Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Ms. Coffin was charged with the misdemeanor of obstruction of justice without violence under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 843.02. Mr. Coffin was charged with several felonies: two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.07(2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with violence under Fla....

...Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer (BOLEO) Under the Florida Statutes, battery is a crime, but it is not always a felony. Two battery statutes are relevant in this case: simple battery, section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2006), and battery on a law enforcement officer, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...itting an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer . . . the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: . . . (b) in the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree. § 784.07(2)(b) (emphasis added)....

...We apply the Perkins statutory elements test to resolve the conflict. That test is designed to determine whether an offense involves the use or threat of physical force or violence. In applying the Perkins test, we analyze the elements of the battery statute from which BOLEO derives its conduct element. See § 784.07, Fla....

...Explanation of amendment: This instruction begins on page 77 of the manual. The Note to Judge is added to bring F.S. 775.0823 to the court's attention in appropriate cases. [Page A-30] *1208 ASSAULT OFON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER (Amended) F.S. 784.07A(2)(a) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Assault on a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the State must prove the following six elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....

...The court now instructs you that (name of official position of victim designated in charge) is a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. Explanation of proposed changes: The instruction is on page 92 of the manual. The changes are editorial. [Page A-31] *1209 BATTERY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER (Amended) F.S. 784.07B(2)(b) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Battery of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....

...in charge) is a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. Explanation of proposed changes: The instruction is on page 93 of the manual. The changes are editorial. [Page A-32] *1210 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER (New) F.S. 784.07(2)(c) Before you can find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the state must prove the following seven elements beyond a reasonable doubt....

...to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily alleged harm. Give if 4a It is not necessary for the state to prove that the alleged defendant had an intent to kill. Explanation of proposed instruction: This instruction is new based on F.S. 784.07(2)(c), which was created in 1988. The wording is similar to the instruction for assault of law enforcement officer on page 92 of the manual. [Page A-34] *1212 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER (New) F.S. 784.07(2)(d) Before you can find the defendant guilty of aggravated battery of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the state must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt....

...er]. [Page A-35] *1213 Definition; A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened give if 2b to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily alleged harm. Explanation of proposed instruction: This instruction is new based on F.S. 784.07(2)(d), which was created in 1988....

...Improper exhibition of dangerous weapons or firearms — 790.10 Discharging firearms in public — 790.15 Culpable negligence — Culpable negligence — None 784.05(2) 784.05(1) Assault of law None Attempt enforcement officer — Assault — 784.011 [*e] 784.07(2) Battery of law None Attempt enforcement officer — Battery — 784.03 [*e] 784.07(2) Kidnapping — 787.01 False imprisonment — 787.02 Attempt Aggravated assault — 784.021(1)(b) Battery — 784.03(1)(a) Assault — 784.011 [Page A-76] *1254 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 False imprisonment — None Attempt 787.02 Assa...

...dently opened, dousing Aho with concentrated cayenne pepper spray ("It burns like hell."). McLaughlin was charged inter alia with two counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer in violation of sections 784.021 (aggravated assault) and 784.07 (enhancement provision for assault on a law enforcement officer), Florida Statutes (1995). He was convicted on both counts and the district court affirmed, holding that Federal Protection Service officers are law enforcement officers for purposes of section 784.07. Section 784.07 provides that when an assault or battery is committed against a law enforcement officer the offense shall be reclassified upward one degree, e.g., an aggravated assault is enhanced from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony. The statute sets forth a comprehensive list of "law enforcement officers": 784.07 Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or other *1172 specified officers; reclassification of offenses; minimum sentences.— (1)(a) As used in this section, the term "law enforcement officer" includes a law enforcement o...

...tatutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused. § 775.021, Fla. Stat. (1995). Applying the above principles to the present statutes, we note that section 784.07(1)(a) states that "the term `law enforcement officer' includes a law enforcement officer ......

...943.10." Section 943.10 provides at the outset that "`[l]aw enforcement officer' means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof." The meaning of these *1173 words cannot be plainer: A "law enforcement officer" for section 784.07 purposes must be either a state or local officer....

...d States government—i.e., they were both veterans of the United States Federal Protection Service. Although they performed a laudable service for the people of Miami and the State of Florida, they were not law enforcement officers within the orb of section 784.07....

...WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion. OVERTON, Justice, concurring. I concur. I write only to suggest that the legislature consider adding federal law enforcement officers to be within the definition of law enforcement officers under the provisions of section 784.07....

...I do not believe this Court has jurisdiction because the decision of the third District is not in conflict with C.L. v. State, 693 So.2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), which held that a Palm Beach County School Board police officer is a law enforcement officer within the meaning of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...for six days. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence does not support a flight instruction. The second jury-instruction issue challenges the trial court's instruction as to the two charges of battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1985), which defines the substantive offense, requires as an essential element proof that the victim was in fact a law enforcement officer....

...State, 677 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla.1996) (reiterating that courts must construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another). Section 843.01 is part of a statutory scheme that is designed to protect law enforcement officers and ensure that they are able to perform their duties. For example, section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2002), states that "[w]henever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ....

...is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified." [9] For purposes *1115 of our analysis, it is significant that we have previously held that knowledge of the officer's status is an essential element of this offense even though section 784.07(2) lacks specific language to that effect. See Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692; Street v. State, 383 So.2d 900, 900 (Fla. 1980). [10] The language of section 784.07 is almost identical to that of section 843.01—both statutes include the word "knovvingly," followed by a proscribed act upon an officer. Compare § 784.07(2), Fla....

...Although the actus reus or proscribed acts are distinct, i.e., "assault and battery" versus "resists, obstructs, or opposes," the requisite mens rea or mental state is comparable. Therefore, because the Court has previously held that "knowingly" in section 784.07 includes knowledge of the officer's status, it would be unreasonable for the Court not to similarly conclude that "knowingly and willfully" in section 843.01 includes knowledge of the officer's status....

...directly relating to crimes against law enforcement officers as requiring knowledge of an officer's status despite a lack of specific language to that effect. See Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692 (concluding that battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2) and attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(3) include knowledge of the officer's status as an essential element); Cooper, 742 So.2d at 858 (concluding that resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02 requires proof of defendant's knowledge of officer's status)....

...to convict the defendant." Polite, 934 So.2d at 497. [8] Although section 775.082 was amended in 2005, see ch. 2005-28, § 4, Laws of Fla., the revision does not affect the specific text or principles for which this provision is cited. [9] Although section 784.07(2) was amended in 2002, see ch....

...2007-112, § 1, Laws of Fla., the revisions did not amend the text mentioned above or the principles for which the provision was cited. [10] Additionally, this Court previously held that knowledge of an officer's status was also an essential element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under the 1993 version of section 784.07(3). See State v. Barnum, 921 So.2d 513, 517 (Fla.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 493, 166 L.Ed.2d 365 (2006); Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692. Although the 1993 version of section 784.07(3) did not include specific language regarding knowledge of the officer's status, we nevertheless concluded that if the underlying crime of battery required the defendant to know of the officer's status then the greater offense of attempted murder of an officer should also require such knowledge. See Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692. We note that section 784.07(3) has been amended since 1993 and no longer includes the offense of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(3), Fla....

...er types of police-citizen encounters. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We conclude that the statute, by its plain terms, applies only to arrest situations. In non-arrest cases, in order to convict a defendant under sections 784.07 and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), [1] which define the crimes of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, the State must prove that the officer was "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties"...

...Just then, other deputies jumped on top of Tillman and Henriquez. Tillman did not release his hold on Henriquez until he was pepper sprayed. Tillman, 807 So.2d at 107-08. [3] The jury found Tillman guilty of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.07(2)(d) and resisting an officer with violence pursuant to section 843.01....

...(citing State v. Barnard, 405 So.2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and Lowery v. State, 356 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)). The Fifth District explained that it had extended this rule to the crime of battery on a law enforcement *1268 officer defined by section 784.07 and had applied it to encounters that fall short of a full-blown arrest, including illegal stops, detentions, and contacts....

...n, 807 So.2d at 109. We granted review to resolve the conflict between Taylor and Tillman on the scope of section 776.051(1). ANALYSIS I. Statutory Provisions and Standard of Review The issues in this case require us to construe sections 776.051(1), 784.07, and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 776.051(1) provides: A person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07 enhances the penalties for crimes against law enforcement officers and other enumerated classes of public servants by reclassifying the crimes of assault and battery committed against these persons. The reclassification from misdemeanor to felony or from a lower degree of felony to a higher degree increases the authorized sentences for the crimes. Section 784.07 provides in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, a traffic accident investigation officer...

...Thus, to effectuate its plain meaning and displace the common law no more than necessary, section 776.051(1) is implicated only when a defendant acts violently against an officer in resisting an arrest. We reject the Fifth District's use of the interpretive maxim in pari materia to engraft the prohibition into sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 when an actual arrest is not involved....

...The Legislature has not expressly precluded the defense of justifiable use of force against an officer in situations other than arrest. For this reason, and because the Legislature has placed the element of lawful execution of a legal duty in both sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, proof that the officer was acting lawfully is necessary in a prosecution for crimes committed under either statute that occur outside an arrest scenario....

...stitution). We similarly decline to adopt a more amorphous, hence more subjective, "reasonable officer" test for determining whether an officer is acting in the lawful execution of legal duties as required to establish the crimes defined in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01. Cf. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (characterizing "reasonable officer" test as an attempt "to reach subjective intent through ostensibly objective means"). Therefore, in construing the lawful execution element of sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, courts must apply the legal standards governing the duty undertaken by the law enforcement officer at the point that an assault, battery, or act of violent resistance occurs....

...Our holding that section 776.051(1) applies only in an arrest scenario requires that the State establish the element of lawful execution of a legal duty under the facts of this case. *1274 CONCLUSION Without question, the statutory enhancement of the assault and battery offenses against law enforcement officers in section 784.07, and the "resisting" offenses contained in sections 843.01 and 843.02, Florida Statutes, reflect a strong public interest in the protection of law enforcement officers. However, in making "lawful performance" and "lawful execution" of duties an element of both sections 784.07 and 843.01, the Legislature has specified that this enhanced punishment applies only when officers operate within the limits of the law contained in constitutional and statutory provisions as well as pertinent precedent....

...BELL, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur. BELL, J., specially concurring. I join the majority because I cannot say that it is unreasonable to interpret the "lawful execution of a legal duty" element in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 according to its plain meaning, especially in the absence of any contrary legislative intent expressly stated in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...However, I write separately to note my concern that this interpretation may narrow the intended scope of protection for public officials further than actually intended and, thereby, undermine the very purpose of these statutes. It is clear that the purpose behind sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 is to protect public officials by imposing heightened penalties on civilians who physically retaliate against them as they carry out their public duties. Cf. State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (finding that the goal of granting "law enforcement officers the greatest possible protection ... undoubtedly played a role in the enacting of section[ ] 784.07(3)")....

...ect those who are charged with preserving the public welfare from those who impair it"). And we have recognized that it is appropriate for the Legislature to provide this protection. See Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269, 271-72 (Fla.1978) (upholding section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), against an equal-protection challenge, in part because the Legislature's decision to grant greater protection to public officials performing indispensable public services "fosters the public safety and welfare")....

...of this decision. WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Although the 1997 versions of these statutes apply to this case, the provisions have not materially changed in the interim. We therefore cite to the current versions of these statutes. [2] Section 784.07(2) requires that the officer be "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties." Section 843.01 requires that the officer be "in the lawful execution of any legal duty." These elements are functionally identical....

...g Tillman to stumble, lose his balance, and fall to the ground on top of Henriquez. Id. at 108, 807 So.2d 106. [4] In arrest situations, Florida courts have consistently read section 776.051(1) in pari materia with the offenses described in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 and, in so doing, have not required the State to prove that the arrest was lawful....

...Laws § 11-5-5 (2002 & Supp.2005); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1028 (1998 & Supp.2005); Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.36.031 (2004 & Supp.2005); W. Va. Code § 61-2-10b (2002). [10] One of the states that uses this phrase has arguably defined it as we have now defined the phrase in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, Florida Statutes....

...James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Karen Kinney, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, for Appellee, Cross-Appellant. SHAW, Justice. We have for review Iacovone v. State, 639 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), wherein the district court declared sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991), invalid as applied to Alan Iacovone....

...When Deputy Hogsten approached, Iacovone ran to his own car and attempted to flee, striking the officer with the car. Iacovone was convicted of attempted third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term pursuant to sections 784.07 and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...death or life without parole Second-degree murder ........... imprisonment not exceeding 30 years, with a 25 year mandatory minimum term Third-degree murder ............ imprisonment not exceeding 15 years, with a 15 year mandatory minimum term See §§ 775.082, 775.0823, 782.04, Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 784.07 addresses attempted murder of a law enforcement officer and makes the crime a life felony: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the...

...duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. § 784.07(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 775.0825 in turn provides for a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. Such sentence shall *1373 not be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001 [sentencing guidelines]. § 775.0825, Fla. Stat. (1991). It is the State's position that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply to all three degrees of murder and result in the following across-the-board penalty scheme: Attempted first-degree murder ..............

...officers are constantly exposed to great risk of personal injury and death, and consequently are entitled to the greatest protection which can be provided through the laws of this state."). This goal undoubtedly played a role in the enacting of sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825. We fail to see how this goal is furthered by applying sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to all degrees of murder....

...nt officer is greater than the penalty for the attempt. This is a logical arrangement that reasonably advances the legislature's goal of providing law enforcement officers with the greatest protection possible under state laws. We hold that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder....

...Upon arriving, the officers tried to extricate Weaver and his brother from the crowd. Weaver refused to comply, prompting an officer to push him away. Weaver twice shoved the officer in the chest. He was arrested and charged with battery on a law enforcement officer (BOLEO) under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2005). Weaver, 916 So.2d at 896. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes, makes it a felony to commit BOLEO....

...99-188, § 1, at 1040; § 3, at 1042-50; § 6, at 1051-52, Laws of Fla. Most of the remaining sections address sentences, primarily those to be imposed on violent or repeat felony offenders. Section 2 amends the prison releasee reoffender portion of section 775.082, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998); section 4 amends *547 section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...atutes (1981): "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or the threat of violence to the person." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, prior to sentencing, appellant had been convicted under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1981), for battery of a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony....

...and of armed robbery. On appeal, Thompson alleged the trial court erred by denying his requested jury instruction that knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...require that the defendant had knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer. The decision of the district court in this case directly conflicts with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Grinage v. State , which found that section 784.07(3) created a new substantive offense and that knowledge of the victim's status as an officer was a necessary element of that offense. Grinage, 641 So.2d at 1365. This Court granted conflict review. The issue in this case is whether knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under subsection (3) of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...[2] We answer this question in the affirmative and hold that knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense. The statute at issue is titled "Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or other specified officers: reclassification of offenses." Section 784.07(2) and (3) are relevant to our analysis, and state in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ......

...While the jury's status as fact finder implicates the notion that a substantive offense has been created under the statute, we need not reach this question to resolve the issue here. We hold that knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...element of the offense at issue. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion. WELLS, Justice, dissenting. I dissent because I cannot agree with the majority's construction of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...I agree with this analysis and would apply the statute as written by the legislature. [3] Even if resort to extrinsic aids were required in order to interpret this subdivision, the majority fails to address the significance of the fact that in 1995, the legislature removed this subdivision from section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), and reenacted this statute as section 775.0823, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The majority should honor the legislature's clear expression on this question. Furthermore, the majority should state whether its analysis is applicable to section 775.0823, Florida Statutes (1995), since its reasoning is dependent upon the knowledge element of section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...l after a detective's allegedly prejudicial testimony. We resolve the conflict, but decline to address the additional issues. [3] I also cannot agree with the majority's analysis that because attempted first-degree murder is a specific-intent crime, section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), should be read to include a knowledge requirement....

...Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was approved in 2007. See Small v. State, 889 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). 8.10 ASSAULT ON A [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [ FIREFIGHTER], ETC. § 784.07(2)(a), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) . Lesser Included Offenses --------------------------------------------------------- ASSAULT ON LAW [ENFORCEMENT OFFICER] [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. 784.07(2)(a) --------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...------------------------------ Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 --------------------------------------------------------- Comment Several statutes have been added in recent years providing for reclassification of assaults and batteries on designated classes: §§ 784.074, 784.075, 784.076, 784.078, 784.081, 784.082, 784.083, and 784.085. This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007. 8.11 BATTERY ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) . Lesser Included Offenses ----------------------------------------------------- BATTERY ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER] [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. 784.07(2)(b) ----------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...1 ----------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007. 8.12 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...Give if 4a alleged. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to kill. Lesser Included Offenses ---------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], ETC. — 784.07(2)(c) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Aggravated assault 784.021 8.2 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Assault on law on 784.07(2)(a) 8.10 enforcement officer ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Assault 784.011 8.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------...

...--------------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was approved in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and amended in 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007. 8.13 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. § 784.07(2)(d), Fla....

...A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Lesser Included Offenses ---------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON [LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER], [FIREFIGHTER], ETC. — 784.07(2)(d) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...---------------------------------------------------------------------- Aggravated battery 784.045 8.4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Felony battery 784.041 8.5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Battery on 784.07(2)(b) 8.11 enforcement officer ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Battery 784.03 8.3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 -----------------------------...

...Anderson, Jr. and C. Marie King, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. Appellant has prosecuted an appeal in this Court following an order of the trial judge denying his motion to dismiss. Because the order upheld the validity of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In the police station appellant struck a law enforcement officer in the mouth. On December 13, 1976, a felony information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit charging appellant with battery of a law enforcement officer pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976). [1] He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On January 20, 1977, by a motion to dismiss, appellant challenged the constitutionality of Section 784.07 on the grounds that it reclassifies the offense of battery of a police officer from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree, and that such reclassification in this instance is violative of equal protection of the law....

...The motion to dismiss was denied. Thereafter, appellant changed his plea to nolo contendere, specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of the pretrial motion. Appellant was then sentenced to two years probation. Appellant now contends that Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...treatment; (2) it vests unlimited discretion in the prosecutor to file, on identical conduct, either a felony or a misdemeanor information because the prosecutor may charge someone who commits an assault or battery upon a police officer under either Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...statute because the language of the statute specifically states that the term "law enforcement officer" is not limited to the officers enumerated in the statute. Because we find appellant's arguments unpersuasive, we uphold the constitutionality of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...the public safety and welfare. See Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1972); Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1970). With regard to his second point on appeal, appellant notes that prior to the enactment of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), battery on a police officer constituted an offense under Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1975), the misdemeanor statute. Since Section 784.03 was not repealed or modified by the enactment of Section 784.07, appellant suggests that the prosecutor may file under the felony or the misdemeanor statute. Appellant concludes this unbridled discretion in the prosecutor must invalidate the statute at issue. While we agree that the prosecutor has the discretion to charge under either Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Traditionally, the legislature has left to the prosecutor's discretion which violations to prosecute and hence which range of penalties to visit upon the offender. Id. at 22. In sum, simply because the Government could have proven a violation by appellant of both Sections 784.03 and 784.07 but decided to prove its case under Section 784.07, appellant's right to equal protection is not violated....

...nts of knowingly and willfully resisting, obstructing or opposing the specifically designated class of officers by offering or doing *273 violence to the person of the officer while the officer is in the lawful execution of a legal duty. Conversely, Section 784.07 subjects the accused to prosecution for a felony without regard to the seriousness of the injury which he causes....

...uries without overextending the scope of a felony level statute. Consequently, while appellant concedes that Section 843.01 falls within the legislative purview of legislating for the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, he argues that Section 784.07 does not. Sections 843.01 and 784.07 will frequently overlap, and a prosecutor is imbued again with the discretion to decide under which statute he wishes to charge. Although appellant is correct in noting that Section 843.01 contains different elements which must be proven, it does not necessarily follow that Section 784.07 falls outside the legislative authority to denominate conduct as criminal. For the reasons heretofore stated, the legislature was well within its reach in enacting the challenged statute. In those situations where an accused may be charged under either statute but the elements of Section 843.01 are difficult to prove, Section 784.07 effectively "closes the gap" by permitting prosecution under the latter statute. Finally, appellant contends that the statute gives the prosecutor the additional discretion of determining who constitutes a law enforcement officer, thereby allowing him to decide who is within the purview of the increased penalty aspect of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...This rule of statutory construction is based on the principle that if the legislature had intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, they would not have made mention of the particular classes. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 332, pp. 658-60 (1953). Accordingly, the prosecutor may charge under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...be devoid of the constitutional deficiencies asserted and, accordingly, affirm the order of the trial judge denying appellant's motion to dismiss. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla....

...ment if a violation of the misdemeanor statute invariably constituted a violation of the felony statute. Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972). In the instant case, a violation of § 784.03 would not invariably constitute a violation of § 784.07....

...y involve the other. Under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1979), one could obstruct or oppose a law enforcement officer by threatening violence and still at the same time not be committing a battery on the law enforcement officer as proscribed in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...on. Florida law specifies that an essential element of any assault, including aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, is an act creating a well founded fear in the victim that violence is imminent. Compare § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (1989) with § 784.07(2), Fla....

...Section 3: amends section 775.084 to redefine "habitual felony offender," to define "three-time felony offender," and to require the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences on persons fitting the definition of "three-time felony offender." Section 4: amends section 784.07 to provide mandatory minimum sentences for aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer and aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer....

...tory prison term of 5 years when the three-time violent felony offense is a third degree felony; providing for construction; providing for ineligibility of a three-time violent felony offender for parole, control release, or early release; amending ss. 784.07 and 784.08, F.S.; providing minimum terms of imprisonment for persons convicted of aggravated assault or aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer or a person 65 years of age or older; amending s....

...gher degree, see, e.g., Ex parte Murry, 455 So.2d 72 (Ala. 1984) (murder of police officer capital offense), and affords a rational basis for the reclassification of a crime to a higher offense, see, e.g., Street v. State, 383 So.2d 900 (Fla. 1980) (Section 784.07, Florida Statutes, making battery upon a law enforcement officer a felony, does not viola-se equal protection clause by the special treatment it gives to police officers as victims of batteries); Landrau v....

...Although the underlying facts of Weaver are similar to those presented here, we find that the Second District misapplied this Court's decision in holding that the instruction in this case was not fundamental error. In Weaver, the defendant was tried for the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07, Fla....

...We also reverse the conviction of battery of a law enforcement officer in case number 91-1160 and remand for entry of judgment of guilty of simple battery for the following reasons. Mordica filed a motion to dismiss the information charging him with battery of a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), alleging: 1....

...Officer Sullivan also [sic] hit in the nose, while standing behind inmate Milton. *303 2. It is the defendant's position that his behavior above related does not constitute the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer, as that crime is defined by ss. 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...2) the critical intent transferred by the doctrine is only that directed toward the intended victim (the inmate), not the unintended victim (the law enforcement officer). The elements of the offense of battery of a law enforcement officer defined in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), [1] are *304 "1) knowingly 2) actually 3) intentionally 4) touching or striking 5) against the will 6) of a law enforcement officer 7) engaged in the lawful performance of his duties." State v....

...It is "a crime encompassing a requirement of a subjective intent to accomplish a statutorily prohibited result," Linehan at 248, to wit, not simply battery but battery on a law enforcement officer. The battery on a law enforcement officer statute, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), requires that the perpetrator knowingly commit the offense on a law enforcement officer....

...law enforcement officer. Since the record does not support that conclusion in this case, the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the conviction of battery of a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.07 and the sentence in case number 91-1160 is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction and sentence on the lesser included offense of simple battery pursuant to section 784.03....

...harge, we also remand for reconsideration of the revocation in light of only those matters alleged in the affidavit of violation. See Blake v. State, 433 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). REVERSED AND REMANDED. ALLEN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ..., while the officer ......

...ffense of battery of a law enforcement officer. Merritt. The Fifth District certified conflict with the decision of the First District in Fredericks. In Fredericks, the appellant was charged with aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), after he raised a knife and took a step toward an officer who had responded to a 911 call involving a domestic disturbance. Fredericks, 675 So.2d at 990. The appellant was convicted of the lesser *385 offense of attempted aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer. Id. at 989-90. The First District reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which enhances the penalty for aggravated assault when it is inflicted on a law enforcement officer, does not specify an offense labeled attempted aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and therefore, the offense does not exist. Id. at 990. Merritt argues here that the First District's reasoning in Fredericks applies to this case, and thus we should find that the absence of the offense of attempted battery of a law enforcement officer from the language of section 784.07(2) indicates that the offense does not exist. We agree that section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), does not include the offenses of attempted battery or attempted aggravated assault. Thus, neither attempted battery nor attempted aggravated assault can be reclassified based upon section 784.07(2). Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers....

...ficer are nonexistent offenses. See Fredericks, 675 So.2d at 990. This conclusion is in accord with our decision in State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 183 (Fla.1987). In Crumley, we approved in a double-jeopardy context the First District's construction of section 784.07 that "by enacting the enhancement statute, section 784.07, the legislature merely provided for a felony punishment when the victim [of one of the enumerated offenses] is a law enforcement officer." Crumley v....

...In this case, Merritt was convicted of violating section 777.04, Florida Statutes (1995) (attempt), and section 784.03(1), Florida Statutes (1995) (battery). Therefore, we remand with directions that Merritt be resentenced for the offense of attempted battery without felony reclassification based upon section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) (battery of a law enforcement officer)....

...Florida Statutes (1995), which provides that the offense of battery occurs when a person "(a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (b) Intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual"; and section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides in relevant part: Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ......

...assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer . . . the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: . . . (b) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree. Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2). A person commits battery if he: (a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (b) Intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. Fla....

...s when a person “[‘a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person ... [or] [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.’” United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03, 784.07 (defining battery and battery of a law enforcement officer))....

...Recently, however, the Florida Supreme Court held that battery of a law enforcement officer is not a forcible felony, and does not necessarily involve the use or threat of physical force or violence. See State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 218-20 (Fla. 2007) (discussing Fla. Stat. § 784.07). IV. We interpret the sentencing guidelines according to their plain meaning....

...V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. In this case we are presented, as we were in Carpenter, with the question of whether resisting an officer with violence, section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983), is a lesser included offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), and again we reach the conclusion that it is not....

...In reaching its conclusion that resisting an officer with violence is a lesser included offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, the district court reasoned "[a]ll the elements contained in section 843.01 must be proved, along with more, in order to sustain a conviction under section 784.07." Henriquez, 463 So.2d at 1180....

...(1983). The elements of battery on a law enforcement officer are 1) knowingly 2) actually 3) intentionally 4) touching or striking 5) against the will 6) of a law enforcement officer 7) engaged in the lawful performance of his duties. §§ 784.03 and 784.07, Fla....

...y involve the other. Under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1979), one could obstruct or oppose a law enforcement officer by threatening violence and still at the same time not be committing a battery on the law enforcement officer as proscribed in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...case. [3] The acts leading to the convictions in Carpenter are indistinguishable from those of the instant case. In Carpenter the defendant attacked a police officer during the course of an arrest. He was then convicted under both section 843.01 and section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...----------------------------------------------------------------- Battery 784.03 8.3 ----------------------------------------------------------------- None ----------------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 2008. 8.10 ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(a), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) . Lesser Included Offenses ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FIREFIGHTER, ETC. 784.07(2)(a) ------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...--------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Comment Several statutes have been added in recent years providing for reclassification of assaults and batteries on designated classes: "784.074, 784.075, 784.076, 784.078, 784.081, 784.082, 784.083, and 784.085. This instruction was adopted in 1981 [431 So.2d 594] and amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007 [962 So.2d 310], and 2008. 8.11 BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1991) . Lesser Included Offenses BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. 784.07(2)(b) -------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...--------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 [431 So.2d 594] and amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007 [962 So.2d 310], and 2008. 8.12 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Give if 4a alleged. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to kill. Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(c) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT INS. NO. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Aggravated assault 784.021 8.2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assault on law on enforcement officer 784.07(2)(a) 8.10 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assault 784.011 8.1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------------...

...----------------------------------- *1047 Comment This instruction was approved in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and amended in 1995 [657 So.2d 1152], and 2007 [962 So.2d 310], and 2008. 8.13 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(d), Fla....

...Definition. Give if 2b alleged. A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Lesser Included Offenses *1048 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FIREFIGHTER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(d) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Aggravated battery 784.045 8.4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Felony battery 784.041 8.5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Battery on enforcement 784.07(2)(b) 8.11 officer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Battery 784.03 8.3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 -----------------------...

...Merritt precluded a habitual felony offender sentence, because battery on a law enforcement officer was already an enhancement, and double enhancement was barred by double jeopardy. This timely petition for review followed. In Merritt, we held that section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995) [2] (providing for reclassification of offenses and minimum sentences for assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical care providers, public transit employees or agents, or other specified officers) did not apply to the offense of attempted battery of a law enforcement officer. See id. at 385 ("We agree that section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), does not include the offenses of attempted battery or attempted aggravated assault. Thus, neither attempted battery nor attempted aggravated assault can be reclassified based upon section 784.07(2)."). In so doing, we explained: Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers. At the time the enhancement statute was enacted, the legislature had created the four enumerated offenses in other statutory provisions. Id. (emphasis supplied). We concluded in Merritt that section 784.07 contained "no enhancement or reclassification of penalties for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses." Id. (emphasis supplied). Mills appears to conflict with Merritt because of our statement in Merritt —albeit in the context of determining that section 784.07 did not create the substantive offenses of attempted assault, attempted battery, or attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer—that section 784.07 "is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." 712 So.2d at 385....

...This statement was germane to resolution of the issue before us at that time, and was, therefore (as Judge Browning observed in a separate opinion below), [3] not technically "dicta." However, *1287 as reflected in the language of the statute itself, section 784.07 operates as a reclassification statute....

...rence, it does more than provide for minimum sentences applicable to those offenses; it also reclassifies the enumerated offenses based upon the status of the victim. Cf. Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024, 1030-31 (Fla.1991) (observing that "[s]ection 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1985), which defines the substantive offense [of battery upon a law enforcement officer], requires as an essential element of proof that the victim was in fact a law enforcement officer" (citing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 93)); Grinage v. State, 641 So.2d 1362, 1369 & n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (assuming, without deciding, that section 784.07(3) creates a new substantive offense), approved, 656 So.2d 457 (Fla.1995); Carpentier v. State, 587 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (analyzing the "offense described" in section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), in determining that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague)....

...enalties), section 775.083 (criminal fines) or section 775.084 (habitual offenders) —was amended, and the reference to section 775.084 (habitual offenders) was deleted). We conclude that the Legislature did not intend felony convictions pursuant to section 784.07 to be so excluded. Consistent with this legislative intent, offenses which are thus reclassified as felonies pursuant to section 784.07 qualify as felony offenses for purposes of habitual felony offender status, and such treatment does not offend double jeopardy....

...e doubt. Cf. King v. State, 763 So.2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (observing that, although there "is a logical argument to be made that battery on a law enforcement officer is a separate crime from battery," *1288 this Court's statement in Merritt that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute "should be adhered to by the lower courts," but this did not preclude the Fifth District's holding that King could be sentenced pursuant to both section 784.07 and section 775.084), review denied, 779 So.2d 271 (Fla.2000)....

...e criminal episode); Perez v. State, 772 So.2d 577, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("Also, we do not find that a double jeopardy violation occurred upon imposition of a habitual violent felony offender sentencing following the reclassification, pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997), of appellant's attempted robbery offense for use of a firearm.")....

...oval in Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So.2d 981, 988 (Fla.1981). Here, the Legislature has made the offense of battery, which is otherwise a misdemeanor, a third-degree felony when the victim is a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...ers. Thus, the imposition on a qualifying defendant of one sentence under the habitual felony offender statute for the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer is proper, and not violative of double jeopardy. Indeed, if a conviction pursuant to section 784.07 were not treated as a qualifying offense under section 775.084, this would, in effect, nullify the clear legislative expression of intent to treat battery on a law enforcement officer as a felony....

...This Court determined that the defendant could not be convicted of two separate crimes which addressed the same "evil" and were based upon a single offense. Id. at 184. Here, in contrast, there is only one punishment being imposed for a single offense. That offense is reclassified as a felony pursuant to section 784.07, and therefore constitutes a qualified offense under section 775.084....

...The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph. 5. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding. [2] Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), provides in relevant part: 784.07....

...rritt, it is further understandable that Judge Browning, in "giving ... deference to" the "plain wording of the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Merritt" would be prompted to bring to our attention the fact that the panel majority's conclusion that section 784.07 was not "an enhancement statute in the sense it would not be subject to the double jeopardy bar when combined with another enhancement statute," Mills, 773 So.2d at 652 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), appeare...

...Section 843.01, Florida Statutes states in material part, that "[w]hoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer ... is guilty of a felony in the third degree." (emphasis supplied). Likewise, section 784.07(2) reclassifies a simple battery to a felony in the third degree if the victim is a law enforcement officer "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties." In the present case, the state failed to prove that Deputy Gootee was engaged in the performance of a legal duty at the time of the alleged offenses....

...In determining whether appellant was lawfully arrested, a consideration of appellant's action in shoving the police officer during the attempted, improper initial search is necessary. The jury convicted appellant of battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(b). A person has committed a battery under section 784.03(1)(a) if he "[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other." Section 784.07(2)(b) reclassifies such a battery, when it has been committed on a law enforcement officer while he "is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties," as a third degree felony....

...Rodriguez's trial was held in January 2005. She was convicted of resisting an officer with violence, § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (2003), for her attack on the deputy when he was attempting to detain her husband; and battery on a law enforcement officer, § 784.07, Fla....

...Henriquez, 485 So.2d 414, 415-16 (Fla. 1986). An element of both crimes is that the law enforcement officer must be lawfully executing a legal duty when the obstruction or the battery takes place. § 843.01 (requiring that the officer be "in the lawful execution of any legal duty"); § 784.07(2) (specifying that the officer be "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties")....

...2d DCA 2005) (answering in the negative the question of "whether the illegality of a stop during which a suspect allegedly commits resisting with violence and battery of a law enforcement officer causes a failure of the [lawful execution] elements" of sections 784.07(2) and 843.01), quashed, 944 So.2d 340 (Fla.2006), opinion on remand, 947 So.2d 671 (Fla....

...at section 776.051(1) extended beyond an arrest situation to other types of police-citizen encounters. Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Fla. 2006). Noting that the legislature had placed the element of lawful execution of a legal duty in both section 784.07(2) and 843.01, the court explained that in prosecutions under either statute for crimes committed outside an arrest situation, the State must prove that the officer was acting lawfully....

...Accordingly, we must determine whether the State's evidence against Mrs. Rodriguez proved that the deputy was lawfully executing a legal duty at the time of their encounter. [1] *837 Tillman instructs that when determining whether the evidence proved the "lawful execution" elements of sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, we must apply the "legal standards governing the duty undertaken by the law enforcement officer at the point that an assault, battery, or act of violent resistance occurs." 934 So.2d at 1271; see also Yarusso, 942 So.2d at 942....

...Because the State's proof did not establish the crimes for which Mrs. Rodriguez was convicted, we must reverse her convictions. See F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 230-31 (Fla.2003). While the evidence did not prove that there was an unlawful battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07, it did establish the lesser included crime of simple battery under section 784.03(1)....

...We answer in the affirmative as explained herein and approve the result in Stevens on this issue. Stevens was convicted of attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term pursuant to sections 784.07 [1] and 775.0825, [2] Florida Statutes (Supp.1988)....

...constitutional lens to determine if the case really was constitutional in nature. Applying this concept to Iacovone, I conclude that our decision was constitutional in nature. In a footnote to Iacovone, we alluded to the fact that applying sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to second- and third-degree murder violates due process, because "the guarantee of due process requires that the means selected shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be [attained]." Iacovone, 660 So.2d at 1373 n. 1 (quoting State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla.1986)). The opinion in Iacovone reasoned that allowing section 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to apply to second- and third-degree murder would punish attempts more severely than the completed crime of murder, a means which certainly is not related to the object of discouraging lethal attacks....

...ll factors to that decision. First, the purpose of the rule announced in Iacovone was to prohibit the maximum penalty for an attempt from being greater than that for the completed crime. Second, the reliance on the old rule in this area was minimal. Section 784.07(3) became effective on October 1, 1988, and was struck down on June 8, 1995—a period of only a little more than six years. The old rule had never been approved by this Court before, and very few district courts had ruled on the subject. See generally Carpentier v. State, 587 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (denying a vagueness claim to section 784.07(3)); Gantorius v....

...ANSTEAD, J., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur. WELLS, Justice, dissenting. I agree with Judge Griffin's dissent in the district court. I fear that this decision will prove exceedingly difficult in future application to a never-ending variety of statutory construction situations. NOTES [1] Section 784.07 makes the crime of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer a life felony: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful per...

...duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. § 784.07(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988). [2] Section 775.0825 provides for a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole....

...It only became `nonexistent' when we decided Gray." ). Gray did not implicate matters that were constitutional in nature but rather marked an "evolutionary refinement[] in the criminal law" governing attempts. Witt, 387 So.2d at 929. [7] See Iacovone, 660 So.2d at 1374 ("We hold that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder.")....

...From his conviction for resisting an officer with violence and simple assault, defendant appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Benjamin was charged with resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983) (Count I) and assault on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2) (Count II)....

...ery on the same officer. However, Dixon also argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred in enhancing the attempted aggravated battery from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony. The law enforcement enhancement prescribed by section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1999), does not apply to attempted aggravated battery because the statute does not include attempted aggravated battery as one of the enumerated offenses to which reclassification applies....

...following a jury trial. See Barnum v. State, 662 So.2d 968, 968-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (" Barnum I "). Important for purposes of the instant analysis, Barnum was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1991). In 1991, section 784.07, "Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or intake officers; reclassification of offenses," provided, in relevant part: (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of atte...

...duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. § 784.07(3), Fla....

...Subsequently, Barnum was appointed counsel, an amended motion was filed asserting error under Thompson v. State, 695 So.2d 691 (Fla.1997), [3] and an evidentiary hearing was held. In Thompson, this Court held that "knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)." Id....

...cisions that "change" the law require a Witt analysis to determine if the decision should be applied retroactively. See Barnum II, 849 So.2d at 374. The First District held that it was *517 unable to reconcile Thompson with either category, stating: Section 784.07(3) did not contain broad terms evincing that the legislature expected the courts to engage in judicial construction, but instead used language that was intended to include a knowledge requirement from the date of the law's enactment, w...

...has been rendered moot. The State's claim is misplaced. The issue presented in Thompson was "whether knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under subsection (3) of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993)." Thompson, 695 So.2d at 692....

...While the jury's status as fact finder implicates the notion that a substantive offense has been created under the statute, we need not reach this question to resolve the issue here. Id. at 693. The Thompson Court determined that knowledge was an element of a violation of section 784.07(3), but refused to classify section 784.07(3) of the Florida Statutes (1993) as either a substantive offense or a sentencing enhancement....

...ling authority today. In Merritt, this Court held that attempted assault, attempted battery, and attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses. See Merritt, 712 So.2d at 385. In so holding, we wrote: "Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." Id....

...Notably, Thompson was not cited in the opinion, nor was there any issue presented or discussed regarding a knowledge element of *518 the offense of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer. Our recent decision in Mills clarified that, even though our reference in Merritt that section 784.07 addresses the concept of enhancement, this statute actually reclassifies the enumerated offenses based upon the status of the victim....

...utes such as the habitual offender statute, `which cut across some or all criminal statutes.'" Id. at 1287 (quoting State v. Brown, 476 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla.1985)). Clearly, in Mills we held that offenses that are reclassified as felonies pursuant to section 784.07 qualify as felony offenses for purposes of the habitual felony offender statute, and double jeopardy principles are not violated....

...ment officer presented or discussed. Neither Merritt nor Mills modified the holding in Thompson, which requires that a jury determine if the defendant had knowledge of his victim's status as a law enforcement officer. The language in Mills declaring section 784.07 to be a reclassification statute is of no separate importance here. Thompson itself held that section 784.07(3) included a knowledge element, and section 784.07(3)'s classification as either a substantive offense or a sentencing enhancement was totally irrelevant to our determination on that issue. See Thompson, 695 So.2d at 693. Irrespective of whether section 784.07(3) is considered to create a substantive offense, an enhancement provision, or a reclassification statute, Thompson still mandates that a jury is required to determine whether the defendant had knowledge of his victim's status as a law enforcement officer....

...Stevens, 714 So.2d 347 (Fla.1998), we held that the decision in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995), satisfied all three prongs of the Witt test and should be applied retroactively. See Stevens, 714 So.2d at 348. In Iacovone, this Court held that sections 784.07 and 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (Supp....

...re because "imposition of a hefty criminal sentence pursuant to a patently `irrational' sentencing scheme `could not withstand a due process analysis' of any sort." Id. at 348 (quoting Callaway, 658 So.2d at 986). The Thompson decision, holding that section 784.07(3) contains a knowledge element, does not implicate due process concerns present in both Callaway and Stevens....

...ot what the Legislature intended. The same cannot be said in the instant action. Here, the respondent was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, a life felony with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum under sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court held that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape." Id. at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861. Thompson merely provided that section 784.07(3) contains a knowledge element; it did not "place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties." Witt, 387 So.2d at 929....

...rove that he knew his victim was a police officer." Grinage, 641 So.2d at 1364. We accepted jurisdiction in Thompson on the basis of conflict between Grinage and Thompson v. State, 667 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), where the Third District held that section 784.07(3) was only a sentencing enhancement and did not require the defendant to have knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer....

...Thus, it could safely be inferred from those three decisions that Moreland's outcome would have been the same had we had the opportunity to consider the issue. The same cannot be said in Barnum's case. Although this Court held in Thompson that knowledge is an element of section 784.07(3), we have not addressed the issue in any other decision....

...5th DCA 1994), approved on other grounds, 656 So.2d 457 (Fla.1995). Thus, there was a law of the First District and a conflicting law of the Fifth District, but no law of the state. Not until this Court's decision in Darryl Thompson was there law of the state correctly interpreting section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), to require proof of knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer. In Darryl Thompson we construed section 784.07(3) as it had existed from its enactment in 1988, despite the First District's erroneous interpretation in Carpentier. [14] This *535 Court's decision in Darryl Thompson clarified section 784.07(3) by holding that knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer was indeed an essential element of the offense....

...). However, upon further review, we decline to answer the certified question as worded and instead base our jurisdiction upon the basis of certified conflict of decisions of the district courts of appeal. [2] In 1995, subsection (3) was removed from section 784.07....

...[11] A corollary point—in Moreland, the defendant had preserved the issue of the constitutionality of the administrative order, just as the defendant in Spencer had. Here, the defendant in Thompson had preserved the relevant issue by requesting a jury instruction that knowledge was an element of section 784.07(3), see Thompson, 695 So.2d at 691, while Barnum did not....

...2020, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2003), on remand, 882 So.2d 890 (Fla.2004). Herein, I identify our first decision as Bunkley I, the United States Supreme Court's decision on certiorari review as Bunkley II, and our decision on remand from the United States Supreme Court as Bunkley III. [14] The issue of whether section 784.07(3) included a knowledge element was clouded by uncertainty as to whether the enhanced punishment in the case of a law enforcement victim aggravator applied to all degrees of attempted murder or only attempted first-degree murder. In a case decided before our decision in Darryl Thompson, we held that both section 784.07(3) and the accompanying twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term in section 775.0825 applied only to attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer....

...touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (2) Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a). Though battery is ordinarily a misdemeanor, battery against a law-enforcement officer is a felony. Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b). The Supreme Court recently held that Florida’s felony battery offense is not categorically a crime of violence under the ACCA’s elements clause....

...ause courtroom is proper place to contest arrest rather than street). See also K.G. v. State, 338 So.2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. den., 352 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1977). In Meeks v. State, 369 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), the district court, citing to section 784.07, Florida Statutes [reclassifies offense when person knowingly commits battery upon a law enforcement officer while the officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties] held that a person is not justified in committing a battery upon a law enforcement officer to resist an unlawful arrest....

...iveira v. State, 751 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this constituted double jeopardy. We now recognize that we were wrong in Oliveira and recede from that opinion. In Oliveira the defendant was also convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997), enhances the offense of battery, which is normally a misdemeanor, to a third degree felony, where it is committed on certain persons including law enforcement officers....

...than the legislature intended." State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989)(quoting Hunter ). In the present case, the legislature made battery, which is ordinarily a misdemeanor, a third degree felony when the victim is a law enforcement officer. § 784.07(2)(b)....

...Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant Charles Lee Radford filed this appeal from his conviction and sentence for the felony offense of battery of a law enforcement officer under Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...eputy Sheriff of Charlotte County, while acting in the capacity of his official duties, by actually and intentionally touching or striking said person against said person's will, in violation of Florida Statute 784.03." The felony battery statute is 784.07(2) which provides in pertinent part as follows: "Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing ......

...es bodily harm to an individual. (2) Whoever commits battery shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree... ." It is quite clear that the language of the information under which appellant was charged does not track the statutory language of Section 784.07(2)....

...attempted murder of a law enforcement officer (as charged in count III), and aggravated assault (a lesser offense of the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer charged in count IV). On this direct appeal, among appellant's contentions is that Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), is unconstitutionally vague....

...As can be seen, the statute applies (1) when the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, or (2) when the motivation for the attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer. Unlike the related offense of assault or battery on a law enforcement *1357 officer (Section 784.07(2)), there is no apparent scienter requirement when the violation occurs in the manner described above in alternative # 1....

...nder which the attempted murder was committed. It is true that, under current law, a person convicted of third degree murder of a law enforcement officer would receive a less severe sentence than one convicted of attempted murder of an officer under Section 784.07(3)....

...While I concur with Judge Nimmons's opinion, I do so with substantial reservation. I am unable to agree that the use of the term "murder" in the subject statute is not inherently vague and ambiguous, but I do not believe this deficiency rises to the level of constitutional infirmity. The use of "attempted murder" in section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), without specific definition or reference to any other definitions of murder in the Florida Statutes, is patently confusing and ambiguous....

...Thus, first degree murder is a capital offense punishable by death or life imprisonment; second degree murder is a life felony punishable by imprisonment for life or a term not exceeding 40 years; third degree murder is a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years. By way of comparison, section 784.07(3) specifies that attempted murder of a law enforcement officer is a life felony punishable by imprisonment for life or a term not exceeding 40 years, the equivalent penalty for second degree murder, plus the additional requirement tha...

...alty than if found guilty of "attempted murder" in any degree. Traditionally, the law of this state has not recognized any crime known simply as "murder" or "attempted murder" without specifying the degree thereof, and it does not do so today unless section 784.07(3) may be said to create an entirely new offense of "attempted murder of a law enforcement officer." If that is the legislative intent, the section fails to specify the particular elements of the new statutory offense. Section 784.07 fails to define murder as requiring an "unlawful killing," as do the other provisions in section 782.04....

...der *1359 circumstances that would amount to either first, second or third degree murder rather than an attempt to kill a law enforcement officer that would amount only to manslaughter or would be excused by sections 782.02 and 782.03. In any event, section 784.07(3) is fraught with inherent ambiguities that not only make it difficult to determine legislative intent but leave the statute vague and uncertain in respect to its precise meaning, application, and enforcement in various circumstances....

...Appellant's motion seeks certification of four questions to the supreme court as questions of great public importance. In view of the concerns expressed in my special concurring opinion, I believe it is most appropriate to certify the first question set forth in the motion: WHETHER FLORIDA STATUTES, SECTION 784.07(3) CREATES A NEW, SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE, OR IS ONLY A RECLASSIFICATION STATUTE WHICH INCREASES THE PENALTIES FOR ATTEMPTED VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 782.04 WHEN THE VICTIM IS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER? NOTES [1] The subject indictment specified only alternative # 1....

...know that the victim is a police officer. He relies on Grinage v. State, 641 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) for the proposition that the state must allege and prove that the defendant knew that his victim was a police officer for a conviction under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...However, we do not read that case as deciding the question of whether or not knowledge of the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense of *472 attempted murder when the conviction is enhanced under Florida Statute section 784.07(3) (1993). Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1993) involves the offense of assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer....

...State, 625 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), that the "statute simply does not require that the offender have knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer." Carpentier, 587 So. at 1357. We disagree with Isaac, however, to the extent that it holds that section 784.07(3) creates a separate, substantive offense....

...his duty or if the motivation for the attempt was related to the lawful duties of the officer. This reading is supported by the recent case of State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995). In that case, the Florida Supreme Court held that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991) do not apply to all degrees of murder, only to first degree murder....

...m, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement, should, be distinguished from Florida felony battery under § 784.03(2), which punishes as a recidivist an offender who has more than one prior battery conviction, and Florida felony battery under § 784.07(2)(b), which applies to an offender who has committed simple battery against a certain kind of victim, such as a police officer....

...Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. *621 GRIMES, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from a revocation of probation and subsequent sentence to five years imprisonment. The appellant was originally charged with battery of a law enforcement officer contrary to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.)....

...request for a jury instruction on a non-existent offense. Achin v. State, 436 So.2d 30 (Fla.1982). We agree with appellant's argument in the case before us that the offense of attempted aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer does not exist. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993) reclassifies certain enumerated offenses and enhances the penalties for those offenses when the victim is a law enforcement officer....

...By its terms, the statute does not reclassify or enhance the penalty for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses. As explained by this court in Crumley v. State, 489 So.2d 112, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), approved, State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 183 (Fla.1987), "by enacting the enhancement statute, section 784.07, the legislature merely provided for a felony punishment when the victim [of one of the enumerated offenses] ......

...ce to be harmless. Appellant next challenges the legality of his three consecutive life sentences for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, each of which carries a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term before becoming eligible for parole. Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: *560 Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty ... shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. Section 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1989), provides: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole....

...that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer. Tillman's final argument, regarding the imposition of the collections court program, was not preserved for appeal. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla....

...ent term of 180 months of imprisonment, and on the three counts of shooting into a vehicle to concurrent terms of 180 months. The convictions for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer are the subject of the first issue raised in this appeal. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993), addresses attempted murder of a law enforcement officer and makes the crime a life felony: (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enfo...

...be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. Section 775.0825 in turn provides for a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole....

...esser degrees of the charged offense, but allowed simply for a finding of guilt or non-guilt. Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995), case law provided that the enhanced sentencing provisions of section 784.07(3) applied to all degrees of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer. In Iacovone, however, the court held that the enhanced sentencing provided for in section 784.07(3) applies only to attempted first-degree *965 murder convictions. In light of State v. Iacovone , and State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995) (holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in Florida), it is now apparent that one may be convicted of a violation of section 784.07(3) only if it is established that the murder attempted satisfies all of the elements found in that section and, in addition, the elements of first-degree premeditated murder. See Moody v. State, 679 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In the case sub judice, if the jury intended to convict appellant under any theory but first-degree attempted murder, then the enhanced sentencing provisions of section 784.07(3) were not applicable....

...5th DCA 1984), the Fifth District upheld a delinquency adjudication based upon a violation of Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1983), making it a misdemeanor of the first degree to resist an officer without violence to the officer's person. Section 843.02 provided in part, similar to section 784.07, that the officer, at the time of the offense, must either be "in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty." In M.C....

...Again in Kaiser v. State, 328 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), the Third District held that a defendant could be convicted of resisting an officer with violence to his person, as proscribed by Section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1973), which, in language also similar to section 784.07(2), required that the law enforcement officer or other person be "legally authorized to execute process, in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty." In so holding, the court concluded that the offic...

...ance of his duties as a law enforcement officer at the time appellee committed a battery upon him, in that Bates was then lawfully assisting in an investigation in order to determine whether the person detained had committed a criminal act. All that section 784.07(2) demands is that the defendant know or reasonably understand that the officer desired to detain him, and if the defendant responds to the detention with a battery upon the detaining officer, the defendant may then be guilty of violating the statute....

...stated intent. The order granting motion for judgment of acquittal is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED with directions to the court to impose judgment and sentence in accordance with the verdict rendered. NIMMONS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), provides: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an intake officer as defined in s....

...Grinage urges, and we agree, that before he can be convicted of attempting to murder a police officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, the State must allege and prove that he knew his victim was a police officer. The State argues, however, that since section 784.07(3) is silent as to the requirement of mens rea, then the defendant's knowledge of the victim's status is immaterial....

...atute (statutory as distinguished from common law crimes) need not be accompanied by a criminal intent, unless such intent be specifically required by the statute itself, as the doing of the act furnishes such intent. [2] *1365 However, we find that section 784.07(3) is not silent as to the requirement of mens rea. Section 784.07(3) is a subsection of a section entitled "Assault or battery of law enforcement officers ...; reclassification of offenses." The purpose of this section is to enhance the penalty for certain offenses against law enforcement officers (a...

...engaged in the lawful performance of his duty," if he did not know that Boaz was, in fact, a police officer? We agree that the court erred in instructing the jury that the State was not required to prove such knowledge. Had the State charged Grinage with the offense of attempted murder under section 784.07(3), [3] intent to commit the murder and knowledge that the victim was a police officer would, we think, be necessary elements....

...defendant will be presumed not only to have intended a killing but also to know that the undercover agent was a police officer is stacking presumption on top of presumption. We hold that section 782.04(1)(a)2 is not the proper vehicle for charging a section 784.07(3) attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty....

...etration of an attempted robbery. The above charge, without the additional allegation that Grinage intended to murder Boaz, charges nothing more than an aggravated assault (section 784.021) of a police officer engaged in the performance of his duty (section 784.07(2)(c)) committed as a part of an attempted robbery....

...ny (robbery). Although this aggravated assault allegation is coupled with the additional allegation that the victim was a police officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, this does nothing more than bring the offense within the ambit of section 784.07(2)(c) which enhances the penalty for the aggravated assault of a police officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty....

...ague, overbroad and ambiguous, thus leaving the jury to speculate and conjecture. This instruction appears to be a combination of the standard instruction on "attempt," [1] the statutory definition of felony murder, [2] and the case law interpreting section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, which requires an enhanced penalty for a person convicted of "attempted murder of a law enforcement officer." Isaac v....

...I do not, however, disagree with the First District Court of Appeal that the state need not prove the defendant knew his victim was a law enforcement officer. It may be that the overall legislative scheme found in sections 775.0823, 775.0825, 782.04(1) and 784.07, Florida Statutes, is odd, but these statutes plainly communicate the legislative scheme for charging, proving and punishing the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer....

...generally are disfavored ... and have suggested that some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime. Staples, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 114 S.Ct. at 1796-1797. [3] Assuming that section 784.07(3) creates a new substantive offense....

...Patterson of Masterson, Rogers, Patterson, Masterson & Lowe, St. Petersburg, for appellee. CAMPBELL, Judge. Grooms was arrested on September 8, 1979, and released two days later. Subsequently, an information was filed charging him with battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes....

...State, 368 So.2d 395, 396-97 (Fla. 3d DCA) (majority opinion and Schwartz, J., specially concurring) (same), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1979). [4] The jury instruction at issue in Wright was the instruction for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...First, Spurgeon challenges the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. He next argues the trial court erred when it failed to provide the jury with an instruction on self-defense. Because we agree with Spurgeon that the State failed to prove the victim was an “emergency medical care provider” pursuant to section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes, it was error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment of acquittal....

...Spurgeon was tried before a jury. At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State failed to prove DenDekker satisfied the definition of “emergency medical care provider” as provided in section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 784.07(l)(a) defines an “emergency medical care provider” as: [A]n ambulance driver, emergency medical technician, paramedic, registered nurse, physician as defined in s....

...hospitals as defined in chapter 395, who are employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof. § 784.07(l)(a), Fla....

...ion of an “emergency medical care provider” because no evidence was presented that South Seminole Hospital satisfied the definition of “hospital” as that term is defined in chapter 395. Spurgeon argues the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes, and thereby erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied Spurgeon’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on its interpretation of section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla.2006) (“The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.”). In denying Spurgeon’s motion, the court reasoned: This Court’s reading of section 784.07(l)(a) is that when it says the term emergency medical care provider it also includes physicians, employees, agents or volunteers of hospitals as defined in Chapter 395. Doesn’t mean hospital as defined in 395, it means— [[Image here]] ... those type of individuals who may be employed as defined in 395. The court went on to say: [M]y interpretation is ... that the statute 784.07(l)(a) does not require the hospital be defined as in 395, but that the physicians, employees, agents or volunteers of hospitals are as defined in 395 and it goes on to say who are employed under contract or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated which include security....

...State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998). Furthermore, “[i]t is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction.” State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1993). Here, the court’s construction of section 784.07(1)(a), that the statute *1046 “does not require the hospital be defined as in 395, but that the physicians, employees, agents or volunteers of hospitals are as defined in 395,” is problematic. Since “hospital” is the only term defined in chapter 395, the appropriate construction of section 784.07(l)(a) is that the term “emergency medical care provider” only covers physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of a hospital as a hospital is defined in chapter 395. Just as “physician” and “medical director” are specifically defined under section 784.07(l)(a), “hospital” is defined by chapter 395. Section 784.07(l)(a) states: The term “emergency medical care provider” also includes physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of hospitals as defined in chapter 395, who are employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof. § 784.07(l)(a) (emphasis added)....

...y). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and sentence for battery on an emergency medical care provider and remand for new trial on the charge of battery. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL. ORFINGER, C.J. and PALMER, J., concur. . See §§ 784.03, 784.07(l)(a), and 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...Even if the underlying arrest had been invalid, this court has held that a defendant is not justified in using force to resist an unlawful arrest (pursuant to sections 843.01 and 776.051(1), Florida Statutes) or in committing a battery to resist an unlawful arrest (pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes)....

...Appellant's category one scoresheet showed a total of 210 points and a guidelines recommended range of 12 to 17 years incarceration. For the attempted murder, he was sentenced to seventy-five years incarceration with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. This sentence is challenged on appeal. Pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), the attempted murder of a law enforcement official is a life felony, punishable as provided in section 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Meeks appeals his conviction of battery on a law enforcement officer and sentence of six months to three years. Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the information on the grounds that the officers were not in the lawful performance of their duties at the time of the offense. § 784.07, Fla....

...However, just as the appellant is not justified in using force to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Sections 843.01 and 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (1977), neither is he justified in committing a battery to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977). See Lowery v. State, 356 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Under these unique facts, Sections 784.07 and 843.01 overlap in their application and the appellant was properly chargeable under either statute....

...HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge. The State of Florida appeals from an order granting Robert Johnson's motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). Johnson was charged by information with battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1978)....

...ie case of guilt. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Johnson contends that the lower court properly granted the motion to dismiss, as Officer Brubaker was not "engaged in the lawful performance of his duties," an essential requirement of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes....

...The appellate court held: [J]ust as the appellant is not justified in using force to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Sections 843.01 and 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (1977), neither is he justified in committing a battery to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. *553 SUNDBERG, Justice. Appellant has prosecuted an appeal in this Court following an order of the trial judge denying his motion to dismiss the information. Because that order upheld the validity of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), [1] in the face of appellant's constitutional challenge to the statute, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution....

...They also became involved in the scuffle. Appellant was then arrested and had to be subdued before he could be given aid. Appellant was charged by information with Counts I and II, Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer; and Counts III and IV, Battery on a Fire Fighter, pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

..." to have the broad application which appellant imputes to it. What the legislature did intend was to protect the person who protects the public's life and property by risking his life in fighting fires. To further the legislative intent, therefore, Section 784.07(1)(b) should be read so that "fire fighter" is defined, inter alia, as "any person employed by any public employer of this state whose duty it is to extinguish fires" AND "to protect life or property......

...e proffered medical help because he was under no legal obligation to accept that help. We cannot agree that appellant acted legally in committing a battery, whether it be upon a fire fighter or anyone else. With regard to appellant's contention that Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), is unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection, this Court's opinion in Soverino v. State, supra, has recently decided this point adversely to his position. Finally, appellant posits that Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), is unconstitutional because its title fails to express the subject of the enactment....

...The title to the act here under review gives fair notice of its contents for purposes of Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution. Accordingly, the order of the trial judge is affirmed. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla....

...[1] The defendant next argues that the victims were not acting as law enforcement officers at the time of the offense and therefore the charges should be reduced from aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer to aggravated assault. We agree with the defendant on this issue. Subsection (2) of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2001) provides: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, ......

...We concluded that the sentences there had, therefore, only been enhanced once under the habitual offender statute resulting in no double jeopardy violation. See id. Appellant, however, relies on Oliveira v. State, 751 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which holds that section 784.07, creating the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer, is an enhancement statute rather than a statute which defines separate substantive offenses as we held in Evans....

...The fourth district, however, has now receded from their opinion in Oliveira. See Spann v. State, 772 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(en banc). In Oliveira, the fourth district had relied on Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), in which the Florida Supreme Court held that section 784.07 only defined completed crimes and not attempts, making the defendant's conviction in that case for attempted battery on a law enforcement officer error. See id. at 385. In Merritt, the supreme court, after discussing the statute at issue, stated in what appears to be dicta, "Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." Id....

...ed by the principle of double jeopardy. It is well recognized that a criminal offense cannot be enhanced twice because of the double jeopardy bar. See State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 183 (Fla.1987). In view of this bar, a determination of whether or not Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute, or a statute that creates and defines a separate criminal offense, is essential. If the former, the trial court must be reversed, and if the latter, the trial court must be affirmed. I strongly believe that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute and, therefore, the trial court must be reversed. I primarily base my opinion upon the plain wording of the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998). In Merritt the court, when construing whether section 784.07 was an enhancement or a substantive statute, opined that: *652 Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers....

...rritt was somewhat careless," and thus, should be disregarded. I believe the determination by the Supreme Court in Merritt meets neither of these descriptions, and the best approach is for this court to follow the plain words of Merritt finding that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute rather than a substantive statute....

...ual views of author of opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent. The majority's determination that the words used by the court in Merritt constitute dicta is clearly erroneous. There the court was compelled to determine whether section 784.07(c) was an enhancement or a substantive statute, because the defendant was convicted of an attempted battery on a law enforcement officer. As section 784.07 contains no specific reference to an attempted battery of a law officer being a crime, had the court determined that section 784.07 is a substantive statute, see section 777.04, Florida Statutes, the general attempts statute would apply, and the conviction of the defendant of attempted battery would require affirmance. However, since the court found section 784.07 is an enhancement statute, section 777.04 did not apply, and the defendant's conviction was reversed. Because of this context of the case, the court's determination that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute was the very crux of the decision and cannot be logically determined to be "dicta." Also, I disagree with the hypothesis that the court's choice of words in Merritt was "somewhat careless," as maintained by the appellee and, therefore, should not be followed. I believe the court expressed itself precisely as intended, because it was impelled by the facts to do so. The pertinent language is unambiguous, and if for some reason the court did not mean that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute in the sense it would not be subject to the double jeopardy bar when combined with another enhancement statute, the Supreme Court should make any needed change, and not this court, or the other district courts that have seen fit to "assist" by instructing the Supreme Court what it meant by labeling section 784.07 as an enhancement statute....

...By giving such deference to the Supreme Court, this court will avoid confusion in its application of precedent and more often arrive at the correct result regardless of the outcome of this case. For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court and remand for resentencing solely under section 784.07, Florida Statutes, because the double enhancement by virtue of the appellant's act against a law officer, and his status as a previous felony offender, would constitute a double jeopardy violation.

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and James A. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. Savage was convicted of resisting a law enforcement officer with violence, section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983) and battery of an officer, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), both arising out of the same episode, and sentenced to three-and-one-half years for each crime to be served concurrently....

...e offense of battery of a law enforcement officer, thus a defendant could not be convicted for both crimes based on the same incident. 463 So.2d at 1180. A close reading of the two statutes, however, reveals this is not the case. See §§ 843.01 and 784.07, Fla....

...of such officer... ." § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (1983). Battery of a law enforcement officer consists of "knowingly committing" a "battery upon a law enforcement officer ... while the officer ... is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties... ." § 784.07, Fla....

...al as to Count VI on the evidentiary ground and the motion was granted. The court then, sua sponte, raised the question of whether the remaining five counts sufficiently alleged that each victim was a law enforcement officer within the definition of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Polk Correctional Facility"], while said Law Enforcement Officer was engaged in the lawful performance of said Law Enforcement Officer's duties, by [specific act of battery alleged], against said Law Enforcement Officer's will, in violation of Florida Statutes 784.03, 784.07(1) and 784.07(2)(b)....

...e the ten-year habitual felony offender sentences to the five-year statutory maximums that apply, absent habitualization. Because both resisting an officer under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2002), and battery of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), are third-degree felonies subject to maximum sentences of five years under section 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2002), we reverse the ten-year sentences imposed for those offenses and remand for resentencing....

...e absence of a simple battery instruction. We do not consider Diaz controlling, however, because the issue was not preserved in that case. [3] The Blockburger test is codified at Section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). [4] See § 784.03(1) & 784.07, Fla....

...ng the said officer without the consent of the said officer or by intentionally causing bodily harm to the said officer while the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, to-wit: striking Officer Cheek in the mouth, in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes.

...The record clearly establishes that Gilchrist, when contacted by the officers, unquestionably resorted to violence. Therefore, dismissal of this count was clearly erroneous. REVERSED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). [2] § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (1983) [3] § 784.07, Fla....

...Sunderland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. ALTENBERND, Judge. Renetha C. Wyche appeals her convictions and sentences of loitering for the purpose of prostitution and battery of a law enforcement officer. § 24-61, City of Tampa Code (1987); § 784.07, Fla....

...Wallace v. State, 724 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1998). Casselman also argues that all the elements of assault on a law enforcement officer and battery on a law enforcement officer are contained in the statute which addresses resisting an officer with violence. See §§ 784.07 (a)(2)(a); 784.011; 784.03; 784.07(2)(b) and 843.01, Fla.Stat....

...2d DCA 1991). See also Whitehead v. State, 446 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Reynolds v. State, 429 So.2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED for Resentencing. DAUKSCH and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 784.03, 784.07(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1997). [2] § 843.01, Fla.Stat. (1997). [3] §§ 784.011, 784.07(2), Fla.Stat....

...[6] Section 784.03 provides: (1)(a) The offense of battery occurs when a person: 1. Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other.... The offense of assault on a law enforcement officer is set forth in section 784.011. The punishment for this offense is also enhanced by section 784.07(2)....

...ault, aggravated battery, and attempted murder in the third degree of a law enforcement officer. We reverse the appellant's judgment and *1109 sentence for attempted murder in the third degree of a law enforcement officer on the ground that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991), as applied, violate the Equal Protection Clause. [1] We affirm the remaining convictions. The appellant argues that the offense classification and penalty mandated by sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, violate the rationality requirement of the Equal Protection Clause. Section 784.07(3) provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a l...

...The Florida Legislature has expressed an intention to provide law enforcement officers with the greatest protection possible because of their exposure to great risk of violence. See Ch. 89-100, § 2, Laws of Fla. (creating § 775.0823, Fla. Stat.). It is obvious that this intent guided the legislature in enacting sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825....

...he completed murder with a lower sentence than the failed attempt. Such a result is inconsistent with the objective of protecting law enforcement officers. [3] *1110 Finding no rational basis for the penalty classification, we conclude that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 violate the Equal Protection Clause when applied to attempted third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer....

...It is "a crime encompassing a requirement of a subjective intent to accomplish a statutorily prohibited result," Linehan at 248, to wit, not simply battery but battery on a law enforcement officer. The battery on a law enforcement officer statute, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), requires that the perpetrator knowingly commit the offense on a law enforcement officer....

...The test to be used in determining whether a statutory classification satisfies the Equal Protection Clause is whether the classification rests on some difference bearing a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1978). Soverino concerned an equal protection challenge to section 784.07, which enhances the sanction for battery when the battery is upon a law enforcement officer or firefighter rather than upon a person not a member of that class. In Soverino, the court found that section 784.07 is constitutional, since it reclassified the offense only if the law enforcement officer or firefighter is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties....

...ividual," so long as the person qualifies as a prison releasee. [1] We already have special penalties for violent crimes against correctional officers. See § 775.0823, Fla. Stat. (1999). A simple battery upon a correctional officer is a felony. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...The state argues first that the trial court, by entering into its own plea agreement with appellant and imposing a downward departure sentence, denied the state its right to try Hewitt on the charges set forth in the information. The state next contends that the sentence is facially illegal for the following reasons: (1) section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), prohibits the court from withholding adjudication of guilt, (2) adjudication of guilt cannot be withheld in the absence of a probationary term, (3) a general sentence cannot be imposed for multiple crimes, and (4) a sentence cannot be inflicted in the absence of an adjudication of guilt....

...Applying the above principles to the state's arguments as to the second point, we affirm. The state's first argument, which *636 was preserved, is that the sentence is facially illegal, because the court was precluded from withholding adjudication of guilt by virtue of the express language of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995). We cannot agree. That portion of section 784.07 which prohibits the court from withholding adjudication of guilt appears in subsection (3), involving use of a firearm or destructive device during the battery on the law enforcement officer. Hewitt was charged with a violation of section 784.07(2)(b), without using any firearm or destructive device....

...of resisting an officer with violence and two counts of carrying a concealed firearm. Count four of the amended information charged that "Cox, on the 3rd day of March, 1987, in said county and state, did, in violation of Florida Statutes 784.03 and 784.07, knowingly commit a battery upon a law enforcement officer, Jan A....

...See also Blackwelder v. State, 476 So.2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Smith v. State, 475 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). In the present case, Cox was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1987) and section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1987), which provides in part as follows: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ......

...icer. Accordingly, any error as to this issue is not fundamental. Moreover, we have already rejected appellant's argument on the merits. In Carpentier v. State, 587 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev. denied, 599 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1992), we held that section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), does not require that the defendant have knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer when the defendant is charged with attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty. This is the exact offense with which the appellant was charged. On the second issue, the appellant argues that his sentences for four counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer were unconstitutionally enhanced twice: first, under section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), the crimes were reclassified from third-degree to second-degree felonies because the victims were law enforcement officers; and second, an enhancement occurred when appellant was sentenced as a habitual felony offender under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The court reasoned that section 812.014(2)(d) created a separate substantive offense, rather than merely enhancing the penalty, and thus Gayman's sentence was not enhanced twice. Id. at 19. We find the same reasoning applicable in this case. Although the appellant contends that section 784.07(2)(c) merely enhances the penalty for aggravated assault, the statute actually creates a separate substantive offense consisting of the elements of aggravated assault plus the added elements that the victim was a law enforcement office...

...Under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1989), the state must prove that the person charged resisted, obstructed, or opposed any law enforcement officer, parole officer, or "other person legally authorized to execute process in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty." Under section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), a person cannot be convicted of assault or battery of a law enforcement officer unless that officer "is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties." Taking judicial notice of this court's records, t...

...a crime of violence.”1 One of the two prior felony convictions that the court found was a “crime of violence” and that made Rozier a career offender was a Florida felony conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b).2 The career offender enhancement led to a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment....

...A person commits battery on a law enforcement officer if he “[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes [a law enforcement officer] against the will of the [officer]; or [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to [the officer].” Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03(1)(a), 784.07(2). 2  Case: 11-13557 Date Filed: 11/21/2012 Page: 3 of 23 U.S.S.G....

...lorida Statutes (2002), and with resisting an officer without violence, in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2002). [1] In lower tribunal case number 05-9631, Lanier was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), battery on a facility employee, in violation of section 784.078, Florida Statutes (2002), and threatening a public servant, in violation of section 838.021, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...t from the officers. First, as to the severity of the crime, assuming that Fidel did not flick a lit cigarette at Officer Bushing, which would be battery upon a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony in the State of Florida, see Fla. Stat. §§ 784.07(2)(b), 843.01, there is still no right to resist as Fidel did....

...n him, Fidel swung his arms about and struck at least one of the uniformed officers. This was a battery. See id. § 784.03. [8] Under Florida law, a battery committed against a law enforcement officer in this manner is a third-degree felony, see id. § 784.07(2)(b), [9] *1382 and in this case obviously involved "the use ....

...In 1984, a jury found appellant guilty of battery in violation of section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1983) (a first degree misdemeanor), resisting arrest with violence in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983) (a third degree felony), and two counts of battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983) (third degree felonies)....

...Estrella, 31 Cal.App.4th 716, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 383 (1995). But that case involved an entirely different statutory scheme. The defendant was accused of fleeing a peace officer and the statute specifically required the peace officer's vehicle to be "distinctively *650 marked." In the instant case, section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997) reclassifies aggravated assault from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony when the assault is committed upon a law enforcement officer....

...Keroff of Keller & Keroff, Palm Beach, for appellants. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Rober Bogen, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Be for appellee. BOYD, Justice. The appellants were convicted, following jury trial, of the offense of battery upon a law enforcement officer, a felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. *534 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., A.S. Johnston and Miguel A. Olivella, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. WENTWORTH, Judge. Hughes appeals her conviction for the battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of § 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...When Officer Zipperer attempted to subdue Hughes, she struck him and tore his shirt. The State subsequently charged Hughes with petit theft and with battery on a law enforcement officer. She was convicted of the battery, but the trial court declared a mistrial on the petit theft count. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), makes the battery of a law enforcement officer a third degree felony: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer or a firefighter while th...

...harged shall be classified as follows: * * * * * * (b) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree. In Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1978), the appellant challenged the constitutionality of § 784.07....

...1978), governing battery of privately employed security guards as a general class. We conclude that reversal on that authority is not warranted. In light of the legislative intent as interpreted in Soverino, we hold there is a rational basis for punishing Hughes' action under the more stringent provisions of § 784.07....

...4th DCA 1999) on the issue of whether the double jeopardy clause precludes sentencing of a defendant as either a prison releasee reoffender or an habitual violent felony offender, after the defendant's sentence had already been enhanced pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, R.B., J. Jorge A. Rodriguez appeals his conviction of battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...icer was working an off-duty job at a night club as there was no proof that the officer was engaged in any official police activity or criminal investigation. On retrial, the parties should make certain that the evidence satisfies the requirement of section 784.07(2) that the officer be "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties" as discussed in Nicolosi.

...State, 492 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In the instant case, the appellant, Marvin Graydon, a Union Correctional Institution inmate, had a physical encounter with a state corrections officer. Graydon was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985), and with resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...of obstructing or opposing an officer with and without violence, I concur with the majority that P.B.P. was not entitled to a judgment of dismissal on those charges. NOTES [1] The statutes under which P.B.P. was charged use slightly different terms. Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2003), refers to the "lawful performance of his or her duties." Sections 843.01 and 843.02, Florida Statutes (2003), refer to the "lawful execution of any legal duty." [2] P.B.P....

...has argued that he was entitled to a judgment of dismissal as to each offense with which he was charged because the State failed to prove that the officers were engaged "in the lawful performance" of their duties, or "in the lawful execution of any legal duty" at the time the offenses occurred. See §§ 784.07, 843.01, 843.02, Fla....

...did then and there unlawfully commit battery upon PTL. GEORGE CABANAS, of the Key West Police Department, while said officer was in the lawful performance of his duties, to-wit: making the arrest of said DEBORAH WESLEY, by hitting said PTL. GEORGE CABANAS in the face, in violation of F.S. 784.03 and 784.07....

...It is important to observe that each count alleges that the appellant unlawfully rather than knowingly committed the battery. Consequently, the accusatory pleading as written constitutes a misdemeanor pursuant to Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1977) rather than a felony as provided by Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony, in conjunction with a ten-year sentence under the habitual felony offender statute has resulted in improper double enhancement. We agree. The Florida Supreme Court has recently explained, "[s]ection 784.07 ... is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384, 385 (Fla.1998). In the present case, the Defendant's offense was reclassified pursuant to section 784.07(2)(b). In addition, his sentence was enhanced under the habitual felony offender statute. Because section 784.07 is itself an enhancement statute, the Defendant has been subjected to double punishment by also having his sentence enhanced under the habitual offender statute....

...er and three counts of aggravated assault. At trial, appellant contested only the charge of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer. Likewise, on appeal he seeks review only of his conviction on that charge. He raises eight issues: (1) whether section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1991), is unconstitutionally vague; (2) whether section 784.07(3) violates the rationality requirement of the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions; (3) whether the charge should have been dismissed because, as phrased in the information, it was duplicitou...

...as a lesser-included offense of that charged, constituted reversible error; and (8) whether the crime of attempted felony murder, as defined in Florida, is unconstitutional. We affirm. Appellant was charged by amended information with a violation of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...lated, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. The section was added in 1988. Ch. 88-381, § 55, at 2077-78, Laws of Fla. In the trial court, appellant argued that section 784.07(3) *1083 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not distinguish between degrees of murder, and because it does not require knowledge on the part of the perpetrator that the victim is a law enforcement officer....

...State, 587 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), review denied, 599 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1992), again concluding that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Appellant has failed to persuade us that we should revisit those two decisions. Appellant argues that section 784.07(3) violates the rationality requirement of the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions....

...Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused his request to instruct the jury on attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, as a lesser-included offense of that charged. We conclude that appellant's argument grows out of a misperception regarding section 784.07(3)....

...The offense created consists of the elements of murder (in any degree), which are found by reference to section 782.04; plus the elements of a criminal attempt, which are found by reference to section 777.04(1); plus the added element either that the victim was a "law enforcement officer [as defined in section 784.07(1)(a)] engaged in the lawful performance of his duty" or that "the motivation" for the attempted murder of the "law enforcement officer" "was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer." Such a conclusion is supported by our recent decision in Evans v. State, 625 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), in which we held that section 784.07(2)(c) creates a separate substantive offense of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. The clear intent behind section 784.07(3) is that one who attempts to murder "a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty," or who attempts to murder "a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to...

...t out in section 775.0825. Whether the attempted murder would otherwise have been classified as first, second or third-degree is irrelevant. Carpentier, 587 So.2d at 1358; Nephew, 580 So.2d at 306. All are punished in precisely the same manner under section 784.07(3)....

...he attempted first-degree murder. We affirm. Nephew was charged by information with the foregoing offenses following an incident wherein he fired four shots at an officer who had stopped him for a traffic offense. He was tried by jury and convicted. Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. Section 775.0825 goes on to provide that "any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole." Accordingly, Nephew was sentenced to 25 years for the attempted first-degree murder conviction, and to various lesser terms on the other charges....

...mission of a felony constitutes double jeopardy, is without merit. See Lentz v. State, 567 So.2d 997, 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (the use of a firearm is not an essential element of the offense of attempted first-degree murder). Nephew also argues that section 784.07(3), under which he was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, is unconstitutionally vague in that it does not specify the degree of attempted murder to which the mandatory term set forth in section 775.0825 will apply....

...While the term "murder" is not defined in the body of the statute, in such cases resort may properly be had to related statutory provisions which define the term. Hagan at 945. Here, the definition of "murder" may be found in sections 782.04(1) — (4), Florida Statutes. That section 784.07(3) does not limit its application to one particular degree of attempted murder does not render the statute "vague;" it simply means that conviction of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, of whatever degree, will be treated as a life felony and punished accordingly....

...ALLEN, J., concurring specially with opinion. ALLEN, Judge, concurring specially. I concur in the result reached by the majority. In doing so, I observe that Nephew raised no equal protection argument. Accordingly, we have not determined whether the punishment classification established by section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, meets the rationality requirement imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....

...ny, s. 782.04(4), a defendant could receive a lesser sentence for completing the murder of a law enforcement officer (the statutory maximum sentence for a second-degree felony is 15 years, s. 775.082(3)(c)) than for attempting the same offense under s. 784.07(3) (25 years minimum mandatory term). This is certainly questionable as a matter of public policy and perhaps warrants re-visitation by the Legislature, but it does not render s. 784.07(3) void for vagueness as maintained by appellant....

...conviction. Under the analysis required by Valdes , we conclude that battery and felony battery (one prior) are merely different degrees of the same offense. 4 The same is true of felony battery (one prior) and battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2Ó09), reclassifies a battery from a misdemeanor to a felony based on the status of the victim as a law enforcement officer. § 784.07(2)0»), Fla. Stat. (2009). 5 See generally State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 188, 184 (Fla.1987) (holding under now-outmoded “same evil” test that aggravated battery and battery on law enforcement officer are both aggravated versions of simple battery). Section 784.07 identifies underlying crimes, including assault and battery, adds aggravating factors and enhances the penalties accordingly. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...Though not argued by the parties, we also find that felony battery (one prior) subsumes simple battery. See § 775.021(b)3., Fla. Stat. (2009); Harris v. State, 111 So.3d 922 , 2013 ’ WL 1235888 (Fla. 1st DCA March 8, 2013) (holding convictions of felony battery and battery for same act violate double jeopardy). . Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2009), provides, in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer .......

...Upon further consideration, we recede from Watson to the extent it required that an information recite a "violation" of section 775.0823 in order for the trial court to incorporate a law enforcement multiplier into a defendant's scoresheet. It is sufficient that the information identify the offense as a violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), a qualifying offense....

...Count II alleged "aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer." It did not specifically allege a violation of the Law Enforcement Protection Act, codified in section 775.0823, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), but it did specifically identify the offense as a violation of section 784.07. Section 784.07 is a specific offense dealing with assault or battery on a law enforcement officer....

...to the previous sentences imposed. Section 784.045(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), under which appellant was convicted defines aggravated battery as: (1) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery: ... . (b) Uses a deadly weapon. Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), which defines battery on a law enforcement officer under which appellant was also convicted states: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforceme...

...Similarly, we find that the legislature did not intend to punish aggravated battery and battery of a law enforcement officer separately where the victim in both is the same law enforcement officer and there is only one battery. Prior to the enactment of section 784.07, battery of a law enforcement officer was covered by section 784.03 (defining battery), a misdemeanor statute. By the enactment of section 784.07, one who has battered a law enforcement officer may be *114 charged, at the prosecutor's discretion, with a felony under section 784.07 rather than only a misdemeanor under section 784.03. Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1978). In Soverino, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's discretion to charge under either section 784.07 (felony statute) or section 784.03 (misdemeanor statute) when a law enforcement officer is the victim of a battery does not constitute a constitutional infirmity. The language of the opinion indicates that the prosecutor may prosecute under either section 784.07 or section 784.03 but not both....

...State, 456 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1984), where the Supreme Court held that section 775.021(4), excluding lesser included offenses from its provisions, excludes only necessarily lesser included offenses. We conclude that by enacting the enhancement statute, section 784.07, the legislature merely provided for a felony punishment when the victim of a battery is a law enforcement officer....

...The Legislature obviously intended to do exactly what was done here by enacting separate statutory provisions enhancing punishment for use of a deadly weapon [Section 784.045(1)(b), Florida Statutes] and for offenses against "law enforcement officers" [Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes]....

...y involve the other. Under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1979), one could obstruct or oppose a law enforcement officer by threatening violence and still at the same time not be committing a battery on the law enforcement officer as proscribed in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1979)....

MONACO, J. The appellant, V.D., takes this appeal from an order adjudicating her delinquent for resisting arrest with violence in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), and battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...within that radius. State v. Burch, 545 So.2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), aff'd, 558 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1990). By further analogy, we have considered the statute applicable to assault and battery upon law enforcement officers or firefighters. That statute, section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1989), states in part: Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an intake officer as defined in § 39.01, or a parking enforceme...

...Did unlawfully commit a battery upon DEPUTY JAMES SCHULTZ, a law enforcement officer, while the said JAMES SCHULTZ was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties, by striking the said person against his will and in violation of Florida Statute 784.07. (emphasis supplied) This language tracked Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, except that it substituted the word "unlawfully" for the word "knowingly." Because of this defect the information failed to allege knowledge, an essential element of the crime of battery of a law enforcement officer....

...ies for VCC sentencing. See § 775.084(1)(d)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001) (stating that a "forcible felony" is subject to VCC sentencing); § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2001) (defining "forcible felony" and listing offenses which constitute forcible felonies); § 784.07(2), Fla....

...offense for VCC sentence enhancement" because one may commit the offense without the use or threat of violence. Hearns, 961 So.2d at 219. Consequently, we reverse the denial of Cribbs' claim. Because BOLEO is a felony of the third degree pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2001), and Cribbs' fifteen-year sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for this offense, we remand for resentencing on count one without the VCC enhancement....

...On February 22, 1977, the defendant/appellee, Earl Bailey, was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence to his person, attempted escape, and obstructing justice. The defendant/appellee moved to dismiss the battery charges on the ground that Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...tes Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution. Finding the statute violative of both the equal protection and due process clauses, the circuit court dismissed the charges. The State appeals from the order granting dismissal. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Any commonlaw definition of felony is inapplicable in Florida. Chapman v. Lake, supra. In matters of punishment, the legislature's determination will be sustained against due process challenges unless the punishment itself is cruel and unusual. Sowell v. State, 342 So.2d 969 (Fla. 1977). Section 784.07 does not violate state and federal guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment. Since the reclassification of already prohibited conduct from a misdemeanor to a felony reflects merely an increase in the prescribed punishment, Section *774 784.07 does not violate due process and is not unconstitutional....

...manded to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent herewith. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The circuit court also found that the absence of a scienter requirement of § 784.07, Fla....

...Appellant also claimed in ground four that his conviction in count eight for attempted aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer was illegal because that offense does not exist. As the state points out, appellant's offense was reclassified under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1999), from a third degree felony to a second degree felony. The controlling case law reveals that this was erroneous. *112 In Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384, 385 (Fla.1998), the supreme court held that section 784.07, which provides for the reclassification of offenses and minimum sentences for assault or battery of law enforcement officers, among others, does not apply to attempted battery of a law enforcement officer. In so doing, the court explained: Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers. At the time the enhancement statute was enacted, the legislature had created the four enumerated offenses in other statutory provisions. Id. (footnote omitted). The court concluded in Merritt that section 784.07 "contains no enhancement or reclassification of penalties for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses." Id....

...Oliveira holds that because the crime of Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer is an enhancement of the crime of Battery that it is wrong to impose an enhancement again by increasing the sentence because he is a repeat offender. The case cites Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), where our supreme court did say "Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995) is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." This statement by the supreme court should be adhered to by the lower courts....

...(1985), grand theft of property valued at $295, a third degree felony; and to § 784.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon without intent to kill, a third degree felony. In Case No. 89-3414, appellant pled nolo contendere to a violation of § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and John W. Tiedemann, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. *420 SHIVERS, Judge. Appellant Gregory Amaker appeals his conviction on two counts of battery of a law enforcement officer under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983) and two counts of resisting an officer with violence under Section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge - 12 - requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based - 16 - on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement - 36 - officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge - 41 - requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based - 46 - on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the - 50 - victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah Fraim Hogge, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. ALTENBERND, Judge. J.H.M. appeals an order adjudicating her delinquent for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...t resulted in charges of battery on a law enforcement officer against the protesting citizens. Tillman held the prohibition against a use of force applied only to arrest situations. In non-arrest cases, in order to convict a defendant under sections 784.07 and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), which define the crimes of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, the State must prove that the officer was "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties" or "in the lawful execution of any legal duty." *645 Id....

...Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1982). We have compared the statutory elements of assault or battery of a law enforcement officer, Sections 784.011, 784.03 and 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), with those of resisting an officer with violence to his person, Section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1983). All of the elements contained in Section 843.01 must be proved, along with more, in order to sustain a conviction under Section 784.07....

...ocess or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 784.07 Assault or battery of law enforcement officers or firefighters; reclassification of offenses....

...Johnson, 433 So.2d at 649. The panel affirmed Johnson's conviction. See id. at 650. Although two other opinions address a different statute, the State contends these decisions are analogous to the instant case because of the similarities between section 843.01 and section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (proscribing the knowing commission of an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer while the officer is "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties," and reclassifying upward the degree of the assault or battery). In the first opinion, Street v. State, 383 So.2d 900 (Fla.1980), the defendants were convicted of battery upon a law enforcement officer. See id. The Streets argued that section 784.07 failed to provide sufficient warning as to what conduct renders someone liable to prosecution for the felony, as opposed to ordinary battery....

...ue. See id. at 901. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed, stating that "[a]s a matter of common understanding and practice, the statute conveys sufficiently definite warning as to what is proscribed." See id. After the adequacy of this language in section 784.07(2) was recognized in Street, the Fourth District Court in State v....

...He has appealed the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse because the defendant's sentence is illegal under State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995). [1] In 1988, the legislature enacted section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), which provided that any person convicted of attempting to murder a law enforcement officer would be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in section 775.0825, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988)....

...In other words, it appeared from the plain reading of the statute that the punishment would be the same regardless of whether the attempt was to commit first-, second-, or third-degree murder. However, in Iacovone, our supreme court construed sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to apply only to the crime of attempted first-degree murder....

...This language supports the conclusion that the Iacovone decision is constitutional in nature. The second district court's opinion in Iacovone v. State, 639 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), evinces concern over the due process implications of sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825....

...the Iacovone decision where the court referenced the due process requirement that the means selected have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. 660 So.2d at 1373, n. 1. The holding of Iacovone, however, was that section 784.07(3) and section 775.0825, Florida Statutes, in referring to "attempted murder of a law enforcement officer" meant attempted first-degree murder, not second or third-degree murder....

...The Government presents four1 prior convictions to justify Braun’s sentence: (1) aggravated battery on a pregnant woman under Florida law, FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(b); (2) battery on a law enforcement officer under Florida law, FLA. STAT. § 784.07(2)(b); 2 (3) resisting arrest with violence under Florida law, FLA....

...CCA. 2 The parties discuss this conviction as battery on a corrections officer. However, the statute describes battery on a law enforcement officer, and it defines law enforcement officers to include corrections officers. FLA. STAT. § 784.07(1)(d). 5  Case: 13-15013 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 6 of 16 intent to commit robbery under Maryland law, MD....

...Thus, the Government has failed to prove that Braun’s conviction for aggravated battery on a pregnant woman was a prior violent felony. B. Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer Braun concedes that he was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer under FLA. STAT. § 784.07(2)(b)....

...1st DCA 1987); Rozmestor v. State, 381 So.2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). As in Sanchez we remand to the trial court for resentencing. QUASH sentences; REMAND for resentencing. COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 893.13(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (1987). [2] § 784.07(2), Fla....

...As grounds for reversal, appellant contends (1) that the statute providing for an enhanced penalty for the offense of battery when committed against a law enforcement officer was improperly applied because the officer was not at the time "engaged in the lawful performance of his... duties," as provided by section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1997); and (2) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury in regard to the scope of the officer's legal duty....

...oom. Upon hearing Officer Berens' explanation that appellant had hit him, the judge said, "Well, why don't you arrest him?" Berens did as suggested, and appellant was thereafter charged with the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer. Under section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), the offense of battery upon a law enforcement officer, while the officer is "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties," is reclassified from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree....

...he officer is therefore not entitled to the special protections of the statute. We disagree, and find that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to any offense covered by the enhancement provisions of section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...lant to the police. See Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 203-204 (Fla.1989). Also, we do not find that a double jeopardy violation occurred upon imposition of a habitual violent felony offender sentencing following the reclassification, pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997), of appellant's attempted robbery offense for use of a firearm....

...ng an off-duty job." J.A.S.R. v. State, 967 So.2d 1050, 1051 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). For the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, the State must prove that the officer was "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties. . . ." § 784.07(2), Fla....

...On November 15, 1991, the jury returned a guilty verdict, in pertinent part, on four counts of attempted second degree murder of a law enforcement officer as lesser included offenses. Gantorius was convicted and sentenced to four concurrent life sentences with 25-year minimum mandatory provisions pursuant to sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes....

...The purpose of the rule announced in Iacovone is to ensure that the maximum penalty for a criminal attempt is not greater than that established for the completed crime. The extent of reliance on the old rule in this area is limited to the brief life span of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes....

...Steven Darst appeals the use of a 1.5 multiplier pursuant to section 921.0024(1)(6), Florida Statutes (1999) on his scoresheet for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. Darst alleges that the use of the multiplier was improper when his crime was already enhanced by reclassification under section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Nevertheless, he is entitled to a corrected scoresheet although any errors made in the calculation would be harmless. E.g., Poole v. State, 777 So.2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The State also appeals Darst's downward departure sentence, but we find no error by the sentencing court. Section 784.07(2)(c) reclassifies an aggravated assault from a third degree felony to a second degree felony when the assault is directed toward law enforcement officers and certain other officials....

...sentencing him, it rendered his sentence unconstitutional as a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. See State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 183 (Fla.1987). Resolution of Darst's claims requires that we determine whether section 784.07(2)(c) creates a substantive offense or enhances a substantive offense....

...deadly weapon without intent to kill; or (b) [w]ith an intent to commit a felony." Clearly, section 784.021(1) is a substantive statute creating and defining aggravated assault and makes no mention of especially protecting law enforcement officers. Section 784.07(2)(c) [3] reclassifies an aggravated assault, presumably as defined in section 784.021, against a police officer, judge, prosecutor, fireman, or EMT, from a third degree felony to a second degree felony. The statute also mandates a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of three years. See Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(c). Florida courts have disagreed as to whether 784.07 is an enhancement statute or a statute which creates and defines a substantive offense. In Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384, 385 (Fla.1998), the supreme court opined that, The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers. At the time the enhancement statute was enacted, the legislature had created the four enumerated offenses in other statutory provisions. Other courts have followed the supreme court and have held that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute....

...*683 1st DCA 2000) (Browning, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); King v. State, 763 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 779 So.2d 271 (Fla.2000); Light v. State, 667 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Clearly, a person who commits an aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer under 784.07(2)(c) is subject to an enhanced penalty by having the offense reclassified. However, section 784.07(2)(c) could also be interpreted as creating a substantive offense because it contains the element of knowingly committing the act of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. Thus, section 784.07 contains one more element than section 784.021, which defines aggravated assault. Two other appellate courts have determined that 784.07(2)(c) does create and define the substantive offense of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. See Matthews v. State, 774 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 2d DCA) (en banc), rev. denied, 779 So.2d 272 (Fla.2000) (indicating that "[s]ection 784.07 is a specific offense dealing with assault or battery on a law enforcement officer"); Mills v. State, 773 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Evans v. State, 625 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (section 784.07(2)(c) "actually creates a separate substantive offense consisting of the elements of aggravated assault plus the added elements that the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties and that the defendant knew the victim was a law enforcement officer"). The Mathews court does not appear to have been presented with a double jeopardy argument, although Mills met the issue squarely. The Mills majority discussed the supreme court's pronouncement in Merritt, supra, that section 784.07 was an enhancement statute but dismissed it as dicta. Judge Browning dissented, choosing to follow the supreme court's pronouncement that section 784.07 was an enhancement statute....

...As long as different purposes are being served by the enhancements or the elements causing the enhancement are not the same, multiple enhancements are allowed. See State v. Whitehead, 472 So.2d 730 (Fla.1985); see also Spann, 772 So.2d at 39 (affirming sentence as a Prison Release Reoffender and reclassification under section 784.07)....

...der s. 775.0823(2), the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by 2.5. If the primary offense is a violation of s. 775.0823(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), or (8), the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by 2.0. If the primary offense is a violation of s. 784.07(3) or s....

...... which offense arises out of or in the scope of the officer's duty as a law enforcement or correctional officer,... as follows: * * * (10) For aggravated assault as described in s. 784.021, a sentence pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code. [3] Section 784.07, entitled "Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical care providers, public transit employees or agents, or other specified officers; reclassification of offenses; minimum sentences", states in rel...

...CR97-12781, Bright was charged with seven offenses; carjacking (§ 812.133); kidnaping with intent to commit a felony (§ 787.01(1)(a)2.); burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery (§ 810.02(1), (2)(a), battery on a law enforcement officer (§ 784.07(2)(b); resisting an officer with violence (§ 843.01); resisting arrest without violence (§ 843.02); and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer (§ 784.07(2)(d))....

...[2] Burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery. § 810.02(1), (2)(a), Fla. Stat. [3] Resisting an officer with violence (§ 843.02, Fla.Stat.), and resisting arrest without violence. § 843.01, Fla. Stat. [4] Aggravated battery with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer § 784.07(2)(d), Fla....

...Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The state appeals from a sentence which was less than that recommended under the sentencing guidelines. We reverse. Vincent Bryant, a state prisoner, was convicted of battery upon a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. § 784.07, Fla....

...Additional deputies eventually arrived, and the Coffins were arrested.7 7 Mrs. Coffin was charged with the misdemeanor of obstruction of justice without violence under Fla. Stat. § 843.02. Mr. Coffin was charged with several felonies: two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with violence under Fla....

...death or life without parole Second-degree murder ... imprisonment not exceeding 30 years, with a 25 year mandatory minimum term Third-degree murder ... imprisonment not exceeding 15 years, with a 15 year mandatory minimum term Id. at 1372 (citing §§ 775.082, 775.0823, 782.04, Fla. Stat. (1991)). Section 784.07 addressed attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, making the crime a life felony punishable by life or less than forty years imprisonment with a 25-year mandatory minimum term. Id. at 1373 (citing §§ 784.07(3), 775.0825, Fla....

...similarly fail to include any definition. See, e.g., § 775.087(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015) (providing mandatory minimum sentences for persons who commit certain designated offenses and who “during the commission of the offense” actually possess a firearm or destructive device); § 784.07(3), Fla....

...The aggravated assaults were committed when the defendant, using a gun, threatened and placed in fear Deputies Brady and Davis. See §§ 784.011(1) (defining crime of assault), 784.021 (defining crime of aggravated assault), 784.07(2)(c) (defining crime of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer)....

...As a result, the arresting officer decided to place handcuffs on the defendant as a safety precaution. As the officer was attempting to handcuff him, Mr. Freeney pushed the officer backwards and ran away. This physical contact is the event that resulted in the felony charge of battery on a law enforcement officer. § 784.07, Fla....

...a premeditated design or intent to effect the death of said S. HUSS, and toward commission of said offense, said JAMES RONALD VONDECK did SHOOT AT S. HUSS WITH A FIREARM, TO WIT: PISTOL, contrary to Sections 777.04(1), *1130 777.04(4)(a) and 782.04, 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, During the charge conference at trial the defendant objected to proposed jury instructions relating to aggravated assault, arguing that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense of the crime of attempted murder as charged in the charging document....

...t a felony. (2) Whoever commits an aggravated assault shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. An aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer is a second degree felony. See § 784.07(2), Fla....

...Additional deputies eventually arrived, and the Coffins were arrested.7 7 Mrs. Coffin was charged with the misdemeanor of obstruction of justice without violence under Fla. Stat. § 843.02. Mr. Coffin was charged with several felonies: two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with violence under Fla....

...ences and remand for re-sentencing within the guidelines. Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1990). Convictions AFFIRMED; Sentences VACATED; REMANDED for Resentencing. PETERSON, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.03, Fla. Stat. (1993); § 784.07, Fla....

...son, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose. Lesser Included Offenses [[Image here]] Comment This instruction was adopted in 2013. 8.12 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...A weapon is a “deadly weapon” if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Give if fa alleged. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to kill. Lesser Included Offenses *766 784.07(2X*:) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT INS. NO. Aggravated assault 784.021 8.2 Assault on law ©a enforcement officer 784.07(2)(a) 8.10 Improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon or firearm, if 790,10 Fla....

...1 At the adjudicatory hearing, K.H. was found to have committed battery on a law enforcement officer because he pushed the officer. 2 One of the elements of battery on a law enforcement officer is that the officer “is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties.... ” § 784.07(2), Fla....

...(2002) (defining "law enforcement officer" to include "any person who is . . . employed by . . . the state . . . and . . . [w]hose responsibility includes supervision, protection, care, custody, or control of inmates within a correctional institution"); § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...Mullins appeals his sentence as illegal pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We have jurisdiction. Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D). Mullins was convicted of a single count of battery on a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...tence. Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1987); Rivero v. State, 592 So.2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Clifton v. State, 608 So.2d 890, 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing. HARRIS, C.J., and GOSHORN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 784.07 Fla....

...Appellant's battery of Officer Fischer was, of course, a criminal act. However, pursuant to Tillman, appellant cannot be found to have committed the crime of battery of a law enforcement officer. In his concurring opinion in Tillman, Justice Bell observed that the purpose behind sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, was to protect public officials by imposing heightened penalties on civilians who physically retaliate against them as they carry out their public duties....

...w enforcement officer. The evidence was, however, sufficient to support a finding of guilt as to the lesser-included offense of battery. [4] We remand for a new disposition hearing. REVERSED and REMANDED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla....

...The officer retrieved the cup and found several crack cocaine rocks in it. The State charged Kaigler with cocaine possession, resisting with violence in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2003), and battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida *1255 Statutes (2003)....

...because the State could no longer prove a statutory element of each of these charges: that the officer was "in the lawful execution of any legal duty," § 843.01 (resisting with violence), or "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties," § 784.07(2) (battery of a law enforcement officer)....

...enforcement officer for events on March 18, 1992. The trial judge sentenced Wiley as an habitual offender to thirty years in prison, with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory *548 term. Attempted murder of a law enforcement officer is a life felony. § 784.07(3), Fla....

...Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with and found guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer. The officer involved was a Palm Beach County School Board police officer. Succinctly put, the issue presented here is whether a school board police officer is a law enforcement officer within the meaning of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995). Specifically, section 784.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), states the following: As used in this section, the term "law enforcement officer" includes a law enforcement officer, a correctional officer, a correctional probation officer, a part-time law enforcement...

...In this case however, a careful reading *715 of the applicable statutes, specifically section 1.01, leads us to conclude that a school district is a "political subdivision" within this state. We therefore hold that a Palm Beach County School Board police officer is a "law enforcement officer" within the meaning of section 784.07, Florida Statute (1995), and affirm appellant's conviction....

...Within our standards of review—which the dissent would have us ignore—no legitimate basis for reversal exists. 8  Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment and sentence. We also note that the parties agree that an incorrect statutory reference to section 784.07(2)(b) was added to Appellant’s judgment in error upon revocation....

...battery if the person who was the victim of the battery was pregnant at the time of the offense and the offender knew or should have known that the victim was pregnant." The knowledge requirement in this statute is analogous to such a requirement in section 784.07, which prohibits the "knowing" commission of a battery on a law enforcement officer....

...ment if a violation of the misdemeanor statute invariably constituted a violation of the felony statute. Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972). In the instant case, a violation of § 784.03 would not invariably constitute a violation of § 784.07....

...r section 775.0845, Florida Statutes; the use of a weapon or firearm is used to enhance criminal penalties under section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes; assaults and batteries upon an officer or firefighter are used to enhance criminal penalties under section 784.07, Florida Statutes; and the carrying of a weapon or firearm enhances the penalty for robbery [7] under sections 812.13(2)(a) and (2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Statutes (1993). The court ordered that all sentences were to be served concurrently. McLaughlin argues on appeal that United States Federal Protection Service officers do not fall under the definition of a "law enforcement officer" for purposes of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995). That provision provides, among other things, that when a person is charged with knowingly committing an aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, the offense is to be reclassified from a third degree felony to a second degree *298 felony. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...orrections who supervises or provides services to inmates; officer of the Parole Commission; and law enforcement personnel of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, the Department of Environmental Protection, or the Department of Law Enforcement. § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...ployed by the employing agency. McLaughlin maintains that because Federal Protection Service officers do not fall under the definition of "law enforcement officer" found in section 943.10, it was error to subject him to the enhancement provisions of section 784.07. For two reasons, we are convinced that the legislature did not intend to exclude federal law enforcement personnel from the statute's ambit. First, section 784.07(1)(a) states that "the term `law enforcement officer' includes a law enforcement officer ...." (emphasis added)....

...Second, in Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla.1978), our supreme court interpreted the substantially similar predecessor to the current statute. [5] Applying the same principle of statutory construction we referred to earlier, the court held that section 784.07 covers those officers specifically enumerated in the statute and those persons falling within the general class of "law enforcement officers." Id....

...That subsection specifically provides that officers of the United States with authority to make arrests are "law enforcement officers." § 790.001(8), Fla. Stat. (1995). Thus, in this case, the trial judge correctly ruled that United States Protection officers were "law enforcement officers" for purposes of section 784.07, Florida Statutes....

...Thus, in accord with our discussion in footnote two, supra, we strike Count 4, unlawfully discharging a firearm in public, from the judgment of conviction. We affirm the judgment, as modified, and the sentences entered thereon. NOTES [1] §§ 784.021, 784.07, Fla....

...0 So.3d at 612. The Hernandez court held that the reclassification resulted in an illegal sentence. The defendant's conviction for the second-degree felony of aggravated battery was reclassified to a first-degree felony pursuant to the provisions of section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1995)....

...None of appellant's sundry claims, which revolve around this issue, have any merit. Although a special verdict form was not used, the jury's verdict reflects a clear finding that appellant committed every element of aggravated assault on a LEO permitting reclassification under section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203, 127 S. Ct. 1586, 1594 (2007). The district court found that three predicate offenses had been established to sentence Gandy under the ACCA: (1) aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.07; (2) robbery, in violation of Fla....

...Aggravated Assault Gandy does not dispute that the Florida crime of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer is a violent felony. Rather, he argues that, because the information and certified judgment of conviction cited only a sentence enhancement provision (Fla. Stat. § 784.07) and did not cite the substantive provision of the aggravated assault statute, the government has not sufficiently proven that his conviction was for that particular crime....

...establish that Gandy had pleaded guilty to aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, a violent felony under the ACCA. The certified final judgment indicated that Gandy had pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.07....

...*641 James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and John S. Lynch, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Stephen A. Baker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. For his convictions of battery on two law enforcement officers, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), and resisting arrest with violence, section 843.01, the appellant was sentenced on May 28, 1991, within the guidelines recommended range....

...Wulchak, Chief, Appellate Division, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent. LEWIS, J. We have for review the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Darst v. State, 816 So.2d 680 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), both declaring section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1999) to be an enhancement statute, and certifying conflict with Mills v. State, 773 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. This Court granted review in Mills, and addressed the issue presented here. See Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284 (Fla.2002). There we held section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes is a reclassification statute, not an enhancement statute, and thus creates a substantive crime....

...sible error since the defendant does not contest that he hit the officer. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). The defendant further contends that our previous ruling negates an essential element of battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes requires that the officer be engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties at the time of the battery....

...the officer, and still not commit a battery on that officer. Similarly, one could batter an officer by placing an unwanted hand on the officer's arm, or simply by striking the officer without necessarily resisting or obstructing the officer. Compare § 784.07(2)(d) and § 843.01, Fla....

...Having determined that Blockburger is initially satisfied, we next examine the statutory exceptions, and conclude that only the second exception—whether the offenses are degrees of the same offense— has possible application. [4] A cursory examination of § 784.07(2)(d) (aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer), and § 843.01 (resisting an officer with violence), reflects that the two offenses are not on their face degrees of the same offense....

...We reverse the conviction for attempted aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, and remand so that the sentencing scoresheet may be recalculated and Mills resentenced *1199 for the crime of attempted aggravated assault. See Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998)("The enhancement statute [section 784.07] contains no enhancement or reclassification of penalties for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses.")....

...On Suggestion of Certification August 20, 1986. *724 Martha Ann Lott, Gainesville, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. NIMMONS, Judge. A jury found appellant guilty of one count of battery upon a law enforcement officer under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985), and one count of resisting an officer with violence under Section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...challenges his adjudication of delinquency and his disposition order claiming that the trial court committed error by adjudicating him delinquent on the nonexistent crime of attempted battery on a law enforcement officer. We agree. In Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), the supreme court held that section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes, which enhances the punishment for committing assault, aggravated assault, battery and aggravated battery committed against law enforcement and other specified public officers, does not create new substantive of...

...ted offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses. Id. at 385. The State argues that the supreme court has since determined that section 784.07 is a reclassification statute, and thus creates a substantive crime of attempted battery on a law enforcement officer, citing to Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284 (Fla.2002). However, a close reading of Mills reveals that the supreme court reiterated its position that section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes is an enhancement statute which reclassified enumerated offenses committed against law enforcement officers rather than a statute creating new criminal offenses. See Mills, 822 So.2d at 1286-1287. Other recent cases have also held that attempted assault, battery or aggravated assault on one of the enumerated individuals set forth in section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes are non-existent crimes....

...sed upon a finding that W.T.D. committed attempted battery and, consequently, to hold a new disposition hearing). J.S.'s other claims of error raised on appeal are without merit. REVERSED and REMANDED. PLEUS, C.J. and SAWAYA, J., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 784.07(2)(b); 777.04, Fla....

...If the primary offense is a violation of subsection 775.0823(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), or (8) the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by a factor of 2.0. If the primary offense is a violation of the Law Enforcement Protection Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, or section 775.0875(1), the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by a factor of 1.5....

...If the primary offense is a violation of subsection 775.0823(5), (6), (7), (8), or (9), Florida Statutes, the subtotal - 39 - sentence points are multiplied by 2.0. If the primary offense is a violation of section 784.07(3) or 775.0875(1), Florida Statutes, or the Law Enforcement Protection Act under subsection 775.0823(10) or (11), Florida Statutes, the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by 1.5. (21) If the primary offense is grand...

...(2003) (requiring that person convicted of aggravated assault or aggravated battery on elderly person "shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years" and "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld"); see also § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...er Scudder handcuff the appellant. The appellant was eventually subdued and placed in a police cruiser until the deputy sheriff arrived and arrested him. Appellant was charged with two counts of battery upon a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1981), and one count of resisting arrest without violence in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...e a prima facie case, and specifically reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The plea was accepted, and the appellant was placed on probation. Appellant was charged with battery of law enforcement officers in violation of section 784.07....

...n said misdemeanor amounts to breach of the peace. Sturman v. The City of Golden Beach, 355 So.2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). If the appellant was arrested in this manner, and the power to arrest was our only concern, he would not be guilty of violating section 784.07 because a citizen is not an officer under the statute and, accordingly, cannot be engaged in the performance of his or her "official" duties....

...4th DCA 2003) (Table). Furthermore, it lacks merit. See Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284, 1287 (Fla.2002) (concluding that, although certain offenses were excluded from habitual sentencing, "the Legislature did not intend felony convictions pursuant to section 784.07 to be so excluded"); Kenon v....

...Although there is no record evidence to support the two orally stated departure grounds, the record supports the written ground for departure. [2] The State is correct, however, that Appellee's conviction for aggravated battery upon a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes, required the lower court to impose a five-year minimum mandatory sentence. Section 784.07(2)(d) provides in pertinent part: d) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a felony of the first degree....

...944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency or conditional medical release under 947.149, prior to serving the mandatory minimum sentence.” § 316.1935(6), Fla. Stat. (2004-2005); § 775.087(2) & (3), Fla. Stat. (1996-2005); § 784.07(3)(b), Fla....

...5th DCA 2002) (on grant of rehearing); see also Carlson v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2162 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct.4, 2002). [1] We believe it is time to acknowledge the error of that ruling. Accordingly, Jones' sentences are reversed and this case is remanded for resentencing pursuant to section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), which does not provide for imposition of a mandatory minimum prison sentence....

...Chapter 02-209, Laws of Florida, has its genesis in the unconstitutional enactment of Chapter 99-188, which provided for the imposition of mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain offenses. Specifically, section four of chapter 99-188 purported to amend section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), to require imposition of a mandatory minimum prison term for the offense of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer....

...ot to run afoul of the single-subject rule. The 2002 enactments were expressly made retroactive to July 1, 1999. Of specific importance to the instant case is Chapter 02-209, section two's reenactment of section four of Chapter 99-188, which amended section 784.07(2)(c) to require imposition of mandatory minimum prison terms for the offense of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer....

...In the instant case, unlike in Dobbert, the sentences imposed on Jones via the retroactively-applied enactment increase the punishment for the crimes he committed. Jones is charged with two counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(c)....

...d sentenced to fifteen years' prison as a habitual felony offender. Fussell argues that he was sentenced in violation of the double jeopardy clause because his sentence was twice enhanced: first, because the victim was a law enforcement officer, see § 784.07, Fla....

...Whitehead, 472 So.2d 730 (Fla.1985). We similarly conclude here that the legislature intended that both enhancements be imposed. See King v. State, 763 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The two enhancement statutes at issue serve wholly different purposes. Section 784.07 provides for the reclassification of certain crimes when the victim is a law enforcement officer. Section 775.084 provides for enhanced penalties for persons who qualify, because of prior criminal convictions, as habitual felony offenders. In addition, although section 784.07 does not reference any sentencing provisions, it does relate back to the aggravated assault statute which explicitly refers to the possibility of sentencing under the habitual felony offender statute....

...y be applied to a single conviction without violating double jeopardy. See Spann, 772 So.2d 38; King, 763 So.2d 546. Cf. Mills v. State, 773 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (finding no double enhancement and hence no jeopardy violation on grounds that section 784.07 is not *132 an enhancement statute), [1] review granted, Mills v....

...State, 790 So.2d 1105 (Fla.2001). Affirmed. FULMER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Although we agree with the result reached in Mills, we do not agree with the court's reasoning. In Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), our supreme court stated that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute....

...Because of the error, we reverse for a new trial on battery on a law enforcement officer. Id. at 1219. As we stated in Brown, the crime of battery upon a law enforcement officer does not require proof of injury. Id.; see also § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat....

PER CURIAM. J.W. was found guilty of attempted assault upon a school employee — a crime which we have previously determined to be non-existent in Florida. See J.S. v. State, 925 So.2d 438 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (section 784.07’s enhancement of punishment for assault, aggravated assault, battery, or aggravated battery committed against law enforcement official or other specified public officials did not apply to attempt to commit crimes enumerated therein)....

...For example, under section 784.081(2), the offense of battery upon a school district employee is reclassified from a first degree misdemeanor to a third degree felony. In Merritt, however, the Florida Supreme Court held that a similar statute, Florida Statutes section 784.07, which enhances the punishment for assault, aggravated assault, *335 battery and aggravated battery committed against law enforcement and other specified public officers, does not create new substantive offenses and, by its plain language, does not apply to "attempts" to commit the enumerated crimes....

...Based upon the record before us and the state's concession, we can only conclude that the jury verdict reflects a second degree conviction. At every stage of this proceeding, however, the trial court was without the benefit of the Supreme Court's conclusion in Iacovone that sections 775.0825 and 784.07(3) permit enhancement of the sentence only where the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer is in the first degree....

...State, 667 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), review granted, 675 So.2d 931 (Fla.1996). [2] Section 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1993)(repealed 1995), provides as follows: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. Such sentence shall not be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001. Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)(amended 1995), provides as follows: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his...

...ivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. [3] The record indicates some confusion regarding the nature of sections 775.0825 and 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), the statutes in effect at the moment when Steverson committed the criminal act....

...Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. LEVINE, J. The issue presented is whether a prior conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer, pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes, is a sufficient predicate for a violation of section 784.03(2), Florida Statutes, felony battery, which requires one prior conviction for "battery, aggravated battery, or felony battery." We find that under this part...

...ing the victim's status." State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 219 (Fla.2007). [1] The offense alleged in a battery on a law enforcement officer is effectively a misdemeanor charge of battery reclassified to a felony due to *599 the status of the victim. Section 784.07(2) states that "[w]henever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ....

...We, thus, affirm the conviction and sentence. Affirmed. WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The issue would be less clear if the predicate conviction was not for a battery that was reclassified as a felony based on the victim's status. Sections 784.075 and 784.076, Florida Statutes, for example, list the conduct as a separate felony and do not reclassify the battery charge to a felony based on the victim's status....

...g his arms in an irrational manner). There was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the officers were engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty at the time of Eastes' violent actions. AFFIRMED. PLEUS and LAWSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.07, Fla....

...lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [6] As to the crime of battery of a law enforcement officer, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2005), utilizes the language "is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties." As to the offense of resisting an officer with violence, section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), uses the language "in the la...

...State, 798 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the order of delinquency for attempted battery on a law enforcement officer and to issue an order finding J.J. delinquent as to attempted battery, a second degree misdemeanor. Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2011), is an enhancement statute which increases the penalties for certain enumerated crimes when the victim is a law enforcement officer....

...The State served a notice of its intent to seek to have Johnson sentenced as a violent career criminal (VCC) pursuant to section 775.084(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2000). After a hearing, the trial court found that Johnson qualified as a VCC. Johnson's BOLEO conviction was a third-degree felony. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before HUBBART, JORGENSON and GERSTEN, JJ. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal by the defendant Bergent Newbold from judgments of conviction and sentences for five counts of attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer [§§ 782.04(2), 784.07(3), 775.0825, Fla....

...(1993)]. We reverse in part and affirm in part. The sole point raised by the defendant on appeal is that it was fundamental error to convict and sentence the defendant for five counts of attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer under Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), because (a) the subject statute is facially unconstitutional, and (b) the subject statute is only applicable, in any event, to attempted first -degree murder of a law enforcement officer....

...t’s motion for judgment of acquittal. We conclude that the testimony adduced at trial by the law enforcement officer-complainant in this case, if believed, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

ALTENBERND, Judge. J.H.M. appeals an order adjudicating her delinquent for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...t resulted in charges of battery on a law enforcement officer against the protesting citizens. Tillman held the prohibition against a use of force applied only to arrest situations. In non-arrest cases, in order to convict a defendant under sections 784.07 and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), which define the crimes of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, the State must prove that the officer was “engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties” or “in the lawful execution of any legal duty.” *645 Id....

...se argument the elimination of the clause is no more than a drop in its bucket of argument which is drowned by the torrent of contrary legislative intent upon which we rely. See also Polite v. State, 973 So.2d 1107 (Fla.2007) (stating that fact that section 784.07(2), forbidding battery on a law enforcement officer, does not specifically provide that the defendant have knowledge of the officer’s status does not militate against ruling that such knowledge is required, even though similar statutes do contain' that language); Cooper v....

...ng the commission of a felony violate double jeopardy. Our review of the record indicates that the aggravated assault was not reclassified due to the use of a firearm. Rather, the defendant was charged and convicted of aggravated assault pursuant to section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), which specifically creates the distinct substantive offense of aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer, a second-degree felony. See § 777.04(4)(d), Fla.Stat. (1995). The other issues raised by the defendant being without merit, we affirm. AFFIRMED. PETERSON, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 784.07(2)C, 784.021(1)(a), and 775.0823(1), Fla.Stat....

...At trial, the court refused to instruct the jury, per Sweeney's request, that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was an officer and that Sweeney knew of same. He was convicted of attempted first degree felony murder of a law enforcement officer with a firearm, and *930 sentenced under sections 784.07(3) [2] and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991) to a total of twenty-five years imprisonment, with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory....

...Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Sweeney's rule 3.850 motion. AFFIRMED. STONE, C.J., and DELL and POLEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Thompson v. State, 667 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) and Grinage v. State, 641 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). [2] Section 784.07(3) provided as follows: 784.07....

...duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. § 784.07(3), Fla....

...At that point, the juvenile, with a clenched fist, pushed the officer in the chest. The officer then took the juvenile into custody. The state ultimately filed a petition for delinquency charging the juvenile with assault on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: (a) In the case of assault, from a misdemeanor of the second degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree. § 784.07(2)(a), Fla....

...enied his motion to dismiss the information. We agree and, accordingly, reverse. On March 11, 1994, the state filed a one-count amended information purporting to *24 charge appellant with attempted murder of a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...lawful performance of his duty, and during the commission of the aforesaid Attempted Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer, the said MATTHEW RAY MOODY carried or had in his possession a firearm, to-wit: a rifle, contrary to the provisions of Sections 784.07(3), 775.0825 and 775.087, Florida Statutes....

...rder ... a law enforcement officer," but that there is no crime in Florida known as "unlawful murder." According to appellant, to charge attempted murder of a law enforcement officer properly, one was obliged to allege all of the elements set out in section 784.07(3) and all of the elements of the underlying offense attempted—murder....

...This included an obligation to allege the degree of murder allegedly attempted. Relying principally on Isaac v. State, 626 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So.2d 624 (Fla.1994), the trial court denied the motion. In Isaac, we held that section 784.07(3) "is more than simply an enhancement or a reclassification statute—it creates a separate substantive offense," the intent of which is to punish as a life felony attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, as defined in that statute, without regard to whether the offense would otherwise have been punished as attempted first, second or third-degree murder. Id. at 1083. Recently, however, the supreme court has held that section 784.07(3) was intended by the legislature to apply only to attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, overruling by implication our conclusion to the contrary in Isaac. State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995). As the Third District Court of Appeal has since concluded, Iacovone strongly suggests that section 784.07(3) should be read merely to provide for enhancement of a conviction of attempted first-degree murder when the victim is a law enforcement officer (and the provisions of the statute are otherwise satisfied), rather than as a separate substantive offense....

...Thompson v. State, 667 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). In light of Iacovone and State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995) (holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in Florida), it is now apparent that one may be convicted of a violation of section 784.07(3) only if it is established that the murder attempted satisfies all of the elements found in that section and, in addition, the elements of first-degree premeditated murder. Given this, and the fact that it appears from Iacovone that section 784.07(3) was intended by the legislature to act as an enhancement statute, it seems to us that, to charge the offense of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, one must allege in the information all of the elements set out in section 784.07(3) and the elements of first-degree premeditated murder pursuant to section 782.04(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes....

...[1] At the adjudicatory hearing, K.H. was found to have committed battery on a law enforcement officer because he pushed the officer. [2] One of the elements of battery on a law enforcement officer is that the officer "is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties. ..." § 784.07(2), Fla....

...Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence §§ 90.404(1), 90.609 & 90.610 (1992 ed.); Landry v. State, 620 So.2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (improper for the state to query officer about his "unblemished record"). NOTES [1] § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] §§ 784.021(1)(a), 784.07(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] Six-foot-two inches; 230 pounds. [4] § 784.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). [5] § 784.07(2), Fla....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...."). Statutes authorizing enhancements do not add an element that would create a separate, substantive crime, but simply authorize a judge to impose a more severe sentence based on certain factual findings. See, e.g., Mills v. State, 822 So. 2d 1284, 1288-89 (Fla. 2002) (holding that section 784.07 was not an enhancement statute because the victim's status as a law enforcement officer was an element of a reclassified crime). That is not what happened in Mr....

...(2010) (explicitly providing for reclassification of any crime by one degree where the crime was based on prejudice against the victim for their race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, homeless status, mental or physical disability, or advanced age), and § 784.07, Fla....

...We certify conflict with Green v. State, 839 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). We additionally note the erroneous reference on the sentencing order to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes. We remand the cause to the trial court for correction of this scrivener's error to reference section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...Chapter 02-209, Laws of Florida, has its genesis in the unconstitutional enactment of Chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida, which provided for the imposition of mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain offenses. Specifically, section 4 of chapter 99-188 purported to amend section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), to require imposition of mandatory minimum prison terms for the offense of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer....

...as not to run afoul of the single subject rule. The 2002 enactments were expressly made retroactive to July 1, 1999. Of specific importance to the instant case is Chapter 02-209, section 2's reenactment of section 4 of Chapter 99-188, which amended section 784.07(2)(c) to require imposition of mandatory minimum prison terms for the offense of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer....

...Nieves v. State, 833 So.2d 190 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing Hersey ). If not for this court's decisions in Hersey, Carlson, and their progeny, I would hold that Fillyaw's sentence should be reversed and this case remanded for resentencing pursuant to section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), which does not *592 provide for imposition of a mandatory minimum prison sentence....

...State, 828 So.2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), this court, on the basis of the unconstitutionality of Chapter 99-188, reversed and remanded for resentencing a sentence that included a three-year mandatory minimum term that had been imposed in accordance with section 784.07(2)(c)....

...In my view, the inquiry here should be whether the sentence imposed on Fillyaw via the retroactively applied enactment increases the punishment for the crime he committed. Fillyaw is charged with aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(c)....

...This entails examining the legislative history, prior case law, and other similar statutes, inter alia. See id.; State v. D.C., 114 So.3d 440 , 441 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). Looking beyond the plain language of the statute, we begin our analysis by reviewing the Florida Supreme Court’s earlier determination of whether section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), which, as discussed below, ultimately progressed to the statute at issue, section 782.065, required knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer. In 1993, section 784.07 — entitled Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or other specified officers; reclassification of offenses....

...or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. *593 § 784.07(2X3), Fla....

...State, 695 So.2d 691 (Fla.1997), the Florida Supreme Court addressed on appeal whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s requested jury instruction, which included knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer as an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The court reversed the defendant’s conviction for attempted felony murder, holding that, notwithstanding the absence of language in the statute itself, “knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer is an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under subsection (3) of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993).” Id....

...Moreover, “where criminal statutes are susceptible to differing constructions, they must be construed in favor of the accused.” Id. (citing Scales v. State, 603 So.2d 504, 505 (Fla.1992)). As noted by the dissent in Thompson , in 1995, the Legislature removed subsection (3) from section 784.07 and reenacted it in section 775.0823, the Law Enforcement Protection Act (“LEPA”)....

...ithout eligibility for release.” Id. For all other pertinent offenses, the defendant was required to be sentenced “pursuant to the sentencing guidelines.” Id. In essence, then, the Legislature transplanted the subsection at issue in Thompson , section 784.07(3), into section 775.0823, and increased the penalty for its violation....

...While no case has squarely addressed this issue, we find that the reasoning provided in Thompson is applicable to the instant appeal. Specifically, we find the court’s second and fourth rationales to be instructive. The court’s finding that the language and application of section 784.07(3) implicated a knowledge requirement because attempted murder of a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime may appear, at first blush, to not apply to the facts of this case because attempted second-degree murder is a general intent crime....

...orcement officer, including attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, which is a specific intent crime, this implies that section 782.065 requires knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer in all circumstances. Like former section 784.07(3), section 782.065 does not distinguish between specific intent crimes and general intent crimes....

...nt predators detention or commitment facility ... while the staff member is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties and when the person committing the offense knows or has reason to know the identity or employment of the victim....” § 784.074(1), Fla....

...The Legislature then revised the statute to make clear that the penalty shall increase by one degree “regardless of whether [the defendant] knows or has reason to know the age of the victim.” See § 784.08(2), Fla. Stat. (2013); id. Relatedly, the Flori *597 da Supreme Court in Thompson interpreted section 784.07(8) as requiring knowledge even though subsection (3) did not specify whether knowledge was required. 695 So.2d at 698 . Section 784.07(3) was subsequently removed and reenacted in section 782.0823, and 782.065 was enacted in 2008 to “supersede” section 782.0823....

...His argument assumes that section 782.065 is a substantive offense. To address Ramroop’s argument, we must determine whether section 782.065 is a substantive offense, an enhancement provision, or a reclassification statute. The Florida Supreme Court’s historical consideration of section 784.07 is again helpful to our analysis. In Thompson , the court expressly declined to decide whether 784.07(3) was a substantive offense, as previously “assumed” by this court in Grinage v....

...a substantive offense has been created under the statute, we need not reach this question to resolve the issue here.” Thompson, 695 So.2d at 693 . *598 Subsequently, in Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), the court stated that “[s]ection 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense.” Id. at 385 . In Merritt , the court found that neither attempted battery nor attempted aggravated assault could be reclassified under section 784.07(2) because that statute did not include those offenses. Id. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to resentence Merritt for the offense of attempted battery “without felony reclassification based upon section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) (battery of a law enforcement officer).” Id. Four years later, in Mills , the court reconsidered the statute a second time, concluding that “section 784.07 operates as a reclassification statute,” rather than an enhancement statute....

...tutes such as the habitual offender statute, “which cut across some or all criminal statutes.” Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 476 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla.1985)). 9 As such, the court went on to find that an offense reclassified as a felony pursuant to section 784.07 could qualify as a felony offense for purposes of habitual felony offender status without violating double jeopardy....

...atory minimum sentence for possession of a firearm statute, all of which are enhancement statutes, section 782.065 does not “cut across some or all criminal statutes.” See Mills, 822 So.2d at 1287 (quoting Brown, 476 So.2d at 662 ). Rather, like section 784.07, section 782.065 “reclassifies enumerated offenses committed against law enforcement officer[s].” See id....

...Defense counsel objected to this line of argument as a "misstatement” of her' argument. The court responded, ‘-The jury will remember whatever was said by counsel and I'll leave it up to them.” . Section 775.0825 provided, “Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s.784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole.” § 775.0825, Fla. Stat. (1993). Sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 applied only to first-degree murder....

...Further, interpreting section 782.065 to require knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer does not contravene the legislative history and purpose of the statute. Notwithstanding the relatively limited legislative history of the statute, it appears that its purpose, like section 784.07, is to discourage lethal attacks against law enforcement officers Cf....

...Iacovone, 660 So.2d at 1373-74. However, the statute, as worded, has no specific deterrent effect on individuals who do not know that their potential victim is a law enforcement officer. . For a discussion of the Florida Supreme Court’s classification and reclassification of section 784.07, see State v....

...the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.’” (quoting Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))); Taylor v. State, 573 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (“Pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), the attempted murder of a law enforcement official is a life felony, punishable as provided in section 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (1987)....

...3.850. We affirm. Defendant was charged with attempted first degree murder of a police officer and unlawful possession of a weapon while engaged in a criminal offense. * The attempted first degree murder charge carried a potential life sentence, see § 784.07(3) Fla....

...§ 782.04(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). The offense for which Kerr was convicted and sentenced (i.e., aggravated assault) is a third degree felony, § 784.021(2), Fla. Stat. (2003), reclassified to a second degree felony because the victim is a law enforcement officer. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...If the primary offense is a violation of subsection 775.0823(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), or (8) the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by a factor of 2.0. If the primary offense is a violation of the Law Enforcement Protection Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, or section 775.0875(1), the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by a factor of 1.5....

Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or section 784.07(3) or section 775.0875(1), the subtotal sentence

...points are multiplied by a factor of 2.5. If the primary offense is a violation of subsection 775.0823(3-))-(4-)^(5), (6), (7), or-(8), or (9), the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by a factor of 2.0. If the primary offense is a violation of section 784.07(3) or 775.0875(1) or the Law Enforcement Protection Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or (11), — or—section 784.07(3)⅜ — Florida—Statutes,—or—section 775.087-5(-l-), the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by a factor-of 1.5....

...currency, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed firearm, and resisting an officer with violence. In open court, the state orally amended the attempted murder count to state that during the charged offense, the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duty, pursuant to section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...er. The court adjudicated Sibley guilty and sentenced him as a habitual felony offender to a term of life in prison with a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory as provided in section 775.0825. Sibley’s first point contends that sections 775.0825 and 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), are impermissibly vague and violate *1246 due process, thus rendering unlawful his sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years....

...Sibley’s second point contends that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence as a habitual offender in sentencing him for a life felony. Sibley was convicted and sentenced for attempted first degree murder of a law enforcement officer, which is punishable as a life felony. § 784.07(3), Fla....

WOLF, J. We find that the trial court erred in adjudicating appellant guilty of attempted aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. In Fredericks v. State, 675 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), we held that section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, which enhances the penalty for aggravated assault when it is inflicted on a law enforcement officer, does not apply to attempted aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. See also Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998). We, therefore, vacate the sentence as to the attempted aggravated assault charge and direct that as to this count, the defendant be resentenced without the penalty enhancement contained in section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...If the primary offense is a violation of subsec *1378 tion 775.0823(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), or (8) the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by a factor of 2.0. If the primary offense is a violation of the Law Enforcement Protection Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or section 784.07(3) or section 775.0875(1), the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by a factor of 1.5....

...Aggravated battery with a firearm while wearing a mask, a second degree felony; § 784.045(l)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). Reclassified as a first degree felony because of the use of a firearm. 3. Aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a firearm while wearing a mask; a second degree felony. § 784.07(2)(e), Fla.Stat....

...ntence of a term of incarceration not exceeding 30 years with a minimum mandatory term of 10 years. § 775.084(4)(b)(2), Fla.Stat. (1997). 3. Aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a firearm. This offense is a second degree felony. See § 784.07(2)(c), Fla.Stat....

...We conclude that the trial court erred in classifying this offense as a second degree felony. Therefore, we reverse for resentencing. The defendant was originally sentenced on June 17, 1992. At that time, the courts were applying the enhancement provisions of section 784.07, Florida Statutes, which made the crime of attempted third degree murder of a law enforcement officer a life felony. See § 784.07(3), Fla....

...State, 636 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). On remand, the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years. While the defendant was serving his sentence, the supreme court determined that the enhancement under section 784.07, Florida Statutes, for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer can be applied only to attempted first degree murder....

...II. That night’s events led to four criminal charges: Count I alleged resisting an officer with violence, in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes; Count II alleged battery upon an officer, in violation of sections 784.03 and 784.07(2)(b); Count III alleged depriving an officer of a means of protection (the flashlight), in violation of section 843.025; and Count IV alleged battery—for the underlying domestic violence that led the officers to Tims’s home in the first place....

...resisted arrest and accosted officers, lawfully present or not. 2 Tims pleaded no contest to crimes that included as elements lawful action by officers. See § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (criminalizing resisting officers “in the lawful execution of any legal duty”); § 784.07(2), Fla....

on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), a felony. The State

battery of a law enforcement officer contrary to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), asserts the

PER CURIAM. The defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder and sentenced in accordance with section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides: 784.07 Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or intake officers; reclassification of offenses.— ****** (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforce...

PER CURIAM. Appellant was tried by jury and convicted of committing a battery upon a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...1st DCA 1978). Appellant then filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing the same point before the trial judge. Hunter now appeals the judge’s denial, after evi-dentiary hearing, of his motion. We reverse. Section 784.07(l)(a) does not, by its terms, provide that county correctional officers are law enforcement officers: As used in this section, the term “law enforcement officer” includes, but shall not be limited to, any sheriff, deputy sheriff, m...

...Had the legislature intended that county correctional officers be classed as law enforcement officers, it could have so stated in either of the statutes. The conviction must be reversed because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the appellant. Violation of Section 784.07 is a felony, but the victim was not, as we have stated, a law enforcement officer....

...ice. Convictions and sentences affirmed; • court costs stricken; remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SCHEB, A.C.J., and DANAHY and HALL, JJ., concur. . Knighten was also convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer, § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. All of the issues posed by this appeal were passed upon when we upheld the constitutionality of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1976), in Soverino v....

...See § 775.084(1)(d)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000, 2001, 2004) (stating that a "forcible felony" is subject to VCC sentencing); § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2000, 2001, 2004) (defining "forcible felony" and listing offenses which constitute forcible felonies); § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (2000, 2001, 2004) (providing definitions and reclassifying the severity of battery on a law enforcement officer). Thus, Wilder was not subject to a VCC sentence enhancement on his BOLEO conviction. Pursuant to section 784.07(2)(b), BOLEO is a felony of the third degree....

UPCHURCH, Chief Judge. Charles Silas appeals a conviction for the crimes of battery and battery upon a law enforcement officer in violation of sections 784.03 and 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...statute. We disagree and affirm. A person is guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer for: [K]nowingly committing an assault upon a law enforcement officer while the officer or firefighter is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties ... § 784.07(2), Fla.Stat....

...weapon, a first-degree felony under sections 782.04(2), 777.04, and 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1999), thirty years in prison as a prison releasee reof-fender (PRR); for aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer, a first-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), thirty years as a PRR; for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, a second-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(e), fifteen years as a PRR; for battery on a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(b), five years; and for possession of contraband in a state correctional facility, a second-degree felony under section 944.47(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), five years....

...felony to a first-degree felony based on the use of a weapon. But Henry overlooks the fact that this offense was not reclassified based on the use of a weapon; it was reclassified based on the fact that the victim was a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(2)(d)....

lawful performance of his duties contrary to Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1977). We reverse

...944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the minimum sentence.” § 775.087(2)(a)3.(b), Fla. Stat. (2012). The same language appears in section 784.07, which establishes an eight-year mandatory minimum sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer or other specified public safety personnel while possessing a semi-automatic firearm: “[T]he defendant is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the minimum sentence.” § 784.07(3), Fla....

...State, 549 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). We note a discrepancy between the offense shown on the judgment and the offense shown on the scoresheet. Apparently, defendant’s aggravated assault conviction was enhanced to a second-degree felony by virtue of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1988)....

...The legislature chose not to define “law enforcement official” in section 944.02(5), and we reject Williams’ suggestion that the term is equivalent to “law enforcement officer” as defined in section 943.10(1), Florida Statutes (1999), or section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), which would exclude a private security guard....

...not include support personnel employed by the employing agency." (e.s.) As a federal police officer, you are not appointed or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof. The Supreme Court of Florida in McLaughlin v. State 10 noted that section 784.07 , Florida Statutes, which defined "law enforcement officer" as "those terms are respectively defined in s. 943.10 ," did not embrace United States Federal Protection Service officers since such officers were not state or local officers: "[W]e note that section 784.07 (1)(a) states that "the term `law enforcement officer' includes a law enforcement officer ....

...943.10 ." Section 943.10 provides at the outset that "`[l]aw enforcement officer' means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof." The meaning of these words cannot be plainer: A "law enforcement officer" for section 784.07 purposes must be either a state or local officer." Since the federal officers were not employees or officers of "any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof," the Court held the officers were not covered by the provisions of section 784.07 , Florida Statutes....

...The vehicle pursuit ended when Singletary drove his car into an occupied, stationary, police vehicle. Singletary then fled on foot and was apprehended shortly after. Sin-gletary was charged with, among other things, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon, a vehicle, in violation of section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2000); and fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer at high speed in violation of section 316.1935(3), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.’” (quoting Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))); Taylor v. State, 573 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (“Pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), the attempted murder of a law enforcement official is a life felony, punishable as provided in section 775.0825 of the Florida Statutes (1987)....

without felony reclassification based upon section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995). See Merritt

...By this consolidated appeal defendant seeks review of the trial court’s summary denial of a Rule 3.800 motion to correct an illegal sentence, and seeks to correct his judgment and sentence to reflect that he plead nolo contendere to a violation of section 784.021, Florida Statutes, rather than a violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the final judgment....

...Upon confession of error by the state we return this case to the trial court with directions to correct defendant’s judgment to reflect that defendant plead nolo contendere to a violation of section 784.021, Florida Statutes, rather than a violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes....

...a crime of violence.”1 One of the two prior felony convictions that the court found was a “crime of violence” and that made Rozier a career offender was a Florida felony conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b).2 The career offender enhancement led to a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment....

...intentionally touches or strikes [a law enforcement officer] against the will of the [officer]; or [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to [the officer]” while the officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties. Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03(1)(a), 784.07(2). 2  Case: 11-13557 Date Filed: 11/21/2012 Page: 3 of 23 U.S.S.G....

...Appellant’s battery of Officer Fischer was, of course, a criminal act. However, pursuant to Tillman, appellant cannot be found to have committed the crime of battery of a law enforcement officer. In his concurring opinion in Tillman, Justice Bell observed that the purpose behind sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, was to protect public officials by imposing heightened penalties on civilians who physically retaliate against them as they carry out their public duties....

...We vacate the finding that appellant was guilty of the offense of battery of a law enforcement officer. The evidence was, however, sufficient to support a finding of guilt as to the lesser-included offense of battery. 4 We remand for a new disposition hearing. REVERSED and REMANDED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. . § 784.07, Fla....

...ndant discharged the gun “during the commission” of the aggravated assault offenses. Id. at 776. Lemus can be distinguished from this case because the defendant in Lemus was charged with aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(c)....

adjudication is specifically proscribed. See, e.g., section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997). Accordingly, we reverse

...ith the intent to impede the officer’s pursuit. Section 784.03(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: The offense of battery occurs when a person: 1. actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other.... Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ......

...se the harsher treatment on a person convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer and who meets the criteria for sentencing as a habitual felony offender. In Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court reviewed sections 784.07(2)(b) and 775.084, Florida Statutes, and stated: [T]he Legislature has made the offense of battery, which is otherwise a misdemeanor, a third-degree felony when the victim is a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...rs. Thus, the imposition on a qualifying defendant of one sentence under the habitual felony offender statute for the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer is proper, and not vio-lative of double jeopardy. Indeed, if a conviction pursuant to section 784.07 were not treated as a qualifying offense under section 775.084, this would, in effect, nullify the clear legislative expression in intent to treat battery on a law enforcement officer as a felony. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and SAWAYA, JJ„ concur. . § 775.084, Florida Statutes (1999). . § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

that an enhanced conviction and sentence under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997) may properly be made

...n off-duty job.” J.A.S.R. v. State, 967 So.2d 1050 , 1051 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). For the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, the State must prove that the officer was “engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties....” § 784.07(2), Fla....

...§ 924 (e)(1): A.Sale/Delivery of Cocaine, section 893.13, Florida Statutes, Volusia County (Florida) Circuit Court, Case No. 96-35422, arrested September 24,1996, convicted and sentenced June 24,1997; B. Aggravated Assault on a Police Officer, Volusia County (Florida) Circuit Court, Case No. 03-35686, section 784.07(2)(c), arrested November 2, 2003, convicted and sentenced June 30, 2004; C....

...Since the defense failed to establish that admission of the photograph would shed any light on the issues to be tried in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 640 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). AFFIRMED. COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

...Appellant raises six points on appeal, but only one merits discussion. The information by which appellant was charged with the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer stated, in pertinent part: . . . WILBUR WEBB SELLEY on the 26th day of August, 1977 did, in violation of Florida Statutes 784.03 and 784.07, knowingly commit a battery upon a law enforcement officer, JOHN MOBILIO, a deputy sheriff of Orange County, Florida, and in furtherance thereof did actually and intentionally strike the said JOHN MOBILIO with his hands while the said officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties....

...The motion to dismiss was denied. Appellant now contends that the information is defective because it does not allege an essential element of battery, i. e., that the touching or striking was against the will of the victim. To charge battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2) (1977), an information must not only allege the essential elements of that crime, but must also allege the elements of a simple battery, Ferrell v....

...dly weapon, to wit: a handgun, while Michael Antinick was in the lawful performance of his duties, without intent to kill, by brandishing a handgun in a threatening manner thereby placing him in fear of imminent violence, contrary to F.S. 784.021, F.S. 784.07(2)(c) and F.S. 775.057(L6).... Section 784.021 is aggravated assault. Section 784.07(2)(c) reclassifies an assault committed on a law enforcement officer....

PER CURIAM. From convictions and habitualized sentences for aggravated assault on a prison guard, and aggravated battery on another prison guard, violations of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), the appellant presents three issues: (1) that the element of “putting in fear” to support a conviction of aggravated assault was not proven at trial, (2) that the element of “causing great bodily harm, p...

RYDER, Judge. This cause arose from an adjudication of delinquency. Three petitions for delinquency were filed against appellant, charging him with battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of sections 784.03 and 784.07, Florida Statutes (1981); resisting an officer with violence to his person in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1981); and possession of twenty grams or less of cannabis in violation of section 893.-13, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...After a hearing, appellant was found guilty on all charges and adjudged delinquent. On appeal, he contends that the convictions should be reversed because the state failed to prove that a “campus policeman” was a law enforcement officer within the statutory definition of section 784.07, and failed to show that the substance which appellant had possessed was marijuana....

...r. Street is an employee of the Pinellas County School Board who responds to violations of law on the high school campus. For purposes of the matter sub judice, we must determine whether he is a law enforcement officer within the purview of sections 784.07 and 843.01, Florida Statutes (1981). We begin with the definition of law enforcement officer as provided in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1981), assault or battery of law enforcement officers or fire fighters, which states: (l)(a) As used in this section, the term “law enforcement officer” includes, but shall not be limited to, any sheriff; deputy...

...The above provision does not include a reference to any type of school security personnel. See also section 790.001(8), Florida Statutes (1981). In Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1978), the Florida Supreme Court construed the definition of law enforcement officer in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), concluding that only those “individuals specifically enumerated in the statute and those persons within the class of ‘law enforcement officers’ ” will be recognized under the statute....

...On the day of the incident, when he came upon appellant in the restroom, appellant knew that Mr. Street was a campus policeman from a prior incident. After the officer attempted to arrest appellant, he became belligerent and struck Officer Street. In light of sections 784.07(1), 843.-01, and 790.001(8), Florida Statutes (1981), as well as chapter 75-486, Laws of Florida as amended by chapter 76-477, we hold that Roy Street was a law enforcement officer....

...We therefore reverse H.E.S.’s judgment and sentence. Upon remand, we direct that H.E.S. be found guilty of the crime of attempted aggravated battery and that he be sentenced for this charge. See Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998); Case v. State, 723 So.2d 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

information in Blandón charged a violation of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), murder of a law

...§ 776.032(1), Fla. Stat. (2024). 2  I. Relevant Background The State charged Maslo with aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a firearm. See § 784.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2023); § 784.07(1)(e), Fla....

...th violence, 2 and battery. 3 He was sentenced to eight years in prison. Wilson later challenged his sentence for attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), on the basis that section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), only applied to attempted first-degree murder and that the offense should have been ranked as a level four offense, pursuant to section 921.0013(2), Florida Statutes (1993). On resentencing, the trial court properly recognized that section 784.07(3) applies only to attempted first-degree murder. See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995)(stating that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991) only apply to attempted first-degree murder)....

...Stevens, 714 So.2d 347 (Fla.1998). In resentencing Wilson, the trial court found attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer to be unlisted in section 921.0012, Florida Statutes (1993), and ranked it as a level four offense, pursuant to section 921.0013(2). 4 Section 784.07(3) does not create a separate criminal offense but rather imposes a penalty enhancement where the attempted murder victim is a law enforcement officer. See Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384, 385 (Fla.1998); see also Steverson v. State, 677 So.2d 398 , 400 n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Since the supreme court has ruled that section 784.07(3) does not apply in the case of attempted second-degree murder, the underlying offense should be ranked as it would be without the law enforcement penalty enhancement contained in section 784.07(3)....

...3d DCA 1996). In this case, Wilson’s primary offense of attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer should have been reduced to the necessarily included offense of attempted second-degree murder without the felony reclassification based upon section 784.07(3)....

...to the necessarily included offense of attempted second-degree murder which is a level eight offense under the 1994 sentencing guidelines. Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing. *523 CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT and STRINGER, JJ., Concur. . See § 784.07(3), Fla....

...Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with and found guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer. The officer involved was a Palm Beach County School Board police officer. Succinctly put, the issue' presented here is whether a school board police officer is a law enforcement officer within the meaning of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995). Specifically, section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), states the following: As used in this section, the term “law enforcement officer” includes a law enforcement officer, a correctional officer, a correctional probation officer, a part-time law enforce...

...In this case however, a careful read *715 ing of the applicable statutes, specifically section 1.01, leads us to conclude that a school district is a “political subdivision” within this state. We therefore hold that a Palm Beach County School Board police officer is a “law enforcement officer” within the meaning of section 784.07, Florida Statute (1995), and affirm appellant’s conviction....

...d assault upon a law enforcement officer. First, the term “firearm” should be stricken from the judgment as no firearm was used in this offense. Second, the judgment should reflect that a three year minimum mandatory term was imposed pursuant to section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes, instead of section 775.087, Florida Statutes....

...security officer. The State concedes both that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for battery on a licensed security officer because the evidence did not establish that the victim was wearing a uniform as described in section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), and that Mr....

...(2016); Rodriguez v. State, 964 So. 2d 833, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that although the evidence did establish the lesser included offense of simple battery, the evidence "did not prove that there was an unlawful battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07" and remanding with instructions for the trial court to adjudicate the defendant guilty of simple battery)....

...To do so the court would have to find a conflict between our decision and that of another appellate court. The state cites Evans v. State, 625 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), to show a conflict. Evans held, among other things, that: “Although the appellant contends that section 784.07(2)(e) merely enhances the penalty for aggravated assault, the statute actually creates a separate substantive offense consisting of the elements of aggravated assault plus the added elements that the victim was a law enforcement office...

...The substantive offense is therefore only enhanced once under the habitual offender statute, and no double jeopardy violation occurs.” 625 So.2d at 916 . In the later decision of Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), however, the supreme court disagreed with that conclusion and held that: “Section 784.07 ... is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggra *92 vated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers.” 712 So.2d at 385 ....

...sical harm," as required for the lawful use of deadly force. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the Florida statutes under which Ms. Harrell was convicted required only "battery upon a law enforcement officer," § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...Rather than showing punches thrown by Prosper, Plaintiff claims the Biscayne Air Video shows merely that the two “los[t] their balance and f[e]ll 11 In addition to battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of Florida Statutes § 784.07(2)(b), Martin alleges that Prosper violated: § 316.061(1) (leaving the scene of an accident); § 316.130(18) (walking on a limited access facility or a ramp connecting a limited access facility to any other street or highway); § 316.072(3...

...shall be reclassified to the next higher degree" under certain statutorily dictated conditions. (Emphasis added.)3 As we explained in Pethtel, a 3 We note that the legislature has enacted numerous reclassification statutes: section 784.07 reclassification of assault or battery to the next higher degree if the victim was a law enforcement officer; section 775.0845 reclassification of almost any offense to the next higher degree where the defendant wore a mask; section 77...

...finds that the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) have been met. In an analogous situation, the Fourth District held in Talley v. State, 877 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), that reclassifying the degree of offenses arising from a single episode under section 784.07 where the victim was a law enforcement officer and then imposing consecutive sentences was legal because section 784.07 is not an enhancement statute. B....

...probation officer, part-time correctional probation officer, or auxiliary correctional probation officer, as those terms are defined in s. 943.10, engaged in the lawful performance of a legal duty. § 782.065, Fla. Stat. (2013). Similar to section 782.065, section 784.07, titled “Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical care providers, public transit employees or agents, or other specified officers: reclassification of offenses; minimum sentences,” provides for reclassification “[w]henever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer . . . while the officer . . . is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties.” § 784.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). Section 784.07 provides the lesser- included offense of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer that was listed on the verdict form as to Count 1 of the information in Ramroop’s trial. -7-  Subsection (3) of a former version of section 784.07 eventually became what is now section 782.065. As the Fifth District explained: Looking beyond the plain language of the statute, we begin our analysis by reviewing the Florida Supreme Court’s earlier determination of whether section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), which, as discussed below, ultimately progressed to the statute at issue, section 782.065, required knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer. In 1993, section 784.07—entitled Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or other specified officers; reclassification of offenses.—provided in relevant part as follows: (2) Whenever any person i...

...murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. § 784.07(2)-(3), Fla....

...As drafted, knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer was not expressly required as an element under subsection (3) to prove the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer. Ramroop, 174 So. 3d at 592-93 (footnote omitted). In Wright, this Court held that section 784.07 defines the “substantive offense” of battery on a law enforcement officer and “requires as an essential element proof that the victim was in fact a law enforcement officer.” 586 So. 2d at -8- 1030. Two years later, again reviewing section 784.07 in Thompson v....

...State, this Court “addressed on appeal whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s requested jury instruction, which included knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer as an element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993).” Ramroop, 174 So. 3d at 593 (citing Thompson, 695 So. 2d 691, 691 (Fla. 1993)). This Court concluded that “knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense” defined in section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993), and reversed the defendant’s conviction for attempted felony murder. Thompson, 695 So. 2d at 693. Therefore, taking Wright and Thompson together, it is clear that knowledge that the victim is a law enforcement officer is an essential element of the crime defined by section 784.07. Thus, relying on our case law regarding section 784.07, the Fifth District correctly held that “section 782.065 requires knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer.” Ramroop, 174 So. 3d at 597....

...Id.; see Thompson, 695 So. 2d at 693; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476- 77. -9-  Section 782.065, which sets forth the crime of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, is functionally the same as section 784.07, which sets forth the crime of assault and battery on a law enforcement officer, except of course that the crime is different and the penalty for violating section 782.065 is a mandatory life sentence. In Darst, we unanimously held that section 784.07 was not an enhancement statute but a reclassification statute that creates a substantive crime: We have for review the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Darst v. State, 816 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), both declaring section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes (1999) to be an enhancement statute, and certifying conflict with Mills v....

...2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. This Court granted review in Mills, and addressed the issue presented here. See Mills v. State, 822 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 2002). There we held section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes is a reclassification statute, not an enhancement statute, and thus creates a substantive crime....

...its decision is quashed and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with Mills. 837 So. 2d at 395. The Fifth District in Darst, contrary to the First District in Mills, erroneously held that section 784.07 was an enhancement statute and was created to “increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officer.” Darst v. State, 816 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (quoting Merritt v. State, 712 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. 1998)). However, the Fifth District - 10 - acknowledged that “section 784.07(c) could also be interpreted as creating a substantive offense because it contains the element of knowingly committing the act of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer.” Id....

...State, 773 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), held that this same subsection actually creates a substantive offense dealing with assault or battery on a law enforcement officer. Darst, 816 So. 2d at 683. We acknowledge that, in Merritt, we stated that section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), the precursor to section 782.065, “is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense.” 712 So....

...3d at 1287, to conclude that “section 782.065 operates as a reclassification statute” rather than an enhancement statute because it “does not ‘cut across some or all criminal statutes.’ ” Ramroop, 174 So. 3d at 598. As we have pointed out, we held in Darst that section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes “is a reclassification - 11 - statute, not an enhancement statute, and thus creates a substantive crime.” 837 So. 2d at 395....

...convicted only if the jury has found each element of the crime of conviction. Id. at 2161-62 (second and third emphasis added), overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). Therefore, the same principles that apply to treating section 784.07 as a substantive offense, requiring knowledge as an essential element, apply equally to section 782.065....

...The assault was made with a deadly weapon. 5. Christopher Brill[]ant was at the time a law enforcement officer. 6. Gangapersad Ramroop knew Christopher Brill[]ant was a law enforcement officer. “Willfully” means intentionally and purposely. (Citing § 784.07(c), Fla. Stat.) (emphasis added). These jury instructions make clear that aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, which includes a knowledge requirement, is treated as a separate, substantive crime under section 784.07....

...Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. MONACO, J. The appellant, V.D., takes this appeal from an order adjudicating her delinquent for resisting arrest with violence in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), and battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005)....

statute is analogous to such a requirement in section 784.07, which prohibits the “knowing” commission of

...Kollra, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 11-000030-CF-10A. Kelly Garrick, Ocala, pro se. No appearance required for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Talley v. State, 877 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that consecutive sentences can be imposed under section 784.07, Florida Statutes, because it is a reclassification statute rather than an enhancement statute). WARNER, CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely fil...

...SHARP and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). . These were possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, § 893.13(1), Fla.Stat. (1993), and battery on a law enforcement officer, § 784.07(2), Fla.Stat....

...ons the lawyer is incompetent. Merelus v. State, 735 So.2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). AFFIRMED. PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . § 893.13(l)(a)(l), Fla. Stat. (1997). . § 893.03(2)(a)(4), Fla. Stat. (1997). . § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). . § 784.07(2)(b), 784.07(3), Fla....

felony. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Aggravated battery on an LEO is a first degree felony. § 784.07(2)(d)

...the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Based on these decisions, the defendant is correct that the trial court improperly convicted him of both simple battery under section 784.03(1), Florida Statutes (2021), and battery on a law enforcement office under section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2021)....

“unlawful killing of a human being” a crime. Unlike section 784.07, there is no prerequisite in section 782.04

...must be stricken. See Thornton v. State, 679 So.2d 871, 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). [1] The charging document alleged that defendant committed attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, with a firearm, "in violation of § 782.04(1) and § 784.07 and § 775.0825 and § 777.04, [Florida Statutes]." Of interest here is the citation to section 775.0825, Florida Statutes, which formerly provided a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum penalty for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer....

...Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929 (Fla.1986), that the trial judge must instruct the jury on all necessarily lesser included offenses. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.510(b) (category # 1 offenses). In Wimberly , the court held that simple battery was a necessarily lesser included offense of battery of a law enforcement officer. § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. Appellant challenges the facial constitutionality of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), on the ground that the statute is violative of the equal protection clauses found in the United States and Florida Constitutions....

...He argues that the “compelling state interest” test is the burden which the State must sustain in order to uphold the statute at issue because felons suffer attendant inflictions from their classification as such which deprive them of fundamental rights. We recently upheld Section 784.07, Florida Statutes, against an equal protection challenge in Soverino v....

...Ms. Coffin was charged with the misdemeanor of obstruction of justice without violence under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 843.02. Mr. Coffin was charged with several felonies: two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.07(2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with violence under Fla....

...Ms. Coffin was charged with the misdemeanor of obstruction of justice without violence under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 843.02. Mr. Coffin was charged with several felonies: two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.07(2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with violence under Fla....

...d downward departure sentences without providing written reasons. On September 8, 1993, Godwin pled nolo contendere to battery on a law enforcement officer and simple battery. He was subsequently adjudicated guilty on both counts, section 784.03 and section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), and sentenced to concurrent terms of two days in the Orange County Jail with credit for two days served....

...3d DCA 1974). This instruction was approved in 1981 and amended in 2013 [131 So. 3d 755], and 2016. - 11 -  8.10 ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(a), Fla....

...See Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1991). The court now instructs you that a (name of official position of victim designated in charge) is a law enforcement officer. For cases involving other types of victims, insert definitions from § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...be found to have been in fear, and actual fear on the part of the actual victim(victim) need not be shown. Lesser Included Offenses ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(a) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...NO. Assault 784.011 8.1 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 - 13 -  Comments See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida StatutesFla....

...2d 594] and amended in 1992 [603 So. 2d 1175], 1995 [657 So. 2d 1152], 2007 [962 So. 2d 310], 2008 [994 So. 2d 1038], and 2015 [157 So. 3d 1027], and 2016. 8.12 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...See Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1991). The court now instructs you that a (name of official position of victim designated in charge) is a law enforcement officer. For cases involving other types of victims, insert definitions from § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...Give if element 4a alleged. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to kill. Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, ETC. - —784.07(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT INS. NO. Aggravated assault 784.021 8.2 Assault on law 784.07(2)(a) 8.10 enforcement officer Improper exhibition 790.10* 10.5* of a dangerous weapon or firearm, if Fla....

...3d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) and Michaud v. State, 47 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) with Mack v. State, 305 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5thth DCA 2013)(holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida StatuteFla....

...Larry Edward Robbins answered the door, the officers attempted to enter, and Robbins shot one of them. The State’s appeal of the thirty-year prison sentence imposed on Robbins for the crime of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), directs us to a series of reclassification statutes to determine whether, as the State contends, they require imposition of a life sentence....

...2) uses a deadly weapon. § 784.045(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). Hence, there are two alternative bases upon which a conviction for this offense may be established. The offense of aggravated battery is reclassified as a first-degree felony pursuant to section 784.07(2)(d) when the crime is committed against a law enforcement officer while engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties. Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284, 1287 (Fla.2002) (“[A]s reflected in the language of the statute itself, section 784.07 operates as a reclassification statute.”)....

...assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer . . . the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: . . . (b) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree. Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2). A person commits battery if he: (a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (b) Intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. Fla....

...Coffin's wife. . Mrs. Coffin was charged with the misdemeanor of obstruction of justice without violence under Fla. Stat. § 843.02 . Mr. Coffin was charged with several felonies: two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. § 784.07 (2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with violence under Fla....

County Animal Control Officer” in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1981), and in count 2 with

...The Downward Departure Sentence At Andrews’s sentencing hearing, the permissible range of sentence was from 29.175 months to fifteen years. The state requested the maximum sentence of fifteen years with a three-year mandatory minimum pursuant to section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Telly Andrews would be dead. It is for that reason that this Court departs downward in its sentencing of the Defendant. The state appeals the trial court’s downward departure sentence below the minimum mandatory sentence of three years required by section 784.07(2)(e). It contends that Chapter 99-188, the statute that added the mandatory minimum sentence language to section 784.07, does not violate the single subject rule and this court should follow the holding and rationale of State v....

...Hemandez-Molina^ 860' So.2d at 489 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). At the time Andrews was sentenced, the trial court was required to follow Taylor , because that was the only appellate opinion addressing the constitutional deficiency of the session law creating the mandatory minimum sentence of section 784.07(2)(c). In light of Hemandez-Molina, Andrews’s sentence must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing consistent with section 784.07(2)(c)....

...We conclude that Barnum is entitled to relief under Moreland v. State, 582 So.2d 618 (Fla.1991), on the basis of fundamental fairness. Barnum was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a law-enforcement officer in violation of sections 782.04(l)(a)(l), 777.04(1), and 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1991). Section 784.07(3) reclassified attempted murder from a first-degree felony to a life felony if the victim was performing his or her duties as a law-enforcement officer. 1 Section 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991), provided that any person who was convicted under section 784.07(3) must serve a 25-year minimum-mandatory sentence before becoming eligible for parole....

...He told them he was an officer, but he did not display his badge. Barnum testified that he did not believe the man was a police officer. *373 In 1991, this court had indicated that knowledge of an officer’s status was not an essential • element of section 784.07(3), when it held that the provision was not unconstitutionally vague for failing to include a requirement that the defendant knew the victim was a law-enforcement officer....

...In a motion for rehearing, Barnum asked for a certified question on the knowledge issue, but this court denied the motion and issued mandate on December 20, 1995. The Third District subsequently agreed with Carpentier and held in Thompson v. State, 667 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), that knowledge is not an element under section 784.07(3)....

...The supreme court accepted jurisdiction to resolve the conflict and approved Grinage in Thompson v. State, 695 So.2d 691 (Fla.1997), holding that knowledge of the victim’s status as a law-enforcement officer is a necessary element of the offense. The court reasoned that section 784.07(2), pertaining to assault or battery upon a law-enforcement officer, expressly required the state to prove that the offense was “knowingly” committed upon an officer, and it would be “illogical and unreasonable” to dispense with such element when proving attempted murder of an officer under subsection (3)....

...State, 833 So.2d 739 (Fla.2002), in which the court explained that supreme court decisions that “clarify” statutory law apply to all cases, pending or final, while decisions that “change” the law require a Witt analysis. We are unable to reconcile Thompson with either category. Section 784.07(3) did not contain broad terms evincing that the legislature expected the courts to engage in judicial construction, but instead used language that was intended to include a knowledge requirement from the date of the law’s enactment,...

...REQUIRES RESOLUTION OF A DISPUTED FACTUAL MATTER? We REVERSE and REMAND for either a new trial or entry of a conviction for the lesser-included offense of attempted murder and resentencing. BROWNING, J., concurs; BOOTH, J., dissents with opinion. . Section 784.07(3) provided: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a l...

...ery. The transcript of the voir dire reveals that neither of these prospective jurors was rehabilitated after making the challenged statements. We reverse Adkins’s conviction, and remand for a new trial. ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., Concur. . § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...earm; §§ 782.04(2), 775.087; Life Felony Attempted Second Degree Murder with a Firearm; §§ 782.04(2), 777.04(1), 775.087; First Degree Felony Sentence: 304.58 months Jail Credit: 674 days Case 11-11697 Battery on a Correctional Support Employee; § 784.07(2)(b); Third Degree Felony; 5 year max....

...Appellant also claimed in ground four that his conviction in count eight for attempted aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer was illegal because that offense does not exist. As the state points out, appellant’s offense was reclassified under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1999), from a third degree felony to a second degree felony. The controlling case law reveals that this was erroneous. *112 In Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384, 385 (Fla.1998), the supreme court held that section 784.07, which provides for the reclassification of offenses and minimum sentences for assault or battery of law enforcement officers, among others, does not apply to attempted battery of a law enforcement officer. In so doing, the court explained: Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers. At the time the enhancement statute was enacted, the legislature had created the four enumerated offenses in other statutory provisions. Id. (footnote omitted). The court concluded in Merritt that section 784.07 “contains no enhancement or reclassification of penalties for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses.” Id....

...Kelvin Eugene Jelks, the defendant, appeals his convictions of battery and battery on a law enforcement officer. Defendant was charged with aggravated battery, section 784.045(l)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1985), and battery on a law enforcement officer, section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), as a result of his striking a law enforcement officer one time between the eyes with a tree limb saw....

...unt V; and count VII (resisting officer with violence), five years in prison, consecutive to count VI. Talley challenges the consecutive sentences received on- counts III, IV, V, and VI. On each of the four contested counts, Talley was charged under section 784.07, Florida Statutes, which reclassifies the degree of the offense where the victim is a law enforcement officer. Talley argues that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute and, therefore, the court could not order his sentences to run consecutively....

...zed by an enhancement statute. Id. at 323. The court concluded that the legislature did not authorize consecutive enhancement sentences and, as a result, held Boler’s sentence was improper. Id. at 324. The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that section 784.07 is a reclassification statute, not an enhancement statute. Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284, 1290 (Fla.2002)(concluding there is no double enhancement problem when sentencing a defendant convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer as a habitual offender because section 784.07 is not an enhancement statute). Here, the statute prescribing the penalty for certain offenses against law enforcement officers includes the mandatory minimum sentence, without resorting to a separate enhancement statute. § 784.07(2), Fla....

COWART, Judge. An “auxiliary deputy sheriff” as defined in section 943.10(6), Florida Statutes (1981), is a “law enforcement officer” within the meaning of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1981), prohibiting the assault or battery of law enforcement officers....

...For example, under section 784.081(2), the offense of battery upon a school district employee is reclassified from a first degree misdemeanor to a third degree felony. In Merritt , however, the Florida Supreme Court held that a similar statute, Florida Statutes section 784.07, which enhances the punishment for assault, aggravated as *335 sault, battery and aggravated battery committed against law enforcement and other specified public officers, does not create new substantive offenses and, by its plain language, does not apply to “attempts” to commit the enumerated crimes....

...Burney appears to have several prior convictions for battery, and the information charged this offense as both battery on a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony, and battery by a defendant with a prior battery conviction sufficient to elevate the battery charge to a third-degree felony. §§ 784.07(2)(b), .03(2), Fla....

...Although Mr. Burney appears to have known that his victim was a police officer and probably targeted him because of this fact, under the language of the statute, that is not enough to transform this battery into a battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07(2) defines battery on a law enforcement officer as follows: Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer ......

...In Soverino the Supreme Court stated that the statutes at issue frequently overlap and “a prosecutor is imbued .. . with the discretion to decide under which statute he wishes to charge.” In Meeks this court held that under the facts of that case, the defendant was chargeable under either Section 784.07 or 843.01....

...he subtotal sentence points are multiplied by 2.5. If the primary offense is a violation of subsection 775.0823(5), (6), (7), (8), or (9), Florida Statutes, the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by 2.0. If the primary offense is a violation of section 784.07(3) or 775.0875(1), Florida Statutes, or the Law Enforcement - 38 - Protection Act under subsection 775.0823(10) or (11), Florida Statutes, the subtotal sentence points are multiplied by 1.5....

...§ 784.03(1)(b), but converts conduct constituting a simple battery into a felony offense when the conduct is committed under certain circumstances or by certain persons. For example, a simple battery committed upon a law enforcement officer is treated as a felony, Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b), as is a simple battery committed upon a known staff member of a sexually violent predator detention or commitment facility, Fla. Stat. § 784.074(1)(c), and as is a simple battery committed on a person sixty-five years of age or older, Fla....

...nificant force or violence. United States v. Joseph, 371 Fed.Appx. 70 (11th Cir.2010) ("Pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson, we conclude that the Florida offense of simple battery, as defined by Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 784.03 and 784.07, will not invariably constitute a crime of violence under the Guidelines....

Battery on a law enforcement officer is illegal. See § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (2000). Once appellee committed a

...(1985), grand theft of property valued at $295, a third degree felony; and to § 784.021(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon without intent to kill, a third degree felony. In Case No. 89-3414, appellant pled nolo contendere to a violation of § 784.07(2)(b), Fla.Stat....

attempted murder of a law enforcement officer is section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993). In State v. Iacovone

...sentences entered pursuant to an open plea. We recognize that a scrivener’s error exists in the written judgment which states that 1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). the three-year minimum mandatory sentence was imposed because Appellant used a firearm pursuant to section 784.07(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...in the written judgment. In case number 06-2022, the written judgment reflects that appellant was convicted of aggravated battery upon a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or emergency medical care provider, a first-degree felony in violation of section 784.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes....

...We find merit only in his contention that the court erred in enhancing his sentence for aggravated assault. Therefore, we reverse solely for resentencing on this offense. The appellant was convicted on various charges, including aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a firearm in violation of section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...y harm, section 784.045, Florida Statutes (1993). However, the second-degree felony of aggravated battery was then properly reclassified to a first-degree felony by virtue of Alvarez having committed the battery against a police officer, pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Accordingly, the charge was indeed “reduced” from attempted first-degree murder of a police officer, a first-degree felony, to the second-degree felony of aggravated assault with great bodily harm against a police officer, which describes the reclassified offense of a first-degree felony by operation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...ly pleaded to the twenty-seven years. [T.20]. Alvarez asserts that the error lies in the printed judgment sheet, which lists his offense as aggravated assault with great bodily harm on a police officer, pursuant to section 784.045, but fails to list section 784.07, the reclassification statute....

...the enhanced charge. Alvarez has not been illegally sentenced, and his plea to the charge was not unknowingly made. However, we remand for correction of the final judgment to accurately reflect the numerical statute references, sections 784.047 and 784.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), to accompany the description of the charges of which Alvarez was convicted.

...t part of the State’s proof. See G.S. v. State, 761 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to reduce the conviction to simple battery. REVERSED and REMANDED. GRIFFIN, THOMPSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. . Section 784.07, Fla....

...Although the written sentence reflects that the three-year sentence is a minimum mandatory term relating to a firearm, it is clear from the record that this minimum mandatory term was imposed for the aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(2)(e), Fla....

PER CURIAM. The adjudication of delinquency for the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, under Section 784.07(l)(a), (2), Florida Statutes (1983), is affirmed upon a holding that a security officer employed by the Dade County School Board is a law enforcement officer within the meaning of the above-stated statute. We reach this conclusion based on the following, briefly stated, legal analysis. First, a law enforcement officer, as defined under Section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), includes those persons who fall within the generic class of law enforcement officers; for guidance in determining which individuals fall within this generic class, one may look to Section 790.001(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...State, 798 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the order of delinquency for attempted battery on a law enforcement officer and to issue an order finding J.J. delinquent as to attempted battery, a second degree misdemeanor. Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2011), is an enhancement statute which increases the penalties for certain enumerated crimes when the victim is a law enforcement officer....

...n the conviction. Id.; see also J.W.J. v. State, 994 So. 2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“A motion for judgment of dismissal should not be granted unless there is no legally sufficient evidence on which to base a guilty verdict.”). Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes, enhances the crime of battery to a third-degree felony when committed on a law enforcement officer who is “engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties.” See also Mills v. State, 822 So. 2d 1284, 1290 (Fla. 2002) (finding that section 784.07 is an enhancement statute rather than a statute defining a new criminal offense). While the term “lawful performance of his or her duties” is not defined in the statute, the Florida Supreme Court instructs that when evaluating section 784.07, “courts must apply the legal standards governing the duty undertaken by the law enforcement officer at the point that an assault, battery, or act of violent resistance occurs.” Tillman v....

...was arrested for loitering and prowling, battery on a police officer, and resisting an officer without violence. The State took no action on the loitering and prowling charge but filed a petition for delinquency charging R.A. with battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of sections 784.03 and 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2021), and resisting an officer without violence in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2021)....

...See D.L. v. State, 138 So. 3d 499, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Wyche v. State, 987 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 2008); Harris v. State, 761 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). ANALYSIS I. Lawful Performance Prong of Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes The outcome of this case hinges on an examination of the battery on a law enforcement officer “lawful performance” prong under section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, in the context of the judicially created 20 “community caretaker” exception to the Fourth Amendment. Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes, reclassifies a battery committed against a law enforcement officer from a first-degree misdemeanor to a third-degree felony. This reclassification carries with it an additional element that is not present in simple battery cases. The State must prove the officer was “engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties” at the time the battery occurred. § 784.07(2), Fla....

...this case. Comment This instruction was adopted in 2013 [131 So. 3d 720] and 2015. 8.10 ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(a), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1991). For cases involving other types of victims, insert definitions from § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...ictim may be found to have been in fear, and actual fear on the part of the actual victim need not be shown. Lesser Included Offenses ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(a) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments Several statutes have been added in recent years providing for reclassification of assaults and batteries on designated classes: ‘‘ 784.074, 784.075, 784.076, 784.078, 784.081, 784.082, 784.083, and 784.085. See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)(holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, had to be vacated because the statute does not include physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of facilities that do not satisfy the definition of a hospital under chapter 395). This instruction was adopted in 1981 [431 So....

...2d 1175], 1995 [657 So. 2d 1152], and 2007 [962 So. 2d 310], and 2008 [994 So. 2d 1038], and 2015. - 11 -  8.11 BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1991). For cases involving other types of victims, insert definitions from § 784.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat., as appropriate. Lesser Included Offenses BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(b) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY FLA....

...NO. TWO Battery 784.03 8.3 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, had to be vacated - 13 - because the statute does not include physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of facilities that do not satisfy the definition of a hospital under chapter 395). This instruction was adopted in 1981 [431 So....

...2d 594] and amended in 1992 [603 So. 2d 1175], 1995 [657 So. 2d 1152], and 2007 [962 So. 2d 310], and 2008 [994 So. 2d 1038], and 2015. 8.12 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1991). For cases involving other types of victims, insert definitions from § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...Give if element 4a alleged. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to kill. Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT INS. NO. Aggravated assault 784.021 8.2 Assault on law 784.07(2)(a) 8.10 enforcement officer Improper exhibition 790.10 10.5 of a dangerous weapon or firearm, if Fla....

...Discharging firearms in 790.15 10.6 public Comments See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)(holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, had to be vacated because the statute does not include physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of facilities that do not satisfy the definition of a hospital under chapter 395). This instruction was approved in 1992 [603 So....

...2d 1175], and amended in 1995 [657 So. 2d 1152], 2007 [962 So. 2d 310], 2008 [994 So. 2d 1038], and 2013 [131 So. 3d 755] and 2015. 8.13 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(d), Fla....

...The instruction must state the class of officers to which the victim belongs, e.g., probation officer, correctional officer. See Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1991). For cases involving other types of victims, insert definitions from § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...Give if element 2b alleged. A weapon is a “deadly weapon” if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(d) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT INS. NO. Aggravated battery 784.045 8.4 Felony battery* 784.041 8.5 Battery on a law 784.07(2)(b) 8.11 enforcement officer Battery 784.03 8.3 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 - 19 -  Improper ex...

...Comments *The lesser included offense of Felony Battery is only applicable if element 2a is charged and proved. See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)(holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, had to be vacated because the statute does not include physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of facilities that do not satisfy the definition of a hospital under chapter 395). This instruction was adopted in 1992 [603 So....

...If Defendant is solely enhanced as a Career Offender, the guideline range in the PSR remains 360 months to life. However, the Court may depart from this range pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The Movant was charged under Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03 and 784.07. Florida's simple battery statute, § 784.03 is enhanced under § 784.07, from a misdemeanor to a felony when committed against a law enforcement officer....

...Her actions that followed, however, gave him reason to believe that she was Mr. Coffin's wife. .Mrs. Coffin was charged with the misdemeanor of obstruction of justice without violence under Fla. Stat. § 843.02 . Mr. Coffin was charged with several felonies: two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer under Fla. Stat. § 784.07 (2)(b) and § 784.03(1); resisting an officer with violence under Fla....

...The trial court sentenced him to a term of life with no possibility of parole for twenty-five years. We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing as appellant was neither charged with nor convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties. See § 784.07(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1988). Contrary to the state’s assertion that section 784.07(3) did not create a new crime, the defendant in Gonzalez v. State, 572 So.2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), was formally charged with attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and convicted of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. Furthermore, appellant responds that even if section 784.07(3) is construed as an enhancement statute, its elements still must be alleged in the information, the jury must be instructed on these elements, and the verdict must reflect a finding of guilt of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer before appellant can be sentenced pursuant to section 775.0825. Section 775.-0825, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), states: Attempted murder of law enforcement officer; penalty. — Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole....

...Such sentence shall not be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001. As appellant asserts, he was not convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm. According to the language of section 775.0825, a conviction pursuant to section 784.07(3) is a prerequisite to a sentencing under section 775.0825....

...If there is, the standard instruction is inappropriate and should not be given. See Pittman v. State, 440 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Accordingly, defendant’s convictions and sentences are reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. DOWNEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. . § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

...1st DCA 1995)(vacat-ing appellant’s sentence and remanding the case for resentencing because the guidelines scoresheet incorrectly scored the offenses as first-degree felonies rather than second-degree felonies); State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995)(holding that section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), which classifies attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as a life felony, is limited to first-degree murder); State v....

...riffin’s objection. Griffin’s 1984 conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer while armed should have been scored as a level 5 offense, as the State correctly concedes. (Battery on a law enforcement officer while armed is a violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983). Section 921.0012(3), Florida Statutes (1997), lists a violation of 784.07(2)(b) as a level 4 offense....

...fendant to a total of seven years’ state supervision. 6 *1021 Accordingly, the defendant’s sentences are reversed and this case remanded for resen-tencing. REVERSED and REMANDED. HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . § 843.01, Fla.Stat. (1989). . § 784.07(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...The only point which merits discussion is his contention that the convictions and sentences for battery on a law enforcement officer are illegal. We agree and reverse in part. *1022 The information charged, as to the counts of battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977), that appellant actually and intentionally did touch and strike another person, to-wit: [sic] R....

enforcement officer” within the meaning of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supplement 1976). The trial

Act under subsection 775.0823(9) or (10) or section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes, or section 775.0875(1)

without felony reclassification based upon section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993). FULMER, A.C

J., concur. . § 843.01, Fla.Stat. (1985). . § 784.07, Fla.Stat. (1985).

...Instead, we have referred those proposed amendments back to the Committee to be considered in light of Shepard v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S546 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2018). -2-  Last, instruction 8.20 (Battery on Facility Employee) is amended to reflect the language in section 784.078, Florida Statutes (2018) (Battery of facility employee by throwing, tossing, or expelling certain fluids or materials). Accordingly, instruction 8.20 is amended to remove the “intentionally touched or struck” language that is used in other battery statutes, but is not found in section 784.078, Florida Statutes....

...battery. This instruction was adopted in 2000 [765 So. 2d 692] and amended in 2018. -8-  8.11 BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...1991). The court now instructs you that a (name of official position of victim designated in charge) is a law enforcement officer. - 10 -  For cases involving other types of victims, insert definitions from § 784.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat., as appropriate. Lesser Included Offenses BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(b) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY FLA....

...NO. TWO Battery 784.03 8.3 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, had to be vacated because the statute does not include physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of facilities that do not satisfy the definition of a hospital under chapter 395). This instruction was adopted in 1981 [431 So....

...This instruction was adopted in 1997 [697 So. 2d 84] and amended in 2018. - 12 - 8.20 BATTERY ON FACILITY EMPLOYEE (THROWING, TOSSING, OR EXPELLING CERTAIN FLUIDS OR MATERIALS) § 784.078, Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Facility Employee, the State must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1....

...(Defendant) intended did so with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm (victim). 4. (Victim) was a facility employee. 5. (Defendant) knew (victim) or had reason to knowreasonably should have known that (victim) was a facility employee. Definitions. § 784.078(1), Fla....

...tution, private correctional facility, county, municipal, or regional jail or other detention facility of local government, or any secure facility operated and maintained by the Department of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice. § 784.078(2), Fla....

...enhancement programs or the correctional work programs] [or] [who is a parole examiner with the Florida Parole Commission on Offender Review]. - 13 -  Lesser Included Offenses BATTERY ON FACILITY EMPLOYEE — 784.078 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...Instead, we have referred those proposed amendments back to the Committee to be considered in light of Shepard v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S546 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2018). -2-  Last, instruction 8.20 (Battery on Facility Employee) is amended to reflect the language in section 784.078, Florida Statutes (2018) (Battery of facility employee by throwing, tossing, or expelling certain fluids or materials). Accordingly, instruction 8.20 is amended to remove the “intentionally touched or struck” language that is used in other battery statutes, but is not found in section 784.078, Florida Statutes....

...battery. This instruction was adopted in 2000 [765 So. 2d 692] and amended in 2018. -8-  8.11 BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...1991). The court now instructs you that a (name of official position of victim designated in charge) is a law enforcement officer. - 10 -  For cases involving other types of victims, insert definitions from § 784.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat., as appropriate. Lesser Included Offenses BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, FIREFIGHTER, ETC. — 784.07(2)(b) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY FLA....

...NO. TWO Battery 784.03 8.3 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, had to be vacated because the statute does not include physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of facilities that do not satisfy the definition of a hospital under chapter 395). This instruction was adopted in 1981 [431 So....

...This instruction was adopted in 1997 [697 So. 2d 84] and amended in 2018. - 12 - 8.20 BATTERY ON FACILITY EMPLOYEE (THROWING, TOSSING, OR EXPELLING CERTAIN FLUIDS OR MATERIALS) § 784.078, Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Facility Employee, the State must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1....

...(Defendant) intended did so with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm (victim). 4. (Victim) was a facility employee. 5. (Defendant) knew (victim) or had reason to knowreasonably should have known that (victim) was a facility employee. Definitions. § 784.078(1), Fla....

...tution, private correctional facility, county, municipal, or regional jail or other detention facility of local government, or any secure facility operated and maintained by the Department of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice. § 784.078(2), Fla....

...enhancement programs or the correctional work programs] [or] [who is a parole examiner with the Florida Parole Commission on Offender Review]. - 13 -  Lesser Included Offenses BATTERY ON FACILITY EMPLOYEE — 784.078 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...On June 4,1997, the City filed an amended verified complaint for probable cause and for final order of forfeiture pursuant to sections 932.701-.707, Florida Statutes (1995). The City alleged that Walker had used his vehicle as an instrumentality in the commission of an aggravated assault on a police officer in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...See Dutton v. State, 89 So.3d 963, 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). However, the record reflects that the error was merely clerical. Aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer is a second-degree felony that carries a three-year minimum mandatory sentence. § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...We hold that the trial court properly imposed the minimum mandatory sentence pursuant to the crime charged, but we remand with instructions that the trial court correct the final judgment and sentence to reflect that the minimum mandatory term was imposed pursuant to section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes....

...We have examined the several points he raises and find that only one has merit. He contends that the trial court improperly retained jurisdiction over his sentence. We agree. The state charged defendant with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

PER CURIAM. The appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of attempted voluntary escape and of committing a battery upon a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...t fall under the classification of law enforcement officer within the purview of Section 784.-07. See Hunter v. State, 376 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Reversed and remanded with directions that appellant’s judgment and sentence for violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977), be vacated....

on a law enforcement officer in violation of section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993). After a hearing

...The presentence investigation report (PSR) identified three prior state convictions as qualifying predicate offenses requiring a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). [1] The listed convictions were for battery on a law enforcement officer, § 784.07(2)(b), Fla....

...The State conceded the sentencing error both in its trial court filing and in its brief to this court. Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Card’s sentences and remand for the trial court to impose lawful sentences. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. DAVIS and WALLACE, JJ., Concur. . § 784.07(2)(d), Fla....

...battery fell well within the elements clause and similar statutory definitions. These decisions did not suggest that their holdings departed from any prior decisions to 5 BOLEO is simple battery with the added element of a law enforcement victim. Fla. Stat. § 784.07(2)(b). 6 The Supreme Court indicated BOLEO convictions could still qualify under the elements clause in specific cases under the modified categorical approach....

...r departure from the sentencing guidelines. We agree and reverse the sentence and remand for proper resentencing. A jury convicted the defendant of 1) aggravated battery, § 784.045(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985), 2) battery upon a law enforcement officer, § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

...Here, the trial court was obligated to follow Whitehead and limit the defendant’s sentence to guideline perimeters. Next, the finding that the crime was committed against a police officer acting in the line of duty constituted the gist of the offense as defined by the statute. § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

...Hale v. 4 State, 630 So. 2d 521, 525 (Fla. 1993). Bryan’s four convictions for battery (counts one, three, four, and five) were reclassified from first-degree misdemeanors to third-degree felonies because the victims were correctional officers. §§ 784.03, 784.07(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017); see also Ramroop v. State, 214 So. 3d 657, 663 (Fla. 2017) (explaining that section 784.07 is a reclassification statute, not an enhancement statute). Typically, the statutory maximum sentence for a third-degree felony is five years in prison....

...State, 659 So.2d 1060 (Fla.1995)). Therefore, Nelson argues, the trial court erred and the aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer sentence must run concurrent with the HFO sentences. Nelson is correct that aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, section 784.07(2)(d), is an enhancement of the crime of aggravated battery. See Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998). This court has acknowledged as much. See King v. State, 763 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)(“our supreme court did say [in Merritt that] ‘Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995) is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense.’ This statement by the supreme court should be adhered to by the lower courts”)....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

...1997), the Supreme Court held that knowledge of the victim’s status is a necessary element of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, but that was prior to the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 782.065 and was based on a construction of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, which explicitly contains a knowledge requirement....

battery conviction, and Florida felony battery under § 784.07(2)(b), which applies to an offender who has committed

...[i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” § 784.03(1)(a)−(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). When a battery is committed on certain persons, including “an emergency medical care provider . . . while the . . . emergency medical care provider . . . is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties,” section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes reclassifies the offense “of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree.” § 784.07(2), (2)(b), Fla....

...defined in chapter 395, who are employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof. § 784.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015) (spacing and numbering added). 3  In Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the Fifth District clarified that because section 784.07 is penal in nature, the definition of “emergency medical care provider” must be strictly construed in conjunction with its plain language....

...medical care provider,” the State needed to establish that the nurse victim was a “registered nurse . . . or any person authorized by an emergency medical service license under chapter 401 who is engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...[a] hospital[] as defined in chapter 395, who [was] employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by [the] hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof.” § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...Both charges against Maurice were dismissed after he agreed to pay a fine, enroll in anger management classes, and perform community service. Ribel's Concise Statement of Material Facts ¶ 20. Fils was charged with, (1) battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.07, (2) resisting arrest with violence, in violation of Fla....

...Therefore, all the police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from Maurice's § 1983 false arrest claims. b. Fils's false arrest claims According to her arrest affidavit, Fils was charged with battery on a law *1208 enforcement officer (Fla.Stat. § 784.07), resisting arrest with violence (Fla.Stat....

...Appellant made the statements that when he got out of jail, he would kill the officers. 1 To obtain a conviction for battery of a law enforcement officer, the state must prove that the accused had the specific intent to knowingly batter a law enforcement officer. § 784.07, Fla....

PER CURIAM. A.R., appellant, pled nolo contendere to the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony. Section 784.07(2)(b), Fla.Stat....

...Thus, the defendant’s threat to kill the detective, at a time when the defendant was not subdued and still had possession of his weapon, constituted an assault upon an officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties. Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla.1978); § 784.07(2), Fla.Stat....

...e county jail correctional officer he battered was not a law enforcement officer. He relies on Hunter v. State, 376 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The trial court correctly denied the motion because, after Hunter was decided, the legislature amended section 784.07, Florida Statutes, to include county correctional officers. See § 784.07(l)(a), Fla....

resentencing. Cole was convicted of violation of section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1993), attempted murder

...struck one of the backup officers, Officer Garcia, and cut his lip. *1205 The trial court found that J.C. had committed one count of resisting an officer with violence in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2006), and two counts of battery on a police officer in violation of sections 784.03 and 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...ution of a legal duty. Id. § 843.01. In order to convict J.C. of the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, it was likewise necessary for the State to establish that the officers were engaged in the lawful performance of their duties. Id. § 784.07(2)....

...that battery on a law enforcement officer is not a forcible felony for purposes of a VCC sentence. The Hearns opinion reasoned that battery on a law enforcement officer, which consists of a simple battery under section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), and an enhancement under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (2006), may be committed by a simple touching or nominal contact and does not necessarily require physical force or violence. Id....

...[i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” § 784.03(1)(a)−(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). When a battery is committed on certain persons, including “an emergency medical care provider . . . while the . . . emergency medical care provider . . . is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties,” section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes reclassifies the offense “of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree.” § 784.07(2), (2)(b), Fla....

...defined in chapter 395, who are employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof. § 784.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015) (spacing and numbering added). In Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the Fifth District clarified that because section 784.07 is penal in nature, the definition of “emergency medical care provider” must be strictly construed in conjunction with its plain language....

...medical care provider,” the State needed to establish that the nurse victim was a “registered nurse . . . or any person authorized by an emergency medical service license under chapter 401 who is engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...[a] hospital[] as defined in chapter 395, who [was] employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by [the] hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof.” § 784.07(1)(a), Fla....

...challenges his adjudication of delinquency and his disposition order claiming that the trial court committed error by adjudicating him delinquent on the nonexistent crime of attempted battery on a law enforcement officer. We agree. In Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), the supreme court held that section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes, which enhances the punishment for committing assault, aggravated assault, battery and aggravated battery committed against law enforcement and other specified public officers, does not create new substantive of...

...ed offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses. Id. at 385 . The State argues that the supreme court has since determined that section 784.07 is a reclassification statute, and thus creates a substantive crime of attempted battery on a law enforcement officer, citing to Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284 (Fla.2002). However, a close reading of Mitts reveals that the supreme court reiterated its position that section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes is an enhancement statute which reclassified enumerated offenses committed against law enforcement officers rather than a statute creating new criminal offenses. See Mills, 822 So.2d at 1286-1287 . Other recent cases have also held that attempted assault, battery or aggravated assault on one of the enumerated individuals set forth in section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes are non-existent crimes....

...cy based upon a finding that W.T.D. committed attempted battery and, consequently, to hold a new disposition hearing). J.S.’s other claims of error raised on appeal are without merit. REVERSED and REMANDED. PLEUS, C.J. and SAWAYA, J„ concur. . §§ 784.07(2)(b); 777.04, Fla....

...Appellant was sentenced to, nine years in prison on each of the battery on a law enforcement officer charges, the four sentences to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to appellant’s federal sentence. As appellant correctly points out, battery on a law enforcement officer is a third-degree felony. § 784.07(2)(b), Fla.Stat....

...3d DCA), review denied, 606 So.2d 1165 (Fla.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1003 , 122 L.Ed.2d 152 (1993); Bilinski v. State, 463 So.2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Ryan v. State, 457 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), review denied, 462 So.2d 1108 (Fla.1985); § 784.07(3), Fla.Stat....

...ld have been granted because the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that the defendant knew the victim was a police officer. Evans v. State, 452 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime); § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

the information properly states a crime [under § 784.07, Fla.Stat. (1979)] for battery on a law enforcement

...at 940 (citations omitted); see also Callaghan v. State, 462 So.2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). In the present case, Petitioner was charged with attempted murder under section 782.04, Florida Statutes (1989) (murder), section 777.04, Florida Statutes (1989) (attempt), and section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989) (assault or battery of law enforcement officers ...; reclassification of offenses)....

...[3] In the instant case, this Court must also evaluate the state statutes. The applicable Florida statutes provide that "[A]ny person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer ... shall be guilty of a life felony," Fla.Stat. § 784.07(3), and "Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer ......

...In ruling, the court referred to the testimony as “disingenuous.” This determination concerning the credibility of the witness is within the realm of the trier of fact and will not be disturbed on appeal. See State v. Polak, 598 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). AFFIRMED. PETERSON, C. J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. . § 784.07, Fla....

...mption is to protect the safety of the law enforcement personnel and their families. 3 In the absence of legislative clarification, this office looked to analogous statutes which serve a similar purpose ? the protection of law enforcement personnel. Section 784.07 , Florida Statutes, seeks to protect the safety of law enforcement personnel by increasing the penalties for assault and battery against such individuals....

...efinition of the term "law enforcement personnel," this office recommended that agencies faced with implementing the provisions of section 119.07 (3)(k) [now section 119.071 (4)(d)1.], Florida Statutes, consider utilizing the definition contained in section 784.07 (1)(a), Florida Statutes, until this matter is clarified by the Legislature....

...4 This office is not aware of any decision which would alter the suggestions made in the informal opinion. I would therefore reaffirm the conclusions reached in that opinion. Accordingly, in the absence of legislative clarification, an agency should consider utilizing the definition in section 784.07 (1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Hankinson, Judge. April 22, 2019 PER CURIAM. Theron Sapp was convicted in 2006 of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. Because the victim was an officer, the aggravated battery charge was a first-degree felony. § 784.07(2)(d), Fla....

...The state properly concedes that one of the reasons given for the departure sentence, that the victim was a corrections officer, is an inappropriate reason. A corrections officer is specifically included in the definition of “law enforcement officer” provided by section 784.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The second reason given for departure was the location of the crime at a correctional facility. If this one remaining reason is valid, then the departure sentence is valid. Cosatime v. State, 570 So.2d 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). However, this reason is also invalid. Section 784.07 provides that when a person is charged with battery upon a law enforcement officer while the officer is engaged in the lawful performance of duties, the offense shall be reclassified to a higher level offense. § 784.07(2), Fla.Stat....

...The trial court shall not give new reasons for a departure sentence. Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748 (Fla.1987); Rivero v. State, 592 So.2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . § 784.07, Fla.Stat. (1993). . § 784.03(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). .§ 784.07(2)(b), Fla.Stat....

...ted fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer. 4 On appeal, Anglin argues that the trial court erred when it permitted his counsel to withdraw prior to sentencing and by imposing the three-year minimum mandatory sentences, required by section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), based on the charges of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer....

...Accordingly, finding no prejudice, we find no merit in Anglin’s argument. Next, Anglin argues that the trial court should not have imposed three-year minimum mandatory terms on the charges of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer because Chapter 99-188, Laws of Flofida, which amended section 784.07(2)(c) to add the minimum mandatory term, was enacted in violation of the single subject rule, and that a later enact *676 ment, purportedly curing the constitutional defect, could not be applied retroactively without violating the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions....

...However, on remand, the trial court shall enter, and furnish to the Department of Corrections, an order striking the minimum mandatory provisions. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE. GRIFFIN and PLEUS, JJ., concur. . § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). . § 784.07(2)(c), Fla....

...The judgment lists count 7 as the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and refers to section 784.021(1)(A). This appears to be a scrivener’s error as count 7 in the indictment charges aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(c)....

...Moreover, “the facts constituting probable cause need not reach the standard of conclusiveness and probability required of the circumstantial facts upon which a conviction must be based.” Id. The officer charged Ms. Tursi with battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), and resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1989). Section 784.07 penalizes any battery on an officer while the officer “is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties.......

GALLEN, THOMAS M., Associate Senior Judge. C.B. appeals the order finding that she committed battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2006), withholding adjudication, and placing her on probation....

...nor did they communicate to her that she was under arrest, although Officer Robinson stated that “I transported her to the police department, decided to take her away from there.... [W]e just decided to take her to the station and put her in a holding cell.” Section 784.07(2) provides an enhancement to the offense of battery under section 784.08(1), Florida Statutes (2006), by elevating the offense to a third-degree felony....

...The Legislature has not expressly precluded the defense of justifiable use of force against an officer in situations other than arrest. For this reason, and because the Legislature has placed the element of lawful execution of a legal duty in both sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, proof that the officer was acting lawfully is necessary in a prosecution for crimes committed under either statute that occur outside an arrest scenario....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Dale E. Tarpley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. GALLEN, THOMAS M., Associate Senior Judge. C.B. appeals the order finding that she committed battery on a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (2006), withholding adjudication, and placing her on probation....

...nor did they communicate to her that she was under arrest, although Officer Robinson stated that "I transported her to the police department, decided to take her away from there. . . . [W]e just decided to take her to the station and put her in a holding cell." Section 784.07(2) provides an enhancement to the offense of battery under section 784.03(1), Florida Statutes (2006), by elevating the offense to a third-degree felony....

...The Legislature has not expressly precluded the defense of justifiable use of force against an officer in situations other than arrest. For this reason, and because the Legislature has placed the element of lawful execution of a legal duty in both sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, proof that the officer was acting lawfully is necessary in a prosecution for crimes committed under either statute that occur outside an arrest scenario....

...This court granted the writ to the extent of allowing him to proceed as if on direct appeal from a denial of a motion under Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant was charged by information with battery on a law enforcement officer pursuant to Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...intent to strike a school employee). What distinguishes Mordica, V.M., and S.G. from the instant case is that the enhancement statutes at issue all required proof of specific intent. See Mordica, 618 So.2d at 304 (stating that battery of a LEO under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1989), was a specific intent crime that required that the offender knowingly commit the offense on a LEO); V.M., 729 So.2d at 429 (stating that the general intent to commit a simple battery would not transfer to the...

...nd battery’]. Irby was arrested 3 three days later for battering Ball. (References to transcript omitted). On October 18, 1982, a joint information was filed charging Irby and Martin with battery of Officer Ball on August 30, 1982, in violation of section 784.07, Florida Statutes....

...Since appellant successfully contended that the first battery was not included within that charge, his argument that he must have been brought to trial within 180 days of his arrest on September 3 is without merit. AFFIRMED. ERVIN, C.J., and BOOTH, J., concur. . § 784.07, Fla.Stat....

...He challenges his conviction for attempted battery on a law enforcement officer, claiming that the offense does not exist. For this proposition, Merritt relies on Fredericks v. State, 675 So.2d 989, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), in which the court stated: Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993) reclassifies certain enumerated offenses and enhances the penalties for those offenses when the victim is a law enforcement officer....

...By its terms, the statute does not reclassify or enhance the penalty for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses. As explained by this court in Crumley v. State, 489 So.2d 112, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ... “by enacting the enhancement statute, section 784.07, the legislature merely provided for a felony punishment when the victim [of one of the enumerated offenses] ......

...t officer, was inherent in one of the other offenses, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. Where aggravated assault is committed on a law enforcement officer, the offense is increased from a third degree felony to a second degree felony, section 784.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993)....