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(Code 1981, §15-11-135, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-9/SB 364; Ga. L. 2016, p. 134, § 1-1/HB 887; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1112, § 15/SB 365.)
The 2014 amendment, effective April 28, 2014, rewrote subsection (c); and substituted "document why such joint placement would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings" for "why such efforts are not appropriate" at the end of the first sentence of subsection (e).
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted the present provisions of subsection (e) for the former provisions, which read: "In any case in which a child is taken into protective custody of DFCS, such child shall be placed together with his or her siblings who are also in protective custody or DFCS shall include a statement in its report and case plan of continuing efforts to place the siblings together or document why such joint placement would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings. If siblings are not placed together, DFCS shall provide for frequent visitation or other ongoing interaction between siblings, unless DFCS documents that such frequent visitation or other ongoing interaction would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings."
The 2018 amendment, effective May 8, 2018, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in the first and second sentences of paragraph (e)(2).
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2016, "that such relative" was substituted for "that the such relative" in paragraph (e)(1).
- For note criticizing jurisdiction of juvenile justice system over runaways and advocating alternative legal approaches, see 24 Emory L. J. 1075 (1975).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-20, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-48, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
- Contrary to the defendant's claims, neither former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-67 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-442) nor former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-48(e) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-135,15-11-400, and15-11-412) applied to the defendant's case because both provisions applied when the child was found "unruly," and the defendant was adjudicated delinquent, not unruly. In the Interest of B. Q. L. E., 297 Ga. App. 273, 676 S.E.2d 742 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1197, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-48).
- There was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-20 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-155,15-11-400,15-11-412, and15-11-504) because a juvenile suspect was first taken to a police station for booking purposes, if the juvenile was advised of the juvenile's rights under that section to be questioned elsewhere; the juvenile signed a waiver of these rights on an "advice to juveniles" form and was detained at a youth development center. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
- Juvenile defendant's confession was admissible despite the fact that the juvenile was not taken before an impartial juvenile intake officer but a member of the county police department since the defendant's mother was present during the juvenile's interrogation and it was not alleged that the officer failed to perform any duty imposed upon the officer. Worthy v. State, 253 Ga. 661, 324 S.E.2d 431 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-20).
- Juvenile courts are not granted the power and authority to supervise and control all the various detention facilities. Jones v. State, 134 Ga. App. 611, 215 S.E.2d 483 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
- Subsection (a) of former section contemplated otherwise than that the Department of Human Resources guarantee all bed space desired by the juvenile courts. Jones v. State, 134 Ga. App. 611, 215 S.E.2d 483 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
- Juvenile court's order for detention was merely an order pursuant to the former statute; designating the place of confinement was not an exercise of jurisdiction by that court. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
- Children are placed in foster homes as an alternative to institutional care for what is clearly designed as a transitional phase in the child's life. Therefore, in the eyes of the state, which creates the foster relationship, the relationship is considered temporary at the outset and gives rise to no state-created rights in the foster parents. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S. Ct. 3103, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
- Juvenile intake officer should make all reasonable efforts to locate an appropriate juvenile facility for the detention of an allegedly delinquent child before determining that such a facility was "not available" for purposes of the former statute. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-13 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1403).
- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 49, 50, 56 et seq., 69.
- 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 140 et seq., 226 et seq., 239.
- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 16.
- What constitutes delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant, 45 A.L.R. 1533; 85 A.L.R. 1099.
Authority of court to order juvenile delinquent incarcerated in adult penal institution, 95 A.L.R.3d 568.
Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile, 5 A.L.R.4th 1211.
Foster parent's right to immunity from foster child's negligence claims, 55 A.L.R.4th 778.
(Code 1981, §15-11-145, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this article, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's note at the beginning of the chapter.
Notice and hearing requirements were mandatory and must be adhered to in order for the juvenile court to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. If for some reason the statutes were not, dismissal of the petition would be without prejudice. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).
Failure to comply with notice and hearing requirements of the Juvenile Code, after an allegedly deprived child has been taken from the parent's custody, prejudices or injures the rights of the parent, primarily the right to possession of the child under former Code 1933, §§ 74-106, 74-108, and 74-203 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1,19-7-25, and19-9-2). Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).
Juvenile court erred by not holding a preliminary protective hearing within 72 hours after the children were placed in foster care, by not giving the mother proper notice of the hearing, and by not making the required written findings regarding the children's welfare. In the Interest of R. B., Ga. App. , 816 S.E.2d 706 (2018).
- Time limits established by the General Assembly in the Juvenile Code are jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to. A failure to comply with the time periods set out in the statute requires dismissal. R.A.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 366, 274 S.E.2d 752 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re R.D.F., 66 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).
- Word "day," not being qualified, means a calendar or civil day consisting of 24 hours from midnight to midnight. J.B.H. v. State, 139 Ga. App. 199, 228 S.E.2d 189 (1976), overruled on other grounds, In re R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).
- Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights, 80 A.L.R.3d 1141.
No results found for Georgia Code 15-11-135.