Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 766.106 (2025)

Notice before filing action for medical negligence; presuit screening period; offers for admission of liability and for arbitration; informal discovery; review.

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766.106 Notice before filing action for medical negligence; presuit screening period; offers for admission of liability and for arbitration; informal discovery; review.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Claim for medical negligence” or “claim for medical malpractice” means a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.

(b) “Self-insurer” means any self-insurer authorized under s. 627.357 or any uninsured prospective defendant.

(2) PRESUIT NOTICE.—

(a) After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s. 766.203(2) and before filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence by at least one of the following verifiable means:

1. United States Postal Service certified mail, return receipt requested;

2. United States Postal Service mail with a tracking number;

3. An interstate commercial mail carrier or delivery service; or

4. Any person authorized by law to serve process.

(b)1. Proof of service made pursuant to this subsection and delivered to an address on file with the Department of Health, the Secretary of State, or the Agency for Health Care Administration creates a rebuttable presumption that service was received by the prospective defendant.

2. If service is challenged during subsequent litigation, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prospective defendant or a person legally related to the prospective defendant was provided notice pursuant to this subsection and, if so, the date of such service. If service is challenged under this subparagraph, it must be challenged in the first response to the complaint, and if:

a. The court determines that service was properly made at the prospective defendant’s address as listed on the state licensing agency website or an address on file with the Secretary of State; and

b. The prospective defendant proves by the greater weight of the evidence that neither the prospective defendant nor a person legally related to the prospective defendant at the time of service knew or should have known of the service,

the court must stay the case for a presuit investigation period pursuant to this section, and the statute of limitations and statute of repose must be tolled from the time service was properly made at the prospective defendant’s address as listed on the state licensing agency website or an address on file with the Secretary of State. The tolling shall end at the conclusion of the presuit investigation period provided for in this subsection, and the stay of litigation shall automatically end at the conclusion of the presuit investigation period.

(c) Notice to each prospective defendant must include, if available, a list of all known health care providers seen by the claimant for the injuries complained of subsequent to the alleged act of negligence, all known health care providers during the 2-year period before the alleged act of negligence who treated or evaluated the claimant, copies of all of the medical records relied upon by the expert in signing the affidavit, and the executed authorization form provided in s. 766.1065.

(d) Following the initiation of a suit alleging medical negligence with a court of competent jurisdiction, and service of the complaint upon a prospective defendant, the claimant shall provide a copy of the complaint to the Department of Health and, if the complaint involves a facility licensed under chapter 395, the Agency for Health Care Administration. The requirement of providing the complaint to the Department of Health or the Agency for Health Care Administration does not impair the claimant’s legal rights or ability to seek relief for his or her claim. The Department of Health or the Agency for Health Care Administration shall review each incident that is the subject of the complaint and determine whether it involved conduct by a licensee which is potentially subject to disciplinary action, in which case, for a licensed health care practitioner, s. 456.073 applies and, for a licensed facility, part I of chapter 395 applies.

(3) PRESUIT INVESTIGATION BY PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT.—

(a) A suit may not be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is delivered to any prospective defendant. During the 90-day period, the prospective defendant or the prospective defendant’s insurer or self-insurer shall conduct a review as provided in s. 766.203(3) to determine the liability of the prospective defendant. Each insurer or self-insurer shall have a procedure for the prompt investigation, review, and evaluation of claims during the 90-day period. This procedure must include one or more of the following:

1. Internal review by a duly qualified claims adjuster;

2. Creation of a panel comprised of an attorney knowledgeable in the prosecution or defense of medical negligence actions, a health care provider trained in the same or similar medical specialty as the prospective defendant, and a duly qualified claims adjuster;

3. A contractual agreement with a state or local professional society of health care providers, which maintains a medical review committee; or

4. Any other similar procedure which fairly and promptly evaluates the pending claim.

Each insurer or self-insurer shall investigate the claim in good faith, and both the claimant and prospective defendant shall cooperate with the insurer in good faith. If the insurer requires, a claimant must appear before a pretrial screening panel or before a medical review committee and shall submit to a physical examination, if required. Unreasonable failure of any party to comply with this section justifies dismissal of claims or defenses. There shall be no civil liability for participation in a pretrial screening procedure if done without intentional fraud.

(b) At or before the end of the 90 days, the prospective defendant or the prospective defendant’s insurer or self-insurer shall provide the claimant with a response:

1. Rejecting the claim;

2. Making a settlement offer; or

3. Making an offer to arbitrate in which liability is deemed admitted and arbitration will be held only on the issue of damages. This offer may be made contingent upon a limit of general damages.

(c) The response shall be delivered to the claimant if not represented by counsel or to the claimant’s attorney, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Failure of the prospective defendant or insurer or self-insurer to reply to the notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed a final rejection of the claim for purposes of this section.

(d) Within 30 days of receipt of a response by a prospective defendant, insurer, or self-insurer to a claimant represented by an attorney, the attorney shall advise the claimant in writing of the response, including:

1. The exact nature of the response under paragraph (b).

2. The exact terms of any settlement offer, or admission of liability and offer of arbitration on damages.

3. The legal and financial consequences of acceptance or rejection of any settlement offer, or admission of liability, including the provisions of this section.

4. An evaluation of the time and likelihood of ultimate success at trial on the merits of the claimant’s action.

5. An estimation of the costs and attorney’s fees of proceeding through trial.

(4) SERVICE OF PRESUIT NOTICE AND TOLLING.—The notice of intent to initiate litigation must be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11. However, upon mailing of the notice of intent to initiate litigation, as provided in subparagraph (2)(a)1., subparagraph (2)(a)2., or subparagraph (2)(a)3., and during the 90-day period provided in subsection (3), the statute of limitations is tolled as to all prospective defendants. If the notice of intent to initiate litigation is served by a process server as provided in subparagraph (2)(a)4., the statute of limitations is tolled upon the process server’s first attempt to serve the prospective defendant and continues during the 90-day period as to all prospective defendants. Upon stipulation by the parties, the 90-day period may be extended and the statute of limitations is tolled during any such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. As used in this section, the terms “prospective” and “potential” are interchangeable.

(5) DISCOVERY AND ADMISSIBILITY.—A statement, discussion, written document, report, or other work product generated by the presuit screening process is not discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any purpose by the opposing party. All participants, including, but not limited to, physicians, investigators, witnesses, and employees or associates of the defendant, are immune from civil liability arising from participation in the presuit screening process. This subsection does not prevent a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 or a dentist licensed under chapter 466 who submits a verified written expert medical opinion from being subject to denial of a license or disciplinary action under s. 458.331(1)(oo), s. 459.015(1)(qq), or s. 466.028(1)(ll).

(6) INFORMAL DISCOVERY.—

(a) Upon receipt by a prospective defendant of a notice of claim, the parties shall make discoverable information available without formal discovery. Failure to do so is grounds for dismissal of claims or defenses ultimately asserted.

(b) Informal discovery may be used by a party to obtain unsworn statements, the production of documents or things, and physical and mental examinations, as follows:

1. Unsworn statements.—Any party may require other parties to appear for the taking of an unsworn statement. Such statements may be used only for the purpose of presuit screening and are not discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any purpose by any party. A party desiring to take the unsworn statement of any party must give reasonable notice in writing to all parties. The notice must state the time and place for taking the statement and the name and address of the party to be examined. Unless otherwise impractical, the examination of any party must be done at the same time by all other parties. Any party may be represented by counsel at the taking of an unsworn statement. An unsworn statement may be recorded electronically, stenographically, or on videotape. The taking of unsworn statements is subject to the provisions of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and may be terminated for abuses.

2. Documents or things.—Any party may request discovery of documents or things. The documents or things must be produced, at the expense of the requesting party, within 20 days after the date of receipt of the request. A party is required to produce discoverable documents or things within that party’s possession or control. Medical records shall be produced as provided in s. 766.204.

3. Physical and mental examinations.—A prospective defendant may require an injured claimant to appear for examination by an appropriate health care provider. The prospective defendant shall give reasonable notice in writing to all parties as to the time and place for examination. Unless otherwise impractical, a claimant is required to submit to only one examination on behalf of all potential defendants. The practicality of a single examination must be determined by the nature of the claimant’s condition, as it relates to the liability of each prospective defendant. Such examination report is available to the parties and their attorneys upon payment of the reasonable cost of reproduction and may be used only for the purpose of presuit screening. Otherwise, such examination report is confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.

4. Written questions.—Any party may request answers to written questions, the number of which may not exceed 30, including subparts. A response must be made within 20 days after receipt of the questions.

5. Interviews of treating health care providers.—A prospective defendant or his or her legal representative may interview the claimant’s treating health care providers consistent with the authorization for release of protected health information. This subparagraph does not require a claimant’s treating health care provider to submit to a request for an interview. Notice of the intent to conduct an interview shall be provided to the claimant or the claimant’s legal representative, who shall be responsible for arranging a mutually convenient date, time, and location for the interview within 15 days after the request is made. For subsequent interviews, the prospective defendant or his or her representative shall notify the claimant and his or her legal representative at least 72 hours before the subsequent interview. If the claimant’s attorney fails to schedule an interview, the prospective defendant or his or her legal representative may attempt to conduct an interview without further notice to the claimant or the claimant’s legal representative.

6. Unsworn statements of treating health care providers.—A prospective defendant or his or her legal representative may also take unsworn statements of the claimant’s treating health care providers. The statements must be limited to those areas that are potentially relevant to the claim of personal injury or wrongful death. Subject to the procedural requirements of subparagraph 1., a prospective defendant may take unsworn statements from a claimant’s treating physicians. Reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard must be given to the claimant or the claimant’s legal representative before taking unsworn statements. The claimant or claimant’s legal representative has the right to attend the taking of such unsworn statements.

(c) Each request for and notice concerning informal presuit discovery pursuant to this section must be in writing, and a copy thereof must be sent to all parties. Such a request or notice must bear a certificate of service identifying the name and address of the person to whom the request or notice is served, the date of the request or notice, and the manner of service thereof.

(d) Copies of any documents produced in response to the request of any party must be served upon all other parties. The party serving the documents or his or her attorney shall identify, in a notice accompanying the documents, the name and address of the parties to whom the documents were served, the date of service, the manner of service, and the identity of the document served.

(7) SANCTIONS.—Failure to cooperate on the part of any party during the presuit investigation may be grounds to strike any claim made, or defense raised, by such party in suit.

History.—s. 14, ch. 85-175; s. 9, ch. 86-287; s. 3, ch. 88-173; s. 48, ch. 88-277; s. 245, ch. 94-218; s. 1, ch. 94-258; s. 424, ch. 96-406; s. 1800, ch. 97-102; s. 164, ch. 98-166; s. 225, ch. 2000-160; s. 166, ch. 2000-318; s. 1, ch. 2000-341; s. 49, ch. 2003-416; s. 11, ch. 2011-233; s. 3, ch. 2013-108; s. 17, ch. 2022-190.

Note.—Former s. 768.57.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 342 cases (48 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Emma Gayle Weaver, etc. v. Stephen C. Myers, M.D., 229 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2017).

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Emma Gayle Weaver, etc. v. Stephen C. Myers, M.D., 229 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2017). · cites it 36× “650 specifically addresses section 766.106, Florida Statutes, and the medical malpractice presuit notice and screening process.”

Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2000). · cites it 38× “See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988), notes.”

Hillsborough Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Coffaro, 829 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2002). · cites it 38× “Further, another section of the Staff Analysis discussing the provision which would ultimately become section 766.106 states: "The purpose of this section is to encourage prompt settlement of meritorious claims.”

Cohen v. Dauphinee, 739 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1999). · cites it 37× “In rejecting this argument, the court stated: "We understand the work product protection in section 766.106 not to apply to the corroborating opinion requirement in section 766.”

Thompson v. Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2002). · cites it 9× “quately plead the elements necessary to bring a cause of action for negligence and violation or residents’ rights, or, in the alternative, whether Plaintiff Thompson, has alleged any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters in her claim for negligence and…”

Gutman v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2010). · cites it 18× “Discussion Defendants argue that Count II fails because Plaintiff fails to meet the pre-suit notice requirements for medical negligence claims under Fla. Stat. § 766.106 (2009) and that Counts III and IV fail because the underlying wrong in a negligent supervision and negligent…”

The Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC, etc. v. Denise Townes, etc., 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018). · cites it 8× “§ 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). 1 In the decision under review, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a claim arising out of the alleged negligence by employees of the National Deaf Academy in attempting to physically restrain one of its residents, which resulted in…”

Musculoskeletal Inst. v. Parham, 745 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1999). · cites it 17× “104 or their service of a "Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation" as required by Florida Statute § 766.106, cannot be sustained. The Court rejects the applicability of Moore v.”

Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996). · cites it 8× “3d DCA 1994) (applying Williams and holding that notice required by section 766.106 must be filed within statute of limitations); Stein v.”

Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993). · cites it 8× “The notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1987), was filed on February 12, 1990.”

Welker v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Florida, Inc., 864 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). · cites it 22× “Because we conclude that (1) the third count of the amended complaint states a cause of action against appellee for negligent interference with appellant's parental rights; (2) such a claim is not one for medical malpractice, requiring compliance with the presuit screening…”

Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993). · cites it 14× “§ 766.106(2)-(4), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added).”

Show all 342 citing cases →

— 766.106(1) — 8 cases

Liles v. PIA Medfield, Inc., 681 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

Quintanilla v. Coral Gables Hosp., Inc., 941 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Corbo v. Garcia, 949 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Fotea, 937 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Musculoskeletal Inst. v. Parham, 745 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1999). “104 or their service of a "Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation" as required by Florida Statute § 766.106, cannot be sustained. The Court rejects the applicability of Moore v.”

— 766.106(1)(a) — 43 cases

The Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC, etc. v. Denise Townes, etc., 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018). “§ 766.106(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). 1 In the decision under review, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a claim arising out of the alleged negligence by employees of the National Deaf Academy in attempting to physically restrain one of its residents, which resulted in…”

JB v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola, 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994).

NME Props., Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).

Indian River Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Browne, 44 So. 3d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Bell v. Indian River Mem. Hosp., 778 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

— 766.106(10)(a) — 1 case

Cohen v. Dauphinee, 739 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1999). “In rejecting this argument, the court stated: "We understand the work product protection in section 766.106 not to apply to the corroborating opinion requirement in section 766.”

— 766.106(10)(b) — 2 cases

Tallahassee Mem. Reg. Med. v. Kinsey, 655 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Kinsey, 655 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

— 766.106(11) — 1 case

— 766.106(12) — 3 cases

St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 699 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

Tallahassee Mem. Reg. Med. v. Kinsey, 655 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Kinsey, 655 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

— 766.106(2) — 86 cases

Univ. of Miami v. Wilson, 948 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996). “3d DCA 1994) (applying Williams and holding that notice required by section 766.106 must be filed within statute of limitations); Stein v.”

Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).

Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 2011).

Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994).

— 766.106(2)(3)(a) — 1 case

Integrated Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002).

— 766.106(2)(a) — 30 cases

Emma Gayle Weaver, etc. v. Stephen C. Myers, M.D., 229 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2017). “650 specifically addresses section 766.106, Florida Statutes, and the medical malpractice presuit notice and screening process.”

Edwards v. Sunrise Ophthalmology ASC, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Raphael v. Shecter, 18 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Weaver v. Myers, 170 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

Simmons v. Jackson Mem'l Hosp., 253 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

— 766.106(2)(b) — 1 case

Fagan v. Jackson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., Jackson Hosp. (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).

— 766.106(2)(b)(2) — 1 case

In Re: Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.070 & 1.650 (Fla. 2023).

— 766.106(2)(c) — 2 cases

Eric Bystrak, Lpn, Citrus Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., Inc., & Amsurg, LLC v. Dahlia McLean (Fla. 6th DCA 2025).

— 766.106(3) — 21 cases

Fox v. McCaw Cellular Commc'ns, 745 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993). “§ 766.106(2)-(4), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added).”

Archer v. Maddux, 645 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Okaloosa Cnty. v. Custer, 697 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

— 766.106(3)(1) — 1 case

Estevez v. Montero, 662 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

— 766.106(3)(a) — 39 cases

Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993). “§ 766.106(2)-(4), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added).”

Hillsborough Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Coffaro, 829 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2002). “Further, another section of the Staff Analysis discussing the provision which would ultimately become section 766.106 states: "The purpose of this section is to encourage prompt settlement of meritorious claims.”

Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996). “3d DCA 1994) (applying Williams and holding that notice required by section 766.106 must be filed within statute of limitations); Stein v.”

Wainscott v. Rindley, 610 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

— 766.106(3)(a)(4) — 2 cases

Estevez v. Montero, 662 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

Karr v. Sellers, 668 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

— 766.106(3)(a)(d) — 1 case

Mason v. Bisogno, 633 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

— 766.106(3)(a)(l) — 1 case

Grau v. Wells, 795 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

— 766.106(3)(b) — 15 cases

Eileen Hernandez, M.D. v. Lualhati Crespo, 211 So. 3d 19 (Fla. 2016).

Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Walker v. Virginia Ins. Reciprocal, 842 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2003).

Barron v. Crenshaw, 573 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

Pergrem v. Horan, 669 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

— 766.106(3)(b)(3) — 2 cases

Barron v. Crenshaw, 573 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

Franks v. Bowers, 62 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

— 766.106(3)(c) — 7 cases

Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993). “§ 766.106(2)-(4), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added).”

Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Barron v. Crenshaw, 573 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

Boyd v. Becker, 603 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

Damus v. Parvez, 556 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

— 766.106(4) — 59 cases

Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2000). “See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988), notes.”

Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993). “The notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1987), was filed on February 12, 1990.”

Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 2011).

— 766.106(5) — 13 cases

Waddington v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Beaches, Inc., 78 So. 3d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

Grimshaw v. Schwegel, 572 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

Lane v. Calhoun-Liberty Cnty. Hosp. Ass'n Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Fla. 1994).

— 766.106(6) — 10 cases

Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

Weaver v. Myers, 170 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

Torrey v. Leesburg Reg'l Med. Ctr., 796 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

Variety Child.'s Hosp. v. Boice, 27 So. 3d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

— 766.106(6)(7) — 1 case

Brancaccio v. Mediplex Mgmt. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 711 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

— 766.106(6)(a) — 6 cases

Gordon v. Shield, 41 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Weaver v. Myers, 170 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

McPherson v. Phillips, 877 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

Robinson v. Scott, 974 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

— 766.106(6)(b) — 1 case

— 766.106(6)(b)(3) — 1 case

Salazar v. Coello, 154 So. 3d 430 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

— 766.106(6)(b)(l) — 1 case

Weaver v. Myers, 170 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

— 766.106(7) — 8 cases

Robinson v. Scott, 974 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Melanson v. Agravat, 675 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Castillo-Plaza v. Green, 655 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

— 766.106(7)(a) — 3 cases

Popps v. Foltz, 806 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Nolan v. Turner, 737 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

— 766.106(7)(b) — 2 cases

Wainscott v. Rindley, 610 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

Nolan v. Turner, 737 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

— 766.106(7)(c) — 1 case

— 766.106(b)(5) — 1 case

Weaver v. Myers, 170 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

— 766.106(l)(a) — 14 cases

Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Est. of Lawson ex rel. Lawson, 175 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

Jane Doe v. Baptist Primary Care, Inc, 177 So. 3d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

South Miami Hosp., Inc. v. Perez, 38 So. 3d 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Steve Buck v. Columbia Hosp. Corp. of South Broward, 147 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

GalenCare, Inc. v. Mosley, 59 So. 3d 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

— 766.106(l)(b) — 1 case

Plemendon v. Fernandez, 602 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

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