Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Ms. Coffin was charged with the misdemeanor of obstruction of justice without violence under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 843.02. Mr. Coffin was charged with several felonies: two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.07(2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with violence under Fla....

...Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer (BOLEO) Under the Florida Statutes, battery is a crime, but it is not always a felony. Two battery statutes are relevant in this case: simple battery, section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2006), and battery on a law enforcement officer, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...itting an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer . . . the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: . . . (b) in the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree. § 784.07(2)(b) (emphasis added)....

...We apply the Perkins statutory elements test to resolve the conflict. That test is designed to determine whether an offense involves the use or threat of physical force or violence. In applying the Perkins test, we analyze the elements of the battery statute from which BOLEO derives its conduct element. See § 784.07, Fla....

...Explanation of amendment: This instruction begins on page 77 of the manual. The Note to Judge is added to bring F.S. 775.0823 to the court's attention in appropriate cases. [Page A-30] *1208 ASSAULT OFON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER (Amended) F.S. 784.07A(2)(a) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Assault on a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the State must prove the following six elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....

...The court now instructs you that (name of official position of victim designated in charge) is a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. Explanation of proposed changes: The instruction is on page 92 of the manual. The changes are editorial. [Page A-31] *1209 BATTERY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER (Amended) F.S. 784.07B(2)(b) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Battery of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....

...in charge) is a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. Explanation of proposed changes: The instruction is on page 93 of the manual. The changes are editorial. [Page A-32] *1210 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER (New) F.S. 784.07(2)(c) Before you can find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the state must prove the following seven elements beyond a reasonable doubt....

...to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily alleged harm. Give if 4a It is not necessary for the state to prove that the alleged defendant had an intent to kill. Explanation of proposed instruction: This instruction is new based on F.S. 784.07(2)(c), which was created in 1988. The wording is similar to the instruction for assault of law enforcement officer on page 92 of the manual. [Page A-34] *1212 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER (New) F.S. 784.07(2)(d) Before you can find the defendant guilty of aggravated battery of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the state must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt....

...er]. [Page A-35] *1213 Definition; A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened give if 2b to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily alleged harm. Explanation of proposed instruction: This instruction is new based on F.S. 784.07(2)(d), which was created in 1988....

...Improper exhibition of dangerous weapons or firearms — 790.10 Discharging firearms in public — 790.15 Culpable negligence — Culpable negligence — None 784.05(2) 784.05(1) Assault of law None Attempt enforcement officer — Assault — 784.011 [*e] 784.07(2) Battery of law None Attempt enforcement officer — Battery — 784.03 [*e] 784.07(2) Kidnapping — 787.01 False imprisonment — 787.02 Attempt Aggravated assault — 784.021(1)(b) Battery — 784.03(1)(a) Assault — 784.011 [Page A-76] *1254 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 False imprisonment — None Attempt 787.02 Assa...

...dently opened, dousing Aho with concentrated cayenne pepper spray ("It burns like hell."). McLaughlin was charged inter alia with two counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer in violation of sections 784.021 (aggravated assault) and 784.07 (enhancement provision for assault on a law enforcement officer), Florida Statutes (1995). He was convicted on both counts and the district court affirmed, holding that Federal Protection Service officers are law enforcement officers for purposes of section 784.07. Section 784.07 provides that when an assault or battery is committed against a law enforcement officer the offense shall be reclassified upward one degree, e.g., an aggravated assault is enhanced from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony. The statute sets forth a comprehensive list of "law enforcement officers": 784.07 Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or other *1172 specified officers; reclassification of offenses; minimum sentences.— (1)(a) As used in this section, the term "law enforcement officer" includes a law enforcement o...

...tatutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused. § 775.021, Fla. Stat. (1995). Applying the above principles to the present statutes, we note that section 784.07(1)(a) states that "the term `law enforcement officer' includes a law enforcement officer ......

...943.10." Section 943.10 provides at the outset that "`[l]aw enforcement officer' means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof." The meaning of these *1173 words cannot be plainer: A "law enforcement officer" for section 784.07 purposes must be either a state or local officer....

...d States government—i.e., they were both veterans of the United States Federal Protection Service. Although they performed a laudable service for the people of Miami and the State of Florida, they were not law enforcement officers within the orb of section 784.07....

...WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion. OVERTON, Justice, concurring. I concur. I write only to suggest that the legislature consider adding federal law enforcement officers to be within the definition of law enforcement officers under the provisions of section 784.07....

...I do not believe this Court has jurisdiction because the decision of the third District is not in conflict with C.L. v. State, 693 So.2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), which held that a Palm Beach County School Board police officer is a law enforcement officer within the meaning of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...for six days. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence does not support a flight instruction. The second jury-instruction issue challenges the trial court's instruction as to the two charges of battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1985), which defines the substantive offense, requires as an essential element proof that the victim was in fact a law enforcement officer....

...State, 677 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla.1996) (reiterating that courts must construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another). Section 843.01 is part of a statutory scheme that is designed to protect law enforcement officers and ensure that they are able to perform their duties. For example, section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2002), states that "[w]henever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ....

...is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified." [9] For purposes *1115 of our analysis, it is significant that we have previously held that knowledge of the officer's status is an essential element of this offense even though section 784.07(2) lacks specific language to that effect. See Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692; Street v. State, 383 So.2d 900, 900 (Fla. 1980). [10] The language of section 784.07 is almost identical to that of section 843.01—both statutes include the word "knovvingly," followed by a proscribed act upon an officer. Compare § 784.07(2), Fla....

...Although the actus reus or proscribed acts are distinct, i.e., "assault and battery" versus "resists, obstructs, or opposes," the requisite mens rea or mental state is comparable. Therefore, because the Court has previously held that "knowingly" in section 784.07 includes knowledge of the officer's status, it would be unreasonable for the Court not to similarly conclude that "knowingly and willfully" in section 843.01 includes knowledge of the officer's status....

...directly relating to crimes against law enforcement officers as requiring knowledge of an officer's status despite a lack of specific language to that effect. See Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692 (concluding that battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2) and attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(3) include knowledge of the officer's status as an essential element); Cooper, 742 So.2d at 858 (concluding that resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02 requires proof of defendant's knowledge of officer's status)....

...to convict the defendant." Polite, 934 So.2d at 497. [8] Although section 775.082 was amended in 2005, see ch. 2005-28, § 4, Laws of Fla., the revision does not affect the specific text or principles for which this provision is cited. [9] Although section 784.07(2) was amended in 2002, see ch....

...2007-112, § 1, Laws of Fla., the revisions did not amend the text mentioned above or the principles for which the provision was cited. [10] Additionally, this Court previously held that knowledge of an officer's status was also an essential element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under the 1993 version of section 784.07(3). See State v. Barnum, 921 So.2d 513, 517 (Fla.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 493, 166 L.Ed.2d 365 (2006); Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692. Although the 1993 version of section 784.07(3) did not include specific language regarding knowledge of the officer's status, we nevertheless concluded that if the underlying crime of battery required the defendant to know of the officer's status then the greater offense of attempted murder of an officer should also require such knowledge. See Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692. We note that section 784.07(3) has been amended since 1993 and no longer includes the offense of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(3), Fla....

...James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Karen Kinney, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, for Appellee, Cross-Appellant. SHAW, Justice. We have for review Iacovone v. State, 639 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), wherein the district court declared sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991), invalid as applied to Alan Iacovone....

...When Deputy Hogsten approached, Iacovone ran to his own car and attempted to flee, striking the officer with the car. Iacovone was convicted of attempted third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term pursuant to sections 784.07 and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...death or life without parole Second-degree murder ........... imprisonment not exceeding 30 years, with a 25 year mandatory minimum term Third-degree murder ............ imprisonment not exceeding 15 years, with a 15 year mandatory minimum term See §§ 775.082, 775.0823, 782.04, Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 784.07 addresses attempted murder of a law enforcement officer and makes the crime a life felony: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the...

...duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. § 784.07(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 775.0825 in turn provides for a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. Such sentence shall *1373 not be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001 [sentencing guidelines]. § 775.0825, Fla. Stat. (1991). It is the State's position that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply to all three degrees of murder and result in the following across-the-board penalty scheme: Attempted first-degree murder ..............

...officers are constantly exposed to great risk of personal injury and death, and consequently are entitled to the greatest protection which can be provided through the laws of this state."). This goal undoubtedly played a role in the enacting of sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825. We fail to see how this goal is furthered by applying sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to all degrees of murder....

...nt officer is greater than the penalty for the attempt. This is a logical arrangement that reasonably advances the legislature's goal of providing law enforcement officers with the greatest protection possible under state laws. We hold that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder....

...atutes (1981): "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or the threat of violence to the person." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, prior to sentencing, appellant had been convicted under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1981), for battery of a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony....

...and of armed robbery. On appeal, Thompson alleged the trial court erred by denying his requested jury instruction that knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...require that the defendant had knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer. The decision of the district court in this case directly conflicts with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Grinage v. State , which found that section 784.07(3) created a new substantive offense and that knowledge of the victim's status as an officer was a necessary element of that offense. Grinage, 641 So.2d at 1365. This Court granted conflict review. The issue in this case is whether knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under subsection (3) of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...[2] We answer this question in the affirmative and hold that knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense. The statute at issue is titled "Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or other specified officers: reclassification of offenses." Section 784.07(2) and (3) are relevant to our analysis, and state in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ......

...While the jury's status as fact finder implicates the notion that a substantive offense has been created under the statute, we need not reach this question to resolve the issue here. We hold that knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...element of the offense at issue. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion. WELLS, Justice, dissenting. I dissent because I cannot agree with the majority's construction of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...I agree with this analysis and would apply the statute as written by the legislature. [3] Even if resort to extrinsic aids were required in order to interpret this subdivision, the majority fails to address the significance of the fact that in 1995, the legislature removed this subdivision from section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), and reenacted this statute as section 775.0823, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The majority should honor the legislature's clear expression on this question. Furthermore, the majority should state whether its analysis is applicable to section 775.0823, Florida Statutes (1995), since its reasoning is dependent upon the knowledge element of section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...l after a detective's allegedly prejudicial testimony. We resolve the conflict, but decline to address the additional issues. [3] I also cannot agree with the majority's analysis that because attempted first-degree murder is a specific-intent crime, section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), should be read to include a knowledge requirement....

...99-188, § 1, at 1040; § 3, at 1042-50; § 6, at 1051-52, Laws of Fla. Most of the remaining sections address sentences, primarily those to be imposed on violent or repeat felony offenders. Section 2 amends the prison releasee reoffender portion of section 775.082, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998); section 4 amends *547 section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was approved in 2007. See Small v. State, 889 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). 8.10 ASSAULT ON A [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [ FIREFIGHTER], ETC. § 784.07(2)(a), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) . Lesser Included Offenses --------------------------------------------------------- ASSAULT ON LAW [ENFORCEMENT OFFICER] [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. 784.07(2)(a) --------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...------------------------------ Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 --------------------------------------------------------- Comment Several statutes have been added in recent years providing for reclassification of assaults and batteries on designated classes: §§ 784.074, 784.075, 784.076, 784.078, 784.081, 784.082, 784.083, and 784.085. This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007. 8.11 BATTERY ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) . Lesser Included Offenses ----------------------------------------------------- BATTERY ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER] [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. 784.07(2)(b) ----------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...1 ----------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007. 8.12 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...Give if 4a alleged. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to kill. Lesser Included Offenses ---------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], ETC. — 784.07(2)(c) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Aggravated assault 784.021 8.2 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Assault on law on 784.07(2)(a) 8.10 enforcement officer ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Assault 784.011 8.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------...

...--------------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was approved in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and amended in 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007. 8.13 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. § 784.07(2)(d), Fla....

...A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Lesser Included Offenses ---------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. — 784.07(2)(d) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...---------------------------------------------------------------------- Aggravated battery 784.045 8.4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Felony battery 784.041 8.5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Battery on 784.07(2)(b) 8.11 enforcement officer ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Battery 784.03 8.3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 -----------------------------...

...on. Florida law specifies that an essential element of any assault, including aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, is an act creating a well founded fear in the victim that violence is imminent. Compare § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (1989) with § 784.07(2), Fla....

...y involve the other. Under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1979), one could obstruct or oppose a law enforcement officer by threatening violence and still at the same time not be committing a battery on the law enforcement officer as proscribed in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Upon arriving, the officers tried to extricate Weaver and his brother from the crowd. Weaver refused to comply, prompting an officer to push him away. Weaver twice shoved the officer in the chest. He was arrested and charged with battery on a law enforcement officer (BOLEO) under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2005). Weaver, 916 So.2d at 896. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes, makes it a felony to commit BOLEO....

...Anderson, Jr. and C. Marie King, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. Appellant has prosecuted an appeal in this Court following an order of the trial judge denying his motion to dismiss. Because the order upheld the validity of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In the police station appellant struck a law enforcement officer in the mouth. On December 13, 1976, a felony information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit charging appellant with battery of a law enforcement officer pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976). [1] He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On January 20, 1977, by a motion to dismiss, appellant challenged the constitutionality of Section 784.07 on the grounds that it reclassifies the offense of battery of a police officer from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree, and that such reclassification in this instance is violative of equal protection of the law....

...The motion to dismiss was denied. Thereafter, appellant changed his plea to nolo contendere, specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of the pretrial motion. Appellant was then sentenced to two years probation. Appellant now contends that Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...treatment; (2) it vests unlimited discretion in the prosecutor to file, on identical conduct, either a felony or a misdemeanor information because the prosecutor may charge someone who commits an assault or battery upon a police officer under either Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...statute because the language of the statute specifically states that the term "law enforcement officer" is not limited to the officers enumerated in the statute. Because we find appellant's arguments unpersuasive, we uphold the constitutionality of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...the public safety and welfare. See Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1972); Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1970). With regard to his second point on appeal, appellant notes that prior to the enactment of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), battery on a police officer constituted an offense under Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1975), the misdemeanor statute. Since Section 784.03 was not repealed or modified by the enactment of Section 784.07, appellant suggests that the prosecutor may file under the felony or the misdemeanor statute. Appellant concludes this unbridled discretion in the prosecutor must invalidate the statute at issue. While we agree that the prosecutor has the discretion to charge under either Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Traditionally, the legislature has left to the prosecutor's discretion which violations to prosecute and hence which range of penalties to visit upon the offender. Id. at 22. In sum, simply because the Government could have proven a violation by appellant of both Sections 784.03 and 784.07 but decided to prove its case under Section 784.07, appellant's right to equal protection is not violated....

...nts of knowingly and willfully resisting, obstructing or opposing the specifically designated class of officers by offering or doing *273 violence to the person of the officer while the officer is in the lawful execution of a legal duty. Conversely, Section 784.07 subjects the accused to prosecution for a felony without regard to the seriousness of the injury which he causes....

...uries without overextending the scope of a felony level statute. Consequently, while appellant concedes that Section 843.01 falls within the legislative purview of legislating for the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, he argues that Section 784.07 does not. Sections 843.01 and 784.07 will frequently overlap, and a prosecutor is imbued again with the discretion to decide under which statute he wishes to charge. Although appellant is correct in noting that Section 843.01 contains different elements which must be proven, it does not necessarily follow that Section 784.07 falls outside the legislative authority to denominate conduct as criminal. For the reasons heretofore stated, the legislature was well within its reach in enacting the challenged statute. In those situations where an accused may be charged under either statute but the elements of Section 843.01 are difficult to prove, Section 784.07 effectively "closes the gap" by permitting prosecution under the latter statute. Finally, appellant contends that the statute gives the prosecutor the additional discretion of determining who constitutes a law enforcement officer, thereby allowing him to decide who is within the purview of the increased penalty aspect of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...This rule of statutory construction is based on the principle that if the legislature had intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, they would not have made mention of the particular classes. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 332, pp. 658-60 (1953). Accordingly, the prosecutor may charge under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...be devoid of the constitutional deficiencies asserted and, accordingly, affirm the order of the trial judge denying appellant's motion to dismiss. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla....

...ment if a violation of the misdemeanor statute invariably constituted a violation of the felony statute. Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972). In the instant case, a violation of § 784.03 would not invariably constitute a violation of § 784.07....

...Although the underlying facts of Weaver are similar to those presented here, we find that the Second District misapplied this Court's decision in holding that the instruction in this case was not fundamental error. In Weaver, the defendant was tried for the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07, Fla....

...ffense of battery of a law enforcement officer. Merritt. The Fifth District certified conflict with the decision of the First District in Fredericks. In Fredericks, the appellant was charged with aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), after he raised a knife and took a step toward an officer who had responded to a 911 call involving a domestic disturbance. Fredericks, 675 So.2d at 990. The appellant was convicted of the lesser *385 offense of attempted aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer. Id. at 989-90. The First District reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which enhances the penalty for aggravated assault when it is inflicted on a law enforcement officer, does not specify an offense labeled attempted aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and therefore, the offense does not exist. Id. at 990. Merritt argues here that the First District's reasoning in Fredericks applies to this case, and thus we should find that the absence of the offense of attempted battery of a law enforcement officer from the language of section 784.07(2) indicates that the offense does not exist. We agree that section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), does not include the offenses of attempted battery or attempted aggravated assault. Thus, neither attempted battery nor attempted aggravated assault can be reclassified based upon section 784.07(2). Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers....

...ficer are nonexistent offenses. See Fredericks, 675 So.2d at 990. This conclusion is in accord with our decision in State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 183 (Fla.1987). In Crumley, we approved in a double-jeopardy context the First District's construction of section 784.07 that "by enacting the enhancement statute, section 784.07, the legislature merely provided for a felony punishment when the victim [of one of the enumerated offenses] is a law enforcement officer." Crumley v....

...In this case, Merritt was convicted of violating section 777.04, Florida Statutes (1995) (attempt), and section 784.03(1), Florida Statutes (1995) (battery). Therefore, we remand with directions that Merritt be resentenced for the offense of attempted battery without felony reclassification based upon section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) (battery of a law enforcement officer)....

...Florida Statutes (1995), which provides that the offense of battery occurs when a person "(a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (b) Intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual"; and section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides in relevant part: Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ......

...We also reverse the conviction of battery of a law enforcement officer in case number 91-1160 and remand for entry of judgment of guilty of simple battery for the following reasons. Mordica filed a motion to dismiss the information charging him with battery of a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), alleging: 1....

...Officer Sullivan also [sic] hit in the nose, while standing behind inmate Milton. *303 2. It is the defendant's position that his behavior above related does not constitute the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer, as that crime is defined by ss. 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...2) the critical intent transferred by the doctrine is only that directed toward the intended victim (the inmate), not the unintended victim (the law enforcement officer). The elements of the offense of battery of a law enforcement officer defined in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), [1] are *304 "1) knowingly 2) actually 3) intentionally 4) touching or striking 5) against the will 6) of a law enforcement officer 7) engaged in the lawful performance of his duties." State v....

...It is "a crime encompassing a requirement of a subjective intent to accomplish a statutorily prohibited result," Linehan at 248, to wit, not simply battery but battery on a law enforcement officer. The battery on a law enforcement officer statute, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), requires that the perpetrator knowingly commit the offense on a law enforcement officer....

...law enforcement officer. Since the record does not support that conclusion in this case, the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the conviction of battery of a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.07 and the sentence in case number 91-1160 is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction and sentence on the lesser included offense of simple battery pursuant to section 784.03....

...harge, we also remand for reconsideration of the revocation in light of only those matters alleged in the affidavit of violation. See Blake v. State, 433 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). REVERSED AND REMANDED. ALLEN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ..., while the officer ......

...s when a person “[‘a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person ... [or] [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.’” United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03, 784.07 (defining battery and battery of a law enforcement officer))....

...Recently, however, the Florida Supreme Court held that battery of a law enforcement officer is not a forcible felony, and does not necessarily involve the use or threat of physical force or violence. See State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 218-20 (Fla. 2007) (discussing Fla. Stat. § 784.07). IV. We interpret the sentencing guidelines according to their plain meaning....

...m, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement, should, be distinguished from Florida felony battery under § 784.03(2), which punishes as a recidivist an offender who has more than one prior battery conviction, and Florida felony battery under § 784.07(2)(b), which applies to an offender who has committed simple battery against a certain kind of victim, such as a police officer....

...Merritt precluded a habitual felony offender sentence, because battery on a law enforcement officer was already an enhancement, and double enhancement was barred by double jeopardy. This timely petition for review followed. In Merritt, we held that section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995) [2] (providing for reclassification of offenses and minimum sentences for assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical care providers, public transit employees or agents, or other specified officers) did not apply to the offense of attempted battery of a law enforcement officer. See id. at 385 ("We agree that section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), does not include the offenses of attempted battery or attempted aggravated assault. Thus, neither attempted battery nor attempted aggravated assault can be reclassified based upon section 784.07(2)."). In so doing, we explained: Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers. At the time the enhancement statute was enacted, the legislature had created the four enumerated offenses in other statutory provisions. Id. (emphasis supplied). We concluded in Merritt that section 784.07 contained "no enhancement or reclassification of penalties for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses." Id. (emphasis supplied). Mills appears to conflict with Merritt because of our statement in Merritt —albeit in the context of determining that section 784.07 did not create the substantive offenses of attempted assault, attempted battery, or attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer—that section 784.07 "is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." 712 So.2d at 385....

...This statement was germane to resolution of the issue before us at that time, and was, therefore (as Judge Browning observed in a separate opinion below), [3] not technically "dicta." However, *1287 as reflected in the language of the statute itself, section 784.07 operates as a reclassification statute....

...rence, it does more than provide for minimum sentences applicable to those offenses; it also reclassifies the enumerated offenses based upon the status of the victim. Cf. Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024, 1030-31 (Fla.1991) (observing that "[s]ection 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1985), which defines the substantive offense [of battery upon a law enforcement officer], requires as an essential element of proof that the victim was in fact a law enforcement officer" (citing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 93)); Grinage v. State, 641 So.2d 1362, 1369 & n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (assuming, without deciding, that section 784.07(3) creates a new substantive offense), approved, 656 So.2d 457 (Fla.1995); Carpentier v. State, 587 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (analyzing the "offense described" in section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), in determining that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague)....

...enalties), section 775.083 (criminal fines) or section 775.084 (habitual offenders) —was amended, and the reference to section 775.084 (habitual offenders) was deleted). We conclude that the Legislature did not intend felony convictions pursuant to section 784.07 to be so excluded. Consistent with this legislative intent, offenses which are thus reclassified as felonies pursuant to section 784.07 qualify as felony offenses for purposes of habitual felony offender status, and such treatment does not offend double jeopardy....

...e doubt. Cf. King v. State, 763 So.2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (observing that, although there "is a logical argument to be made that battery on a law enforcement officer is a separate crime from battery," *1288 this Court's statement in Merritt that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute "should be adhered to by the lower courts," but this did not preclude the Fifth District's holding that King could be sentenced pursuant to both section 784.07 and section 775.084), review denied, 779 So.2d 271 (Fla.2000)....

...e criminal episode); Perez v. State, 772 So.2d 577, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("Also, we do not find that a double jeopardy violation occurred upon imposition of a habitual violent felony offender sentencing following the reclassification, pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997), of appellant's attempted robbery offense for use of a firearm.")....

...oval in Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So.2d 981, 988 (Fla.1981). Here, the Legislature has made the offense of battery, which is otherwise a misdemeanor, a third-degree felony when the victim is a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...ers. Thus, the imposition on a qualifying defendant of one sentence under the habitual felony offender statute for the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer is proper, and not violative of double jeopardy. Indeed, if a conviction pursuant to section 784.07 were not treated as a qualifying offense under section 775.084, this would, in effect, nullify the clear legislative expression of intent to treat battery on a law enforcement officer as a felony....

...This Court determined that the defendant could not be convicted of two separate crimes which addressed the same "evil" and were based upon a single offense. Id. at 184. Here, in contrast, there is only one punishment being imposed for a single offense. That offense is reclassified as a felony pursuant to section 784.07, and therefore constitutes a qualified offense under section 775.084....

...The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph. 5. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding. [2] Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), provides in relevant part: 784.07....

...rritt, it is further understandable that Judge Browning, in "giving ... deference to" the "plain wording of the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Merritt" would be prompted to bring to our attention the fact that the panel majority's conclusion that section 784.07 was not "an enhancement statute in the sense it would not be subject to the double jeopardy bar when combined with another enhancement statute," Mills, 773 So.2d at 652 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), appeare...

...Section 843.01, Florida Statutes states in material part, that "[w]hoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer ... is guilty of a felony in the third degree." (emphasis supplied). Likewise, section 784.07(2) reclassifies a simple battery to a felony in the third degree if the victim is a law enforcement officer "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties." In the present case, the state failed to prove that Deputy Gootee was engaged in the performance of a legal duty at the time of the alleged offenses....

...gher degree, see, e.g., Ex parte Murry, 455 So.2d 72 (Ala. 1984) (murder of police officer capital offense), and affords a rational basis for the reclassification of a crime to a higher offense, see, e.g., Street v. State, 383 So.2d 900 (Fla. 1980) (Section 784.07, Florida Statutes, making battery upon a law enforcement officer a felony, does not viola-se equal protection clause by the special treatment it gives to police officers as victims of batteries); Landrau v....

...V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. In this case we are presented, as we were in Carpenter, with the question of whether resisting an officer with violence, section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983), is a lesser included offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), and again we reach the conclusion that it is not....

...In reaching its conclusion that resisting an officer with violence is a lesser included offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, the district court reasoned "[a]ll the elements contained in section 843.01 must be proved, along with more, in order to sustain a conviction under section 784.07." Henriquez, 463 So.2d at 1180....

...(1983). The elements of battery on a law enforcement officer are 1) knowingly 2) actually 3) intentionally 4) touching or striking 5) against the will 6) of a law enforcement officer 7) engaged in the lawful performance of his duties. §§ 784.03 and 784.07, Fla....

...y involve the other. Under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1979), one could obstruct or oppose a law enforcement officer by threatening violence and still at the same time not be committing a battery on the law enforcement officer as proscribed in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...case. [3] The acts leading to the convictions in Carpenter are indistinguishable from those of the instant case. In Carpenter the defendant attacked a police officer during the course of an arrest. He was then convicted under both section 843.01 and section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...We answer in the affirmative as explained herein and approve the result in Stevens on this issue. Stevens was convicted of attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term pursuant to sections 784.07 [1] and 775.0825, [2] Florida Statutes (Supp.1988)....

...constitutional lens to determine if the case really was constitutional in nature. Applying this concept to Iacovone, I conclude that our decision was constitutional in nature. In a footnote to Iacovone, we alluded to the fact that applying sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to second- and third-degree murder violates due process, because "the guarantee of due process requires that the means selected shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be [attained]." Iacovone, 660 So.2d at 1373 n. 1 (quoting State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla.1986)). The opinion in Iacovone reasoned that allowing section 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to apply to second- and third-degree murder would punish attempts more severely than the completed crime of murder, a means which certainly is not related to the object of discouraging lethal attacks....

...ll factors to that decision. First, the purpose of the rule announced in Iacovone was to prohibit the maximum penalty for an attempt from being greater than that for the completed crime. Second, the reliance on the old rule in this area was minimal. Section 784.07(3) became effective on October 1, 1988, and was struck down on June 8, 1995—a period of only a little more than six years. The old rule had never been approved by this Court before, and very few district courts had ruled on the subject. See generally Carpentier v. State, 587 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (denying a vagueness claim to section 784.07(3)); Gantorius v....

...ANSTEAD, J., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur. WELLS, Justice, dissenting. I agree with Judge Griffin's dissent in the district court. I fear that this decision will prove exceedingly difficult in future application to a never-ending variety of statutory construction situations. NOTES [1] Section 784.07 makes the crime of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer a life felony: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful per...

...duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. § 784.07(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988). [2] Section 775.0825 provides for a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole....

...It only became `nonexistent' when we decided Gray." ). Gray did not implicate matters that were constitutional in nature but rather marked an "evolutionary refinement[] in the criminal law" governing attempts. Witt, 387 So.2d at 929. [7] See Iacovone, 660 So.2d at 1374 ("We hold that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder.")....

...----------------------------------------------------------------- Battery 784.03 8.3 ----------------------------------------------------------------- None ----------------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 2008. 8.10 ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(a), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) . Lesser Included Offenses ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FIREFIGHTER, ETC. 784.07(2)(a) ------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...--------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Comment Several statutes have been added in recent years providing for reclassification of assaults and batteries on designated classes: "784.074, 784.075, 784.076, 784.078, 784.081, 784.082, 784.083, and 784.085. This instruction was adopted in 1981 [431 So.2d 594] and amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007 [962 So.2d 310], and 2008. 8.11 BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) . Lesser Included Offenses BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. 784.07(2)(b) -------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...--------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 [431 So.2d 594] and amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007 [962 So.2d 310], and 2008. 8.12 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Give if 4a alleged. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to kill. Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(c) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT INS. NO. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Aggravated assault 784.021 8.2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assault on law on enforcement officer 784.07(2)(a) 8.10 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assault 784.011 8.1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------------...

...----------------------------------- *1047 Comment This instruction was approved in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and amended in 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007 [962 So.2d 310], and 2008. 8.13 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(d), Fla....

...Definition. Give if 2b alleged. A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Lesser Included Offenses *1048 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FIREFIGHTER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(d) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Aggravated battery 784.045 8.4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Felony battery 784.041 8.5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Battery on enforcement 784.07(2)(b) 8.11 officer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Battery 784.03 8.3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 -----------------------...

...Rodriguez's trial was held in January 2005. She was convicted of resisting an officer with violence, § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (2003), for her attack on the deputy when he was attempting to detain her husband; and battery on a law enforcement officer, § 784.07, Fla....

...Henriquez, 485 So.2d 414, 415-16 (Fla. 1986). An element of both crimes is that the law enforcement officer must be lawfully executing a legal duty when the obstruction or the battery takes place. § 843.01 (requiring that the officer be "in the lawful execution of any legal duty"); § 784.07(2) (specifying that the officer be "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties")....

...2d DCA 2005) (answering in the negative the question of "whether the illegality of a stop during which a suspect allegedly commits resisting with violence and battery of a law enforcement officer causes a failure of the [lawful execution] elements" of sections 784.07(2) and 843.01), quashed, 944 So.2d 340 (Fla.2006), opinion on remand, 947 So.2d 671 (Fla....

...at section 776.051(1) extended beyond an arrest situation to other types of police-citizen encounters. Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Fla. 2006). Noting that the legislature had placed the element of lawful execution of a legal duty in both section 784.07(2) and 843.01, the court explained that in prosecutions under either statute for crimes committed outside an arrest situation, the State must prove that the officer was acting lawfully....

...Accordingly, we must determine whether the State's evidence against Mrs. Rodriguez proved that the deputy was lawfully executing a legal duty at the time of their encounter. [1] *837 Tillman instructs that when determining whether the evidence proved the "lawful execution" elements of sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, we must apply the "legal standards governing the duty undertaken by the law enforcement officer at the point that an assault, battery, or act of violent resistance occurs." 934 So.2d at 1271; see also Yarusso, 942 So.2d at 942....

...Because the State's proof did not establish the crimes for which Mrs. Rodriguez was convicted, we must reverse her convictions. See F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 230-31 (Fla.2003). While the evidence did not prove that there was an unlawful battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07, it did establish the lesser included crime of simple battery under section 784.03(1)....

...er types of police-citizen encounters. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We conclude that the statute, by its plain terms, applies only to arrest situations. In non-arrest cases, in order to convict a defendant under sections 784.07 and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), [1] which define the crimes of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, the State must prove that the officer was "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties"...

...Just then, other deputies jumped on top of Tillman and Henriquez. Tillman did not release his hold on Henriquez until he was pepper sprayed. Tillman, 807 So.2d at 107-08. [3] The jury found Tillman guilty of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.07(2)(d) and resisting an officer with violence pursuant to section 843.01....

...(citing State v. Barnard, 405 So.2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and Lowery v. State, 356 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)). The Fifth District explained that it had extended this rule to the crime of battery on a law enforcement *1268 officer defined by section 784.07 and had applied it to encounters that fall short of a full-blown arrest, including illegal stops, detentions, and contacts....

...n, 807 So.2d at 109. We granted review to resolve the conflict between Taylor and Tillman on the scope of section 776.051(1). ANALYSIS I. Statutory Provisions and Standard of Review The issues in this case require us to construe sections 776.051(1), 784.07, and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 776.051(1) provides: A person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07 enhances the penalties for crimes against law enforcement officers and other enumerated classes of public servants by reclassifying the crimes of assault and battery committed against these persons. The reclassification from misdemeanor to felony or from a lower degree of felony to a higher degree increases the authorized sentences for the crimes. Section 784.07 provides in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, a traffic accident investigation officer...

...Thus, to effectuate its plain meaning and displace the common law no more than necessary, section 776.051(1) is implicated only when a defendant acts violently against an officer in resisting an arrest. We reject the Fifth District's use of the interpretive maxim in pari materia to engraft the prohibition into sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 when an actual arrest is not involved....

...The Legislature has not expressly precluded the defense of justifiable use of force against an officer in situations other than arrest. For this reason, and because the Legislature has placed the element of lawful execution of a legal duty in both sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, proof that the officer was acting lawfully is necessary in a prosecution for crimes committed under either statute that occur outside an arrest scenario....

...stitution). We similarly decline to adopt a more amorphous, hence more subjective, "reasonable officer" test for determining whether an officer is acting in the lawful execution of legal duties as required to establish the crimes defined in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01. Cf. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (characterizing "reasonable officer" test as an attempt "to reach subjective intent through ostensibly objective means"). Therefore, in construing the lawful execution element of sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, courts must apply the legal standards governing the duty undertaken by the law enforcement officer at the point that an assault, battery, or act of violent resistance occurs....

...Our holding that section 776.051(1) applies only in an arrest scenario requires that the State establish the element of lawful execution of a legal duty under the facts of this case. *1274 CONCLUSION Without question, the statutory enhancement of the assault and battery offenses against law enforcement officers in section 784.07, and the "resisting" offenses contained in sections 843.01 and 843.02, Florida Statutes, reflect a strong public interest in the protection of law enforcement officers. However, in making "lawful performance" and "lawful execution" of duties an element of both sections 784.07 and 843.01, the Legislature has specified that this enhanced punishment applies only when officers operate within the limits of the law contained in constitutional and statutory provisions as well as pertinent precedent....

...BELL, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur. BELL, J., specially concurring. I join the majority because I cannot say that it is unreasonable to interpret the "lawful execution of a legal duty" element in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 according to its plain meaning, especially in the absence of any contrary legislative intent expressly stated in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...However, I write separately to note my concern that this interpretation may narrow the intended scope of protection for public officials further than actually intended and, thereby, undermine the very purpose of these statutes. It is clear that the purpose behind sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 is to protect public officials by imposing heightened penalties on civilians who physically retaliate against them as they carry out their public duties. Cf. State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (finding that the goal of granting "law enforcement officers the greatest possible protection ... undoubtedly played a role in the enacting of section[ ] 784.07(3)")....

...ect those who are charged with preserving the public welfare from those who impair it"). And we have recognized that it is appropriate for the Legislature to provide this protection. See Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269, 271-72 (Fla.1978) (upholding section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), against an equal-protection challenge, in part because the Legislature's decision to grant greater protection to public officials performing indispensable public services "fosters the public safety and welfare")....

...of this decision. WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Although the 1997 versions of these statutes apply to this case, the provisions have not materially changed in the interim. We therefore cite to the current versions of these statutes. [2] Section 784.07(2) requires that the officer be "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties." Section 843.01 requires that the officer be "in the lawful execution of any legal duty." These elements are functionally identical....

...g Tillman to stumble, lose his balance, and fall to the ground on top of Henriquez. Id. at 108, 807 So.2d 106. [4] In arrest situations, Florida courts have consistently read section 776.051(1) in pari materia with the offenses described in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 and, in so doing, have not required the State to prove that the arrest was lawful....

...Laws § 11-5-5 (2002 & Supp.2005); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1028 (1998 & Supp.2005); Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.36.031 (2004 & Supp.2005); W. Va. Code § 61-2-10b (2002). [10] One of the states that uses this phrase has arguably defined it as we have now defined the phrase in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, Florida Statutes....

...In determining whether appellant was lawfully arrested, a consideration of appellant's action in shoving the police officer during the attempted, improper initial search is necessary. The jury convicted appellant of battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(b). A person has committed a battery under section 784.03(1)(a) if he "[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other." Section 784.07(2)(b) reclassifies such a battery, when it has been committed on a law enforcement officer while he "is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties," as a third degree felony....

...Section 3: amends section 775.084 to redefine "habitual felony offender," to define "three-time felony offender," and to require the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences on persons fitting the definition of "three-time felony offender." Section 4: amends section 784.07 to provide mandatory minimum sentences for aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer and aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer....

...tory prison term of 5 years when the three-time violent felony offense is a third degree felony; providing for construction; providing for ineligibility of a three-time violent felony offender for parole, control release, or early release; amending ss. 784.07 and 784.08, F.S.; providing minimum terms of imprisonment for persons convicted of aggravated assault or aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer or a person 65 years of age or older; amending s....

...From his conviction for resisting an officer with violence and simple assault, defendant appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Benjamin was charged with resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983) (Count I) and assault on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2) (Count II)....

...that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer. Tillman's final argument, regarding the imposition of the collections court program, was not preserved for appeal. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla....

...attempted murder of a law enforcement officer (as charged in count III), and aggravated assault (a lesser offense of the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer charged in count IV). On this direct appeal, among appellant's contentions is that Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), is unconstitutionally vague....

...As can be seen, the statute applies (1) when the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, or (2) when the motivation for the attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer. Unlike the related offense of assault or battery on a law enforcement *1357 officer (Section 784.07(2)), there is no apparent scienter requirement when the violation occurs in the manner described above in alternative # 1....

...nder which the attempted murder was committed. It is true that, under current law, a person convicted of third degree murder of a law enforcement officer would receive a less severe sentence than one convicted of attempted murder of an officer under Section 784.07(3)....

...While I concur with Judge Nimmons's opinion, I do so with substantial reservation. I am unable to agree that the use of the term "murder" in the subject statute is not inherently vague and ambiguous, but I do not believe this deficiency rises to the level of constitutional infirmity. The use of "attempted murder" in section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), without specific definition or reference to any other definitions of murder in the Florida Statutes, is patently confusing and ambiguous....

...Thus, first degree murder is a capital offense punishable by death or life imprisonment; second degree murder is a life felony punishable by imprisonment for life or a term not exceeding 40 years; third degree murder is a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years. By way of comparison, section 784.07(3) specifies that attempted murder of a law enforcement officer is a life felony punishable by imprisonment for life or a term not exceeding 40 years, the equivalent penalty for second degree murder, plus the additional requirement tha...

...alty than if found guilty of "attempted murder" in any degree. Traditionally, the law of this state has not recognized any crime known simply as "murder" or "attempted murder" without specifying the degree thereof, and it does not do so today unless section 784.07(3) may be said to create an entirely new offense of "attempted murder of a law enforcement officer." If that is the legislative intent, the section fails to specify the particular elements of the new statutory offense. Section 784.07 fails to define murder as requiring an "unlawful killing," as do the other provisions in section 782.04....

...der *1359 circumstances that would amount to either first, second or third degree murder rather than an attempt to kill a law enforcement officer that would amount only to manslaughter or would be excused by sections 782.02 and 782.03. In any event, section 784.07(3) is fraught with inherent ambiguities that not only make it difficult to determine legislative intent but leave the statute vague and uncertain in respect to its precise meaning, application, and enforcement in various circumstances....

...Appellant's motion seeks certification of four questions to the supreme court as questions of great public importance. In view of the concerns expressed in my special concurring opinion, I believe it is most appropriate to certify the first question set forth in the motion: WHETHER FLORIDA STATUTES, SECTION 784.07(3) CREATES A NEW, SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE, OR IS ONLY A RECLASSIFICATION STATUTE WHICH INCREASES THE PENALTIES FOR ATTEMPTED VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 782.04 WHEN THE VICTIM IS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER? NOTES [1] The subject indictment specified only alternative # 1....

...assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer . . . the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: . . . (b) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree. Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2). A person commits battery if he: (a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (b) Intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. Fla....

...ent term of 180 months of imprisonment, and on the three counts of shooting into a vehicle to concurrent terms of 180 months. The convictions for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer are the subject of the first issue raised in this appeal. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993), addresses attempted murder of a law enforcement officer and makes the crime a life felony: (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enfo...

...be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. Section 775.0825 in turn provides for a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole....

...esser degrees of the charged offense, but allowed simply for a finding of guilt or non-guilt. Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995), case law provided that the enhanced sentencing provisions of section 784.07(3) applied to all degrees of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer. In Iacovone, however, the court held that the enhanced sentencing provided for in section 784.07(3) applies only to attempted first-degree *965 murder convictions. In light of State v. Iacovone , and State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995) (holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in Florida), it is now apparent that one may be convicted of a violation of section 784.07(3) only if it is established that the murder attempted satisfies all of the elements found in that section and, in addition, the elements of first-degree premeditated murder. See Moody v. State, 679 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In the case sub judice, if the jury intended to convict appellant under any theory but first-degree attempted murder, then the enhanced sentencing provisions of section 784.07(3) were not applicable....

...Grinage urges, and we agree, that before he can be convicted of attempting to murder a police officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, the State must allege and prove that he knew his victim was a police officer. The State argues, however, that since section 784.07(3) is silent as to the requirement of mens rea, then the defendant's knowledge of the victim's status is immaterial....

...atute (statutory as distinguished from common law crimes) need not be accompanied by a criminal intent, unless such intent be specifically required by the statute itself, as the doing of the act furnishes such intent. [2] *1365 However, we find that section 784.07(3) is not silent as to the requirement of mens rea. Section 784.07(3) is a subsection of a section entitled "Assault or battery of law enforcement officers ...; reclassification of offenses." The purpose of this section is to enhance the penalty for certain offenses against law enforcement officers (a...

...engaged in the lawful performance of his duty," if he did not know that Boaz was, in fact, a police officer? We agree that the court erred in instructing the jury that the State was not required to prove such knowledge. Had the State charged Grinage with the offense of attempted murder under section 784.07(3), [3] intent to commit the murder and knowledge that the victim was a police officer would, we think, be necessary elements....

...defendant will be presumed not only to have intended a killing but also to know that the undercover agent was a police officer is stacking presumption on top of presumption. We hold that section 782.04(1)(a)2 is not the proper vehicle for charging a section 784.07(3) attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty....

...etration of an attempted robbery. The above charge, without the additional allegation that Grinage intended to murder Boaz, charges nothing more than an aggravated assault (section 784.021) of a police officer engaged in the performance of his duty (section 784.07(2)(c)) committed as a part of an attempted robbery....

...ny (robbery). Although this aggravated assault allegation is coupled with the additional allegation that the victim was a police officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, this does nothing more than bring the offense within the ambit of section 784.07(2)(c) which enhances the penalty for the aggravated assault of a police officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty....

...ague, overbroad and ambiguous, thus leaving the jury to speculate and conjecture. This instruction appears to be a combination of the standard instruction on "attempt," [1] the statutory definition of felony murder, [2] and the case law interpreting section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, which requires an enhanced penalty for a person convicted of "attempted murder of a law enforcement officer." Isaac v....

...I do not, however, disagree with the First District Court of Appeal that the state need not prove the defendant knew his victim was a law enforcement officer. It may be that the overall legislative scheme found in sections 775.0823, 775.0825, 782.04(1) and 784.07, Florida Statutes, is odd, but these statutes plainly communicate the legislative scheme for charging, proving and punishing the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer....

...generally are disfavored ... and have suggested that some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime. Staples, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 114 S.Ct. at 1796-1797. [3] Assuming that section 784.07(3) creates a new substantive offense....

...following a jury trial. See Barnum v. State, 662 So.2d 968, 968-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (" Barnum I "). Important for purposes of the instant analysis, Barnum was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1991). In 1991, section 784.07, "Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or intake officers; reclassification of offenses," provided, in relevant part: (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of atte...

...duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. § 784.07(3), Fla....

...Subsequently, Barnum was appointed counsel, an amended motion was filed asserting error under Thompson v. State, 695 So.2d 691 (Fla.1997), [3] and an evidentiary hearing was held. In Thompson, this Court held that "knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)." Id....

...cisions that "change" the law require a Witt analysis to determine if the decision should be applied retroactively. See Barnum II, 849 So.2d at 374. The First District held that it was *517 unable to reconcile Thompson with either category, stating: Section 784.07(3) did not contain broad terms evincing that the legislature expected the courts to engage in judicial construction, but instead used language that was intended to include a knowledge requirement from the date of the law's enactment, w...

...has been rendered moot. The State's claim is misplaced. The issue presented in Thompson was "whether knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under subsection (3) of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993)." Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692....

...While the jury's status as fact finder implicates the notion that a substantive offense has been created under the statute, we need not reach this question to resolve the issue here. Id. at 693. The Thompson Court determined that knowledge was an element of a violation of section 784.07(3), but refused to classify section 784.07(3) of the Florida Statutes (1993) as either a substantive offense or a sentencing enhancement....

...ling authority today. In Merritt, this Court held that attempted assault, attempted battery, and attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses. See Merritt, 712 So.2d at 385. In so holding, we wrote: "Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." Id....

...Notably, Thompson was not cited in the opinion, nor was there any issue presented or discussed regarding a knowledge element of *518 the offense of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer. Our recent decision in Mills clarified that, even though our reference in Merritt that section 784.07 addresses the concept of enhancement, this statute actually reclassifies the enumerated offenses based upon the status of the victim....

...utes such as the habitual offender statute, `which cut across some or all criminal statutes.'" Id. at 1287 (quoting State v. Brown, 476 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla.1985)). Clearly, in Mills we held that offenses that are reclassified as felonies pursuant to section 784.07 qualify as felony offenses for purposes of the habitual felony offender statute, and double jeopardy principles are not violated....

...ment officer presented or discussed. Neither Merritt nor Mills modified the holding in Thompson, which requires that a jury determine if the defendant had knowledge of his victim's status as a law enforcement officer. The language in Mills declaring section 784.07 to be a reclassification statute is of no separate importance here. Thompson itself held that section 784.07(3) included a knowledge element, and section 784.07(3)'s classification as either a substantive offense or a sentencing enhancement was totally irrelevant to our determination on that issue. See Thompson, 695 So.2d at 693. Irrespective of whether section 784.07(3) is considered to create a substantive offense, an enhancement provision, or a reclassification statute, Thompson still mandates that a jury is required to determine whether the defendant had knowledge of his victim's status as a law enforcement officer....

...Stevens, 714 So.2d 347 (Fla.1998), we held that the decision in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995), satisfied all three prongs of the Witt test and should be applied retroactively. See Stevens, 714 So.2d at 348. In Iacovone, this Court held that sections 784.07 and 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (Supp....

...re because "imposition of a hefty criminal sentence pursuant to a patently `irrational' sentencing scheme `could not withstand a due process analysis' of any sort." Id. at 348 (quoting Callaway, 658 So.2d at 986). The Thompson decision, holding that section 784.07(3) contains a knowledge element, does not implicate due process concerns present in both Callaway and Stevens....

...ot what the Legislature intended. The same cannot be said in the instant action. Here, the respondent was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, a life felony with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum under sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court held that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape." Id. at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861. Thompson merely provided that section 784.07(3) contains a knowledge element; it did not "place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties." Witt, 387 So.2d at 929....

...rove that he knew his victim was a police officer." Grinage, 641 So.2d at 1364. We accepted jurisdiction in Thompson on the basis of conflict between Grinage and Thompson v. State, 667 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), where the Third District held that section 784.07(3) was only a sentencing enhancement and did not require the defendant to have knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer....

...Thus, it could safely be inferred from those three decisions that Moreland's outcome would have been the same had we had the opportunity to consider the issue. The same cannot be said in Barnum's case. Although this Court held in Thompson that knowledge is an element of section 784.07(3), we have not addressed the issue in any other decision....

...5th DCA 1994), approved on other grounds, 656 So.2d 457 (Fla.1995). Thus, there was a law of the First District and a conflicting law of the Fifth District, but no law of the state. Not until this Court's decision in Darryl Thompson was there law of the state correctly interpreting section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), to require proof of knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer. In Darryl Thompson we construed section 784.07(3) as it had existed from its enactment in 1988, despite the First District's erroneous interpretation in Carpentier. [14] This *535 Court's decision in Darryl Thompson clarified section 784.07(3) by holding that knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer was indeed an essential element of the offense....

...). However, upon further review, we decline to answer the certified question as worded and instead base our jurisdiction upon the basis of certified conflict of decisions of the district courts of appeal. [2] In 1995, subsection (3) was removed from section 784.07....

...[11] A corollary point—in Moreland, the defendant had preserved the issue of the constitutionality of the administrative order, just as the defendant in Spencer had. Here, the defendant in Thompson had preserved the relevant issue by requesting a jury instruction that knowledge was an element of section 784.07(3), see Thompson, 695 So.2d at 691, while Barnum did not....

...2020, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2003), on remand, 882 So.2d 890 (Fla.2004). Herein, I identify our first decision as Bunkley I, the United States Supreme Court's decision on certiorari review as Bunkley II, and our decision on remand from the United States Supreme Court as Bunkley III. [14] The issue of whether section 784.07(3) included a knowledge element was clouded by uncertainty as to whether the enhanced punishment in the case of a law enforcement victim aggravator applied to all degrees of attempted murder or only attempted first-degree murder. In a case decided before our decision in Darryl Thompson, we held that both section 784.07(3) and the accompanying twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term in section 775.0825 applied only to attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer....

...ause courtroom is proper place to contest arrest rather than street). See also K.G. v. State, 338 So.2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. den., 352 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1977). In Meeks v. State, 369 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), the district court, citing to section 784.07, Florida Statutes [reclassifies offense when person knowingly commits battery upon a law enforcement officer while the officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties] held that a person is not justified in committing a battery upon a law enforcement officer to resist an unlawful arrest....

...request for a jury instruction on a non-existent offense. Achin v. State, 436 So.2d 30 (Fla.1982). We agree with appellant's argument in the case before us that the offense of attempted aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer does not exist. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993) reclassifies certain enumerated offenses and enhances the penalties for those offenses when the victim is a law enforcement officer....

...By its terms, the statute does not reclassify or enhance the penalty for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses. As explained by this court in Crumley v. State, 489 So.2d 112, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), approved, State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 183 (Fla.1987), "by enacting the enhancement statute, section 784.07, the legislature merely provided for a felony punishment when the victim [of one of the enumerated offenses] ......

...a crime of violence.”1 One of the two prior felony convictions that the court found was a “crime of violence” and that made Rozier a career offender was a Florida felony conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b).2 The career offender enhancement led to a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment....

...A person commits battery on a law enforcement officer if he “[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes [a law enforcement officer] against the will of the [officer]; or [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to [the officer].” Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03(1)(a), 784.07(2). 2  Case: 11-13557 Date Filed: 11/21/2012 Page: 3 of 23 U.S.S.G....

...ce to be harmless. Appellant next challenges the legality of his three consecutive life sentences for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, each of which carries a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term before becoming eligible for parole. Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: *560 Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty ... shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. Section 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1989), provides: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole....

...Appellant's category one scoresheet showed a total of 210 points and a guidelines recommended range of 12 to 17 years incarceration. For the attempted murder, he was sentenced to seventy-five years incarceration with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. This sentence is challenged on appeal. Pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), the attempted murder of a law enforcement official is a life felony, punishable as provided in section 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (1987)....

...First, Spurgeon challenges the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. He next argues the trial court erred when it failed to provide the jury with an instruction on self-defense. Because we agree with Spurgeon that the State failed to prove the victim was an “emergency medical care provider” pursuant to section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes, it was error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment of acquittal....

...Spurgeon was tried before a jury. At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State failed to prove DenDekker satisfied the definition of “emergency medical care provider” as provided in section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 784.07(l)(a) defines an “emergency medical care provider” as: [A]n ambulance driver, emergency medical technician, paramedic, registered nurse, physician as defined in s....

...hospitals as defined in chapter 395, who are employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof. § 784.07(l)(a), Fla....

...ion of an “emergency medical care provider” because no evidence was presented that South Seminole Hospital satisfied the definition of “hospital” as that term is defined in chapter 395. Spurgeon argues the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes, and thereby erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied Spurgeon’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on its interpretation of section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla.2006) (“The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.”). In denying Spurgeon’s motion, the court reasoned: This Court’s reading of section 784.07(l)(a) is that when it says the term emergency medical care provider it also includes physicians, employees, agents or volunteers of hospitals as defined in Chapter 395. Doesn’t mean hospital as defined in 395, it means— [[Image here]] ... those type of individuals who may be employed as defined in 395. The court went on to say: [M]y interpretation is ... that the statute 784.07(l)(a) does not require the hospital be defined as in 395, but that the physicians, employees, agents or volunteers of hospitals are as defined in 395 and it goes on to say who are employed under contract or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated which include security....

...State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998). Furthermore, “[i]t is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction.” State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1993). Here, the court’s construction of section 784.07(1)(a), that the statute *1046 “does not require the hospital be defined as in 395, but that the physicians, employees, agents or volunteers of hospitals are as defined in 395,” is problematic. Since “hospital” is the only term defined in chapter 395, the appropriate construction of section 784.07(l)(a) is that the term “emergency medical care provider” only covers physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of a hospital as a hospital is defined in chapter 395. Just as “physician” and “medical director” are specifically defined under section 784.07(l)(a), “hospital” is defined by chapter 395. Section 784.07(l)(a) states: The term “emergency medical care provider” also includes physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of hospitals as defined in chapter 395, who are employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof. § 784.07(l)(a) (emphasis added)....

...y). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and sentence for battery on an emergency medical care provider and remand for new trial on the charge of battery. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL. ORFINGER, C.J. and PALMER, J., concur. . See §§ 784.03, 784.07(l)(a), and 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...State, 368 So.2d 395, 396-97 (Fla. 3d DCA) (majority opinion and Schwartz, J., specially concurring) (same), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1979). [4] The jury instruction at issue in Wright was the instruction for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...know that the victim is a police officer. He relies on Grinage v. State, 641 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) for the proposition that the state must allege and prove that the defendant knew that his victim was a police officer for a conviction under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...However, we do not read that case as deciding the question of whether or not knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense of *472 attempted murder when the conviction is enhanced under Florida Statute section 784.07(3) (1993). Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1993) involves the offense of assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer....

...State, 625 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), that the "statute simply does not require that the offender have knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer." Carpentier, 587 So. at 1357. We disagree with Isaac, however, to the extent that it holds that section 784.07(3) creates a separate, substantive offense....

...his duty or if the motivation for the attempt was related to the lawful duties of the officer. This reading is supported by the recent case of State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995). In that case, the Florida Supreme Court held that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991) do not apply to all degrees of murder, only to first degree murder....

...[1] The defendant next argues that the victims were not acting as law enforcement officers at the time of the offense and therefore the charges should be reduced from aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer to aggravated assault. We agree with the defendant on this issue. Subsection (2) of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2001) provides: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, ......

...Even if the underlying arrest had been invalid, this court has held that a defendant is not justified in using force to resist an unlawful arrest (pursuant to sections 843.01 and 776.051(1), Florida Statutes) or in committing a battery to resist an unlawful arrest (pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes)....

...ery on the same officer. However, Dixon also argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred in enhancing the attempted aggravated battery from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony. The law enforcement enhancement prescribed by section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1999), does not apply to attempted aggravated battery because the statute does not include attempted aggravated battery as one of the enumerated offenses to which reclassification applies....

...Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. *621 GRIMES, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from a revocation of probation and subsequent sentence to five years imprisonment. The appellant was originally charged with battery of a law enforcement officer contrary to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.)....

...Wallace v. State, 724 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1998). Casselman also argues that all the elements of assault on a law enforcement officer and battery on a law enforcement officer are contained in the statute which addresses resisting an officer with violence. See §§ 784.07 (a)(2)(a); 784.011; 784.03; 784.07(2)(b) and 843.01, Fla.Stat....

...2d DCA 1991). See also Whitehead v. State, 446 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Reynolds v. State, 429 So.2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED for Resentencing. DAUKSCH and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 784.03, 784.07(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1997). [2] § 843.01, Fla.Stat. (1997). [3] §§ 784.011, 784.07(2), Fla.Stat....

...[6] Section 784.03 provides: (1)(a) The offense of battery occurs when a person: 1. Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other.... The offense of assault on a law enforcement officer is set forth in section 784.011. The punishment for this offense is also enhanced by section 784.07(2)....

...ault, aggravated battery, and attempted murder in the third degree of a law enforcement officer. We reverse the appellant's judgment and *1109 sentence for attempted murder in the third degree of a law enforcement officer on the ground that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991), as applied, violate the Equal Protection Clause. [1] We affirm the remaining convictions. The appellant argues that the offense classification and penalty mandated by sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, violate the rationality requirement of the Equal Protection Clause. Section 784.07(3) provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a l...

...The Florida Legislature has expressed an intention to provide law enforcement officers with the greatest protection possible because of their exposure to great risk of violence. See Ch. 89-100, § 2, Laws of Fla. (creating § 775.0823, Fla. Stat.). It is obvious that this intent guided the legislature in enacting sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825....

...he completed murder with a lower sentence than the failed attempt. Such a result is inconsistent with the objective of protecting law enforcement officers. [3] *1110 Finding no rational basis for the penalty classification, we conclude that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 violate the Equal Protection Clause when applied to attempted third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer....

...t from the officers. First, as to the severity of the crime, assuming that Fidel did not flick a lit cigarette at Officer Bushing, which would be battery upon a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony in the State of Florida, see Fla. Stat. §§ 784.07(2)(b), 843.01, there is still no right to resist as Fidel did....

...n him, Fidel swung his arms about and struck at least one of the uniformed officers. This was a battery. See id. § 784.03. [8] Under Florida law, a battery committed against a law enforcement officer in this manner is a third-degree felony, see id. § 784.07(2)(b), [9] *1382 and in this case obviously involved "the use ....

...The Government presents four1 prior convictions to justify Braun’s sentence: (1) aggravated battery on a pregnant woman under Florida law, FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(b); (2) battery on a law enforcement officer under Florida law, FLA. STAT. § 784.07(2)(b); 2 (3) resisting arrest with violence under Florida law, FLA....

...CCA. 2 The parties discuss this conviction as battery on a corrections officer. However, the statute describes battery on a law enforcement officer, and it defines law enforcement officers to include corrections officers. FLA. STAT. § 784.07(1)(d). 5  Case: 13-15013 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 6 of 16 intent to commit robbery under Maryland law, MD....

...Thus, the Government has failed to prove that Braun’s conviction for aggravated battery on a pregnant woman was a prior violent felony. B. Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer Braun concedes that he was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer under FLA. STAT. § 784.07(2)(b)....

...5th DCA 1984), the Fifth District upheld a delinquency adjudication based upon a violation of Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1983), making it a misdemeanor of the first degree to resist an officer without violence to the officer's person. Section 843.02 provided in part, similar to section 784.07, that the officer, at the time of the offense, must either be "in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty." In M.C....

...Again in Kaiser v. State, 328 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), the Third District held that a defendant could be convicted of resisting an officer with violence to his person, as proscribed by Section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1973), which, in language also similar to section 784.07(2), required that the law enforcement officer or other person be "legally authorized to execute process, in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty." In so holding, the court concluded that the offic...

...ance of his duties as a law enforcement officer at the time appellee committed a battery upon him, in that Bates was then lawfully assisting in an investigation in order to determine whether the person detained had committed a criminal act. All that section 784.07(2) demands is that the defendant know or reasonably understand that the officer desired to detain him, and if the defendant responds to the detention with a battery upon the detaining officer, the defendant may then be guilty of violating the statute....

...stated intent. The order granting motion for judgment of acquittal is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED with directions to the court to impose judgment and sentence in accordance with the verdict rendered. NIMMONS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), provides: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an intake officer as defined in s....

...We concluded that the sentences there had, therefore, only been enhanced once under the habitual offender statute resulting in no double jeopardy violation. See id. Appellant, however, relies on Oliveira v. State, 751 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which holds that section 784.07, creating the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer, is an enhancement statute rather than a statute which defines separate substantive offenses as we held in Evans....

...The fourth district, however, has now receded from their opinion in Oliveira. See Spann v. State, 772 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(en banc). In Oliveira, the fourth district had relied on Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), in which the Florida Supreme Court held that section 784.07 only defined completed crimes and not attempts, making the defendant's conviction in that case for attempted battery on a law enforcement officer error. See id. at 385. In Merritt, the supreme court, after discussing the statute at issue, stated in what appears to be dicta, "Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." Id....

...ed by the principle of double jeopardy. It is well recognized that a criminal offense cannot be enhanced twice because of the double jeopardy bar. See State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 183 (Fla.1987). In view of this bar, a determination of whether or not Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute, or a statute that creates and defines a separate criminal offense, is essential. If the former, the trial court must be reversed, and if the latter, the trial court must be affirmed. I strongly believe that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute and, therefore, the trial court must be reversed. I primarily base my opinion upon the plain wording of the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998). In Merritt the court, when construing whether section 784.07 was an enhancement or a substantive statute, opined that: *652 Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers....

...rritt was somewhat careless," and thus, should be disregarded. I believe the determination by the Supreme Court in Merritt meets neither of these descriptions, and the best approach is for this court to follow the plain words of Merritt finding that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute rather than a substantive statute....

...ual views of author of opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent. The majority's determination that the words used by the court in Merritt constitute dicta is clearly erroneous. There the court was compelled to determine whether section 784.07(c) was an enhancement or a substantive statute, because the defendant was convicted of an attempted battery on a law enforcement officer. As section 784.07 contains no specific reference to an attempted battery of a law officer being a crime, had the court determined that section 784.07 is a substantive statute, see section 777.04, Florida Statutes, the general attempts statute would apply, and the conviction of the defendant of attempted battery would require affirmance. However, since the court found section 784.07 is an enhancement statute, section 777.04 did not apply, and the defendant's conviction was reversed. Because of this context of the case, the court's determination that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute was the very crux of the decision and cannot be logically determined to be "dicta." Also, I disagree with the hypothesis that the court's choice of words in Merritt was "somewhat careless," as maintained by the appellee and, therefore, should not be followed. I believe the court expressed itself precisely as intended, because it was impelled by the facts to do so. The pertinent language is unambiguous, and if for some reason the court did not mean that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute in the sense it would not be subject to the double jeopardy bar when combined with another enhancement statute, the Supreme Court should make any needed change, and not this court, or the other district courts that have seen fit to "assist" by instructing the Supreme Court what it meant by labeling section 784.07 as an enhancement statute....

...By giving such deference to the Supreme Court, this court will avoid confusion in its application of precedent and more often arrive at the correct result regardless of the outcome of this case. For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court and remand for resentencing solely under section 784.07, Florida Statutes, because the double enhancement by virtue of the appellant's act against a law officer, and his status as a previous felony offender, would constitute a double jeopardy violation.

...iveira v. State, 751 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this constituted double jeopardy. We now recognize that we were wrong in Oliveira and recede from that opinion. In Oliveira the defendant was also convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997), enhances the offense of battery, which is normally a misdemeanor, to a third degree felony, where it is committed on certain persons including law enforcement officers....

...than the legislature intended." State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989)(quoting Hunter ). In the present case, the legislature made battery, which is ordinarily a misdemeanor, a third degree felony when the victim is a law enforcement officer. § 784.07(2)(b)....

...The state argues first that the trial court, by entering into its own plea agreement with appellant and imposing a downward departure sentence, denied the state its right to try Hewitt on the charges set forth in the information. The state next contends that the sentence is facially illegal for the following reasons: (1) section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), prohibits the court from withholding adjudication of guilt, (2) adjudication of guilt cannot be withheld in the absence of a probationary term, (3) a general sentence cannot be imposed for multiple crimes, and (4) a sentence cannot be inflicted in the absence of an adjudication of guilt....

...Applying the above principles to the state's arguments as to the second point, we affirm. The state's first argument, which *636 was preserved, is that the sentence is facially illegal, because the court was precluded from withholding adjudication of guilt by virtue of the express language of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995). We cannot agree. That portion of section 784.07 which prohibits the court from withholding adjudication of guilt appears in subsection (3), involving use of a firearm or destructive device during the battery on the law enforcement officer. Hewitt was charged with a violation of section 784.07(2)(b), without using any firearm or destructive device....

...conviction. Under the analysis required by Valdes , we conclude that battery and felony battery (one prior) are merely different degrees of the same offense. 4 The same is true of felony battery (one prior) and battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2Ó09), reclassifies a battery from a misdemeanor to a felony based on the status of the victim as a law enforcement officer. § 784.07(2)0»), Fla. Stat. (2009). 5 See generally State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 188, 184 (Fla.1987) (holding under now-outmoded “same evil” test that aggravated battery and battery on law enforcement officer are both aggravated versions of simple battery). Section 784.07 identifies underlying crimes, including assault and battery, adds aggravating factors and enhances the penalties accordingly. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...Though not argued by the parties, we also find that felony battery (one prior) subsumes simple battery. See § 775.021(b)3., Fla. Stat. (2009); Harris v. State, 111 So.3d 922 , 2013 ’ WL 1235888 (Fla. 1st DCA March 8, 2013) (holding convictions of felony battery and battery for same act violate double jeopardy). . Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2009), provides, in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer .......

...Patterson of Masterson, Rogers, Patterson, Masterson & Lowe, St. Petersburg, for appellee. CAMPBELL, Judge. Grooms was arrested on September 8, 1979, and released two days later. Subsequently, an information was filed charging him with battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes....

...4th DCA 1999) on the issue of whether the double jeopardy clause precludes sentencing of a defendant as either a prison releasee reoffender or an habitual violent felony offender, after the defendant's sentence had already been enhanced pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. *553 SUNDBERG, Justice. Appellant has prosecuted an appeal in this Court following an order of the trial judge denying his motion to dismiss the information. Because that order upheld the validity of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), [1] in the face of appellant's constitutional challenge to the statute, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution....

...They also became involved in the scuffle. Appellant was then arrested and had to be subdued before he could be given aid. Appellant was charged by information with Counts I and II, Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer; and Counts III and IV, Battery on a Fire Fighter, pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

..." to have the broad application which appellant imputes to it. What the legislature did intend was to protect the person who protects the public's life and property by risking his life in fighting fires. To further the legislative intent, therefore, Section 784.07(1)(b) should be read so that "fire fighter" is defined, inter alia, as "any person employed by any public employer of this state whose duty it is to extinguish fires" AND "to protect life or property......

...e proffered medical help because he was under no legal obligation to accept that help. We cannot agree that appellant acted legally in committing a battery, whether it be upon a fire fighter or anyone else. With regard to appellant's contention that Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), is unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection, this Court's opinion in Soverino v. State, supra, has recently decided this point adversely to his position. Finally, appellant posits that Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), is unconstitutional because its title fails to express the subject of the enactment....

...The title to the act here under review gives fair notice of its contents for purposes of Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution. Accordingly, the order of the trial judge is affirmed. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla....

...e absence of a simple battery instruction. We do not consider Diaz controlling, however, because the issue was not preserved in that case. [3] The Blockburger test is codified at Section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). [4] See § 784.03(1) & 784.07, Fla....

...ng the said officer without the consent of the said officer or by intentionally causing bodily harm to the said officer while the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, to-wit: striking Officer Cheek in the mouth, in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes.

...Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, R.B., J. Jorge A. Rodriguez appeals his conviction of battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...icer was working an off-duty job at a night club as there was no proof that the officer was engaged in any official police activity or criminal investigation. On retrial, the parties should make certain that the evidence satisfies the requirement of section 784.07(2) that the officer be "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties" as discussed in Nicolosi.

...HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge. The State of Florida appeals from an order granting Robert Johnson's motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). Johnson was charged by information with battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1978)....

...ie case of guilt. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Johnson contends that the lower court properly granted the motion to dismiss, as Officer Brubaker was not "engaged in the lawful performance of his duties," an essential requirement of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes....

...The appellate court held: [J]ust as the appellant is not justified in using force to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Sections 843.01 and 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (1977), neither is he justified in committing a battery to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (2) Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a). Though battery is ordinarily a misdemeanor, battery against a law-enforcement officer is a felony. Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b). The Supreme Court recently held that Florida’s felony battery offense is not categorically a crime of violence under the ACCA’s elements clause....

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and James A. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. Savage was convicted of resisting a law enforcement officer with violence, section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983) and battery of an officer, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), both arising out of the same episode, and sentenced to three-and-one-half years for each crime to be served concurrently....

...e offense of battery of a law enforcement officer, thus a defendant could not be convicted for both crimes based on the same incident. 463 So.2d at 1180. A close reading of the two statutes, however, reveals this is not the case. See §§ 843.01 and 784.07, Fla....

...of such officer... ." § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (1983). Battery of a law enforcement officer consists of "knowingly committing" a "battery upon a law enforcement officer ... while the officer ... is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties... ." § 784.07, Fla....

...The test to be used in determining whether a statutory classification satisfies the Equal Protection Clause is whether the classification rests on some difference bearing a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1978). Soverino concerned an equal protection challenge to section 784.07, which enhances the sanction for battery when the battery is upon a law enforcement officer or firefighter rather than upon a person not a member of that class. In Soverino, the court found that section 784.07 is constitutional, since it reclassified the offense only if the law enforcement officer or firefighter is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties....

...lorida Statutes (2002), and with resisting an officer without violence, in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2002). [1] In lower tribunal case number 05-9631, Lanier was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), battery on a facility employee, in violation of section 784.078, Florida Statutes (2002), and threatening a public servant, in violation of section 838.021, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...In 1984, a jury found appellant guilty of battery in violation of section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1983) (a first degree misdemeanor), resisting arrest with violence in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983) (a third degree felony), and two counts of battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983) (third degree felonies)....

...Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant Charles Lee Radford filed this appeal from his conviction and sentence for the felony offense of battery of a law enforcement officer under Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...eputy Sheriff of Charlotte County, while acting in the capacity of his official duties, by actually and intentionally touching or striking said person against said person's will, in violation of Florida Statute 784.03." The felony battery statute is 784.07(2) which provides in pertinent part as follows: "Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing ......

...es bodily harm to an individual. (2) Whoever commits battery shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree... ." It is quite clear that the language of the information under which appellant was charged does not track the statutory language of Section 784.07(2)....

...Appellant also claimed in ground four that his conviction in count eight for attempted aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer was illegal because that offense does not exist. As the state points out, appellant's offense was reclassified under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1999), from a third degree felony to a second degree felony. The controlling case law reveals that this was erroneous. *112 In Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384, 385 (Fla.1998), the supreme court held that section 784.07, which provides for the reclassification of offenses and minimum sentences for assault or battery of law enforcement officers, among others, does not apply to attempted battery of a law enforcement officer. In so doing, the court explained: Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers. At the time the enhancement statute was enacted, the legislature had created the four enumerated offenses in other statutory provisions. Id. (footnote omitted). The court concluded in Merritt that section 784.07 "contains no enhancement or reclassification of penalties for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses." Id....

...Oliveira holds that because the crime of Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer is an enhancement of the crime of Battery that it is wrong to impose an enhancement again by increasing the sentence because he is a repeat offender. The case cites Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), where our supreme court did say "Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995) is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." This statement by the supreme court should be adhered to by the lower courts....

...similarly fail to include any definition. See, e.g., § 775.087(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015) (providing mandatory minimum sentences for persons who commit certain designated offenses and who “during the commission of the offense” actually possess a firearm or destructive device); § 784.07(3), Fla....

...The aggravated assaults were committed when the defendant, using a gun, threatened and placed in fear Deputies Brady and Davis. See §§ 784.011(1) (defining crime of assault), 784.021 (defining crime of aggravated assault), 784.07(2)(c) (defining crime of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer)....

...Under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1989), the state must prove that the person charged resisted, obstructed, or opposed any law enforcement officer, parole officer, or "other person legally authorized to execute process in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty." Under section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), a person cannot be convicted of assault or battery of a law enforcement officer unless that officer "is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties." Taking judicial notice of this court's records, t...

...Estrella, 31 Cal.App.4th 716, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 383 (1995). But that case involved an entirely different statutory scheme. The defendant was accused of fleeing a peace officer and the statute specifically required the peace officer's vehicle to be "distinctively *650 marked." In the instant case, section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997) reclassifies aggravated assault from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony when the assault is committed upon a law enforcement officer....

upon a law enforcement officer, a felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court passed

battery of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985), and with resisting

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Aggravated

battery on a law enforcement officer statute, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), requires that the

battery upon a correctional officer is a felony. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, because aggravated

(1977) rather than a felony as provided by Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977). No objection to

offense. He was tried by jury and convicted. Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), provides

performance of their duties at the time of the offense. § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (1977). The batteries occurred while

committing battery: ... . (b) Uses a deadly weapon. Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), which defines

enforcement officers or firefighters. That statute, section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1989), states in part:

dismiss the battery charges on the ground that Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), which defines

based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07 , which explicitly contains a knowledge

more, in order to sustain a conviction under Section 784.07.[1] The information alleges that appellant

the similarities between section 843.01 and section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (proscribing the knowing

1995).[1] In 1988, the legislature enacted section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), which provided

NOTES [1] § 893.13(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (1987). [2] § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] § 775.082(3)(d), Fla

section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1987) and section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1987), which provides in

appellant pled nolo contendere to a violation of § 784.07(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987), battery on a law enforcement

performance of his... duties," as provided by section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1997); and (2) that the

following the reclassification, pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997), of appellant's attempted

(2)(a), battery on a law enforcement officer (§ 784.07(2)(b); resisting an officer with violence (§ 843

charge of battery on a law enforcement officer. § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (1991). The two officers then chased

enforcement officer is a second degree felony. See § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. An "assault" is defined in section

enforcement officer within the definition of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1991). Each of the remaining

battery of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), are third-degree

190(c)(4). [2] § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (1983) [3] § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (1983).

enforcement officer. § 24-61, City of Tampa Code (1987); § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (1987). She does not contest her concurrent

are used to enhance criminal penalties under section 784.07, Florida Statutes; and the carrying of a weapon

of battery on two law enforcement officers, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), and resisting arrest

resisting or obstructing the officer. Compare § 784.07(2)(d) and § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (2001). Having

battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of § 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977). That statute provides

was charged use slightly different terms. Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2003), refers to the

this area is limited to the brief life span of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes. The statute became effective

already enhanced by reclassification under section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999). Because he

law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (1987). The guidelines called for

082, 775.0823, 782.04, Fla. Stat. (1991)). Section 784.07 addressed attempted murder of a law enforcement

concur. NOTES [1] § 784.03, Fla. Stat. (1993); § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). [2] § 843.01, Fla.

lawful performance of his or her duties.... ” § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). K.H. argues that the officer

denied, 599 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1992), we held that section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), does not require

of inmates within a correctional institution"); § 784.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002) (defining "law enforcement

law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001) (reclassifying battery

2d 384 (Fla.1998)("The enhancement statute [section 784.07] contains no enhancement or reclassification

on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005). We affirm the

violation of Florida Statute 784.07. (emphasis supplied) This language tracked Section 784.07(2), Florida

offenses which constitute forcible felonies); § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2001) (defining the offense of

battery of a law enforcement officer under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983) and two counts of

on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2004). We reverse the adjudication

information identify the offense as a violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), a qualifying

enforcement officer under *1117 section 784.07(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). That statute

C.J., and GOSHORN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 784.07 Fla. Stat. (1991). Counts I, II, & III. [2]

of a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida *1255 Statutes (2003). Kaigler moved

a "law enforcement officer" for purposes of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995). That provision provides

first-degree felony pursuant to the provisions of section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1995). Under the law

2d 680 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), both declaring section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1999) to be an enhancement

element of battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes requires that the officer

battery upon a law enforcement officer under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985), and one count of

charge. He raises eight issues: (1) whether section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1991), is unconstitutionally

enforcement officer in violation of Florida Statutes § 784.07(2)(b), Martin alleges that Prosper violated: §

on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2004). We reverse the adjudication

State, 641 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). [2] Section 784.07(3) provided as follows: 784.07. Assault or

and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement

lawful performance of his or her duties. . . ." § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). So far as applicable here

on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with

on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with

upon a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1981), and one count of

(2004-2005); § 775.087(2) & (3), Fla. Stat. (1996-2005); § 784.07(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1996-2005); § 794.0115(7),

the victim was a law enforcement officer, see § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (1991), and second, because Fussell

require proof of injury. Id.; see also § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). In contrast to what occurred

AFFIRMED. PLEUS and LAWSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (2005). [2] § 843.01, Fla. Stat.

2d 1107 (Fla.2007) (stating that fact that section 784.07(2), forbidding battery on a law enforcement

Defendant's offense was reclassified pursuant to section 784.07(2)(b). In addition, his sentence was enhanced

GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (2005). [2] The fact that Officer

of a law enforcement officer is a life felony. § 784.07(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). We reverse and remand for

the meaning of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995). Specifically, section 784.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes

agree that an incorrect statutory reference to section 784.07(2)(b) was added to Appellant’s judgment in

statute is analogous to such a requirement in section 784.07, which prohibits the "knowing" commission of

would not invariably constitute a violation of § 784.07. DOWNEY, ANSTEAD and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.

on a LEO permitting reclassification under section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes. See State v. Iseley

384 (Fla.1998), the supreme court held that section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes, which enhances the

0. If the primary offense is a violation of section 784.07(3) or 775.0875(1) , Florida Statutes

be suspended, deferred, or withheld"); see also § 784.07(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003) (stating, "[n]otwithstanding

battery upon a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes, required the lower

be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001. Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)(amended 1995),

battery on a law enforcement officer, pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes, is a sufficient predicate

aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. § 784.07, Fla.Stat. (1991); State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187

of a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993). That section reads:

and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement

with a firearm, "in violation of § 782.04(1) and § 784.07 and § 775.0825 and § 777.04, [Florida Statutes]

11-11697 Battery on a Correctional Support Employee; § 784.07(2)(b); Third Degree Felony; 5 year max. Sentence:

case is remanded for resentencing pursuant to section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), which does

enforcement officer, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.07; (2) robbery, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812

So.2d 1284, 1288-89 (Fla.2002) (holding that section 784.07 was not an enhancement statute because the

convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer, § 784.07, Fla.Stat. (1987); resisting an officer with violence

Stat. (2013). Similar to section 782.065, section 784.07, titled “Assault or battery of law enforcement

element of a law enforcement victim. Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b). 6 The Supreme Court indicated BOLEO convictions

Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, or section 775.0875(1)

did not intend felony convictions pursuant to section 784.07 to be so excluded"); Kenon v. State, 780 So

State, 925 So.2d 438 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (section 784.07’s enhancement of punishment for assault, aggravated

held that a similar statute, Florida Statutes section 784.07, which enhances the punishment for assault

attempted battery, a second degree misdemeanor. Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2011), is an enhancement

BOLEO conviction was a third-degree felony. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). Thus, the trial court

second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer under Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), because (a) the

convicted of aggravated assault pursuant to section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), which specifically

lawful performance of his or her duties. ..." § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). K.H. argues that the officer

[4] § 784.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). [5] § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). [6] § 784.011, Fla. Stat

Supreme Court’s earlier determination of whether section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), which, as discussed

the lawful performance of his or her duties....” § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). So far as applicable here

statute is analogous to such a requirement in section 784.07, which prohibits the “knowing” commission of

contested counts, Talley was charged under section 784.07, Florida Statutes, which reclassifies the degree

into a battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07(2) defines battery on a law enforcement officer

Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, or section 775.0875(1)

Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or section 784.07(3) or section 775.0875(1), the subtotal sentence

"in the lawful execution of any legal duty”); § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (classifying battery as a felony

a deadly weapon, a vehicle, in violation of section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2000); and fleeing

assault on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(e). Unlike the robbery statute, the aggravated