CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 1995 | 265 Ga. 821
...Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, Caroline Wight Donaldson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee. CARLEY, Justice. Walter Wayne Bishop is a 14-year-old who allegedly committed multiple offenses which are within the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the superior court. OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2)(A). Acting pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2)(C), the district attorney did not decline to prosecute in the superior court and Bishop was indicted for the offenses. After his indictment, Bishop filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to transfer to the juvenile court. These motions were predicated upon Bishop's challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2). The trial court denied Bishop's motions, but certified its order for immediate review. Bishop's application for an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order was granted. We hold that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) is constitutional and that the trial court therefore correctly denied Bishop's motions. 1. Bishop contends that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) is unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III. Subsection (C) of OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) does clothe the district attorney with pre-indictment discretionary authority to decline to prosecute in the superior court and to transfer the case to the appropriate juvenile court for adjudication....
...rior court, but gives the General Assembly the power to alter that jurisdiction in felony cases involving juvenile offenders. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I. The General Assembly has exercised this constitutional power by enacting OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2), which retains exclusive jurisdiction in the superior court over a juvenile 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed certain serious crimes, but which also provides in subsection (C) that the district attorney is clothe...
...This discretionary choice of forums afforded the district attorney is simply a consequence of the exercise by the General Assembly of the power delegated to it by the Constitution. Chapman v. State, supra at 593(3),
385 S.E.2d 661. *718 Subsection (B) of OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) also clothes the superior court with post-indictment discretion, "after investigation and for extraordinary cause," to transfer certain cases to the juvenile court....
...rior court does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by exercising its discretionary statutory authority to retain or to transfer a case to juvenile court. See Chapman v. State, supra at 593(3),
385 S.E.2d 661. In Chapman, we held that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(1) does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Likewise, we now hold that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) does not violate that doctrine. 2. Bishop also contends that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) is violative of the due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions....
...Thus, a juvenile's right to be tried in the juvenile court derives from statutory, rather than constitutional, law. "[A] juvenile has no right to be tried in juvenile court unless state statutes provide otherwise." Chapman v. State, supra at 592(2),
385 S.E.2d 661. Subsection (A) of OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) provides that, as to the crimes enumerated therein, the superior court retains exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile defendants 13 to 17 years of age. Subsections (B) and (C) of OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) merely grant the superior court and the district attorney the discretionary authority to transfer the case to juvenile court, "after investigation and for extraordinary cause." A juvenile does not acquire special rights until such ti...
...17, 18(3),
257 S.E.2d 525 (1979); Woodard v. Wainwright,
556 F.2d 781, 785-786 (5th Cir.1977); State v. Cain,
381 So.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (Fla.1980); Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d 454, 459, 393 N.E.2d 450, 454-55 (1979). In Chapman, we held that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(1) does not violate the due process rights of juveniles. Likewise, we now hold that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) does not violate the due process rights of juveniles. 3. Bishop further contends that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) is violative of the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions....
...rict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved.' [Cit.]" In the Interest of J.J.S.,
246 Ga. 617, 618(1),
272 S.E.2d 294 (1980). No showing has been made that the classification in OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2)(A) of offenses over which the superior court retains exclusive jurisdiction is arbitrary or discriminatory. See Woodard v. Wainwright, supra at 785. To the contrary, the General Assembly has indicated that the classification in OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2)(A) rests upon rational bases: (1) the need for secure placement of certain violent juvenile offenders; (2) the safety of students and citizens of Georgia; and, (3) the need for the Department of Children and Youth Services to apply its resources to less violent and nonviolent juvenile offenders....
...It follows that the trial court correctly denied Bishop's motion to dismiss and motion to transfer to juvenile court. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. BENHAM, Chief Justice, concurring. I concur fully in the majority opinion; however, the fact that OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2) has today withstood constitutional attack does not mean that the statute cannot be improved....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 31, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 49
NAHMIAS, Justice.
According to OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), the State mustfile apetition alleging delinquency against a juvenile who is not detained within 30 days of the filing of the complaint or seek an extension of that deadline from the juvenile court. These cases present the question of what happens when the State fails to meet this requirement.
In In the Interest of M. D. H.,
334 Ga. App. 394 (779 SE2d 433) (2015), a panel of the Court of Appeals held that the failure to comply with OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) requires dismissal of the juvenile case, but the dismissal is without prejudice. See M. D. H.,
334 Ga. App. at 395. Three days later, a different panel answered the same question the opposite way, concluding that a violation of OCGA §
15-11-521(b) requires dismissal with prejudice. See In the Interest of D. V. H.,
335 Ga. App. 299, 299 (779 SE2d 122) (2015). We granted certiorari in both cases, asking whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied OCGA §
15-11-521 (b)....
...H. was not detained.
On January 6, 2015, a petition alleging delinquency against M. D. H. was filed in the juvenile court. M. D. H. filed a motion to dismiss the petition because it was not filed within 30 days of the complaint as required by OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), and no request for an extension of time was filed by the State or granted by the juvenile court.1 After a hearing at which the State admitted that it missed the deadline set by OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) and did not ask for an extension, the juvenile court dismissed the case on January 28....
...ion to dismiss the second petition. See M. D. H.,
334 Ga. App. at 395. The Court of Appeals relied primarily on this Court’s decision in In the Interest of R. D. F.,
266 Ga. 294 (466 SE2d 572) (1996), which was decided before the enactment of OCGA §
15-11-521 and held that the failure to comply with former OCGA §
15-11-26 (a), which established a deadline for setting the adjudicatory hearing in juvenile cases, resulted in dismissal of the case without prejudice....
...committed the delinquent acts of criminal trespass and theft by taking (misdemeanors) and criminal damage to property in the second degree (a felony) when he trespassed on private property, stole a surveillance camera, and damaged a pick-up truck. The 30-day deadline imposed by OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) for filing a delinquency petition against D....
...H., alleging the same facts and criminal acts alleged in the October 8 complaints. Petitions alleging delinquency based on these complaints were filed on December 16. At the arraignment hearing, D. V. H. moved to dismiss the new petitions on the ground that they were not timely filed pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), because they were filed more than 30 days after the complaints that first alleged the conduct at issue....
...complaint” as “the initial document setting out the circumstances that resulted in a child being brought before the court,” OCGA §
15-11-2 (14), meant that the new complaints were not “complaints” that reset the 30-day period under OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) because they set forth the same circumstances as the original complaints....
...The court also cited In the Interest of C. B.,
313 Ga. App. 778 (723 SE2d 21) (2012), in reasoning that allowing the State to file new complaints to reset the deadline for filing a delinquency petition would eviscerate the time limitation established by OCGA §
15-11-521 (b)....
...D. H.) or seeks an extension but is denied (as in D. V. H.) does not affect the consequence for missing the deadline. The same question — what is that consequence? — is presented in both of these cases, and we will proceed to address it.
OCGA §
15-11-521 was enacted as part of Georgia’s new Juvenile Code, which took effect on January 1, 2014....
...But while this deadline is express and unequivocal — the petition “shall be filed within 30 days” — the statute does not articulate what the remedy is for missing the deadline. So we must determine what remedy the General Assembly meant to impose with this silence.
We have yet to address this question as to OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), but as the Court of Appeals’ panel recognized in M....
...hall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition. In the event the child is not in detention, the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition.
Like OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), former OCGA §
15-11-26 (a) used mandatory language — the court “shall fix a time ....
...able remedy afforded for a non-compliance with OCGA §
17-7-170. The legislature did not so provide.
R. D. F,
266 Ga. at 296 (citation and punctuation omitted).
We also noted that former OCGA §
15-11-21, a related statute analogous to current OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), similarly lacked an explicit direction to dismiss with prejudice.4 Thus, the Court concluded that a violation of former OCGA §
15-11-26 (a), as well as former OCGA §
15-11-21, required dismissal but without prejudice....
...h as the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.’ ” Zilke v. State,
299 Ga. 232, 236 (787 SE2d 745) (2016) (citation omitted).
4. M. D. H. andD. V. H. argue that the juvenile statutes discussed in R. D. F. are different from OCGA §
15-11-521 in two respects that make the reasoning of that case inapplicable. First, subsection (a) of OCGA §
15-11-521 provides explicitly for dismissal without prejudice as the consequence for missing that subsection’s deadline, but subsection (b) does not....
...OCGA §
15-11-26 or OCGA §
15-11-21, M. D. H. and D. V. H. argue that we should presume that the consequence for missing the deadline in (b) is different from the consequence expressed in (a). Second, unlike the statutes considered in R. D. F, OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) establishes a specific procedure for the State to seek an extension if it needs more than 30 days to file a petition. M. D. H. and D. V. H. argue that the General Assembly must have intended that extension procedure to be the only way the State could bring a petition on the facts of a complaint after the 30-day window closed.
*53If we were interpreting OCGA §
15-11-521 without precedents like R....
...but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts.”
Chase v. State,
285 Ga. 693, 695-696 (681 SE2d 116) (2009) (citations omitted).
R. D. F. was well-established law at the time the General Assembly drafted and passed OCGA §
15-11-521 in 2013....
...ejudice when that was the desired result. See OCGA §
15-11-660 (d) (providing for dismissal of a petition with prejudice in certain cases where the child is found to be incompetent). Neither the omission of remedial language that is present in OCGA §
15-11-521 (a) nor the inclusion of a specific deadline-extension process qualify as the express directive to acquit contemplated in R. D. F.
Nevertheless, M. D. H. and D. V. H. contend that we must read the extension provision in OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) as requiring dismissal with prejudice if the State lets the 30-day petition deadline pass without using it, because to do otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless....
...At oral argument, counsel for D. V. H. suggested that statutes of limitation are not really relevant in the context of Juvenile Code complaints and petitions. But the General Assembly made express reference to the relevance of statutes of limitation in OCGA §
15-11-521, saying in subsection (a) that if the 72-hour time limit for filing a petition against a detained child is not met and the complaint is accordingly dismissed without prejudice, a *55petition may be refiled as provided in subsection (b) b...
...on of the case, seeking an extension of the petition-filing deadline could, in many cases, better serve the State’s interests. As the parties acknowledged at oral argument, nothing in the statute limits the length ofan extension granted under OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), whereas as soon as the State files a new complaint, it willbe back on the 30-day clock....
...riminal charge against a detained juvenile to the grand jury to “one extension . . . not to exceed 90 additional days”).7 For these reasons, following the statutory construction precedent that R. D. F. had clearly established by the time of OCGA §
15-11-521’s enactment does not render the statute’s extension provision meaningless.
5....
...raises two additional arguments not made by M. D. H. Neither argument is persuasive.
(a) D. V. H. first argues that the panel in his case was correct in concluding that a new complaint based on the same facts as a dismissed complaint is not a “complaint” under OCGA §
15-11-521....
...here be only one complaint for a given set of facts. OCGA §
15-11-2 (14) defines complaint as “the initial document setting out the circumstances that resulted in a child being brought before the court.” Once a complaint is dismissed under OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), there is no case pending against the child....
...See OCGA §
15-11-16 (a) (3). What would preclude a second complaint with the same allegations is not the definition of “complaint” but rather a dismissal with prejudice of the first complaint, which we have explained is not the remedy for missing the deadline in OCGA §
15-11-521 (b).
(b) D....
...— a case that addresses not a time limitation within the Juvenile Code but rather OCGA §
17-7-50.1, a statute in the Criminal Procedure Code that deals with superior court jurisdiction over juveniles.
In any event, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 is textually different from OCGA §
15-11-521 in a pertinent way....
...S.’s conclusion is correct — a question we need not decide today — the statute at issue there provides an express consequence for the State’s failure to meet its 180-day deadline: the case is transferred to the juvenile court to proceed under the Juvenile *57Code. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b). By contrast, OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) says nothing about the consequence of the State’s failure to meet its 30-day petition-filing deadline....
...ssible — one that would preclude the delinquent act alleged from being addressed and the juvenile and criminal law from being enforced. Implying such an extreme remedy for what happens in the 30-day complaint-to-petition period established by OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) would be especially odd, given that the Juvenile Code appears to place no time limit on the initial filing of the complaint (except the statute of limitation) or on an extension of the deadline for filing a petition (except the constitutional right to a speedy trial).
If the General Assembly wishes to impose a harsher consequence than dismissal without prejudice for the State’s failure to comply with OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), it can do so by expressly providing for that remedy, as we explained 20 years ago in R....
...Rogers, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys, for the State (case no. S16G0428).
Stephen A. Bradley, District Attorney, Joseph M. McKinnon, Assistant District Attorney, for the State (case no. S16G0546).
Because the 30th day after December 5 was Sunday, January 4, the petition was due by January 5. See OCGA §
15-11-5 (a)....
...15, 20-22 (789 SE2d274) (2016) (Ray, J., concurring specially, joined by Presiding Judges Barnes and Ellington). We need not decide whether untimely requests for extensions may be granted in order to resolve the case before us, although we note that there appears to be nothing in the language of OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) or in the Criminal Procedure Code or Juvenile Code permitting such a practice....
...deadline extension upon a motion made after the expiration of the specified period if the failure to comply was the result of excusable neglect). We will address J. F. in due course.
The extension of time that the juvenile court grants under OCGA §
15-11-521 (b) maybe reviewable for abuse of discretion and is limited by the juvenile’s constitutional right to a speedy trial....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 12, 1996 | 266 Ga. 235, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 607
...Appellant, a juvenile, was indicted in November 1994 on charges of aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, and child molestation. The indictment was based upon a continuing series of acts which occurred both before and after May 1, 1994. OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2)(A) ("subsection (b)(2)(A)"), which gives the superior court exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to have committed, inter alia, aggravated child molestation and aggravated sodomy, became effective on May 1, 1994. Before trial commenced, appellant moved to transfer the case to juvenile court under OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2)(B), which authorizes the superior court to transfer cases under its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A) to the juvenile court "upon investigation and for extraordinary cause." Appellant's motion was denied....
...on and aggravated sodomy. Because child molestation is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior court under subsection (b)(2)(A), appellant moved to have the case transferred to the juvenile court for final disposition, pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2)(D)....
...ion, which was part of the same criminal transaction as the two greater offenses. [5] Appellant claims that the superior court erred in denying his first motion to transfer, because "extraordinary cause" warranting a transfer to juvenile court under section
15-11-5(b)(2)(B) existed....
...t the evidence considered by the jury to only that occurring after May 1, 1994. Furthermore, we find that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's second motion to transfer, which was made after the jury's verdict. OCGA §
15-11-5(b)(2)(D) states that "the superior court may transfer any case involving a [juvenile] alleged to have committed *221 any offense enumerated in [subsection (b)(2)(A) ] and convicted of a lesser included offense not included in [subsection (...
