O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-9-2 (2019)

Right of surviving parent to custody of child; discretion of judge

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

Upon the death of either parent, the survivor is entitled to custody of the child; provided, however, that the judge, upon petition, may exercise discretion as to the custody of the child, looking solely to the child’s best interest and welfare.

History

Orig. Code 1863, § 1745; Code 1868, § 1785; Code 1873, § 1794; Code 1882, § 1794; Civil Code 1895, § 2503; Civil Code 1910, § 3022; Code 1933, § 74-106; Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 42; Ga. L. 1996, p. 412, § 2; Ga. L. 2007, p. 554, § 5/HB 369.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2007, p. 554, § 1/HB 369, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The General Assembly of Georgia declares that it is the policy of this state to assure that minor children have frequent and continuing contact with parents who

have shown the ability to act in the best interests of their children and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of rearing their children after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage or relationship.” Ga. L. 2007, p. 554, § 8/HB 369, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 2007 amendment shall apply to all child custody proceedings and modifications of child custody filed on or after January 1, 2008. Law reviews. For note criticizing Quiner v. Quiner, 57

Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1967), holding abnormal religious convictions of mother were not sufficient grounds upon which to deny custody of child, see 17 J. of Pub. L. 193 (1968). For article, “The Child as a Party in Interest in Custody Proceedings,” see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 577 (1974). For article criticizing parental rights doctrine and advocating best interests of child doctrine in parent-third party custody disputes, see 27 Emory L.J. 209 (1978). For comment on “Grandparents’ Visita-

tion Rights in Georgia,” see 29 Emory L.J. 1083 (1980). For article surveying developments in Georgia domestic relations law from mid1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (1981). For review of 1996 domestic relations legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 155 (1996). For article, “Domestic Relations Law,” see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (2001). For annual survey on domestic relations law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 121 (2012).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS On death of custodial parent under divorce decree, right to custody automatically inures to surviving parent. Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 11 S.E.2d 782, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 621 (1940); Raily v. Smith, 202 Ga. 185, 42 S.E.2d 491, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 392 (1947); Land v. Wrobel, 220 Ga. 260, 138 S.E.2d 315, 1964 Ga. LEXIS 512 (1964); Porter v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 188, 249 S.E.2d 608, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1135 (1978). Scope of court’s discretion under section. - Notwithstanding anything implied in O.C.G.A. § 19-9-2, concerning interests and welfare of the child, the court has no authority in the court’s discretion to deprive surviving parent of custody after death of spouse, absent showing of abandonment, cruel treatment, termination of parental rights, unfitness, or other grounds authorized by law. Brant v. Bazemore, 159 Ga. App. 659, 284 S.E.2d 674, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2755 (1981). Surviving parent entitled to custody unless rights have been terminated. - When mother of child is dead, father has prima facie right of custody, and in order to sustain contention that he has lost his parental power by reason of failure to provide necessaries for his child or by abandonment of his family, a clear and strong case must be made. Chambers v. Lee, 215 Ga. 629, 112 S.E.2d 614, 1960 Ga. LEXIS 283 (1960). In determining whether parent or third parties should have custody of child, trial court was required by law to recognize that upon death of one parent, legal right

to child automatically inures to surviving parent, and that parent was entitled to the child’s custody absent showing that the surviving parent had lost parental rights in any one of the ways provided in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 or was an unfit person to have custody, which unfitness must be shown by strong and satisfactory proof. Peck v. Shierling, 222 Ga. 60, 148 S.E.2d 491, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 397 (1966). It is clear that when parent having custody dies, legal custody reverts to other parent unless the other parent has lost parental rights as provided under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1, or was shown to be presently unfit. Porter v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 188, 249 S.E.2d 608, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1135 (1978). Absent showing of abandonment, cruel treatment, termination of parental rights, unfitness, or other grounds authorized by law, trial court lacks discretion to deprive surviving parent of his or her child. Bryant v. Wigley, 246 Ga. 155, 269 S.E.2d 418, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1025 (1980). Surviving parent becomes the legal custodian of the child at the moment of the custodial parent’s death, unless there has been a prior termination of the survivor’s parental rights. Spires v. Lance, 167 Ga. App. 331, 306 S.E.2d 317, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2449 (1983). Court must exercise discretion in awarding custody. - Discretion of judge must be exercised in favor of surviving parent who has legal right to custody of child, unless evidence shows that welfare and interest of child justify the judge

in awarding custody to someone else. Hill v. Rivers, 200 Ga. 354, 37 S.E.2d 386, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 411 (1946); Sherrill v. Sherrill, 202 Ga. 288, 42 S.E.2d 921, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 421 (1947). In every case where custody of minor children is involved, the law requires that court having jurisdiction shall exercise discretion in awarding custody. Waller v. Waller, 202 Ga. 535, 43 S.E.2d 535, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 461 (1947). While judge is vested with discretion in determining to whom custody shall be given, such discretion should be governed by rules of law, and be exercised in favor of party having legal right, unless evidence shows that interest and welfare of child justify judge in awarding custody to another. Perkins v. Courson, 219 Ga. 611, 135 S.E.2d 388, 1964 Ga. LEXIS 345 (1964). Legitimation of child following mother’s death. - Former husband, a resident of Mississippi who had disclaimed paternity in a divorce decree, did not become entitled to custody upon the mother’s death in Georgia; nor could the mother unilaterally substitute her former husband as the child’s legal custodian without the consent of the father. Thus, the child was a Georgia resident for purposes of a legitimation proceeding by the biological father. Hardy v. Arcemont, 213 Ga. App. 243, 444 S.E.2d 327, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1360, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 949 (Ga. Sept. 9, 1994). Court’s limited discretion. - Statute gave court only limited discretion in custody dispute between parent and third party. Spitz v. Holland, 243 Ga. 9, 252 S.E.2d 406, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 777 (1979). Nature of discretion vested in trial judge. - Statute permitted trial court discretion to consider whether child had been abandoned or subjected to cruel treatment by surviving parent, or to suspend proceeding to enable juvenile court to consider termination of parental rights of survivor, or to consider whether surviving parent was shown by clear and satisfactory proof to be unfit to have custody of child, or to consider such other matters as may be authorized by statute, and discretion to suspend proceeding to enable an-

other court to consider such matters as the court had jurisdiction to consider. Bryant v. Wigley, 246 Ga. 155, 269 S.E.2d 418, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1025 (1980). Judicial discretion must respect parties’ established rights. - In exercising discretion, judge cannot disregard or impair acknowledged or established rights of any party; to do so, constitutes an abuse of discretion. Hill v. Rivers, 200 Ga. 354, 37 S.E.2d 386, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 411 (1946). If either parent is a proper and suitable person and has not surrendered his or her parental right of custody, it is an abuse of discretion to award minor child to third parties over claim of such parent. Camp v. Bookman, 204 Ga. 670, 51 S.E.2d 391, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 321 (1949). In all cases, welfare of child is controlling. - In all cases when custody of minor child is involved, paramount consideration is welfare and best interests of child. The court has broad discretion in this respect. Hodges v. Hodges, 77 Ga. App. 86, 47 S.E.2d 823, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 498 (1948). In contest between parents over custody of minor children, paramount issue is welfare and best interest of children, and award based upon evidence and in exercise of sound discretion will not be controlled by Supreme Court. Jordan v. Jordan, 195 Ga. 771, 25 S.E.2d 500, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 555 (1943); Handley v. Handley, 204 Ga. 57, 48 S.E.2d 827, 1948 Ga. LEXIS 537 (1948). In contest between two fit parties, the one having legal right should prevail. If both are proper parties, but neither has a legal right, the one having strongest moral claims should prevail. But in every case, regardless of parties, welfare of child is controlling and important fact. Camp v. Bookman, 204 Ga. 670, 51 S.E.2d 391, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 321 (1949). Surviving parent may give custody to a third party. - Surviving parent had right to give temporary custody of child of tender years to her brother, that he might care for the child. When brother accepted request and offer of sister, and complied faithfully with his obligation, it would be a clear miscarriage of justice for court to have awarded custody to grandparents.

Brant v. Bazemore, 159 Ga. App. 659, 284 S.E.2d 674, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2755 (1981). Act, before death, of giving child to another. - Court errs in granting custody to third parties on ground that father, who was first awarded custody but is deceased at time of mother’s action for custody of child, had given child to third parties, that they had had child since, and were fit and proper parties to have custody, as custody could only be taken from parent having legal right thereto by showing that parent had lost her parental rights to child under former Code 1933, § 74-108 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1), or by clear and satisfactory proof, that she was an unfit person to have custody. Peck v. Shierling, 222 Ga. 60, 148 S.E.2d 491, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 397 (1966). Custodial parent’s contract cannot deprive noncustodial parent of rights. Landrum v. Landrum, 159 Ga. 324, 125 S.E. 832, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 443 (1924), overruled, Camp v. Camp, 213 Ga. 65, 97 S.E.2d 125, 1957 Ga. LEXIS 303 (1957). When surviving parent may lose right. - Surviving parent’s right may be lost by a clear, definite, and certain voluntary contractual release of such right to child to a third person. Such an agreement is not subject to revocation without good cause shown. Durden v. Johnson, 194 Ga. 689, 22 S.E.2d 514, 1942 Ga. LEXIS 660 (1942). Grandparents seeking custody after surviving parent allegedly murdered the other. - Trial court erroneously concluded that the grandparents’ petition seeking custody of a mother’s children failed to state a claim because the custody petition gave fair notice that the grandparents sought custody of the child under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1(b.1) and 19-9-2 based upon the mother’s alleged murder of the father; those allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Scott v. Scott, 311 Ga. App. 726, 716 S.E.2d 809, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 831 (2011). Challenge to legal and parental right to custody. - Legal and parental right to custody is subject to challenge on ground of unfitness for trust. Peck v. Shi-

erling, 222 Ga. 60, 148 S.E.2d 491, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 397 (1966). Proof required to establish unfitness. - Unfitness must be established by clear and satisfactory proof, and for grave and substantial cause, not merely that child might have better financial, educational, or even moral advantages. Peck v. Shierling, 222 Ga. 60, 148 S.E.2d 491, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 397 (1966). Parental unfitness must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Wigley v. Bryant, 247 Ga. 508, 277 S.E.2d 246 (1981). Court errs in awarding custody to grandparent when parent fit. - When father of child is man of good character, has regular job, is well able financially to support child, maintains home of good environment, and there is no evidence showing his abuse or ill treatment of child, trial judge abused discretion in awarding custody of child to maternal grandmother. Hill v. Rivers, 200 Ga. 354, 37 S.E.2d 386, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 411 (1946). Grandparents seeking custody. - Trial court properly determined that collateral estoppel did not bar the grandparents’ petition for custody of a mother’s children because different issues were actually and necessarily decided in the grandparents’ visitation action; in the visitation action, the issues were harm to the child if visitation was not granted and whether visitation would be in the best interest of the children, and in the custody action, the issues were whether the children would suffer physical or emotional harm if custody remained with the mother. Scott v. Scott, 311 Ga. App. 726, 716 S.E.2d 809, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 831 (2011). Surviving parent who failed to provide necessaries. - When the father had both negligently and willfully failed to fulfill his statutory duty to provide “the necessaries” for his minor children but no proceeding to establish abandonment, unfitness, or forfeiture of rights was instituted prior to the mother’s death, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-2, which gives custody to the surviving parent absent a contrary judicial holding based on strong, clear,

and convincing evidence, was probably operative at the time of the mother’s death, and appellee at that time became, and continued to be, the children’s legal custodian. Harper v. Landers, 180 Ga. App. 154, 348 S.E.2d 698, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2098 (1986). Court’s exclusive right to award custody. - Generally, court where custodial parent resides has exclusive right to award change of custody; this is true whether legal custodian lives in another state or in another county, and irrespective of physical presence of child. Matthews v. Matthews, 238 Ga. 201, 232 S.E.2d 76, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 962 (1977). Proceeding to change decree of custody

may not be brought against custodial parent by noncustodial parent in county in which noncustodial parent resides. Matthews v. Matthews, 238 Ga. 201, 232 S.E.2d 76, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 962 (1977). Third party who illegally withholds custody from surviving parent in another jurisdiction cannot counterclaim and contest custody when parent is forced to file a habeas petition in the foreign jurisdiction. Canning v. Evans, 250 Ga. 85, 295 S.E.2d 741, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 982 (1982). Habeas corpus proceeding. - Person claiming no legal right of custody cannot institute habeas corpus proceeding. Spitz v. Holland, 243 Ga. 9, 252 S.E.2d 406, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 777 (1979).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 32. C.J.S. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 58. ALR. What items of damage on account of personal injury to infant belong to him and what to parent, 37 A.L.R. 11; 32 A.L.R.2d 1060. Attempt to bastardize child as affecting right to custody of the child, 37 A.L.R. 531. Appointment of guardian for infant as affecting rights and duties of parent, 63 A.L.R. 1147. Death of mother of child whose custody has been awarded to her or to third person by divorce decree as reviving father’s common-law duty to support, or right to custody of, child, 128 A.L.R. 989. Right to custody of child as affected by death of custodian appointed by divorce decree, 39 A.L.R.2d 258. “Split,” “divided,” or “alternate” custody of children, 92 A.L.R.2d 695. Child custody provisions of divorce or separation decree as subject to modification on habeas corpus, 4 A.L.R.3d 1277. Award of custody of child where contest is between child’s father and grandparent, 25 A.L.R.3d 7.

Award of custody of child where contest is between child’s mother and grandparent, 29 A.L.R.3d 366. Award of custody of child where contest is between child’s grandparent and one other than the child’s parent, 30 A.L.R.3d 290. Award of custody of child where contest is between child’s parents and grandparents, 31 A.L.R.3d 1187. Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances, 35 A.L.R.3d 520. Remarriage of surviving parent as affecting action for wrongful death of child, 69 A.L.R.3d 1038. Right to require psychiatric or mental examination for party seeking to obtain or retain custody of child, 99 A.L.R.3d 268. Parent’s physical disability or handicap as factor in custody award or proceedings, 3 A.L.R.4th 1044. Award of custody of child where contest is between natural parent and stepparent, 10 A.L.R.4th 767. Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1983–2014 · leading case: Harper v. Landers, 348 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
Harper v. Landers, 348 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 20× “Landers answered, denying Georgia courts' jurisdiction over either himself or the children.”
Spires v. Lance, 306 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 12× “"Upon the death of either parent, the survivor is entitled to custody of the child; provided, however, that the court, upon petition, may exercise discretion as to the custody of the child, looking solely to the child's interest and welfare.”
Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000). · cites it 4× “The trial court concluded that upon the death of Cassandra Stills, the right to custody of the child vested in Steven Trainer pursuant to OCGA § 19-9-2. That code section provides "[u]pon the death of either parent, the survivor is entitled to custody of the child; provided,…”
Scott v. Scott, 716 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “l) and [are] authorized to seek custody by OCGA § 19-9-2. 6. Plaintiffs are fit and proper parties to receive custody.”
In the Interest of K. R. S., 560 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “331 (1) ( 306 SE2d 317 ) (1983); see OCGA § 19-9-2; Porter v. Johnson, 242 Ga.”
Burke v. King, 562 S.E.2d 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “] that custody be awarded to the Plaintiff, pursuant to the O.C.G.A. § 19-9-2.” After Burke unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, the trial court, without hearing any further evidence, entered a second order containing additional findings.”
Hardy v. Arcemont, 444 S.E.2d 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 4× “; OCGA § 19-9-2. Based on Meredith v. Meredith, 257 Ga.”
Columbus v. Gaines, 322 S.E.2d 259 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 2× “Rather, although the complaint alleged that the defendant-aunt had “temporary custody” of the minor child and sought to have custody awarded to the plaintiff, it was nevertheless a petition for habeas corpus, because it was brought by the surviving parent, who had prima facie…”
In re B. D. C., 348 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 6× ““Upon the death of either parent, the survivor is entitled to custody of the child; provided, however, that the court, upon petition, may exercise discretion as to the custody of the child, looking solely to the child’s interest and welfare.”
Entrekin v. Friedman, 754 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 2014). · cites it 2× “1 See OCGA § 19-9-2. But it does not follow that Friedman was barred from seeking custody for herself.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.