O.C.G.A. § 15-11-233 (2019)
Termination of parental rights; exceptions
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, DFCS shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of a parent of a child adjudicated as a dependent child or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition, and, concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for an adoption if:
(1) A child adjudicated as a dependent child has been in foster care under the responsibility of DFCS for 15 of the most recent 22 months;
(2) The court has made a determination that the parent has subjected his or her child to aggravated circumstances; or
(3) The court has made a determination that the parent of a child adjudicated as a dependent child has been convicted of:
(A) The murder of another child of such parent;
(B) Murder in the second degree of another child of such parent;
(C) Voluntary manslaughter of another child of such parent;
(D) Voluntary manslaughter of the other parent of such child;
(E) Aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of such parent;
(F) Aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit murder or voluntary manslaughter of the other parent of such child; or
(G) Committing felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to such child or to another child of such parent.
(b) Termination of parental rights may not be in the best interests of a child adjudicated as a dependent child when:
(1) Such child is being cared for by his or her relative;
(2) The case plan documents a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of such child. Such compelling reasons may include, but not be limited to:
(A) A parent of such child is successfully participating in services that will make it possible for his or her child to safely return home;
(B) Another permanency plan is better suited to meet the health and safety needs of such child. Documentation that another permanent plan is better suited to meet the health and safety needs of such child may include documentation that:
(i) Such child is 14 years of age or older and objects to termination of parental rights. Prior to accepting a child’s objection, the court shall personally question such child in chambers to determine whether the objection is a voluntary and knowing choice;
(ii) Such child is 16 years of age or older and specifically requests that emancipation be established as his or her permanent plan;
(iii) The parent of such child and such child have a significant bond, but such parent is unable to care for such child because of an emotional or physical disability and such child’s caregiver has committed to raising such child to the age of majority and facilitating visitation with such disabled parent; or
(iv) Such child is in a residential treatment facility that provides services specifically designed to address his or her treatment needs and the court determines that his or her needs could not be served by a less restrictive placement;
(C) Such child is living with his or her relative who is unable or unwilling to adopt such child, but who is willing and capable of providing such child with a stable and permanent home environment and the removal of such child from the physical custody of his or her relative would be detrimental to such child’s emotional well-being;
(D) The court or judicial citizen review panel, in a prior hearing or review, determined that while the case plan was to reunify the family, DFCS did not make reasonable efforts; or
(E) Such child is an unaccompanied refugee or there are international legal obligations or foreign policy reasons that would preclude terminating parental rights; or
(3) DFCS has not provided to the family of such child services deemed necessary for his or her safe return to his or her home, consistent with the specific time frames for the accomplishment of the case plan goals.
(c) The recommendation by DFCS that termination of parental rights is not in the best interests of a child shall be based on the present family circumstances of such child and shall not preclude a different recommendation at a later date if the family circumstances of a child adjudicated as a dependent child change.
History
Code 1981, § 15-11-233, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 444, § 2-3/HB 271.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-41, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-58, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this article, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s note at the beginning of the chapter. In light of the reenactment of this chapter, effective January 1, 2014, the reader is advised to consult the annotations following Code Section 15-11-202, which may also be applicable to this Code section. Custody by Department suspends parental right. - Removal of custody of the child from the parents is a determination that, for whatever length of time custody is exercised by the Department of Family and Children Services, this right has been suspended, although not finally terminated. Rodgers v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 235, 276 S.E.2d 902 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701). No equal protection violation. - Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58). Extension of temporary custody proper. - Juvenile court did not err in granting a motion filed by a county de-
partment of family and children services (DFCS) to extend the department’s temporary custody of a mother’s children because any procedural defect in the commencement of the case was rendered moot when DFCS thereafter filed new deprivation petitions, new adjudicatory hearings were held on those petitions, and the juvenile court then entered orders granting those petitions and finding that the children continued to be deprived; although the record did not contain an original deprivation order entered by the juvenile court, the record reflected that DFCS subsequently filed new deprivation petitions while the children remained in the department’s care, and the juvenile court conducted adjudicatory hearings on those new petitions and then entered orders finding that the children were deprived. In the Interest of Q.A., 306 Ga. App. 386, 702 S.E.2d 701 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58). Juvenile court did not err in granting a motion filed by a county department of family and children services to extend the department’s temporary custody of a mother’s children because clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that a prior deprivation order needed to be extended in order to accomplish the order’s purpose of ensuring the safety and well-being of the children while the mother completed her reunification plan and prepared for the transition of her children back into her home; there was testimony at the hearing on the extension motion reflecting that the mother had not completed her reunification case plan goals of obtaining stable employment, submitting to random drug screens, and attending scheduled visitations with her children. In the Interest of Q.A., 306 Ga. App. 386, 702 S.E.2d 701 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58). Temporary custody and visitation rights. - Juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify an order granting temporary
custody of a deprived child to the Department of Family and Children Services and to permit visitation by parents who filed a petition for visitation rights four months after the custody order. In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41). Parent’s burden of proof when seeking modification. - Trial court erred in requiring a father to prove by clear and convincing proof that changed
circumstances warranted modification of an order placing the father’s children with their maternal aunts; the father retained an interest in the children sufficient to support a right to petition for modification, and the father was only required to prove the motion by a preponderance of the evidence. In re J. N., 302 Ga. App. 631, 691 S.E.2d 396 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).
PART 13 PERMANENT GUARDIANSHIP