Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...to achieve a favorable and desired result for their clients. I would affirm the award of attorneys' fees entered by the trial court. NOTES [1] The subject properties lie east of the Palmetto Expressway, north of Miller Road near 72nd Avenue. [2] By § 127.01(2) Fla. Stat., F.S.A., when the necessity to take, for park purposes, was raised by the defendants, that issue was to be determined by the court (at a pre-trial hearing according to § 73.061 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.), and, by virtue of § 127.01(2), with no presumption in favor of the county's right to take for such purpose resulting from its determination therefor by resolution or petition, and with the taking for such purpose to be permitted only as to the land for which it should be determined by the court there was a public necessity....

...their use against a foreign government with which the United States is at peace, violate an array of criminal statutes and regulations. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), as specified in 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (a) (1982) and 22 C.F.R. § 127.01 (a) (1982) (criminalizing attempts to export firearms without a license); 18 U.S.C....

Act, 22 U.S.C. § ] 2778(b) and (c) and 22 C.F.R. § 127.1.” He also appeals his sentence, which was imposed

...e condemned airspace. That determination is supported by substantial competent evidence. III. Whether the county invoked sufficient proper statutory authority for the taking. The county's eminent domain petition cited as statutory authority Sections 127.01, 125.012(3) and 332.02(2), Florida Statutes (1981), and Chapters 73 and 74, Florida Statutes (1981). Section 127.01 delegates to the county the power of eminent domain, 125.012(3) grants to the county the power of condemnation to acquire any estate or interest in land for airport facilities, Section 332.02 gives municipalities the power to acquire real property for airports, and Chapters 73 and 74 deal with eminent domain in general and supplemental proceedings. Section 127.01 authorizes a county to exercise the power of eminent domain to take the fee simple title to property or "a *684 particular right or estate in ......

...As pointed out by appellant, Section 333.12 specifically refers to the acquisition of air rights and reference to that section in the petition would have been appropriate. We are convinced that appellee's petition nonetheless substantially complied with the statutory requirements in view of its reliance on Section 127.01....

...rder of the circuit court allowing the taking of that parcel. Case No. 71-1126 is an interlocutory appeal from that same order of taking allowing the county to acquire parcel 4 of the land at issue (owned by the appellees Harvey, et al). Pursuant to § 127.01, Fla....

...We paraphrase these arguments as: (1) the county failed to plead and prove that a survey was made of the line of construction for the parcels involved pursuant to the requirements of Fla. Stat. § 73.021(5), F.S.A.; (2) The county failed in showing the public necessity for the acquisition of the lands pursuant to § 127.01, Fla....

...invests in county commissions the authority to acquire personal property by eminent domain proceedings. It would be ludicrous to argue that a "survey" is necessary of the personal property prior to its condemnation, as a strict construction of that provision would require. Likewise, in proceedings under § 127.01, Fla....

...denied, Fla., 225 So.2d 527; 396 U.S. 1008, 90 S.Ct. 565, 24 L.Ed.2d 500. The second contention of the appellant landowners strikes at the very heart of the proceedings below in alleging that no public necessity was shown for the acquisition of parcels 3 and 4 as is required under § 127.01(2), Fla....

...record supporting the need for the facility. Nor can we read the Peavy decision to mean that any recreational purpose in the acquisition of land is unnecessary, per se, for that would defeat the very purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting § 127.01(2), Fla....

...cost will be less than the cost of acquiring only a portion of the property. The legislature granted these same powers to counties by expressly authorizing counties to exercise those powers granted to the DOT under subsections 337.27(1) and (2). See § 127.01(1)(b), Fla....

...f land if the acquisition costs will be equal to or less than the costs of acquiring a portion of the property. This subsection further provides that "this means of limiting the rising costs to the state of property acquisition is a public purpose." Section 127.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), grants this same power to the counties....

beneficiary would not appertain. Scott On Trusts, § 127-1. Therefore, if the trial judge envisioned invading

...Gregg and wife were defendants below in an eminent domain proceeding instituted by Sarasota County to condemn certain lands of appellants for a public beach and recreation purposes, authorized by Chapter 27886, Sp.Laws of Florida 1951, and Chapter 22802, Laws of Florida 1945, F.S.A. § 127.01....

...sions", § 166.021(2), Fla. Stat., and since the State, Department of Transportation (DOT) as well as counties are expressly permitted by statute to condemn more property than is necessary where they would save money by doing so, §§ 337.27(2), [2] 127.01(1)(b), Fla....

...However, the legislature has made a specific exception as to DOT in section 337.27(2), Florida Statutes, which essentially provides that when the cost to acquire an entire parcel is equal to or less than the cost of acquiring a portion of the tract, DOT is authorized to acquire the entire tract. [3] By section 127.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the legislature has expressly given counties this special eminent domain power granted DOT to take all of a tract of land when only a part is needed....

...Palm Beach County v. Inlet Bay Club, Inc., Fla. App.1973, 280 So.2d 692 . Having reviewed the record in the context of the foregoing rules of law, and having found no error requiring reversal, the judgment on appeal is, therefore, affirmed. . Compare § 127.01(2), Fla.Stat.

...derives solely from statute; Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311 , 31 So.2d 483 (1947); and while the applicable statute is silent as to where such property may lie, we cannot find that the present action is therefore precluded. Section 127.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), delegates to each county of the state “the right to appropriate property, except state or federal, for any county purpose.” No limitation is placed upon the location of such property....

...vernment to exercise the power of eminent domain derives solely from statute." Id. (citing Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 31 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1947)). The only geographical limitation placed on this power in the governing statute, section 127.01(1), Florida Statutes (1987)—which remains unchanged in the current version of the statute—was the following: "no county has the right to condemn any lands outside its own county boundaries for parks, playgrounds, recreational centers, or other recreational purposes." Prosser, 545 So. 2d at 935 (quoting § 127.01(2))....

...question. -6- (g)-(i), (o), (t), (w), (bb), Fla. Stat.; § 125.15, Fla. Stat.; § 125.56, Fla. Stat. (2014); § 125.86(2), Fla. Stat. (2014), the power to take private property and appropriate it for a county purpose, § 127.01, Fla. Stat....

...1 *951 The nonfinal order is REVERSED and the case REMANDED with directions to the trial court to issue an order granting Alachua County title to the property in fee simple. JOANOS and MINER, JJ., concur. . See Hillsborough County v. Lutz Realty & Inv. Co., 553 So.2d 1320, 1324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) *951 (construing Section 127.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), re: eminent domain for recreational uses).

...Palm Beach County undertook to condemn certain land for beach and recreational purposes. The trial court adjudicated a lack of necessity and denied the County’s request for an order of taking. The County appeals. We affirm. The Legislature in its wisdom per Section 127.01(2), F.S.1971, F.S.A., decided that the necessity of taking in such cases would be an issue to be determined as an issue of fact and law by the trial court....

...We affirm the order of taking because this case involves a taking of property for recreational purposes. In such a case, it is the county’s burden to prove reasonable necessity “without regard to or presumption in favor of any prior determination by the county commissioners or the exercise of discretion by them.” § 127.01(2), Fla.Stat....

...must approve the condemnor’s decision, unless the landowner presents additional evidence establishing an abuse of discretion, bad faith, or illegality. By contrast, a condemnation for recreational purposes involves a different standard of review. Section 127.01(2) specifies that the landowner in such a proceeding shall have the right to present an issue before the court as to the necessity for the proposed taking, and the amount of land required for the purpose sought, and thereupon it shall...

...be whether the making of the lease would amount to an abuse of discretion. As you have pointed out, one of the primary problems here is that the county commissioners, to condemn the land, had to determine that there was a "public necessity" for it. Section 127.01 (2), F.S....