O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (2019)

Computations of time

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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Statute text

(a) When a period of time measured in days, weeks, months, years, or other measurements of time is prescribed for the exercise of any privilege or the discharge of any duty, the first day shall not be counted but the last day shall be counted; and, if the last day falls on a weekend, the party having such privilege or duty shall have through the following business day to exercise such privilege or discharge such duty.

(b) When the last day prescribed for the exercise of any privilege or the discharge of any duty falls on a public and legal holiday as set forth in Code Section 1-4-1, the party having such privilege or duty shall have through the next business day to exercise such privilege or discharge such duty.

(c) When the period of time prescribed is less than seven days, intermediate weekends and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.

History

(Code 1981, § 15-11-5, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-2/SB 364.)

Annotations

The 2014 amendment, effective April 28, 2014, deleted "except hours" preceding "is prescribed" near the beginning of subsection (a).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Weekend days excluded. - Trial court properly denied the defendant juvenile's motion to dismiss because the delinquency petition, which was filed on the Tuesday after the Thursday on which the defendant was detained, was timely filed since the 72-hour period was clearly less than seven days and the weekend days were excluded from computation. In the Interest of C. M. B., 335 Ga. App. 456, 781 S.E.2d 570 (2016).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 121 cases, 1984–2016 · leading case: Bishop v. State, 462 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1995).

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Bishop v. State, 462 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1995). · cites it 76× “OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A). Acting pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (C), the district attorney did not decline to prosecute in the superior court and Bishop was indicted for the offenses.”

In the Interest of C. M. B., a Child, 781 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 24× “The trial court entered an order denying the verbal motion, finding that under OCGA § 15-11-5, the day C. M. B. was detained and the intervening weekend days were not included in calculating the 72-hour period.”

H. C. S. v. Grebel, 321 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 12× “In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied on OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (2) (C), which provides that juvenile courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters and shall be the sole court for initiating action involving any proceedings "[f]or the termination of…”

Watkins v. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 1996). · cites it 8× “7 In this regard, OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (1) (C) provides that juvenile courts “have exclusive .”

Reynolds v. State, 458 S.E.2d 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 16× “Reynolds asserts that his case should have been transferred to juvenile court pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (B) because the State introduced evidence of offenses which occurred prior to the effective date of OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A) which gave exclusive jurisdiction to…”

In the Interest of B. C. P., 493 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 8× “Pennyman contends the petition does not properly allege the child was then presently deprived because Mrs.”

State v. Johnson, 738 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 8× “1012, 1034; then OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A); now OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) (A).”

In the Interest of B. G. D., 479 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 8× “This case deals with the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (2) (C) and the right of a surrendering parent to withdraw a voluntarily given consent to the adoption of a child and the surrender of such person’s parental rights.”

Anderson v. the State, 788 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “) OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (1991). Juvenile courts and superior courts thus had concurrent jurisdiction over a child under 17 years old who committed a crime punishable by loss of life or confinement for life.”

State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995). · cites it 4× “Ga.Code Ann. § 15-11-5 (1994). Therefore, Georgia's scheme is now similar to Vermont's, wherein prosecutor discretion is generally limited to deciding which cases to remove to juvenile court and is not usually allowed in deciding which cases to remove to adult jurisdiction.”

Reynolds v. State, 466 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 1996). · cites it 11× “OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A) (“subsection (b) (2) (A)”), which gives the superior court exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to have committed, inter alia, aggravated child molestation and aggravated sodomy, became effective on May 1, 1994.”

State v. Watson, 520 S.E.2d 911 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 8× “In the special case of juvenile offenders indicted under OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A), evidence sufficient to support the allegations of the indictment is necessary to establish the superior court’s authority to exercise original subject matter jurisdiction over a matter…”

Show all 121 citing cases →

— 15-11-5(a) — 2 cases

In Re Jefferson, 645 S.E.2d 349 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).

In Re Kd, 613 S.E.2d 239 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).

— 15-11-5(a)(1)(C) — 2 cases

Watkins v. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 1996). “7 In this regard, OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (1) (C) provides that juvenile courts “have exclusive .”

In Re Kml, 516 S.E.2d 363 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).

— 15-11-5(a)(2)(C) — 6 cases

In the Interest of B. G. D., 479 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). “This case deals with the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (2) (C) and the right of a surrendering parent to withdraw a voluntarily given consent to the adoption of a child and the surrender of such person’s parental rights.”

Watkins v. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 1996). “7 In this regard, OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) (1) (C) provides that juvenile courts “have exclusive .”

In Re Bas, 563 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).

In Re Jcw, 727 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).

In Re Jh, 536 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).

— 15-11-5(b) — 1 case

McIntyre v. State, 463 S.E.2d 476 (Ga. 1995).

— 15-11-5(b)(1) — 2 cases

Bishop v. State, 462 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1995). “OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A). Acting pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (C), the district attorney did not decline to prosecute in the superior court and Bishop was indicted for the offenses.”

In Re Jlb, 634 S.E.2d 514 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).

— 15-11-5(b)(2) — 1 case

— 15-11-5(b)(2)(A) — 3 cases

State v. Watson, 520 S.E.2d 911 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “In the special case of juvenile offenders indicted under OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A), evidence sufficient to support the allegations of the indictment is necessary to establish the superior court’s authority to exercise original subject matter jurisdiction over a matter…”

Appling v. State, 470 S.E.2d 761 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).

— 15-11-5(b)(2)(A)(vii) — 1 case

— 15-11-5(b)(2)(C) — 1 case

— 15-11-5(c) — 1 case

In Re Mcj, 523 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 1999).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.