Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-34, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-55, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Jurisdiction between courts.

- Trial court erred when the court prohibited the Department of Human Resources from placing children with their mother or allowing the children to visit with the mother unsupervised and by staying any decision of a juvenile court that would be contrary to the court's order because, although the trial court and the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction over the temporary custody of the children, the juvenile court in the contemporaneous deprivation proceeding had the authority to order the disposition best suited to the needs of the children, including the transfer of temporary legal custody, and the juvenile court had already exercised the court's jurisdiction over the temporary custody of the children in light of the deprivation action; although the trial court expressed the court's concern about the department's decision to recommend that the children be physically placed with the mother, the juvenile court was competent to oversee the department, and there was no good reason for the trial court to conclude that the trial court was in a better position to address the department's placement decisions than the juvenile court. Long v. Long, 303 Ga. App. 215, 692 S.E.2d 811 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

No equal protection violation.

- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

In a deprivation proceeding, the department of family and child services did not violate equal protection by requiring the parents to pay part of the costs for services mandated under their case plan. The department was not drawing a distinction between similarly situated parties in that a parent who could afford to contribute financially was not similarly situated to one who could not afford to do so; moreover, even if the parents were similarly situated to others who were not required to pay for a portion of services, the goals served by the contribution requirement of requiring parents to take responsibility for conduct that harmed their children and of increasing the likelihood of success for family reunification represented legitimate governmental purposes. In the Interest of P.N., 291 Ga. App. 512, 662 S.E.2d 287 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Determination that deprivation proceeding was not custody dispute.

- Because the pleadings established that a deprivation petition was properly filed and factually supported, and due to the presence of unchallenged, valid allegations of deprivation, the deprivation proceeding was not a disguised custody matter; accordingly, the juvenile court properly exercised the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding. In the Interest of K.L.H., 281 Ga. App. 394, 636 S.E.2d 117 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Purpose of division of juvenile trials into two phases.

- In dividing juvenile trials into two phases, lawmakers intended to give the juvenile judge an opportunity to conduct the "functional equivalent" of a regular trial (the adjudicatory hearing) in a manner which would satisfy the required constitutional procedures concomitant with the usual legal rules, such as those dealing with admissibility of evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and similar requirements applicable to adults. Thereafter, at the dispositional phase, the judge was to explore all available additional avenues, including psychiatric and sociological studies, which would enable the judge to provide a solution for the youngster and the family aimed at making the child a secure law-abiding member of society. D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 234, 217 S.E.2d 470 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

Jurisdiction of adoption while deprivation proceeding pending.

- Superior court has exclusive jurisdiction in adoption matters and had jurisdiction to entertain an adoption petition notwithstanding the pendency of deprivation proceedings in the juvenile court involving the same child. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 422 S.E.2d 234 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Authority of juvenile courts to transfer legal custody.

- Juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, and the juvenile court had the authority to order the disposition best suited to the needs of the children including the transfer of temporary legal custody. In re A.L.L., 211 Ga. App. 767, 440 S.E.2d 517 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Juvenile court erred in awarding custody of a child to the father even after finding that the child was not deprived because according to a plain reading of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-211 and15-11-212), the juvenile court was without authority to transfer custody of the child to the father and paternal grandmother; while under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(c)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-11) the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of custody and support when the issue was transferred by proper order of the superior court, no such order existed in the record, and instead, the juvenile court specifically found that the child was not deprived. In re T.S., 310 Ga. App. 100, 712 S.E.2d 121 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

No need to repeat evidence already presented during adjudicatory portion.

- There is no error in refusing to have the dispositional phase include a repetition of the same evidence and witnesses previously presented during the adjudicatory portion. D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 234, 217 S.E.2d 470 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

Notice of change in placement sufficient given previous discussions.

- As the adoption of a permanency plan and placement of a child with the paternal grandparents had already been discussed at a hearing held at the child advocate's request, the advocate was not prejudiced by the department of family and children services' failure to provide the advocate with five days' notice of a change in the child's placement as required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(d) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-215). In the Interest of N. W., 309 Ga. App. 617, 710 S.E.2d 832 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Standard of proof for finding deprivation.

- If deprivation forms the predicate upon which a third party seeks a temporary transfer of the child's legal custody, in order to support such a disposition the child must first be adjudicated to be a deprived child. By statute, that finding of deprivation must be made by "clear and convincing evidence." In re J.C.P., 167 Ga. App. 572, 307 S.E.2d 1 (1983); but see In re A.W., 240 Ga. App. 259, 523 S.E.2d 88 (1999).(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

No habeas corpus if court enters orders.

- Habeas corpus will not lie if the juvenile court, after notice and hearing, enters an order pursuant to former provisions an disposition of deprived children. Chaffins v. Lowndes County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 528, 255 S.E.2d 360 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

Consideration of parent's behavior at hearing.

- Consideration by a juvenile court of a noncustodial parent's behavior in a hearing to determine the need for continuing the temporary suspension of custody does not deprive a noncustodial parent of due process. In re A.S., 185 Ga. App. 11, 363 S.E.2d 325 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Recommendations by juvenile court.

- Juvenile court does not exceed the court's authority in a hearing to determine the need for continuing the temporary suspension of custody by making recommendations as to the placement, care, and supervision of a child. In re A.S., 185 Ga. App. 11, 363 S.E.2d 325 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

If a juvenile court's finding as to custody is in the nature of a recommendation to the superior court, the custody issue remains pending below and is not before the appellate court on appeal. In the Interest of M.E., 265 Ga. App. 412, 593 S.E.2d 924 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 50. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 7, 53, 68, 116.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 226 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 63 et seq., 378 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 30.

ALR.

- Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights, 80 A.L.R.3d 1141.