Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...At the time (defendant) appeared to have the ability to carry out the threat. 3. The act of (defendant) created in the mind of (victim) a well-founded fear that the violence was about to take place. 4. (Victim) was at the time 65 years of age or older. (13) CARJACKING F.S. 812.133 [New] Before you can find the defendant guilty of carjacking, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....

...n: when a sentencing error is raised under rule 3.800(a), which harmless error test applies? The courts answered the question differently. In the case under review, Brooks pled no contest to carjacking without a firearm — a first-degree felony. See § 812.133(1)-(2)(a), Fla....

...See § 775.21(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The crime of kidnapping does not by definition contain a sexual component. See § 787.01, Fla. Stat. (1999) (defining kidnapping). Neither does carjacking, the other crime of which he was convicted. See § 812.133, Fla....

...For the following reasons, we conclude that double jeopardy does not bar convictions and punishments for robbery and carjacking. FACTS Petitioner James Cruller was convicted of robbery without a firearm in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995), and carjacking without a firearm in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...rom the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines "carjacking" as the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the o...

...or robbery and carjacking, where the offenses are predicated on a single underlying criminal transaction. See State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1997). As the First District explained in Ward: Armed carjacking with a firearm is proscribed by section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).......

...rson or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Moreover, section 812.133(1) defines "carjacking" as the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle,...

...The only difference between the two offenses of robbery and carjacking is that robbery involves the taking of "money or other property which may be the subject of larceny," § 812.13, Fla. Stat.; whereas, carjacking is limited to "the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny." § 812.133, Fla....

...The Third District held that under the circumstances the defendant properly was "convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section 812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)." Id....

...of aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count I), kidnaping with a firearm in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1999), (count II), car jacking with a firearm in violation of section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count III), robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count V), and possession of a firearm during the *1173 commission of the other four felonies in violation of section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1999), (count IV)....

..."Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.133(1), Fla....

...At one point while they were in possession of the Jeep, they had been approached by a police officer behind a Miami Subs in Hollywood. The state charged Williams with carjacking and third degree murder. The carjacking was charged as a first degree felony under section 812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...offense, nor does it change the analysis courts should apply when viewing theft for other purposes, such as venue or jurisdiction. AFFIRMED. KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This court has jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1)(E). [2] Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2000) provides: (1) "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or...

...Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. THOMPSON, J. Bernard Leon Allen appeals an order changing his mandatory minimum sentence from three years to ten years. We affirm. Allen was convicted of carjacking with a firearm in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Minerva, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Brian Durden appeals his conviction and sentence for carjacking while armed with a deadly weapon. See § 812.133, Fla....

...s, he was properly convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section 812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...ransaction or episode, double jeopardy bars separate convictions and sentences unless each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. See M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996). Armed carjacking with a firearm is proscribed by section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Accordingly, double jeopardy precludes convictions for both offenses. Armed robbery with a firearm and armed carjacking with a firearm are both first-degree felonies punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. §§ 812.13(2)(a) & 812.133(2)(a), Fla....

...s, he was properly convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section 812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....

Young’s actions constitute a carjacking under section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2009). We disapprove the

...775.083, or s. 775.084. (b) If in the course of committing the carjacking the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the carjacking is a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 812.133, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). Here, the information alleged that Deleon possessed a firearm during the offense, citing section 812.133, but the jury was instructed that it could find him guilty of carjacking with a deadly weapon as a lesser-included offense....

...the evidence; the victim testified that Deleon carried a gun, and there was no evidence that he carried any other weapon during the commission of the offense. We reject the State's argument that because the information cited the applicable statute, section 812.133, Deleon was put on notice that he could be convicted of carjacking with deadly weapon....

...render an indictment so defective that it will not support a judgment of conviction when the indictment references a specific section of the criminal code which sufficiently details all the elements of the offense."). Although the information cited section 812.133, it specifically included the element of a firearm while it *395 specifically excluded the element of a deadly weapon....

...ect of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.133(1), Fla....

information cited the applicable statute, section 812.133, Deleon was put on notice that he could be

...It is evident from the record that the victim was in fear based upon the well-founded belief appellant was about to kill her. That is aggravated assault because he used a gun, a deadly weapon. § 784.021, Fla. Stat. (1993). CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED in part; REMANDED. COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.133, Fla....

2008 [982 So.2d 1160], and 2013. 15.2 CARJACKING § 812.133, Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Carjacking,

...Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence of this subsequent crime to the jury. Finally, we agree with the appellant's argument that his carjacking charge should be reduced to grand theft. Carjacking has been defined in section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1999), as follows: "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person o...

...Carjacking involves the following elements: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle from the person or custody of another; (2) with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person of the motor vehicle; and (3) during the taking, there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). If, in the course of committing the carjacking, the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, the offense is a felony of the first degree. § 812.133(2)(a)....

...We reject appellant's contention that his motion for judgment of acquittal adequately preserved the argument that the state failed to prove all the elements of the offense of carjacking, [2] and we also reject his "fundamental error" argument. A careful reading of section 812.133, Florida *1143 Statutes (1997), undermines the assertion that his actions with regard to the Pontiac could not have constituted carjacking as a matter of law....

...custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. (Emphasis added.) Section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines carjacking nearly identically, replacing the emphasized language with the words "a motor vehicle." Section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), precludes multiple convictions when one offense co...

...from the person or custody of another, [2] with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, [3] when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 812.133(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), further provides that "[a]n act shall be deemed `in the course of the taking' [under element 3] if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." (Emphasis added.) Appellant focuses on the third element of section 812.133(1), arguing that his taking of the taxicab was an afterthought to the use of force against Laroche....

...ey." Id. at 570 n. 5. This case is distinguishable from Flores because appellant's beating of Laroche intertwined with the taking of the taxicab in time and place, so that the use of force occurred "in the course of the taking" within the meaning of section 812.133(3)(b)....

...Appellant turned off the car's ignition, engaged the victim about not paying the fare, beat the victim, took his glasses, and drove the taxicab away as the victim watched. Thus, the "use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" occurred "prior to" the taking of the property in a "continuous series of acts or events." § 812.133(3)(b), Fla....

...ence involved in taking the keys may have . . . occurred `prior to' stealing the car, it took place within a logically interrelated `continuous series of acts or events,' and thus `in the course of the taking' of the vehicle itself as provided in subsection 812.133(3)(b)." Id....

...Before COPE, GODERICH, and FLETCHER, JJ. PER CURIAM. Finding no merit in the defendant's contentions on appeal, we affirm his convictions and sentences for robbery without a firearm in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995) and carjacking without a firearm in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Because of what appears to have been a defect in the keys, he was unable to do so. Shortly thereafter he was grabbed by witnesses, disarmed, and held until the police arrived. We conclude that the taking of the car keys satisfied the "taking" element of the statute. Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1997), does not require the accused's successful departure from the crime scene in the victim's car....

made no change to the carjacking statute. See § 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). Appellant’s allegation

for conviction of carjacking with a firearm, section 812.133(2)(a), and robbery with a firearm, section

...of his use of the firearm, we must vacate his conviction and sentence on the charge of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The defendant was charged with committing the crimes of carjacking with a firearm in violation of sections 812.133 and 775.087(2) of the Florida Statutes (2000), burglary of dwelling with a firearm in violation of sections 810.02 and 775.087(2) of the Florida Statutes (2000), aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of sections 784.021(1)(a) and 775...

...the porch and ordered him inside the house, and the armed carjacking occurred later when the defendant took the victim's car keys and fled with the vehicle. We agree with the State. The statutory definition of the crime of carjacking is as follows: 812.133....

...larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.133, Fla....

...to the State, demonstrates that the victim could not have been subjected to "the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear during the course of the taking of the motor vehicle." Flores v. State, 853 So.2d 566, 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(citing § 812.133(1), Fla....

...Thus, although Bright was sentenced for count seven as a Prison Releasee Reoffender and as a Habitual Felony Offender on another count, no error was shown here. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In Case No. CR97-12781, Bright was charged with seven offenses; carjacking (§ 812.133); kidnaping with intent to commit a felony (§ 787.01(1)(a)2.); burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery (§ 810.02(1), (2)(a), battery on a law enforcement officer (§ 784.07(2)(b); resisting an officer with violence (§ 843.01...

...by sudden snatching and carjacking each provide that the offense shall be classified as a higher- degree offense if “in the course of committing” the crime the offender carries a firearm or deadly weapon. See §§ 812.13(2)(a), 812.131(2)(a), 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat....

...the attempt or commission. § 812.131(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing the carjacking” if it occurs in an attempt to commit carjacking or in flight after the attempt or commission. § 812.133(3)(a), Fla....

...llant terrified an elderly woman, his fingerprints were on the car, and he had confessed to stealing the car. As the State argued at trial, although evidence of force was introduced, the State only had to prove that Appellant put the victim in fear. § 812.133, Fla....

...ors of this state, and WHEREAS, any person convicted of such felony, or a similar crime, should not have adjudication of guilt suspended, deferred, or withheld unless the offender successfully completes probation or community control; NOW THEREFORE. Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1993), provides: (1) "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or...

...n the same criminal episode. Therefore, the trial judge should not be barred from imposing consecutive sentences, as long as the PRR sentence is served first. AFFIRMED. PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 787.01, 775.087, Fla. Stat. [2] § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....

...We find no merit in this issue, and further note that if there was error in the trial court's discretionary ruling on this matter, there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury's verdict. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). [2] § 812.133(1), Fla....

...[5] In reaching this conclusion, we note a distinction between the home invasion robbery of section 812.135(1), which subsumes the offense of a burglary by requiring, as an element, an entry into a dwelling with the intent to commit a robbery, and the carjacking offense of section 812.133(1), which merely requires the taking of a motor vehicle by force and does not require entry with an intent to commit an offense therein. See McAllister, above, in which the court ruled the offense of burglary is a subsumed offense of home invasion robbery. [1] Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [2] §§ 812.133(1) and (2)(b); 775.087(1), Fla....

...MONACO, J., and PLEUS, R.J., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] A violation of double jeopardy constitutes fundamental error which may be raised for the first time on appeal. Vasquez v. State, 778 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). [2] § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). [3] § 812.133(1) and (2)(a), Fla....

force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” § 812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). The victim does not have

...The offense of carjacking is "the taking of a motor vehicle ... with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." Id. § 812.133(1)....

...propriate the motor vehicle of the victim to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled to it. See Fryer v. State, 732 So. 2d 30, 33 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ( citing Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 697 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1997); § 812.133, Fla....

...Stat. (1999) ("If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm ... then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment."), and armed carjacking. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....

are first degree felonies punishable by life. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016); § 812.13(2)(a), Fla

...ce showed that the defendant had taken the car keys at gunpoint; but, due to a defect in the keys, he was unable to start the car and drive away. The Third District held "that the taking of the car keys satisfied the `taking' element of the statute. Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1997), does not require the accused's successful departure from the crime scene in the victim's car." Id....

...In the trial, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on both carjacking charges. He asserted there was no evidence he took possession or control of either Mr. Sausville's or Ms. Hunter's car, as required by statute. The trial court denied the motion. Section 812.133, Florida Statutes, provides: "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. See § 812.133(1), Fla....

...Before RAMIREZ and SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. The only salient issue on this appeal from multiple convictions and life sentences stemming from a brutal home invasion burglary-robbery-kidnapping concerns the validity of the defendant's conviction for carjacking under section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...nce involved in taking the keys may have indeed occurred "prior to" stealing the car, it took place within a logically interrelated "continuous series of acts or events," and thus "in the course of the taking" of the vehicle itself as provided in subsection 812.133(3)(b)....

...unconstitutionally allowed the judge, rather than the jury, to find that he qualified as a PRR. We reject this last argument without further comment. See Chapa v. State, 159 So. 3d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). By way of background, Louima was charged with carjacking pursuant to section 812.133, Florida Statutes....

deadly weapon. Although the information cited section 812.133, it specifically included the element of a

REMANDED. ORFINGER and BERGER, JJ., concur. . § 812.133, Fla. Stat. (2013). . § 784.021, Fla. Stat.

id. AFFIRMED. PLEUS and TORPY, JJ., concur. . § 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . § 784.021(l)(a), Fla. Stat

jacking is a felony of the first degree,.... § 812.133, Fla.Stat. (1995). Assuming that Pond’s point

800(b)(2)(B), the motion was “deemed denied.” Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2015), provides in pertinent

1995, [665 So.2d 212], and 2008. 15.2 CARJACKING § 812.133, Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Carjacking,

(1999) and not carjacking, a violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1999). He argues that Nickloy’s

carjacking without a weapon, a violation of section 812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997); and two counts

Carjacking while armed is a first-degree felony PBL. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Carjacking while unarmed

convictions for carjacking, in violation of section 812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), and attempted

The elements of car jacking are contained in section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (2001): “Car jacking”

sentence for this offense. See § 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011).' 3 .

[122 So. 3d 2631, and 2018. 15.2 CARJACKING § 812.133, Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Carjacking

], and 2018 . 15.2 CARJACKING § 812.133, Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Carjacking

when enacting Florida’s carjacking statute, section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1995). The prefatory language

...The circuit court denied the motion, attaching a copy of the transcript of the plea colloquy and the stipulations regarding the appellant's HVFO notice and qualification. The record indicates that the appellant's conviction in case number F01-29279 was for the offense of "carjacking" under section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2001), and that he was not convicted of a separate offense of "robbery" under section 812.13....