the use of the weapon is an essential element of the crime); Osorio v. State, 746 So.2d 490, 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that reclassification was error because the information and jury instructions established that the use of a firearm was an essential element of aggravated assault); McCormack v. State, 728 So.2d 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that aggravated battery charge should not be reclassi…
cited Cited "see" Garayoa v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991) (aggravated battery causing great bodily harm and involving the use of a deadly weapon can be enhanced to a first degree felony).
cited Cited "see" Byrd v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Torris v. State, 611 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
discussed Cited "see" Drumwright v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991) (aggravated battery predicated on use of a deadly weapon is not subject to reclassification pursuant to section 775.087(1) because the use of the weapon is an essential element of the crime).
cited Cited "see" Gause v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited "see" Traylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Amlotte v. State, 456 So.2d 448, 449 (Fla.1984). [5] The Gonzalez Court distinguished Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991) on its facts.
cited Cited "see" Conn v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Baxley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991) (when two conflicting or ambiguous provisions of the same legislative act were intended *833 to serve the same purpose, they must be read in pari materia to ascertain the overall legislative intent and to harmonize the provisions so that the fullest effect can be given to each); Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (a law should be construed in harmony with any other statute having the same purpose; where statutes operate on the same subject without plain inconsistency or repugnancy, if possible courts should construe…
cited Cited "see" Armstrong v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited "see" Alexander v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited "see" Garmon v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
Torris v. State, 611 So.2d 57, 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); see Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991) (aggravated battery with the use of a deadly weapon is not subject to reclassification).
cited Cited "see" Harrelson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1991); Brown v. State, 583 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
cited Cited "see" Isaac v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991) and Brown v. State, 583 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
cited Cited "see" Moore v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1991).
discussed Cited "see" Lamont v. State
Fla. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lareau, 573 So.2d at 814 (because conviction was based on great bodily harm provision of aggravated *439 battery statute rather than on use of deadly weapon provision, the use of a weapon was not an essential element of offense and section 775.087(1) could be used to enhance offense).
cited Cited "see" Rodriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jose A. Perez-Flores v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991); Brady v. State, 65 So.3d 599, 601 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Hernandez v. State, 30 So.3d 610, 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Benjamin v. State, 8 So.3d 460, 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Webb v. State, 997 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hernandez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Metz v. State, 15 So.3d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Benjamin v. State, 8 So.3d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Torris v. State, 611 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Stoute v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991); Legg v. State, 742 So.2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); McNeal v. State, 653 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Brown v. State, 583 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Martin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
Grant v. State, 677 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Nathan v. State, 689 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). [2] There is a seeming inconsistency in the sentencing order in circuit court case number 82-3074.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Lovett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Grant v. State, 677 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 814-15 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited "see, e.g." White v. State
Fla. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Gonzalez v. State, 585 So.2d 932, 933 (Fla.1991); see also Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Peacock v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Nesbitt v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Gonzalez v. State, 585 So.2d 932 (Fla.1991); see also Lareau v. State, 554 So.2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), approved, 573 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1991).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Hill v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1991).
Hervey LAREAU, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
75385.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan 10, 1991.
573 So. 2d 813
Per Curiam.
Cited by 67 opinions  |  Published

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tanja Ostapoff and Eric M. Cumfer, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Patricia G. Lampert and John M. Koenig, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We accepted jurisdiction to resolve an asserted conflict between Lareau v. State, 554 So.2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), and Bradfield v. State, 438 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).[1] The issue is whether section 775.087(1) of the Florida Statutes (1985) authorizes a trial court to reclassify aggravated battery from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony when the defendant uses a deadly weapon to commit the offense defined in section 784.045(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1985). We conclude that it does, and we approve the decision of the court below.

The state filed an information charging Hervey Lareau with attempted first-degree murder by shooting Hortense Lareau with a handgun. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Lareau signed a written acknowledgment and waiver of rights. In that form, he agreed to plead to the lesser offense of "Aggravated Battery (great bodily harm) w/ firearm," with the understanding that his sentence would be the maximum allowed by the guidelines, including a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for the use of a firearm in the commission of a[*814] felony.[2] Lareau and the state, however, did not agree on what the maximum guideline sentence should be. Lareau argued that the offense should be scored as a second-degree felony.[3] The state contended that it should be scored as a first-degree felony.[4] The trial court agreed with the state and sentenced Lareau to four years' imprisonment, including the three-year minimum mandatory term. The district court affirmed the sentence. Lareau v. State, 554 So.2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

Lareau claims that the offense to which he pled was a second-degree felony based on section 784.045(2) of the Florida Statutes (1985), which provides:

784.045 Aggravated battery. —
(1) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or
(b) Uses a deadly weapon.
(2) Whoever commits aggravated battery shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The state argues that Lareau pled guilty to aggravated battery causing great bodily harm pursuant to section 784.045(1)(a), and not to aggravated battery with the use of a deadly weapon pursuant to section 784.045(1)(b); that his use of a firearm thus was incidental to the offense to which he pled; and that because the use of a weapon or firearm was not an element of section 784.045(1)(a), the trial court appropriately reclassified the crime as a first-degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1)(b). That statute provides in relevant part:

775.087 Possession or use of weapon; aggravated battery; felony reclassification; minimum sentence. —
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, whenever a person is charged with a felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element, and during the commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm, or during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery, the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:
... .
(b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, to a felony of the first degree.

By basing Lareau's conviction on section 784.045(1)(a) and not on section 784.045(1)(b), the trial and district courts determined, as the state argues here, that the use of a weapon was not an essential element of the crime, and therefore section 775.087(1)(b) could be used to enhance the penalty. Lareau alleges that the Fourth District Court's decision conflicts with Bradfield, where the Second District Court said "aggravated battery is already an enhanced penalty offense not subject to being further enhanced by the use of section 775.087(1)." Bradfield, 438 So.2d at 1005.

The facts of this case require us to examine the interplay of the reclassification statute, section 775.087(1), with the aggravated battery statute, section 784.045. We first note that both provisions took their current form in the same legislative act, chapter 74-383, sections 9, 20, Laws of Florida. There, the legislature created the reclassification statute, section[*815] 775.087, and substantially reworded the aggravated battery statute by adding to section 784.045 subsection (1)(b) to reclassify as a second-degree felony the misdemeanor crime of simple battery when the battery is committed with a deadly weapon. Both sections 775.087 and 784.045 were intended to serve the same purpose: to increase the punishment of violent felonies as the degree of actual injury or potential for serious injury becomes great. This Court has long followed the rule that when two conflicting or ambiguous provisions of the same legislative act were intended to serve the same purpose, they must be read in pari materia to ascertain the overall legislative intent and to harmonize the provisions so that the fullest effect can be given to each. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fla. Jai Alai, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 112 So.2d 825, 828 (Fla. 1959) (citing Florida State Racing Comm'n v. McLaughlin, 102 So.2d 574, 575 (Fla. 1958)).

As we read the two provisions at issue, section 784.045(1)(a) effectively reclassifies as a second-degree felony the crime of simple battery, section 784.03 of the Florida Statutes (1985), when the defendant, without the use of a deadly weapon, knowingly or intentionally causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. Section 784.045(1)(b) effectively reclassifies as a second-degree felony the crime of simple battery when a deadly weapon is used, by supplementing the statutory definition of aggravated battery to include the use of a deadly weapon. Simple battery, a first-degree misdemeanor, is not subject to reclassification pursuant to section 775.087(1), which applies only to felonies. Aggravated battery with the use of a deadly weapon, section 784.045(1)(b), is not subject to reclassification pursuant to section 775.087(1) because the use of a weapon is an essential element of the crime. However, section 775.087(1) permits reclassification and the consequential enhancement of penalties for the crime of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, section 784.045(1)(a), when a weapon is used to commit the crime.

Under this statutory interpretation, the punishment for battery increases as the degree of actual injury or potential for serious injury becomes greater. For example, a simple battery without the use of a deadly weapon is a first-degree misdemeanor (section 784.03); a simple battery involving the use of a deadly weapon is a second-degree felony (statutorily redefined by section 784.045(1)(b) as aggravated battery); aggravated battery causing great bodily harm is a second-degree felony (section 784.045(1)(a)); and aggravated battery causing great bodily harm and involving the use of a deadly weapon is a first-degree felony (section 784.045(1)(a), enhanced by section 775.087(1) by virtue of the use of a weapon or firearm). This interpretation gives consistent effect to both the felony reclassification statute and the provision defining aggravated battery involving the use of a deadly weapon, and it conforms with the legislative intent of increasing the punishment of violent crimes that involve a weapon or firearm. It is also consistent with the language in section 775.087(1) providing for reclassification of felonies where the use of a weapon or firearm is not an essential element of the crime.

Moreover, in light of the legislative intent of increasing punishment as the degree of actual injury or potential for serious injury becomes great, it is improbable that the legislature would provide for reclassification of other felonies while excluding aggravated battery, which involves bodily harm, from the reach of the reclassification statute.

For the reasons stated above, we approve the decision below and disapprove Bradfield to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT and GRIMES, JJ., and EHRLICH, Senior Justice, concur.

KOGAN, J., dissents.

1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
2 Section 775.087(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1985) provides:

(2) Any person who is convicted of:

(a) Any murder, sexual battery, robbery, burglary, arson, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping, escape, breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, or aircraft piracy, or any attempt to commit the aforementioned crimes ...

... .

and who had in his possession a "firearm," as defined in s. 790.001(6) ... shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 calendar years.

The application of this provision is not in issue here.

3 The recommended guideline sentence for a second-degree felony was twelve to thirty months' imprisonment.
4 The recommended guideline range for a first-degree felony was three and one-half to four and one-half years' imprisonment.