Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-41, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-58, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this article, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's note at the beginning of the chapter.

In light of the reenactment of this chapter, effective January 1, 2014, the reader is advised to consult the annotations following Code Section 15-11-202, which may also be applicable to this Code section.

Custody by Department suspends parental right.

- Removal of custody of the child from the parents is a determination that, for whatever length of time custody is exercised by the Department of Family and Children Services, this right has been suspended, although not finally terminated. Rodgers v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 235, 276 S.E.2d 902 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701).

No equal protection violation.

- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Extension of temporary custody proper.

- Juvenile court did not err in granting a motion filed by a county department of family and children services (DFCS) to extend the department's temporary custody of a mother's children because any procedural defect in the commencement of the case was rendered moot when DFCS thereafter filed new deprivation petitions, new adjudicatory hearings were held on those petitions, and the juvenile court then entered orders granting those petitions and finding that the children continued to be deprived; although the record did not contain an original deprivation order entered by the juvenile court, the record reflected that DFCS subsequently filed new deprivation petitions while the children remained in the department's care, and the juvenile court conducted adjudicatory hearings on those new petitions and then entered orders finding that the children were deprived. In the Interest of Q.A., 306 Ga. App. 386, 702 S.E.2d 701 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Juvenile court did not err in granting a motion filed by a county department of family and children services to extend the department's temporary custody of a mother's children because clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that a prior deprivation order needed to be extended in order to accomplish the order's purpose of ensuring the safety and well-being of the children while the mother completed her reunification plan and prepared for the transition of her children back into her home; there was testimony at the hearing on the extension motion reflecting that the mother had not completed her reunification case plan goals of obtaining stable employment, submitting to random drug screens, and attending scheduled visitations with her children. In the Interest of Q.A., 306 Ga. App. 386, 702 S.E.2d 701 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Temporary custody and visitation rights.

- Juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify an order granting temporary custody of a deprived child to the Department of Family and Children Services and to permit visitation by parents who filed a petition for visitation rights four months after the custody order. In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).

Parent's burden of proof when seeking modification.

- Trial court erred in requiring a father to prove by clear and convincing proof that changed circumstances warranted modification of an order placing the father's children with their maternal aunts; the father retained an interest in the children sufficient to support a right to petition for modification, and the father was only required to prove the motion by a preponderance of the evidence. In re J. N., 302 Ga. App. 631, 691 S.E.2d 396 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Cross references.

- Power of judge of probate court to appoint guardian for minor, § 29-2-14.

Notice requirements relating to appointment of guardians for minors by judges of the probate court generally, § 29-2-17.

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-302, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-6 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-30.1, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Jurisdiction of juvenile court in transferred custody proceeding.

- In a custody proceeding transferred from the superior court, the juvenile court was authorized to issue an order restraining the future disclosure of information contained in the juvenile court's files and records and to punish for contempt any past unauthorized disclosure of that material. In re Burton, 271 Ga. 491, 521 S.E.2d 568 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the transfer of a father's petition for custody from Gwinnett County, Georgia, to Douglas County, Georgia because the "complaint for custody" that the father filed in Gwinnett County fairly was read as a petition to modify, vacate, or revoke the permanent guardianship, a petition over which the Juvenile Court of Douglas County had exclusive jurisdiction under the circumstances. In the Interest of M. F., 298 Ga. 138, 780 S.E.2d 291 (2015).

Adoption, not guardianship, in child's best interest.

- Evidence authorized a juvenile court's finding that the termination of a parent's parental rights and the award of the child's permanent custody to DFCS to place for adoption with the child's foster family were in the child's best interest; this was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's denial of the parent's request that the child's grandmother be appointed guardian. The grandmother had already been determined unsuitable. In the Interest of S. P., 336 Ga. App. 488, 784 S.E.2d 846 (2016).

Appointment of permanent guardian proper.

- Trial court was authorized to conclude that the permanent guardian demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment of a permanent guardian would be in the child's best interest as the mother had not completed her case plan, the child had experienced chronic neglect, and the mother lacked the necessary skills to meet the child's severe needs and ensure she received the essential services she was entitled to. In the Interest of K. G., 344 Ga. App. 674, 811 S.E.2d 451 (2018).

Award of permanent guardianship affirmed.

- Award of permanent guardianship to the aunt was affirmed because the parent gave no reason to believe that any objection to taking judicial notice of the deprivation order would have had any merit, nor did the parent identify specific evidence that the parent would have brought forward to challenge the earlier deprivation order. In the Interest of L. B., 319 Ga. App. 173, 735 S.E.2d 162 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.1)

Guardian's petition for permanent guardianship was properly granted as reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the mother would be detrimental to the child because the child was born with Down Syndrome and a congenital heart defect, and had special needs; the mother made no efforts to obtain support or to prepare for the child's birth, even though the child would require services immediately; the mother was unable to get along with the child's service providers to the point that the providers did not want to continue providing services to the child; and the mother lacked the necessary skills to be able to meet the child's severe needs and the ability to ensure that the child received the services to which the child was entitled. In the Interest of K. G., 343 Ga. App. 345, 807 S.E.2d 70 (2017).

Guardianship of a child under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-240 was upheld based on evidence specifically showing that, in light of the child's diagnosed disorders, continued uncertainty about the child's living situation and guardianship would be harmful, and based on the mother's history of drug use and current lack of established, long-term stability and sobriety. In the Interest of J. W., 346 Ga. App. 443, 816 S.E.2d 409 (2018).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-302 and pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-6, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Jurisdiction to appoint guardians for children.

- Former statute implicitly recognized that courts other than juvenile courts had jurisdiction to appoint guardians for children. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-15 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-302).

Support proceedings.

- Subsection (b) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15) authorized the superior court to transfer to the juvenile court support cases not involving a question of paternity as well as those support proceedings originating from a court-established support unit in the judicial circuit. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-7 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Superior court may not transfer a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding to a juvenile court under subsection (b) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15). 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-7 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Paternity questions.

- Since no provision under subsection (b) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15) would permit the transfer of paternity questions to a juvenile court, no case in which paternity was involved may be transferred under that statute by a superior court to a juvenile court. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-7 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Permanent custody determination upon divorce decree.

- When a superior court transfers the question of custody determination to a juvenile court pursuant to subsection (b) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15), the juvenile court may make only a temporary custody determination pending the outcome of the divorce action; but if the divorce decree is entered the juvenile court can then make a permanent custody determination. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U94-1 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 27 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 40 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 343 et seq. 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 180 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 366 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 3.

ALR.

- Parent's involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as evincing neglect, unfitness, or the like in dependency or divestiture proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417.