Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 127.01 (2025)

Counties delegated power of eminent domain; recreational purposes, issue of necessity of taking; compliance with limitations.

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127.01 Counties delegated power of eminent domain; recreational purposes, issue of necessity of taking; compliance with limitations.—

(1)(a) Each county of the state is delegated authority to exercise the right and power of eminent domain; that is, the right to appropriate property, except state or federal, for any county purpose. The absolute fee simple title to all property so taken and acquired shall vest in such county unless the county seeks to condemn a particular right or estate in such property.

(b) Each county is further authorized to exercise the eminent domain power granted to the Department of Transportation by s. 337.27(1), the transportation corridor protection provisions of s. 337.273, and the right of entry onto property pursuant to s. 337.274.

(2) However, no county has the right to condemn any lands outside its own county boundaries for parks, playgrounds, recreational centers, or other recreational purposes. In eminent domain proceedings, a county’s burden of showing reasonable necessity for parks, playgrounds, recreational centers, or other types of recreational purposes shall be the same as the burden in other types of eminent domain proceedings.

(3) A county shall strictly comply with the limitations set forth in ss. 73.013 and 73.014.

History.—s. 1, ch. 7338, 1917; RGS 1503; CGL 2281; s. 1, ch. 22802, 1945; s. 18, ch. 63-559; s. 5, ch. 73-299; s. 1, ch. 84-319; s. 17, ch. 85-80; s. 4, ch. 88-168; s. 1, ch. 91-141; s. 62, ch. 99-385; s. 4, ch. 2006-11.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 17 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1955–2024 · leading case: Dade Cnty. v. Paxson, 270 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).

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Dade Cnty. v. Paxson, 270 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). · cites it 10× “Pursuant to § 127.01, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., the county filed its petition in eminent domain proceedings and declaration of taking for three parcels of land within the proposed Black Point Park area.”

City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992). · cites it 4× “See § 127.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, the legislature expressly granted to the DOT and counties the power to take more property than necessary for a particular project.”

Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Broward Cty., 421 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). · cites it 3× “Section 127.01 delegates to the county the power of eminent domain, 125.”

Dade Cnty. v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). · cites it 3× “[2] By § 127.01(2) Fla. Stat., F.S.A., when the necessity to take, for park purposes, was raised by the defendants, that issue was to be determined by the court (at a pre-trial hearing according to § 73.”

Jorg Busse v. Lee Cnty. Florida, 317 F. App'x 968 (11th Cir. 2009). “Busse therefore cannot rely on his disparate eminent domain treatment vis-a-vis state landowners as the basis for an equal protection claim. Since Busse made no other allegations of disparity in his third amended complaint, we find that he has failed to plead a valid equal…”

Deseret Ranches of Florida, Inc. v. Bowman, 349 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1977). · cites it 2× “Counties and municipalities enjoy such a grant (§ 127.01, Fla. Stat. (1975)) as do quasi-public corporations such as railroad, electric power, gas, and telephone and telegraph companies.”

Yoder v. Sarasota Cnty., 81 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1955). · cites it 2× “Laws of Florida 1951, and Chapter 22802, Laws of Florida 1945, F.S.A. § 127.01. The cause proceeded to trial and resulted in a jury award of ,000 to the Greggs for the property taken plus a fee for their attorneys.”

Prosser v. Polk Cnty., 545 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). · cites it 2× “Section 127.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), delegates to each county of the state “the right to appropriate property, except state or federal, for any county purpose.”

Hillsborough Cnty. v. Lutz Realty & Inv. Co., 553 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). · cites it 3× “” § 127.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1987). In this case, the trial court determined that Hillsbor-ough County had proven reasonable necessity for only one-half acre.”

City of Miami v. Cox, 313 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). · cites it 2× “…rules of law, and having found no error requiring reversal, the judgment on appeal is, therefore, affirmed. . Compare § 127.01(2), Fla.Stat.”

Alachua Cnty. v. Wagner, 581 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). · cites it 2× “2d DCA 1989) *951 (construing Section 127.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), re: eminent domain for recreational uses).”

Nye v. City of Ocala, 559 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). · cites it 2× “The legislature has not seen fit to amend the statutes empowering municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain (§§ 166.”

Show all 17 citing cases →

— 127.01(1) — 1 case

Gary W. Joiner, Successor to Mike Wells v. Pinellas Cnty., Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).

— 127.01(1)(b) — 2 cases

City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992). “See § 127.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, the legislature expressly granted to the DOT and counties the power to take more property than necessary for a particular project.”

Nye v. City of Ocala, 559 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). “The legislature has not seen fit to amend the statutes empowering municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain (§§ 166.”

— 127.01(2) — 7 cases

Dade Cnty. v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). “[2] By § 127.01(2) Fla. Stat., F.S.A., when the necessity to take, for park purposes, was raised by the defendants, that issue was to be determined by the court (at a pre-trial hearing according to § 73.”

Dade Cnty. v. Paxson, 270 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). “Pursuant to § 127.01, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., the county filed its petition in eminent domain proceedings and declaration of taking for three parcels of land within the proposed Black Point Park area.”

Hillsborough Cnty. v. Lutz Realty & Inv. Co., 553 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). “” § 127.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1987). In this case, the trial court determined that Hillsbor-ough County had proven reasonable necessity for only one-half acre.”

City of Miami v. Cox, 313 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). “…rules of law, and having found no error requiring reversal, the judgment on appeal is, therefore, affirmed. . Compare § 127.01(2), Fla.Stat.”

Alachua Cnty. v. Wagner, 581 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “2d DCA 1989) *951 (construing Section 127.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), re: eminent domain for recreational uses).”

— 127.01(l)(a) — 1 case

Prosser v. Polk Cnty., 545 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). “Section 127.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), delegates to each county of the state “the right to appropriate property, except state or federal, for any county purpose.”

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