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(Code 1981, §15-11-107, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
- Freedom of religion, U.S. Const., amend. 1.
Religious opinion and freedom of religion, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. IV.
Consent for surgical treatment, T. 31, C. 9.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-401 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-2, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
In light of the reenactment of this chapter, effective January 1, 2014, the reader is advised to consult the annotations following Code Section 15-11-2(8), for annotations which may also be applicable to this Code section.
- In a criminal trial on charges that the defendant allowed the repeated rapes of the defendant's 11-year-old child, the rule of lenity did not require that the defendant's felony convictions for being a party to rape and cruelty to children to be subsumed by the misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the deprivation of a minor because different facts were necessary to prove the offenses. The rape conviction required proof under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-6-1(a)(1) that the defendant took affirmative steps to aid the rapist. The cruelty to children conviction required proof under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b) that the defendant caused excessive mental pain to the child. The conviction for contributing to the deprivation of a minor required proof under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) and O.C.G.A.16-12-1(b)(3) that the defendant failed to provide the child with proper care necessary for the child's health, which the state proved by showing that the defendant failed to seek prenatal care for the child even though the defendant knew that the child was pregnant. Johnson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 99, 640 S.E.2d 644 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Juvenile court erred in taking judicial notice of a psychological evaluation and citizen review panel's report issued in a mother's case prior to a child's birth because the juvenile court could not consider the evaluation or report to determine whether the child was without proper parental care or control or that the mother was unfit to parent the child; neither of the documents were tendered into evidence, and there was no testimony as to the contents of the documents. In the Interest of S. D., 316 Ga. App. 86, 728 S.E.2d 749 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- When employing the two-step test before terminating a parent's rights, a juvenile court order that a child was deprived, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), which was not appealed, was binding on a mother and satisfied the first factor of the test under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310); the juvenile court determined that due in part to a medical problem, the child had special needs and the mother lacked the ability to provide for the physical, mental, emotional, and moral conditions and needs of the child. In the Interest of J.T.W., 270 Ga. App. 26, 606 S.E.2d 59 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Because the juvenile court properly focused on the subject parent's abandonment of the child in support of the court's deprivation finding, and hence, the focus could not be on the adequate level of care given by the child's maternal grandparent, the court's deprivation finding was supported by sufficient evidence. Moreover, the state adequately showed that the parent was incapable of caring for any child, let alone this child, given that the child had special medical needs. In the Interest of A.B., 289 Ga. App. 655, 658 S.E.2d 205 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Evidence supported the finding that a child was deprived within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), and that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-2320), because the mother, who was homeless and suffering from schizophrenia, failed to maintain contact with the agency or visit with the child for more than one year, and the mother never accomplished court-ordered goals for reunification or demonstrated the ability to adequately care for the child. In the Interest of S.G., 271 Ga. App. 776, 611 S.E.2d 86 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
Child was deprived as defined in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because the mother had borderline intellectual functioning and was at a high risk of engaging in physical child abuse, the child was a special needs child with developmental disorders and physical problems who was not being properly supervised in a dirty home where there was little food, the mother needed long-term intensive psychological treatment but failed to obtain counseling and stopped taking her medications, and the mother failed to support the child or to comply with case plan goals. In the Interest of A.K., 272 Ga. App. 429, 612 S.E.2d 581 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's determination that a mother's child was deprived, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), due to the lack of proper parental care, that such deprivation was likely to continue or not be remedied due to the mother's failure to take responsibility for the child and to work at succeeding at the goals of the case plan, and that such deprivation would cause serious harm to the child, who needed a stable family environment; accordingly, termination of the mother's parental rights was proper pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320). In the Interest of B.S., 274 Ga. App. 647, 618 S.E.2d 695 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- As a parent's actions, including not feeding the child or changing the child's diaper often enough, placed the child at risk, and the parent received one-on-one instruction and training for a considerable period of time, yet failed to put the training into practice and continued to risk the child's well-being, there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that the child was a "deprived child" as defined by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A). In the Interest of W. A. P., 293 Ga. App. 433, 667 S.E.2d 197 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Juvenile court properly held that a 13-year-old grandson continued to be deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because clear and convincing evidence established that the child was without the care necessary for the child's mental or emotional health based on the grandmother/guardian failing to complete family counseling as required. In the Interest of J. B., 319 Ga. App. 796, 738 S.E.2d 639 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Clear and convincing evidence supported an order adjudicating two children deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) because their sibling died of complications from tuberculosis (TB) after not receiving medical treatment for at least a month, the father had been twice diagnosed with active TB, but refused to admit he had TB, and the mother refused to take medication to keep her latent TB from becoming active, and would not admit that TB had anything to do with the death of the sibling. In the Interest of R.M., 276 Ga. App. 707, 624 S.E.2d 182 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
An order finding that a mother's two children were deprived was upheld on appeal since the evidence established that the mother's 12-year-old daughter was pregnant with the mother's 38-year-old boyfriend's child and the daughter had at least four sexual partners since the age of nine, and the mother's son had cavities so large that the cavities were visible in the boy's teeth and he had a very poor educational status; also, the mother failed to accept responsibility for the condition of the children. In the Interest of A.S., 285 Ga. App. 563, 646 S.E.2d 756 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- When a grandparent who had adopted three grandchildren struck one in the face, leaving a mark, pushed a child into a tub of water after asking if the child wanted to drown, spanked the children with a belt, and struck one child with a belt buckle and another with an extension cord, there was sufficient evidence of deprivation under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107). In the Interest of T.R., 284 Ga. App. 742, 644 S.E.2d 880 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Children, ages four and six, were deprived as defined in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) based on their mother's unwarranted and unrelenting insistence that their father, whom she was divorcing, had abused them, subjecting the children to repeated forensic interviews and invasive medical examinations, despite being warned that these repeated interviews were harmful to the children. In the Interest of S.K., 301 Ga. App. 35, 686 S.E.2d 814 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Evidence that parents were imprisoned for abusing one of their three children, and their parental rights were terminated as to that child; that a second child, while in their care, sustained permanent brain injuries due to abusive head trauma, and the child's arm was fractured in a manner consistent with abuse; and the fact that the parents invoked the Fifth Amendment during the deprivation hearing was sufficient to allow the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that their two children were deprived as defined by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107). In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga. App. 471, 667 S.E.2d 641 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Under the circumstances in the mother's case, the juvenile court correctly found that the evidence of the children's deprivation was clear and convincing under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1 and15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1,15-11-2,15-11-381, and15-11-471) in that the evidence demonstrated that the minor children were not receiving adequate support for the children's mental health issues. The uncontrolled behavior of the children related to those issues was negatively affecting the children's academic and social well-being and there was also clear and convincing evidence that the mother was not utilizing available resources to address the children's problems, and that the mother had attempted to have one of the children hospitalized because she could not control the child; moreover, one of the children also exhibited severe mental health issues, including cutting herself and attacking other children, that were not adequately addressed. In the Interest of D. Q., 307 Ga. App. 121, 704 S.E.2d 444 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Juvenile court did not err in finding that a 12-year-old child was deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107) due to the child's severe psychological problems, which required in-patient treatment, because the child's mother had been unable to obtain the recommended treatment for the child and the child's mental health was deteriorating. In the Interest of V.A.D., 305 Ga. App. 23, 699 S.E.2d 346 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Juvenile court did not err in finding that children were deprived and that their father was unable to provide proper parental care for the children because there was clear and convincing evidence to show that the father had engaged in past egregious conduct of a physically abusive nature toward one of the children; there was medical evidence regarding the nature and extent of the child's injuries and evidence that the injuries had been inflicted by the father. In the Interest of T. P., 310 Ga. App. 684, 713 S.E.2d 874 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
- Evidence of willfulness necessary to sustain conviction under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-107), the contributing to the deprivation of a minor statute, was shown since the evidence established that the defendant babysitter knew that the infant needed immediate medical attention, and that the babysitter failed to seek medical treatment for the infant. Hoang v. State, 250 Ga. App. 403, 551 S.E.2d 813 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2).
No results found for Georgia Code 15-11-107.