The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXXI
LABOR

Chapter 440
WORKERS' COMPENSATION

View Entire Chapter

F.S. 440.20

440.20 Time for payment of compensation and medical bills; penalties for late payment.—

(1)(a) Unless the carrier denies compensability or entitlement to benefits, the carrier shall pay compensation directly to the employee as required by ss. 440.14, 440.15, and 440.16, in accordance with those sections. Upon receipt of the employee’s authorization as provided for in s. 440.12(1)(a), the carrier’s obligation to pay compensation directly to the employee is satisfied when the carrier directly deposits, by electronic transfer or other means, compensation into the employee’s account at a financial institution as defined in s. 655.005 or onto a prepaid card in accordance with s. 440.12(1) or transmits the employee’s compensation to the employee’s account with a money transmitter licensed under part II of chapter 560. Compensation by direct deposit, through the use of a prepaid card, or through transmission is considered paid on the date the funds become available for withdrawal by the employee.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, all insurance carriers, group self-insurance funds, assessable mutual insurers, and the Joint Underwriting Association authorized to write workers’ compensation insurance in this state shall make available a notice in writing to the employer the fact that a state-authorized deductible plan is available. Under this plan, an employer may pay, for each injury for which an employee files a claim under this chapter as a deductible, up to the first $2,500 of the total amount payable under compensable claims related to such injury. An employer shall not be reimbursed for any amount paid under this paragraph; however, the reporting requirements of the employer, relating to injuries required under any provision under this chapter, are not altered or alleviated. The rate base of any workers’ compensation insurance offered pursuant to this chapter shall include the deductible provision authorized by this paragraph. Any amounts paid by an employer pursuant to this paragraph shall not apply in any way to such employer’s experience rating for injury.

(2)(a) The carrier must pay the first installment of compensation for total disability or death benefits or deny compensability no later than the 14th calendar day after the employer receives notification of the injury or death, when disability is immediate and continuous for 8 calendar days or more after the injury. If the first 7 days after disability are nonconsecutive or delayed, the first installment of compensation is due on the 6th day after the first 8 calendar days of disability. The carrier shall thereafter pay compensation in biweekly installments or as otherwise provided in s. 440.15, unless the judge of compensation claims determines or the parties agree that an alternate installment schedule is in the best interests of the employee.

(b) The carrier must pay, disallow, or deny all medical, dental, pharmacy, and hospital bills submitted to the carrier in accordance with department rule no later than 45 calendar days after the carrier’s receipt of the bill.

(3) Upon making initial payment of indemnity benefits, or upon suspension or cessation of payment for any reason, the carrier shall immediately notify the injured employee, the employer, and the department that it has commenced, suspended, or ceased payment of compensation. The department may require such notification to the injured employee, employer, and the department in a format and manner it deems necessary to obtain accurate and timely notification.

(4) If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide all benefits or compensation, the carrier shall immediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee’s entitlement to benefits under this chapter and shall admit or deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of compensation or benefits as required under subsection (2) or s. 440.192(8). Additionally, the carrier shall initiate payment and continue the provision of all benefits and compensation as if the claim had been accepted as compensable, without prejudice and without admitting liability. Upon commencement of payment as required under subsection (2) or s. 440.192(8), the carrier shall provide written notice to the employee that it has elected to pay the claim pending further investigation, and that it will advise the employee of claim acceptance or denial within 120 days. A carrier that fails to deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits or payment of compensation as required under subsection (2) or s. 440.192(8) waives the right to deny compensability, unless the carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period. The initial provision of compensation or benefits, for purposes of this subsection, means the first installment of compensation or benefits to be paid by the carrier under subsection (2) or pursuant to a petition for benefits under s. 440.192(8).

(5) If the employer has advanced compensation payments or benefits to the employee, the carrier shall reimburse the employer for the advanced payments if the employee is entitled to compensation and benefits pursuant to this chapter. The carrier may deduct such reimbursements from the employee’s compensation installments or, if applicable, from payments to the employee ordered by a judge of compensation claims.

(6)(a) If any installment of compensation for death or dependency benefits, or compensation for disability benefits payable without an award is not paid within 7 days after it becomes due, as provided in subsection (2), subsection (3), or subsection (4), there shall be added to such unpaid installment a penalty of an amount equal to 20 percent of the unpaid installment, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, such installment of compensation. This penalty shall not apply for late payments resulting from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control. When any installment of compensation payable without an award has not been paid within 7 days after it became due and the claimant concludes the prosecution of the claim before a judge of compensation claims without having specifically claimed additional compensation in the nature of a penalty under this section, the claimant will be deemed to have acknowledged that, owing to conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control, such installment could not be paid within the period prescribed for payment and to have waived the right to claim such penalty. However, during the course of a hearing, the judge of compensation claims shall on her or his own motion raise the question of whether such penalty should be awarded or excused. The department may assess without a hearing the penalty against either the employer or the carrier, depending upon who was at fault in causing the delay. The insurance policy cannot provide that this sum will be paid by the carrier if the department or the judge of compensation claims determines that the penalty should be paid by the employer rather than the carrier. Any additional installment of compensation paid by the carrier pursuant to this section shall be paid directly to the employee by check or, if authorized by the employee, by direct deposit into the employee’s account at a financial institution or by transmission to the employee’s account with a money transmitter licensed under part II of chapter 560.

(b) For medical services provided on or after January 1, 2004, the department shall require that all medical, hospital, pharmacy, or dental bills properly submitted by the provider, except for bills that are disallowed or denied by the carrier or its authorized vendor in accordance with department rule, are timely paid within 45 calendar days after the carrier’s receipt of the bill. The department shall impose penalties for late payments or disallowances or denials of medical, hospital, pharmacy, or dental bills that are below a minimum 95 percent timely performance standard. The carrier shall pay to the Workers’ Compensation Administration Trust Fund a penalty of:

1. Twenty-five dollars for each bill below the 95 percent timely performance standard, but meeting a 90 percent timely standard.

2. Fifty dollars for each bill below a 90 percent timely performance standard.

(7) If any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 7 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 20 percent thereof, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, such compensation, unless review of the compensation order making such award is had as provided in s. 440.25.

(8)(a) In addition to any other penalties provided by this chapter for late payment, if any installment of compensation is not paid when it becomes due, the employer, carrier, or servicing agent shall pay interest thereon at the rate of 12 percent per year from the date the installment becomes due until it is paid, whether such installment is payable without an order or under the terms of an order. The interest payment shall be the greater of the amount of interest due or $5.

(b) In order to ensure carrier compliance under this chapter, the department shall monitor, audit, and investigate the performance of carriers. The department shall require that all compensation benefits be timely paid in accordance with this section. The department shall impose penalties for late payments of compensation that are below a minimum 95-percent timely payment performance standard. The carrier shall pay to the Workers’ Compensation Administration Trust Fund a penalty of:

1. Fifty dollars per number of installments of compensation below the 95-percent timely payment performance standard and equal to or greater than a 90-percent timely payment performance standard.

2. One hundred dollars per number of installments of compensation below a 90-percent timely payment performance standard.

This section does not affect the imposition of any penalties or interest due to the claimant. If a carrier contracts with a servicing agent to fulfill its administrative responsibilities under this chapter, the payment practices of the servicing agent are deemed the payment practices of the carrier for the purpose of assessing penalties against the carrier.

(9) The department may upon its own initiative at any time in a case in which payments are being made without an award investigate same and shall, in any case in which the right to compensation is controverted, or in which payments of compensation have been stopped or suspended, upon receipt of notice from any person entitled to compensation or from the employer that the right to compensation is controverted or that payments of compensation have been stopped or suspended, make such investigations, cause such medical examination to be made, or hold such hearings, and take such further action as it considers will properly protect the rights of all parties.

(10) Whenever the department deems it advisable, it may require any employer to make a deposit with the Chief Financial Officer to secure the prompt and convenient payments of such compensation; and payments therefrom upon any awards shall be made upon order of the department or judge of compensation claims.

(11)(a) When a claimant is not represented by counsel, upon joint petition of all interested parties, a lump-sum payment in exchange for the employer’s or carrier’s release from liability for future medical expenses, as well as future payments of compensation expenses and any other benefits provided under this chapter, shall be allowed at any time in any case in which the employer or carrier has filed a written notice of denial within 120 days after the employer receives notice of the injury, and the judge of compensation claims at a hearing to consider the settlement proposal finds a justiciable controversy as to legal or medical compensability of the claimed injury or the alleged accident. The employer or carrier may not pay any attorney’s fees on behalf of the claimant for any settlement under this section unless expressly authorized elsewhere in this chapter. Upon the joint petition of all interested parties and after giving due consideration to the interests of all interested parties, the judge of compensation claims may enter a compensation order approving and authorizing the discharge of the liability of the employer for compensation and remedial treatment, care, and attendance, as well as rehabilitation expenses, by the payment of a lump sum. Such a compensation order so entered upon joint petition of all interested parties is not subject to modification or review under s. 440.28. If the settlement proposal together with supporting evidence is not approved by the judge of compensation claims, it shall be considered void. Upon approval of a lump-sum settlement under this subsection, the judge of compensation claims shall send a report to the Chief Judge of the amount of the settlement and a statement of the nature of the controversy. The Chief Judge shall keep a record of all such reports filed by each judge of compensation claims and shall submit to the Legislature a summary of all such reports filed under this subsection annually by September 15.

(b) When a claimant is not represented by counsel, upon joint petition of all interested parties, a lump-sum payment in exchange for the employer’s or carrier’s release from liability for future medical expenses, as well as future payments of compensation and rehabilitation expenses, and any other benefits provided under this chapter, may be allowed at any time in any case after the injured employee has attained maximum medical improvement. An employer or carrier may not pay any attorney’s fees on behalf of the claimant for any settlement, unless expressly authorized elsewhere in this chapter. A compensation order so entered upon joint petition of all interested parties shall not be subject to modification or review under s. 440.28. However, a judge of compensation claims is not required to approve any award for lump-sum payment when it is determined by the judge of compensation claims that the payment being made is in excess of the value of benefits the claimant would be entitled to under this chapter. The judge of compensation claims shall make or cause to be made such investigations as she or he considers necessary, in each case in which the parties have stipulated that a proposed final settlement of liability of the employer for compensation shall not be subject to modification or review under s. 440.28, to determine whether such final disposition will definitely aid the rehabilitation of the injured worker or otherwise is clearly for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation and, in her or his discretion, may have an investigation made. The joint petition and the report of any investigation so made will be deemed a part of the proceeding. An employer shall have the right to appear at any hearing pursuant to this subsection which relates to the discharge of such employer’s liability and to present testimony at such hearing. The carrier shall provide reasonable notice to the employer of the time and date of any such hearing and inform the employer of her or his rights to appear and testify. The probability of the death of the injured employee or other person entitled to compensation before the expiration of the period during which such person is entitled to compensation shall, in the absence of special circumstances making such course improper, be determined in accordance with the most recent United States Life Tables published by the National Office of Vital Statistics of the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The probability of the happening of any other contingency affecting the amount or duration of the compensation, except the possibility of the remarriage of a surviving spouse, shall be disregarded. As a condition of approving a lump-sum payment to a surviving spouse, the judge of compensation claims, in the judge of compensation claims’ discretion, may require security which will ensure that, in the event of the remarriage of such surviving spouse, any unaccrued future payments so paid may be recovered or recouped by the employer or carrier. Such applications shall be considered and determined in accordance with s. 440.25.

(c) Notwithstanding s. 440.21(2), when a claimant is represented by counsel, the claimant may waive all rights to any and all benefits under this chapter by entering into a settlement agreement releasing the employer and the carrier from liability for workers’ compensation benefits in exchange for a lump-sum payment to the claimant. The settlement agreement requires approval by the judge of compensation claims only as to the attorney’s fees paid to the claimant’s attorney by the claimant. The parties need not submit any information or documentation in support of the settlement, except as needed to justify the amount of the attorney’s fees. Neither the employer nor the carrier is responsible for any attorney’s fees relating to the settlement and release of claims under this section. Payment of the lump-sum settlement amount must be made within 14 days after the date the judge of compensation claims mails the order approving the attorney’s fees. Any order entered by a judge of compensation claims approving the attorney’s fees as set out in the settlement under this subsection is not considered to be an award and is not subject to modification or review. The judge of compensation claims shall report these settlements to the Deputy Chief Judge in accordance with the requirements set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b). Settlements entered into under this subsection are valid and apply to all dates of accident.

(d)1. With respect to any lump-sum settlement under this subsection, a judge of compensation claims must consider at the time of the settlement, whether the settlement allocation provides for the appropriate recovery of child support arrearages. An employer or carrier does not have a duty to investigate or collect information regarding child support arrearages.

2. When reviewing any settlement of lump-sum payment pursuant to this subsection, judges of compensation claims shall consider the interests of the worker and the worker’s family when approving the settlement, which must consider and provide for appropriate recovery of past due support.

3. With respect to any lump-sum settlement under this subsection, any correspondence to a clerk of the circuit court of this state regarding child support documentation shall be exempt from any fees or costs ordinarily assessed by the clerk’s office.

(e) This section applies to all claims that the parties have not previously settled, regardless of the date of accident.

(12)(a) Liability of an employer for future payments of compensation may not be discharged by advance payment unless prior approval of a judge of compensation claims has been obtained as hereinafter provided. The approval shall not constitute an adjudication of the claimant’s percentage of disability.

(b) When the claimant has reached maximum recovery and returned to her or his former or equivalent employment with no substantial reduction in wages, such approval of a reasonable advance payment of a part of the compensation payable to the claimant may be given informally by letter by a judge of compensation claims.

(c) In the event the claimant has not returned to the same or equivalent employment with no substantial reduction in wages or has suffered a substantial loss of earning capacity or a physical impairment, actual or apparent:

1. An advance payment of compensation not in excess of $2,000 may be approved informally by letter, without hearing, by any judge of compensation claims or the Chief Judge.

2. An advance payment of compensation not in excess of $2,000 may be ordered by any judge of compensation claims after giving the interested parties an opportunity for a hearing thereon pursuant to not less than 10 days’ notice by mail, unless such notice is waived, and after giving due consideration to the interests of the person entitled thereto. When the parties have stipulated to an advance payment of compensation not in excess of $2,000, such advance may be approved by an order of a judge of compensation claims, with or without hearing, or informally by letter by any such judge of compensation claims, if such advance is found to be for the best interests of the person entitled thereto.

3. When the parties have stipulated to an advance payment in excess of $2,000, such payment may be approved by a judge of compensation claims by order if the judge finds that such advance payment is for the best interests of the person entitled thereto and is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. The judge of compensation claims shall make or cause to be made such investigations as she or he considers necessary concerning the stipulation and, in her or his discretion, may have an investigation of the matter made. The stipulation and the report of any investigation shall be deemed a part of the record of the proceedings.

(d) When an application for an advance payment in excess of $2,000 is opposed by the employer or carrier, it shall be heard by a judge of compensation claims after giving the interested parties not less than 10 days’ notice of such hearing by mail, unless such notice is waived. In her or his discretion, the judge of compensation claims may have an investigation of the matter made, in which event the report and recommendation will be deemed a part of the record of the proceedings. If the judge of compensation claims finds that such advance payment is for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation, will not materially prejudice the rights of the employer and carrier, and is reasonable under the circumstances of the case, she or he may order the same paid. However, in no event may any such advance payment under this paragraph be granted in excess of $7,500 or 26 weeks of benefits in any 48-month period, whichever is greater, from the date of the last advance payment.

(13) If the employer has made advance payments of compensation, she or he shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due.

(14) When an employee is injured and the employer pays the employee’s full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability, or pays medical expenses for such employee, and the case is contested by the carrier or the carrier and employer and thereafter the carrier, either voluntarily or pursuant to an award, makes a payment of compensation or medical benefits, the employer shall be entitled to reimbursement to the extent of the compensation paid or awarded, plus medical benefits, if any, out of the first proceeds paid by the carrier in compliance with such voluntary payment or award, provided the employer furnishes satisfactory proof to the judge of compensation claims of such payment of compensation and medical benefits. Any payment by the employer over and above compensation paid or awarded and medical benefits, pursuant to subsection (13), shall be considered a gratuity.

(15)(a) The office shall examine on an ongoing basis claims files in accordance with s. 624.3161 and may impose fines pursuant to s. 624.310(5) and this chapter in order to identify questionable claims-handling techniques, questionable patterns or practices of claims, or a pattern of repeated unreasonably controverted claims by carriers, as defined in s. 440.02, providing services to employees pursuant to this chapter. If the office finds such questionable techniques, patterns, or repeated unreasonably controverted claims as constitute a general business practice of a carrier, as defined in s. 440.02, the office shall take appropriate action so as to bring such general business practices to a halt pursuant to s. 440.38(3) or may impose penalties pursuant to s. 624.4211. The department and office may initiate investigations of questionable techniques, patterns, practices, or repeated unreasonably controverted claims. The Financial Services Commission may by rule establish forms and procedures for corrective action plans and for auditing carriers.

(b) As to any examination, investigation, or hearing being conducted under this chapter, the department and office:

1. May administer oaths, examine and cross-examine witnesses, receive oral and documentary evidence; and

2. Shall have the power to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony, and require by subpoena the production of books, papers, records, files, correspondence, documents, or other evidence which is relevant to the inquiry.

(c) If any person refuses to comply with any such subpoena or to testify as to any matter concerning which she or he may be lawfully interrogated, the Circuit Court of Leon County or of the county wherein such examination, investigation, or hearing is being conducted, or of the county wherein such person resides, may, on the application of the department or the office, issue an order requiring such person to comply with the subpoena and to testify.

(d) Subpoenas shall be served, and proof of such service made, in the same manner as if issued by a circuit court. Witness fees, costs, and reasonable travel expenses, if claimed, shall be allowed the same as for testimony in a circuit court.

(e) The department shall publish annually a report which indicates the promptness of first payment of compensation records of each carrier or self-insurer so as to focus attention on those carriers or self-insurers with poor payment records for the preceding year. The department and the office shall take appropriate steps so as to cause such poor carrier payment practices to halt pursuant to s. 440.38(3). In addition, the department shall take appropriate action so as to halt such poor payment practices of self-insurers. “Poor payment practice” means a practice of late payment sufficient to constitute a general business practice.

(f) The Financial Services Commission, in consultation with the department, shall adopt rules providing guidelines to carriers, as defined in s. 440.02, self-insurers, and employers to indicate behavior that may be construed as questionable claims-handling techniques, questionable patterns of claims, repeated unreasonably controverted claims, or poor payment practices.

(16) No penalty assessed under this section may be recouped by any carrier or self-insurer in the rate base, the premium, or any rate filing. The office shall enforce this subsection.

(17) The Financial Services Commission may by rule establish audit procedures and set standards for the Automated Carrier Performance System.

History.—s. 20, ch. 17481, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(20); s. 9, ch. 18413, 1937; s. 6, ch. 20672, 1941; s. 2, ch. 23921, 1947; s. 2, ch. 26877, 1951; s. 5, ch. 29778, 1955; s. 1, ch. 59-422; ss. 1, 2, ch. 65-203; s. 2, ch. 67-554; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 13, ch. 74-197; s. 11, ch. 75-209; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 5, ch. 77-290; ss. 7, 23, ch. 78-300; ss. 16, 124, ch. 79-40; ss. 12, 21, ch. 79-312; s. 179, ch. 79-400; s. 8, ch. 80-236; s. 277, ch. 81-259; s. 31, ch. 83-215; s. 8, ch. 83-305; s. 7, ch. 84-267; s. 9, ch. 86-171; s. 6, ch. 87-330; ss. 6, 7, ch. 88-203; ss. 16, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 24, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 22, 52, ch. 91-1; s. 30, ch. 91-46; s. 26, ch. 93-415; s. 116, ch. 97-103; s. 6, ch. 98-125; s. 17, ch. 2001-91; s. 48, ch. 2001-158; s. 33, ch. 2002-194; s. 53, ch. 2003-1; s. 481, ch. 2003-261; s. 24, ch. 2003-412; s. 2, ch. 2011-174; s. 35, ch. 2011-194; s. 9, ch. 2013-141; s. 3, ch. 2020-63.

F.S. 440.20 on Google Scholar

F.S. 440.20 on Casetext

Amendments to 440.20

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 440.20

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 440.20.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

DE LA ROSA, v. CHENEY BROTHERS, INC., 267 So. 3d 453 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . burden of proving a break in the causal chain and by failing to find waiver by the E/C under section 440.20 . . .

COSEY, v. LILLEY,, 368 F. Supp. 3d 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Mar. 5, 2018) (holding that the state-court decision denying the petitioner's CPL § 440.20 motion did . . .

WALKER, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 367 F. Supp. 3d 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . in Kings County, denying Plaintiff's 440.20 Motion. . . . A (the "440.20 Opinion") ). . . . of his 440.20 Motion - both because it establishes that Plaintiff submitted the motion on March 29, . . . However, that same Opinion makes clear that Plaintiff's 440.20 Motion was pro se. (Pl. Opp., Ex. . . . Penal Law § 440.20 (the "440.20 Opinion") ) ). . . .

RENTE, v. ORANGE COUNTY BOCC, 263 So. 3d 294 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Compensation Claims (JCC) erred by failing to complete the analysis required by case law and section 440.20 . . . renew its investigation after receipt of the additional information in this case. 120-Day Rule Section 440.20 . . . to benefits under this chapter" and whether they denied compensability within 120 days thereafter. § 440.20 . . .

ST. LUCIE FCRD PGCS, v. FMIT,, 259 So. 3d 992 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . benefits under the pay-and-investigate provision of the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, section 440.20 . . .

MARRAFFINO, v. STERICYCLE SEDGWICK CMS,, 260 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 440.20(10), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

HOWARD, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE,, 257 So. 3d 568 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Second, whether the JCC erred in preventing the Claimant from asserting that section 440.20(4), Florida . . . amendment of the pretrial stipulation to include consideration of the waiver argument under section 440.20 . . .

EMPLOYBRIDGE v. RODRIGUEZ,, 255 So. 3d 453 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . discretion of a judge of compensation claims to award an advance payment of compensation under section 440.20 . . . In context, the type of interest that is furthered by an advance under section 440.20(12)(c)(2) must . . . nexus" standard similar to the one this court has developed in cases involving advances under section 440.20 . . .

ANDERSON, v. BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE, 251 So. 3d 318 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying her request for a $2,000 advance pursuant to section 440.20 . . . Section 440.20(12)(c) 2. provides: In the event the claimant has not returned to the same or equivalent . . . otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the advance statute and would contravene the language in section 440.20 . . . foregoing, we hold that a JCC may consider a claimant's financial need for an advance pursuant to section 440.20 . . .

HARBOR FREIGHT TOOLS, INC. v. WHITEHEAD,, 244 So. 3d 410 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; see also Sierra v. . . .

PARADISE, v. NEPTUNE FISH MARKET RETAILFIRST INSURANCE COMPANY,, 238 So. 3d 901 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Employer/Carrier (E/C) waived the right to contest compensability of his injuries under subsection 440.20 . . . Subsection 440.20(4) provides, in pertinent part: If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide . . . have three options: pay, deny, or pay and investigate within 120 days in accordance with subsection 440.20 . . . The E/C elected to pay and investigate under the 120-day rule of subsection 440.20(4). . . . so, she first found that the E/C had not waived their right to deny compensability under subsection 440.20 . . .

TECO ENERGY, INC. v. K. WILLIAMS,, 234 So. 3d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . major contributing cause (“MCC”); and 2) applying, sua sponte, the “120-Day Rule” pursuant to section 440.20 . . . Claimant’s memorandum did not raise the “120-Day Rule” under section 440.20(4) or attach case law concerning . . . a “preexisting condition” in accordance with case law; and 2) pursuant to “120-Day Rule” of section 440.20 . . . “The 120-Day Rule” Section 440.20(4), commonly referred to as the “120-Day Rule,” allows a carrier the . . . (4); specifically, by “mis-characterizing section 440.20(4) as ‘mandatory’ and ‘not in the nature of . . .

ALAMEDA HEALTH SYSTEM, v. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, v. D. U. S., 287 F. Supp. 3d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2017)

. . . . § 440.20, which set forth definitions of "Outpatient Hospital Services" and "Rural Health Clinic Services . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 440.20(a). . . . . § 440.20(a). . . . They argue that CMS' "New Rule" effectively amends § 440.20(a) by excluding hospital-based FQHC costs . . . The "New Rule" is inconsistent with § 440.20(a), as the services provided by the hospital-based FQHCs . . .

MATHIS, v. BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 224 So. 3d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . denied compensability and after the E/C began providing benefits under the 120-day rule of section 440.20 . . . The “pay-and-investigate” rule of Subsection 440.20(4), Florida Statutes (2014), provides as follows . . . Under subsection 440.20(4), the E/C were required to pay all benefits due “as if the claim had been accepted . . . Dickson, 67 So.3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding section 440.20(4) does not preclude E/C from . . . It should be noted that prior to October- 1, 2003, subsection 440.20(4) permitted an E/C the option of . . .

DELGADO, v. CITY CONCRETE SYSTEMS, INC. FCCI, 220 So. 3d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . owed his attorney for obtaining a washout settlement of his workers’ compensation case under section 440.20 . . .

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE v. RATLIFF,, 217 So. 3d 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. . . .

D. BOYLE, v. JA CUMMINGS, INC. FARA,, 212 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . challenges the exclusion of evidence and the rejection of his argument based on the “120-day rule,” section 440.20 . . .

CITY OF DANIA BEACH PGCS, v. ZIPOLI,, 204 So.3d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See §§ 440.20(6) (penalties) & 440.20(8) (interest), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

HIDDEN, v. DAY ZIMMERMAN Co., 202 So. 3d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . admissible under section 440.13(5)(e), or the employee could petition for an advance under section 440.20 . . .

CASTELLANOS, v. NEXT DOOR COMPANY,, 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016)

. . . successful claimant: (1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in s.440.20 . . .

MATHIS, v. BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 181 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order denying her request for a $2,000 advance under subparagraph 440.20 . . . To qualify for an advance under subparagraph 440.20(12)(e)2., Claimant was required to show “one of the . . .

GOBEL, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES CMS,, 177 So. 3d 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . By its title and its context, rule 60Q-6.123(5) applies only to settlements under section 440.20(11), . . . 60Q-6.124(2), which is the applicable rule for fees and costs paid by a carrier apart from section 440.20 . . . While we express no opinion concerning the validity of rule 60Q-6.123(5) for settlements under section 440.20 . . .

BABAHMETOVIC, v. SCAN DESIGN FLORIDA INC., 176 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . purported major contributing cause], it should either pay for them, pay and investigate under section 440.20 . . . investigation, and that it will advise the employee of claim acceptance or denial within 120 days. § 440.20 . . . to any benefit allowed in Chapter 440” — with one single exception: an advance payment under section 440.20 . . .

O. SIERRA, v. METROPOLITAN PROTECTIVE SERVICES, 188 So. 3d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . rejected Claimant’s waiver argument based on the 120-day “pay and investigate” rule under subsection 440.20 . . . Application of Subsection 440.20(4) To prove entitlement to the requested psychiatric treatment, Claimant . . . Subsection 440.20(4) provides that where a carrier is uncertain as to its obligation to provide' benefits . . . Stat. (2011) (“A carrier that does not deny compensability in accordance with s. 440.20(4) is deemed . . . See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

CONSTANT, v. MARTUSCELLO,, 119 F. Supp. 3d 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Law § 440.20; Notice of Motion to Set Aside Sentence, Feb. 21, 2009, EOF No. 20-12 at 2-3. . . . See Aff. in Supp. of C.P.L. § 440.20 Mot. to Set Aside Sentence, Feb. 21, 2009, EOF No. 20-12 at 4-9. . . .

WALKER, v. A. ARTUS,, 117 F. Supp. 3d 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . challenged' his sentencing only through -a post-conviction motion under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.20 . . . (“440.20 motion”): Id. at 8. . . . Petitioner’s counsel’s brief to the Second Department appealing the denial of Petitioners 440.20 motion . . .

SCHERER, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 171 So. 3d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Furthermore, sub-subsections 440.20(1 l)(a) and (c) permit a "claimant” to settle a workers' compensation . . .

CVS CAREMARK CORPORATION v. McINTOSH,, 163 So. 3d 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . right to challenge compensability of Claimant’s post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) under section 440.20 . . .

BLACK, v. ROCK,, 103 F. Supp. 3d 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Law §§ 440.10, 440.20 (“440 Motion”). Petition at ¶ 9, p. 16; Opp. at ¶ 75-76. . . .

DUNAKIN, v. W. QUIGLEY,, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (W.D. Wash. 2015)

. . . . § 440.20 instead of 42 C.F.R. § 440.240 — when they make this argument. . . . . § 440.20. . . . .

SHANNON, v. CHENEY BROTHERS INC., 157 So. 3d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC): the first denies an advance payment of compensation under section 440.20 . . . An advance payment of compensation under section 440.20(12)(c) is a discrete benefit that is different . . .

F. JACOBS, v. CLARKWESTERN BUILDING SYSTEMS, Co., 158 So. 3d 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . reverse that ruling (save penalties and interest, which are not due on medical benefits, see section 440.20 . . .

MORALES, v. ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY,, 152 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2014)

. . . The agreement was entered pursuant to section 440.20(ll)(c)-(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law . . . , and contains the following release: ELECTION AND WAIVER: Pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 440.20 . . . consideration described in the settlement agreement (i.e., a lump-sum payment authorized by section 440.20 . . . See § 440.20(1l)(c)-(d), Fla. Stat. . . .

J. SILVERNAIL, v. CITY OF TAMPA COMMERCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT,, 148 So. 3d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . brief — that the E/C is estopped from denying compensability based upon the "120-day rule” in section 440.20 . . .

BONNER, v. MIAMI DADE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 148 So. 3d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (2011), permits advances of up to $2,000 on the following proof: . . . whether an item is classified as a “luxury” is not a proper factor for consideration under section 440.20 . . . is not required to live a pauper’s life to be eligible for an advance of up to $2,000 under section 440.20 . . . Advances in excess of $2,000 are permitted under subsections 440.20(12)(c)3. and (12)(d), and those subsections . . . Allied Aerofoam, 48 So.3d 888, 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), “[sjection 440.20(12)(c)2. requires the JCC to . . .

DOMINIQUE, v. ARTUS,, 25 F. Supp. 3d 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)

. . . . § 440.20 to set aside his sentence. (Id. ¶ 26). . . .

TAYLOR, v. AIR CANADA, 136 So. 3d 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . (JCC) abused her discretion in denying her a $2,000 advance of compensation as permitted by section 440.20 . . . Claimant met the preliminary test of entitlement to an advance payment of compensation under section 440.20 . . .

E. McINTOSH, v. CVS PHARMACY CVS, LLC, 135 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . the correct standard in determining whether the Employer/Carrier (E/C) was estopped, under section 440.20 . . . wrong legal standard and, thus, erred by concluding the E/C was not estopped by operation of section 440.20 . . . Snyder, 765 So.2d 752, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding section 440.20(4) applies to any claim for compensability . . . compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period.” § 440.20 . . . JCC rejected Claimant’s argument that the “120-day pay and investigate rule” as set out in section 440.20 . . .

CHRYSLER, v. G. GUINEY,, 14 F. Supp. 3d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)

. . . August 26, 1997, when Geraci was denied leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s denial of his section 440.20 . . .

A. CABRERA, v. OUTDOOR EMPIRE INC. FCCI, 134 So. 3d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Claimant permissibly withdrew from the settlement before it was approved by the JCC as required by section 440.20 . . .

ALACHUA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD v. OFFICE OF STATE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER FOR DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKER S COMPENSATION,, 138 So. 3d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Section 440.20(8)(b), is clear, for instance, that DFS: shall monitor, audit, and investigate the performance . . .

WHITE, v. STATE, 134 So. 3d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . denied, because the Employer/Carrier made use of the “pay and investigate” rule set out in section 440.20 . . . handled by the Employer/Carrier “as if the claim had been accepted as compensa-ble,” under section 440.20 . . . Florida Statutes (2011), during the period when the case was accepted as if compensable under section 440.20 . . . liable for impairment benefits during the period when the case was accepted as compensable under section 440.20 . . .

AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, v. C. B. Z. H. Y. S. Z. W. M. C. M., 130 So. 3d 713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 440.20(2)(d) (2011) (providing that the state Medicaid agency "may place appropriate limits on a . . .

M. DIAZ- LLERENA, P. v. SPILLIS, CANDELA PARTNERS, INC., 121 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . settlement agreement — one for which the JCC had already approved the attorney’s fees as required by section 440.20 . . . under chapter 440 because (as the parties concede) the agreement was entered into pursuant to section 440.20 . . .

WALKER, v. D. GRAHAM,, 955 F. Supp. 2d 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . On June 22, 2009, Walker moved pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.20 in the New York Supreme . . .

MORALES, Jr. SM RM, III v. ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY,, 714 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . Under Florida Statute § 440.20(1 l)(c), a workers’ compensation claimant, if counseled, may waive any . . . Stat. § 440.20(1 l)(c), (d). .The Estate’s suit also included a declaratory judgment claim and a bad . . .

CHURCH S CHICKEN v. ANDERSON,, 112 So. 3d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . directing its recoupment of an advance payment of compensation made to Claimant pursuant to section 440.20 . . .

BON SECOURS HEALTH SYSTEM v. BONANNO,, 109 So. 3d 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 440.20(6), Fla. Stat. (2008); see also Jones v. City of St. . . .

CABRERA, v. OUTDOOR EMPIRE FCCI, 108 So. 3d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Section 440.20(ll)(a) now permits unrepresented claimants to settle their rights to future benefits “ . . . Likewise, section 440.20(ll)(b)’s application is also limited to unrepresented claimants, and allows . . . Section 440.20(ll)(e) was added in 2001 and applies only to represented claimants. . . . .” § 440.20(ll)(c), Fla. Stat. . . . See §§ 440.20(ll)(c) & 440.21(2), Fla. Stat. (2003).” Vallecillo, 982 So.2d at 735. . . .

ESIS ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY v. A. KUHN,, 104 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Kuhn) of a $2000 advance under section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes. . . . , the sole purpose of which was to obtain payment of a $2000 advance under the authority of section 440.20 . . . Nothing in section 440.20(12)(c)(2) suggests that requests for advances are entitlements that JCCs are . . . But the legal question of what “interest” under section 440.20(12)(c)(2) is sufficient to justify an . . . In context, the type of interest that is furthered by an advance under section 440.20(12)(c)(2) must . . .

WORTHY, v. JIMMIE CROWDER EXCAVATING, 100 So. 3d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Claims (JCC) erred in denying his request for a $2,000 advance, which was made pursuant to section 440.20 . . . , was appropriate, the JCC asked Claimant’s counsel why $2,000 was requested and noted that section 440.20 . . . Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (2011), provides in part: (c) In the event the claimant has not . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT,, 97 So. 3d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Florida Statutes (2008), when the E/C made a $2,000 advance compensation payment pursuant to section 440.20 . . . We conclude, ,to the contrary, that payment of an advance under section 440.20(12) does not equate to . . . February 8, 2011, Claimant filed an unopposed motion for a $2,000 advance as authorized by section 440.20 . . . The JCC denied Claimant’s petition, concluding that an advance paid pursuant to section 440.20(12) is . . . Section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), permits claimants to request and obtain advances of up . . .

WILLIAMS, v. TARMAC AMERICA ESIS- ACE U. S. Co., 131 So. 3d 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2004); Ch. 93-415, § 26, at 139, Laws of Fla. . . . (creating section 440.20(4)). . . .

VELASQUEZ, v. ERCOLE,, 878 F. Supp. 2d 387 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . In addition, his Petition was filed six months before Petitioner’s April 2008 CPL § 440.20 post-conviction . . .

PUPO, v. CITY OF HIALEAH CMS,, 91 So. 3d 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Sections 440.20(6) and 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, govern penalties and interest, respectively. . . . Hood, 790 So.2d 578, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (applying section 440.20(6)); E. Indus., Inc. v. . . . unless such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control.” § 440.20 . . . Notably, this subsection contains no exceptions; in contrast to section 440.20(6), it does not condition . . . words “and interest” are dicta in the Corkery opinion, given that the relevant wording of subsections 440.20 . . .

PEPE, v. WALSH,, 31 F. Supp. 3d 441 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . Accordingly, Judge McGuire concluded that he was barred from reconsidering the question pursuant to CPL § 440.20 . . .

RISCO USA CORPORATION Ct. v. ALEXANDER,, 91 So. 3d 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . entered into the Agreement and, therefore, Claimant settled his workers’ compensation claim as section 440.20 . . . Pursuant to section 440.20(1l)(c), a represented “claimant may waive all rights to any and all benefits . . . See § 440.20(ll)(c), Fla. . . .

HIT PROMOTIONAL PRODUCTS INC. c o v. KRIVDIC,, 84 So. 3d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 440.20(12)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

JOHNSON, v. NEW YORK, 851 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . JOHNSON’S SECOND SENTENCING On July 15, 2008, Johns on filed a pro se motion under CPL § 440.20, challenging . . .

COLLINS, v. ERCOLE,, 667 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2012)

. . . The first of the two § 440.20 motions also requested in the alternative that Petitioner be allowed to . . . Granted, in the first § 440.20 motion, like the Article 78 petition, Petitioner urged that DOCS erred . . . The first § 440.20 motion, therefore, unlike the Article 78 petition, sought relief from the judgment . . . To equate the Article 78 petition and the first § 440.20 motion would require us to ignore the portion . . . of Petitioner’s § 440.20 motion in which he sought vacatur of the pertinent judgment, and to read the . . .

PERRY, v. ECOLAB INC. BROADSPIRE,, 79 So. 3d 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . until thirty days after it has been mailed to the parties, unless a timely appeal is filed, section 440.20 . . .

RUCKER, v. JUST BRAKES, 75 So. 3d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . DCA 2011) (holding “JCC denied E/C due process when she sua sponte raised the application of section 440.20 . . . See § 440.20(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009)”). . . .

WEST, v. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, 69 So. 3d 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 440.20(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005); Bell v. Univ. of Fla., 652 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). . . .

REPUBLIC WASTE SERVICES, INC. EAST BAY SANITATION SERVICES CCMSI, v. RICARDO,, 68 So. 3d 934 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 440.20(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

CITRUS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES,, 67 So. 3d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Department of Financial Services (DFS) imposing a $13,250 penalty on the School Board under section 440.20 . . . The sole issue on appeal is whether, for purposes of section 440.20(8)(b), the phrase “late payments” . . . The language in section 440.20(8)(b) is clear and unambiguous. . . . The School Board argues that section 440.20(8)(b) should be construed in pari materia with section 440.20 . . . (6)(a) has no bearing on the proper interpretation of section 440.20(8)(b). . . .

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BROADSPIRE, v. DICKSON,, 67 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Compensations Claims (JCC) erred in awarding compensation based on its improper application of section 440.20 . . . However, despite neither party arguing for application of the provisions of section 440.20(4)— which . . . The JCC denied the E/C’s motion, finding that: The provisions of F.S. 440.20(4) are mandatory and not . . . Here, the JCC denied the E/C due process when she sua sponte raised the application of section 440.20 . . . Because the JCC’s sua sponte application of section 440.20(4) was in error, and because section 440.20 . . . finding the JCC violated the E/C’s right to due process by sua sponte raising the application of section 440.20 . . .

J. FACEN, v. R. CULLY,, 787 F. Supp. 2d 278 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . .”) § 440.20, arguing that because he was not informed of the term of post-release supervision at the . . .

CONCEPTION, v. D. BROWN,, 794 F. Supp. 2d 416 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . . § 440.20 motion and had served out his prison time. . . .

McCLELLAND, v. KIRKPATRICK,, 778 F. Supp. 2d 316 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . . § 440.20 motion in Erie County Court because there is no time limit within which to file such a motion . . . C.P.L. § 440.20(1)(2). Thus, I cannot say that an Eighth Amendment claim is procedurally defaulted. . . . (under C.P.L. § 440.20(3), a state court has discretion to consider a motion in the interest of justice . . . Sept. 6, 2005) (because C.P.L. § 440.10(3) and § 440.20(3) were discretionary, the court was not prepared . . .

BESTER, v. T. CONWAY,, 778 F. Supp. 2d 339 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . . § 440.20 to set aside the sentence on the ground that it is unconstitutional, his Eighth Amendment . . .

McCORMICK, v. MORRISEY,, 770 F. Supp. 2d 556 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . .”) §§ 440.10 and 440.20, arguing that the indictment was jurisdictionally defective, the indictment . . . filed a second pro se motion to vacate the conviction and sentence pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 440.10 and 440.20 . . .

W. DEARSTYNE, v. MAZZUCA,, 48 F. Supp. 3d 222 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . On November 26, 1997, Petitioner brought a motion pursuant to CPL § 440.10 and § 440.20 to vacate the . . .

INTERSTATE BRANDS CORP. BROADSPIRE, v. BLANCO,, 50 So. 3d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . requested benefits, file a notice of denial, or invoke the “pay and investigate” provisions of section 440.20 . . .

REEB, v. R. K. WOODS,, 751 F. Supp. 2d 484 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . motion to set aside his sentence as illegal pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“C.P.L.”) 440.20 . . . throughout the case.... ” The trial court denied the motion in accordance with the express terms of C.P.L. § 440.20 . . . as stating a comprehensible claim, it is unexhausted because it was raised only in Reeb’s C.P.L. § 440.20 . . . recent application for state court review, the 2001 motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to CPL § 440.20 . . .

JONES, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG,, 46 So. 3d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Penalties Section 440.20(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides in pertinent part: If any installment . . . In addressing when benefits become due, section 440.20(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: The . . . Construction of section 440.20(6)(a) in a manner that requires a claimant to prove entitlement to PTD . . . (6)(a), in bi-weekly installments pursuant to section 440.20(2)(a), commencing 14 days from the date . . . (8)(a) the same analysis we apply to penalties under section 440.20(6)(a). . . .

LOPEZ, v. ALLIED AEROFOAM SPECIALTY RISK SERVICES,, 48 So. 3d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), permits a JCC to award an advance payment of compensation . . . conditions pertinent to the inquiry of the appropriateness of such advances are those stated in section 440.20 . . . presumptive knowledge of this court’s holding in Williams, the Legislature elected not to amend section 440.20 . . . Section 440.20(12)(c)2. requires the JCC to consider the “interests of the person entitled [to the advance . . . See § 440.20(12)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

BENNEFIELD, v. KIRKPATRICK,, 741 F. Supp. 2d 447 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . .”) § 440.10 and § 440.20. . . .

BARNEY, v. T. CONWAY,, 730 F. Supp. 2d 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . . §§ 440.10/440.20 Motion at pp. 1-2; see also Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of C.P.L. §§ . . . 440.10/440.20 Motion at pp. 16-19. . . . Judge DiTullio issued a written decision and order denying the C.P.L. §§ 440.10/440.20 Motion and the . . . his conviction and the denial of his C.P.L. § 440.20 motion. . . . Carrington, attached as Exhibit A to Petitioner’s C.P.L. § 440.10/440.20 Motion. . . . .

NEW HOPE BAPTIST CHURCH v. DURAN,, 38 So. 3d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 440.20(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . for interest ... is granted” and “[i]nterest should be calculated pursuant to Florida Statute[s] § 440.20 . . .

HARDY, v. FISCHER, DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS, S. DOCS, DOCS v. DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS, S. DOCS, DOCS v. DOCS J. DOCS, J. Jr. DOCS, S. DOCS, DOCS, 701 F. Supp. 2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . On January 15, 2008, a state court granted Graham’s motion brought pursuant to section 440.20 of the . . .

BESSER, a k a v. WALSH, v. M. v. v. M. v., 601 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . In a collateral proceeding brought pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.20, Phillips raised . . . Thereafter, Phillips appealed both his conviction and the denial of his Section 440.20 motion. . . . the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the underlying conviction and the denial of the Section 440.20 . . .

SMITH, v. WEST,, 640 F. Supp. 2d 222 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . . § 440.20, which may be filed at any time. Resp’t Mem. at 29 (citing People v. . . .

K. PLATO, v. MORRISSEY,, 638 F. Supp. 2d 338 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . .”) § 440.20. . . .

JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF S OFFICE, v. SHACKLETT,, 15 So. 3d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . the Employer agreed to provide benefits subject to the “pay and investigate” provisions in section 440.20 . . .

MIESES, v. APPLEBEE S, 14 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 440.20(6), (8), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

RABAN, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CMS,, 13 So. 3d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . not late, and, despite the October 15, 2007, order, penalties and interest were prohibited by section 440.20 . . . 15, 2007, order as a basis for awarding penalties and interest, reasoning, correctly, that section 440.20 . . . days after the date the judge of compensation claims mails the order approving the attorney’s fees.” § 440.20 . . . This delay in payment exceeds the 14 days dictated by section 440.20(ll)(c), Florida Statutes. . . .

BOGGS, v. USA WATER SKI, INC., 18 So. 3d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The E/C began providing benefits under the 120-day rule outlined in section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes . . .

DEMEDRANO, v. LABOR FINDERS OF TREASURE COAST, 8 So. 3d 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 440.20(11)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004); Eshlibi v. Consol. . . .

CONGELOSI, v. MILLER,, 611 F. Supp. 2d 274 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . .”) §§ 440.10 and 440.20 for vacatur of the judgment. . . . first two claims were raised in Congelosi’s post-judgment motions pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 440.10 and 440.20 . . .

METROPOLITAN CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. TEPPER,, 2 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 2009)

. . . Orlando, 997 So.2d 1089, 1094 (Fla.2008) (“We conclude that if the Legislature had intended for section 440.20 . . .

MURRAY, v. MARINER HEALTH ACE USA,, 994 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2008)

. . . factors as follows: (1) If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in s. 440.20 . . .

SANDERS, v. CITY OF ORLANDO,, 997 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Introduction The City asserts that the 2001 amendment that added subsection (c) to section 440.20(11) . . . In 2001, the Legislature added subsection (c) to section 440.20(11), which is quoted above. . . . We conclude that if the Legislature had intended for section 440.20(1 l)(c) to constitute an explicit . . . by counsel” to the beginning of section 440.20(ll)(b). . . . This lone addition to section 440.20(ll)(b) modified this entire subsection, making representation by . . . In 2001, the Legislature amended section 440.20(11) to include the language presently found in subsection . . . Sunshine Co., 894 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that since the 2001 amendment to section 440.20 . . . So.2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that where the claimant is unrepresented by counsel, section 440.20 . . . To date, the First District is the only district court of appeal to address the effect of section 440.20 . . . Section 440.20(1 l)(c) reads: (c) Notwithstanding s. 440.21(2), when a claimant is represented by counsel . . .

McKITHEN, v. BROWN,, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Law § 440.20, which was denied on September 8, 1994. . . . Law § 440.20, which was denied on February 10, 1997. . . . On March 12, 1997, McKithen filed a pro se motion for leave to appeal the denial of his second § 440.20 . . .

VALLECILLO, v. BACHILLER IRONWORKS,, 982 So. 2d 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . compensation claims erred in enforcing the settlement agreement because it did not comply with section 440.20 . . . compensation claims concluded that he did not have jurisdiction to rescind the agreement under section 440.20 . . . Absent compliance with section 440.20(11), any agreement by the claimant to waive his right to workers . . . See §§ 440.20(11)(c) & 440.21(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

WALKER, v. S. PERLMAN,, 556 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . 26, 2005, Walker challenged his sentence collaterally by filing a pro se motion pursuant to section 440.20 . . . However, in Walker’s pro se section 440.20 motion, he raised the fact that the PRS was added by DOCS . . . motion and seeking leave to appeal from the Appellate Division, First Department when the section 440.20 . . . The denial of leave to appeal in the Appellate Division was the final blow to Walker’s section 440.20 . . . The court denied his § 440.20 motion on December 13, 2005, concluding that “as the sentence was plainly . . .

HARRISON, v. SENKOWSKI,, 247 F.R.D. 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Law § 440.20; Harrison’s Rule 60(b) Mot. at 7; Resp. Aff. at 11. . . .

SANTOS, v. E. PAYANT,, 538 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . .”) § 440.20 to set aside his sentence, claiming that he was improperly adjudicated a predicate felony . . . Procedural Background On December 28, 2004, Petitioner filed a pro se motion pursuant to C.P.L. § 440.20 . . . On March 16, 2005, Petitioner moved, pro se, for leave to appeal the denial of his C.P.L. § 440.20 motion . . . Moreover, Petitioner failed to present any constitutional claim to the state courts in his C.P.L. § 440.20 . . . In addition, Petitioner has already filed a C.P.L. § 440.20 motion to set aside his sentence based on . . .

ARIZONA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM D. v. B. McCLELLAN, U. S. A. G. U. S., 508 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2007)

. . . services are referred to in regulation at 42 CFR 440.10 (“Inpatient hospital services”) and 42 CFR 440.20 . . . time the service was provided; (4) the service was a “facility service,” under 42 C.F.R. § 440.10 or § 440.20 . . . 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203. . 42 C.F.R. § 440.10 (defining "inpatient hospital services”) and 42 C.F.R. § 440.20 . . .

JANICK, v. SUPERINTENDENT OF FRANKLIN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,, 253 F. App'x 65 (2d Cir. 2007)

. . . Law § 440.20 motion, which more clearly articulated that Janick "most likely committed the act charged . . .

TURNER, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 967 So. 2d 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 440.20(6), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that, if the E/SA fail to make payment of impairment . . . Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that the E/SA shall also pay interest from the date . . . interest on the E/SA’s late payment of impairment benefits for claimant’s back injury pursuant to section 440.20 . . . (6) and section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes (2001). . . .