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(Code 1981, §15-11-191, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-12, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
- Consideration of evidence containing some hearsay may technically violate provisions of this section but in a case tried without a jury, the trial judge has a much broader discretion in the admission of evidence and the judge's judgment will not be reversed if there is any legal evidence to support the finding. Moss v. Moss, 135 Ga. App. 401, 218 S.E.2d 93 (1975) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-12).
- Consideration of written reports containing hearsay matter at a fact-finding child deprivation hearing is more than a technical violation of the law, but under the particular facts of a case it may not be reversible error. In re J.C., 242 Ga. 737, 251 S.E.2d 299 (1978), appeal dismissed, 441 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2046, 60 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1979) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-12).
- When a written welfare report in a child in a child deprivation hearing was made by the caseworker who testified and was cross-examined at the hearing and when the evidence introduced at the hearing, not considering the report, was sufficient to support the findings of fact made by the judge, it will be presumed that the judge did not consider any hearsay testimony in the report in the judge's determination that the children were deprived. In re J.C., 242 Ga. 737, 251 S.E.2d 299 (1978), appeal dismissed, 441 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2046, 60 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1979) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-12).
- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 209 et seq.
- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 28.
- Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.
- For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-41, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-58, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this part, are included in the annotations for this part. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
- Superior court properly declined jurisdiction in a custody action brought by grandparents because once a juvenile court took jurisdiction of a deprivation action concerning the child and, later, a termination action of parental rights, the court took jurisdiction of the entire case of the minor child including the issues of disposition and custody. Segars v. State, 309 Ga. App. 732, 710 S.E.2d 916 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
- Former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-13 and15-11-58 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-30,15-11-134, and15-11-200 et seq.), and O.C.G.A. § 20-2-690.1, and49-5-12 were not too vague and amorphous to be enforced by the judiciary and impose specific duties on the state defendants; thus, the federal regulatory scheme embodied in the CSFR process did not relieve the state defendants of the defendants obligation to fulfill the defendants statutory duties to the foster children, nor did the former statute provide a legal excuse for the defendants failure to do so. Kenny A. v. Perdue, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
- Juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify an order granting temporary custody of a deprived child to the Department of Family and Children Services and to permit visitation by parents who filed a petition for visitation rights four months after the custody order. In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).
- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 50. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 60 et seq., 116.
- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 224 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 38 et seq., 63 et seq., 73 et seq., 90 et seq.
- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 36.
No results found for Georgia Code 15-11-191.