CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 4610, 2014 WL 1255319
SAWAYA, J. The issue we must resolve is whether the Legislature intended section
944.35(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), to preclude a correctional officer from asserting the “stand your ground” defense provided in section
776.032, Florida Statutes (2011)....
...th this court. In that Petition, he requests this court issue a writ directing the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section
776.032. Heilman contends the writ is necessitated by an order rendered by the trial court holding that section
944.35(l)(a), which lists specified circumstances in which a correctional officer is authorized to use force against an inmate, provides the defense for Heilman and precludes him from asserting the immunity and justification defense provided under section
776.032....
...The trial court denied the motion and the requested hearing based solely on the rationale of State v. Caamano,
105 So.3d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Specifically, the court held that “[ajpplying the court’s reasoning in Caamano ... to the instant case, the specific language of section
944.35(l)(a), Florida Statutes, governs the Defendant’s use of force rather than section
776.032, Florida Statutes.” We believe that the trial court’s reliance on Caamano is misplaced because that case is clearly distinguishable from the instant case....
...nd reference a defense to, and immunity from, criminal prosecution. The immunity from criminal prosecution extends to “arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.” §
776.032(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). When we analyze section
944.35, we see a different statute. Section
944.35 is found in chapter 944, “The Florida Corrections Code of 1957,” 5 and the stated purpose of the statutes in chapter 944 is to make the correctional system in Florida more efficient and effective and to reduce recidivism. See §
944.012, Fla. Stat. (2011). While section
776.032 specifically provides a justification defense that immunizes an individual from criminal prosecution, no similar provision is found in section
944.35(l)(a). Rather, in section
944.35(l)(a), the Legislature utilized the term “authorized” (meaning “to give au *516 thority or power to”) 6 to provide criteria for and to specify the circumstances in which employees of the Department of Corrections may use physical force against inmates....
...The reasons this criteria and these circumstances are specified in the statute include the following: so that courses of instruction may be developed to “teach the proper methods and techniques in applying authorized physical force on an inmate,” section
944.35(l)(a); for reporting purposes and examination of inmates allegedly injured by the use of force by an employee, section
944.35(l)(b) and (2); for disciplinary action and dismissal from employment, section
944.35(3)(c); and to provide criminal penalties for employees of the Department of Corrections who use unauthorized physical force on inmates, section
944.35(3)(a) and (b). We, therefore, reject the implicit rationale adopted by the trial court that under the holding of Caamano , section
944.35(1) and section
776.032 are analogous to the point where the former precludes application of the latter to correctional officers. We also note that section
944.35 was enacted long before section
776.032, and we hardly think that the Legislature intended that statute preclude application of a statute that had not yet been enacted....
...etained in such institution under sentence for an offense or awaiting trial or commitment for an offense.” Under the Caamano rationale, this statute would appear to preclude application of the justification defense provided in section
776.032. But section
944.35(l)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2011), also addresses situations involving force by correctional officers in cases involving escape....
...an inmate only when and to the extent that it reasonably appears necessary ... [t]o prevent a person from escaping from a state correctional institution when the officer reasonably believes that person is lawfully detained in such institution!!]” § 944.35(l)(a)2., Fla....
...If we apply the Caamano rationale, it would appear that section
776.07(2) is a more specific statute intended to preclude application of section
776.032 in cases involving force used by correctional officers to prevent an escape. But if, under the Caama-no rationale, section
944.35(1) preempts section
776.032, there would be no reason for the Legislature to enact section
776.07(2) in the first instance....
...7 *517 The primary focus of our analysis has been to discern legislative intent — the proverbial polestar that guides statutory construction, see Bautista v. State,
863 So.2d 1180 (Fla.2003) — and the conclusions we reach are that the Legislature did not intend that section
944.35(1) preempt section
776.032 and that the Legislature did intend that section
776.032 apply to correctional officers with the exception provided in section
776.07(2)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3897, 2005 WL 662704
...Specifically, Lewis contests the 80 points assessed for victim injury on his criminal punishment code scoresheet. Lewis argues victim injury points are inappropriate because section
921.0021(7)(a) prohibits such points from being assessed for violations of a similar statute, section
944.35(3)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2002)....
...As the resolution of this appeal hinges upon statutory construction, the appeal is reviewed de novo. See State v. Burkhart,
869 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Section
921.0021(7)(c), exempts the assessment of victim injury points when the defendant is convicted of a violation of section
944.35(3)(b)2., which is similar to section
951.221(1), but applies exclusively to State Department of Corrections employees. §
944.35(3)(b)2., Fla....
...were not placed there by the Legislature.”). We write, however, to suggest the Legislature may wish -to readdress section
921.0021(7)(e), insomuch as the law provides an exemption from victim injury points to a State detention worker who violates section
944.35(3)(b)2., but' does not provide the same exemption to a county or municipal detention worker who violates section
951.221(1)....
