The 2023 Florida Statutes
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2. A violation of s. 815.06; andIn Crapps, the First District determined that the State had failed to prove a violation of section 815.06( 1)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), when the defendant accessed his ex-girlfriend's Instagram account without permission and posted nude photos of her. 180 So.3d at 1126–27. The First District stated that the statute's definitions in section 815.03 referred to tangible devices and not the data located on the device. Id. at 1127. The court stated that to prove a violation the State was required to "establish that the defendant accessed one of the listed tangible devices without authorization, not that the defendant accessed a program or information stored on the device without authorization." Id. (citing Rodriguez v. State, 956 So.2d 1226, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ). In determining that the State failed to prove its case, the First District pointed out that it had before it no evidence to "explain[ ] how accessing an Instagram account works from a technological perspective, leaving unanswered whether or how Appellant's actions amounted to accessing a specific computer, computer system, or computer network." Id. In fact, the court stated that it "d[id] not foreclose the… Plaintiff claims violations of the following statutes or rules: 42 U.S.C. § 249; the Violent Crimes Control Law Enforcement Act of 1994; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause; 18 U.S.C. § 2071 ("falsifying reports"); 18 U.S.C. § 2724 ("civil action for false documents"); 28 U.S.C. § 1346; Fla. Stat. § 112.533 ("receipt and processing of complaints"); Fla. Stat. § 30.09; Fla. Stat. §§ 30.15(g), 30.01; Fla. Stat. § 817.49 ("unfair practices act - copycat crimes first medes [sic] failed to dim"); Fla. Stat. § 112.3173; Fla. Stat. § 815.06 ("offense against film for scheme"); and Fla Rules 6.080, 6.140 (ECF No. 24 at 26).Lastly, Harvey has failed to show that, among other things, the Defendants have previously been convicted of a crime under FLA. STAT. § 815.06, which is a prerequisite to the private right of action he asserts under the state statute. See Mortgage Now, Inc., 2009 WL 4262877, at *6 ("[Florida Statute] Section 815.06 is also criminal in nature but provides a civil remedy for compensatory damages against a person who has already been criminally convicted under the statute. The defendants in this case have not been convicted of any crime under § 815.06, and the statute is inapplicable to them.").Section 815.06 was enacted in 1978, long before the advent of the Internet and the proliferation of social media accounts such as Instagram. The statute has remained virtually unchanged since its original enactment, and at the time of the events giving rise to this case, the statute provided in pertinent part that “[w]hoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization [a]ccesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network ... commits an offense against computer users.” § 815.06(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). The operative terms in the statute—“computer,” “computer system,” and “computer network”—were defined as follows:Turning first to count one, section 815.06(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides that anyone who "willfully, knowingly, and without authorization ... [a]ccesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network ... commits an offense against computer users." Access is defined as "to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system, or computer network." § 815.03(1). Subsection (6) of section 815.06 clarifies that the section "does not apply to any person who accesses his or her employer's computer system ... when acting within the scope of his or her lawful employment." Therefore, to prove this offense, the State must show that: (a) the defendant willfully, knowingly, and without authorization, (b) accessed a computer system, and (c) if the employer's system, that defendant acted outside the scope of his or her lawful employment.The Committee's proposals include revisions to current standard criminal jury instructions 3.6(a), Insanity, and 12.4, Criminal Mischief, as well as five new instructions: 10.6(a), Discharging a Firearm from a Vehicle Within 1000 Feet of a Person; 12.6, Offenses Against Computer Users (sections 815.06(1) and 815.06(2)(c), Florida Statutes); 12.7, Offenses Against Computer Users (sections 815.06(1) and (2)(b), Florida Statutes); 12.8, Offenses Against Computer Users (section 815.06(3), Florida Statutes); and 21.8, Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence.Johansson alleges that Emmons violated criminal statutes and SAO policies by accessing and disseminating Johansson's personal information in violation of Florida Statutes § 815.06(1)(a), which prohibits the willful, knowing, and unauthorized access of any computer, computer system, or computer network. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 23-26; Doc. No. 1-1 at 2-3, 8.) The parties do not cite, and the Court does not find, any authority for the proposition that this statute, by itself or in combination with any other Florida statute, creates a property interest in the confidentiality of Johansson's social security number, driving history, photographs, tag number, or driver's license number.The court next considers plaintiff's contention that defendants have violated the FCCA. Only § 815.04 of the FCCA, which pertains to offenses against intellectual property, and § 815.06, which pertains to offenses against computer users, appear to have any arguable relevance in this case. There are few cases that interpret the FCCA but it appears that neither section has any applicability here. Both are criminal statutes; while § 815.06 additionally provides that a civil action may be brought, the defendant must first have been convicted of violating the statute. Section 815.04 does not appear to be create any civil remedy and thus implies no private right of action. See, generally, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a "bare criminal statute"). Thus plaintiff has not shown there is a substantial likelihood it would prevail on its claim defendants violated the FCCA.. . . Section 815.06(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), provides as follows: (2) A. person commits an offense . . . proposition that accessing a person’s specific account was insufficient to prove a violation of section 815.06 . . . foreclose the possibility that the State could present sufficiént evidence to prove a violation of section 815.06 . . . There, an employee was charged with a violation of section 815.06 for accessing his employer’s computer . . .
. . . sole issue raised by Appellant on appeal is whether these actions constitute a violation of section 815.06 . . . ■Section 815.06 was enacted in 1978, long before the advent of the Internet and the proliferation of . . . any computer, computer system, or computer network ... commits an offense against computer users.” § 815.06 . . . Thus, to prove a violation of section 815.06(l)(a) the State must establish that the defendant accessed . . . State, 956 So.2d 1226, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (reversing conviction under section 815.06 because evidence . . .
. . . . § 815.06; Ind.Code Ann. § 35-43-2-3; Iowa Code Ann. § 716.6B; La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:73.8; Mo. . . .
. . . Willoughby was arrested and charged with unlawfully accessing a computer database in violation of sections 815.06 . . . Turning first to count one, section 815.06(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides that anyone who “willfully . . . Subsection (6) of section 815.06 clarifies that the section “does not apply to any person who accesses . . . network, count one is reversed as the State failed to prove that Willough-by’s conduct violated section 815.06 . . .
. . . Firearm from a Vehicle Within 1000 Feet of a Person; 12.6, Offenses Against Computer Users (sections 815.06 . . . (1) and 815.06(2)(c), Florida Statutes); 12.7, Offenses Against Computer Users (sections 815.06(1) and . . . (2)(b), Florida Statutes); 12.8, Offenses Against Computer Users (section 815.06(3), Florida Statutes . . . The Committee also proposes new jury instructions 12.6, 12.7, and 12.8, in light of section 815.06, Florida . . . Instruction 12.7 defines “property” because section 815.06(2)(b) includes as an alternative element that . . .
. . . As to the section 815.06, Florida Statutes (2003) violation, I concur with the reversal because I believe . . . that appellant fell under the section 815.06(6) exclusion— he was an employee who “accessefd] his .. . . . wit: the computer system located at the Tropicana Products, Inc., Mir-amar Sales Center.... ” Section 815.06 . . . Additionally, subsection 815.06(6), Florida Statutes (2003), indicates that appellant’s conduct is outside . . . the scope of section 815.06. . . . computer program, or computer data when acting within the scope of his or her lawful employment.” § 815.06 . . .
. . . We note that section 815.06, Florida Statutes (1991), which criminalizes accessing a computer without . . . It may be that section 815.06 more aptly describes the conduct Newberger engaged in. . . . exceeds his authorized access to a computer should not be subject to criminal sanctions under section 815.06 . . . The portion of section 815.06 that might be relevant here provides: (1) Whoever willfully, knowingly, . . .
. . . . §§ 815.06, 777.04, Fla.Stat. (1989). . § 812.014(1) & (2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1989). .- § 812.014(2)(d), . . .
. . . Appellant argues that her conviction under section 815.06, Florida Statutes (1991), which criminally . . . point to guide its determination of whether “exceeding one’s authorized use” is proscribed by section 815.06 . . . Section 815.06(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that: (1) Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without . . . agree with appellant’s argument that this court should adopt the same view when interpreting section 815.06 . . .
. . . The amount of the reduction was §>13,-815.06 out of a claim of $37,746.96, a sum grossly disproportioned . . .