Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-41, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-58, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Jurisdiction to award permanent custody over juvenile court's award of temporary custody.

- Judgment was reversed because the juvenile court's authority to place a child in the custody of a "willing" and "qualified" relative was not authority to award permanent custody of the child as custody was determined by discerning the best interests of the child and not the willingness or the qualifications of a person to take temporary custody of the child. Ertter v. Dunbar, 292 Ga. 103, 734 S.E.2d 403 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

No equal protection violation.

- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

No application to legal custodians.

- Affording the text of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-204 its plain and ordinary meaning, viewing the statute in the context in which the statute appears, and reading the statute in its most natural and reasonable way, the presumption set forth therein that reunification is detrimental to a child adjudicated as a dependent child applies to a parent and does not to apply to the circumstance of the failure of a child's legal custodian to comply with a previously-ordered plan to reunite the family; thus, the juvenile court erred in applying that presumption to the child's aunt and uncle as the child's legal custodians. In the Interest of B. G., 345 Ga. App. 167, 812 S.E.2d 552 (2018).

Findings made without transcript reversed.

- Because the juvenile court primarily based the court's decision that a parent's two children were deprived, awarding temporary custody of the children to the county, on evidence received at an unrecorded hearing, and a waiver requiring a transcript of that hearing was not in evidence, those findings were reversed, and the case was remanded. In the Interest of D.P., 284 Ga. App. 453, 644 S.E.2d 299 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Hearing not precondition to commencement of termination proceeding.

- Since the Department of Family and Children Services included plans for reunification in case plans prior to the date a citizen review panel recommended termination of parental rights, a hearing was not a precondition to the commencement of termination proceedings. In re K.H., 229 Ga. App. 307, 494 S.E.2d 69 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).

Court had jurisdiction to enter termination of parental rights.

- Juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter a termination of parental rights order because the juvenile court scheduled a timely hearing on the Department of Human Resource's motion for an extension, and the mother was served with notice of the hearing; the mother, however, failed to appear for the scheduled hearing. By failing to appear for a timely hearing of which the mother had notice, the mother waived the requirement of a hearing before the expiration of the earlier custody order. In the Interest of M.S.S., 308 Ga. App. 614, 708 S.E.2d 570 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Notice of nonreunification.

- Parent had notice that the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services was seeking nonreunification and had the opportunity to contest the issue; after a hearing the court continued the case, noting that a nonreunification case plan had been filed and the parent was contesting the issue of nonreunification, and the hearing was held on the later date with the parent and the parent's attorney present at the hearing. In the Interest of A. E., 314 Ga. App. 206, 723 S.E.2d 499 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Reasonable efforts at reunification not required.

- Reasonable efforts toward reunification of a father with his child were not required because the court made findings of aggravated circumstances including a finding that the father had sexually abused the child and the child's siblings. In the Interest of B.M., 252 Ga. App. 716, 556 S.E.2d 883 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a juvenile court's judgment that reunification services were inappropriate for a mother with a history of drug and alcohol use, whose minor child had been taken from her home on three occasions because of the mother's inability to provide adequate food, clothing, and shelter for the child. In the Interest of J.P.V., 261 Ga. App. 194, 582 S.E.2d 170 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Although former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-134) required a juvenile court to make a finding of fact as to whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made prior to placement of the children in a county agency in a parental rights termination proceeding, such finding was not required because the children had already been found to be deprived by the mother. In the Interest of S.N.L., 275 Ga. App. 600, 621 S.E.2d 792 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Termination of a parent's rights to a child was not barred by the parent's claim that a county department of family and children services established a nonreunification plan before contacting the parent and then denied the parent's requests for information; former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58 did not impose upon termination proceedings the same procedures that applied to disposition orders and recommendations regarding reunification and did not obligate the department in every case to create a plan for reunification, and when the department afforded the parent an opportunity to participate in the case by mailing the initial case plan to the parent and explaining the need to legitimize the child, the parent failed to seize the opportunity or to comply timely with the instructions on legitimization. In the Interest of T.C., 282 Ga. App. 659, 639 S.E.2d 601 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Juvenile court did not err in approving a nonreunification plan when convincing evidence showed reunification was not in the best interests of the children and the likelihood that it would only prolong their deprivation. In the Interest of U.B., 246 Ga. App. 328, 540 S.E.2d 278 (2000).

Evidence that the children's mother permitted and/or assisted her husband in making videotapes for distribution of the children being stripped and spanked was sufficient to show that reunification services between the children and their mother should not be provided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(h) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-204); furthermore, a presumption against nonreunification existed because of the evidence of the mother's past egregious conduct, and there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption favoring reunifications. In the Interest of J.P., 253 Ga. App. 732, 560 S.E.2d 318 (2002).

Reunification was not appropriate since evidence of the children's starvation, coupled with the mother's complete denial of responsibility for their emaciated condition, amply supported the juvenile court's findings that she physically neglected the children and that reunification would be detrimental to the children. In the Interest of R.N.R., 257 Ga. App. 93, 570 S.E.2d 388 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support a juvenile court's approval of nonreunification of the mother and her child under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(h) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-204) as the mother failed to rebut the presumption that reunification services not be provided due to her medically verifiable health deficiency when the mother provided evidence that she complied with her prenatal care, did fine during pregnancy even though she was not on her medication, and was a loving mother, but a psychiatrist testified that the mother was mentally ill, that the illness could cause the mother to hurt the child, and that the mother's mental condition was likely to continue. In the Interest of D.L.W., 264 Ga. App. 168, 590 S.E.2d 183 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

As the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of a medically verifiable condition creating the parent's inability to properly parent the children, this finding created a presumption that reunification services need not be provided. In the Interest of A.W., 264 Ga. App. 705, 592 S.E.2d 177 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's judgment that reunification efforts should be discontinued as to the mother as clear and convincing evidence showed that the mother had not, as required by the reunification plan, gone six consecutive months without testing positive for drugs and had refused to submit to two drug screenings; also, the mother had not rebutted the presumption that reunification efforts should be discontinued. In the Interest of J.B., 274 Ga. App. 564, 618 S.E.2d 187 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Plan for nonreunification under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(h) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-204) was in the child's best interests since: (1) the grandmother relapsed after regaining custody and became so drunk that she passed out and left the four-year-old child unsupervised; (2) the incident resulted in the grandmother's father applying for a protection order; (3) the grandmother was dismissed from a substance abuse treatment program; (4) the grandmother pled guilty to driving under the influence and child endangerment two years earlier; and (5) the child had behavioral problems that resulted in hospitalization and that led a child services agency to seek therapeutic foster care before seeking permanent adoption. In the Interest of J.B., 274 Ga. App. 20, 619 S.E.2d 305 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Trial court properly granted an agency's motion to end reunification services provided to the parents as the evidence indicated that the parents refused to cooperate with case plans and had completely denied responsibility for placing the children in a harmful situation. In the Interest of D.B., 277 Ga. App. 454, 627 S.E.2d 101 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Rational trier of fact could have found clear and convincing evidence that the parent unjustifiably failed to comply with the reunification plan and that reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent would be detrimental to the child under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(h) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-204); the parent failed to complete parenting classes, failed to obtain stable housing and employment, failed to pay child support, failed to attend psychotherapy, and disappeared for months at a time without explanation and without visiting the child. In the Interest of C.A., 279 Ga. App. 747, 632 S.E.2d 698 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

In the termination of parental rights case, contrary to the mother's argument, the reunification plan complied with former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(c)(3) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-201); the plan required the mother, who was mentally retarded, to prove that the mother could be a fit parent, and the mother failed to show this. In the Interest of H.F.G., 281 Ga. App. 22, 635 S.E.2d 338 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Order holding that reunification efforts on the part of a mother were not in the best interest of her two children was upheld on appeal pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(h) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-204) since the record established that the mother suffered from mental illness and was unable to care for her children. The mother failed to rebut the presumption that reunification services were inappropriate when she had unjustifiably failed to comply with a previously ordered plan. In the Interest of T.L., 285 Ga. App. 526, 646 S.E.2d 728 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Although a parent made substantial progress on a reunification plan while incarcerated, an order extending temporary custody for an additional year in favor of the Department of Family and Children Services was upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented that the parent was unable to: (1) establish stable housing; (2) complete a substance abuse assessment; and (3) demonstrate six months of clean drug screens; further, as the parent was living with the other parent who evidence showed to be an unrehabilitated drug user, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the child at issue would not be in a safe environment if returned to the parent. In the Interest of R.B., 285 Ga. App. 556, 647 S.E.2d 300 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Juvenile court did not err in approving nonreunification with regard to a parent and two twin children as some evidence showed that the parent: unjustifiably failed to comply with the case plan goals to provide financial support for the children; failed to maintain stable housing and employment; failed to attend all scheduled psychological evaluations; exhibited paranoid and psychopathic personality tendencies to the extent that the parent's ability to care for the children was severely impaired; and was convicted of threatening a prior spouse and stalking that spouse and children and, thus, had engaged in actions which constituted egregious conduct toward those children. In the Interest of T.W., 288 Ga. App. 386, 654 S.E.2d 218 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Trial court properly extended a department of family and child services' custody of a child when the child's mother, communicating with the child over the Internet while posing as an adult man, had pretended to have witnessed a sexually graphic event; the child was especially vulnerable to sexually inappropriate behavior; and the mother's conduct during visitation with the child, including her statements that the child would be a suspect if anything happened to the mother, that the child would never live with her father, and that the child was "acting like a whore," was also probative of whether she would act abusively toward her daughter if she were returned to her custody. The fact that the mother had substantially completed her reunification case plan did not mandate that the child be returned to her custody. In the Interest of Q.H., 291 Ga. App. 598, 662 S.E.2d 358 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

There was sufficient clear and convincing evidence presented to authorize the juvenile court to find that a mother's child was deprived and that the deprivation was likely to continue, and consequently, that reunification of the child with the mother would be detrimental to the child and was not in the child's best interest because, while the juvenile court took into consideration the previous termination of the mother's parental rights in determining whether the child was deprived, the juvenile court also heard substantial evidence showing that the mother's mental, emotional, and financial condition had not changed significantly since her parental rights to her children were terminated and that, despite the assistance of the Department of Family and Children Services and the loss of her four children, the mother still lacked the necessary skills, judgment, and resources to properly care for the child. In re R. B., 309 Ga. App. 407, 710 S.E.2d 611 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Juvenile court did not err in terminating the reunification services and approving the non-reunification plan because clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that the child was deprived based on the mother's long-term substance abuse and that such deprivation was likely to continue and cause harm to the child. In the Interest of J. T., 322 Ga. App. 4, 743 S.E.2d 571 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Reunification inappropriate when children had severe medical issues.

- Trial court did not err in granting a motion filed by the Department of Family and Children Services for nonreunification because evidence supported the trial court's finding that the parents were not able to meet their children's medical needs, and the children's lives would be endangered if the appropriate level of care was not maintained; the parents' physical neglect of the children and their continuing inability to meet their children's extensive medical needs was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find by clear and convincing evidence that reunification efforts would be detrimental to the children. In the Interest of A.M., 306 Ga. App. 358, 702 S.E.2d 686 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Report recommending nonreuni- fication met requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-200), notwithstanding evidence which the mother contended showed that the contents of the report recommending nonreunification were determined prior to her meeting with caseworkers for the county Department of Family and Children Services. Although the court agreed with the mother that a report should not be finalized until after such a meeting had been conducted, it disagreed with the mother's apparent contention that nothing should be committed to writing prior to such meeting. In the Interest of T.R., 248 Ga. App. 310, 548 S.E.2d 621 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Failure to provide child support resulted in nonreunification.

- Because a presumption of non-unification arose after a parent failed to pay child support or comply with the reunification plan, reunification services were properly discontinued; but a placement order with a foster care agency was reversed as a grandparent presented uncontradicted evidence supporting a consideration for alternative placement. In the Interest of J.J., 287 Ga. App. 746, 652 S.E.2d 639 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Discontinuing efforts for reunification not appropriate.

- Evidence that the mother had substantially complied with the reunification plan and that, in the opinion of the psychologist retained by the Department of Family and Children Services, the psychologist did not understand why the department was seeking to end reunification efforts when the only way it was possible to determine if the mother would be able to effectively parent her eight year old child in the future was by reuniting the mother and child overcame the statutory presumption that reunification was not appropriate in cases when a child had been removed from the mother's home on at least two prior occasions and reunification services had been made available on those occasions. In the Interest of M.H., 251 Ga. App. 528, 554 S.E.2d 616 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Finding of reunification efforts not required.

- Because the children had not been placed in the custody of the Department of Family and Children Services, the trial court was not required to find that the agency had made reasonable reunification efforts. In the Interest of T.R., 284 Ga. App. 742, 644 S.E.2d 880 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Parent's complicity in murder.

- When a mother's boyfriend was charged with murdering one of her three children, and she was charged with complicity, and since there was no evidence she knew that the boyfriend abused her children, and none of the aggravated circumstances contained in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a)(4)(A)-(C) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-203) had been shown, the trial court erred in excusing the state from making reasonable efforts toward reunification. In the Interest of A.B., 263 Ga. App. 697, 589 S.E.2d 264 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Reunification order insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review.

- Juvenile court's order that reunification was not in a child's best interests was vacated because the juvenile court found that reunification efforts would be detrimental to the child but did not specify which, if any, of the presumptions under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(h) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-204) supported the court's finding; therefore, it was impossible for the court of appeals to determine whether the order was supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.S., 310 Ga. App. 100, 712 S.E.2d 121 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Law reviews.

- For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973). For article, "Third Party Stepparent Childcare," see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (2016).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-41, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-58, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this part, are included in the annotations for this part. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Jurisdiction.

- Superior court properly declined jurisdiction in a custody action brought by grandparents because once a juvenile court took jurisdiction of a deprivation action concerning the child and, later, a termination action of parental rights, the court took jurisdiction of the entire case of the minor child including the issues of disposition and custody. Segars v. State, 309 Ga. App. 732, 710 S.E.2d 916 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Foster children.

- Former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-13 and15-11-58 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-30,15-11-134, and15-11-200 et seq.), and O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-690.1 and49-5-12 were not too vague and amorphous to be enforced by the judiciary and impose specific duties on the state defendants; thus, the federal regulatory scheme embodied in the CSFR process did not relieve the state defendants of the defendants obligation to fulfill the defendants statutory duties to the foster children, nor did the former statute provide a legal excuse for the defendants failure to do so. Kenny A. v. Perdue, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

No equal protection violation.

- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58).

Temporary custody and visitation rights.

- Juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify an order granting temporary custody of a deprived child to the Department of Family and Children Services and to permit visitation by parents who filed a petition for visitation rights four months after the custody order. In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).

Consolidated proceedings not appealable when party consented.

- Having consented to the consolidation of nonreunification proceedings with termination proceedings, the mother could not challenge the procedure for the first time on appeal. In the Interest of A.S.O., 243 Ga. App. 1, 530 S.E.2d 261 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1176, 121 S. Ct. 1150, 148 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 50. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 60 et seq., 116.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 72 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 38 et seq., 63 et seq., 73 et seq., 90 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 36.