O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) No person shall be judge of the juvenile court unless, at the time of his or her appointment, he or she has attained the age of 30 years, has been a citizen of this state for three years, is a member of the State Bar of Georgia, and has practiced law for five years. (b) A juvenile court judge shall be eligible for reappointment or reelection.
History
Code 1981, § 15-11-51, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.
Annotations
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under pre-2014 O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-3 and 15-11-18 are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Appointment of retired superior
court judge. - Superior court judge who retires under either of the two superior court judges retirement systems may be appointed to serve as a juvenile court judge; however, with one limited exception, his or her eligibility for senior judge status under either system will be sus-
pended or delayed while appointed to that office. 1991 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 91-9 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3). Appointment of superior court judge as juvenile court judge. - Senior superior court judge, who was not being appointed in that senior judge capacity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1,
may be appointed to serve as a part-time state-funded juvenile court judge and, so long as the hours worked annually do not exceed 1040 hours, there is no effect on the senior judge’s retirement. 2000 Op. Atty. Gen. No. U2000-9 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-18).
Notes of Decisions
In the Interest of R. S. T., a Child., 812 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 4× “4 ( 523 SE2d 88 ) (1999), that language was based on cases construing “the former OCGA § 15-11-51 (a) (1), which was repealed in 1986.”
Wilkins v. Dep't of Human Resources, 337 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1985).
· cites it 8× “, see OCGA §§ 15-11-51 through 15-11-54. The Court of Appeals held that Wilkins was not entitled to appointed counsel.”
Heath v. McGuire, 306 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 6× “While associating with and concurring fully with all that is said and the outcome reached by the majority in this case, I am compelled to make additional comments on the evidentiary burden and the standard of appellate review in termination-of-parental-rights cases where one…”
In the Interest of D. S., 336 S.E.2d 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 6× “OCGA § 15-11-51 (a) (2) provides that the court may order the termination of parental rights of a parent with respect to his child if “[t]he child is a deprived child and the court finds that the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be…”
In the Interest of A. O. A., 323 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 4× “The court further concurred with the opinion of the agency’s doctors and psychologists that the children were suffering or would probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral or emotional harm if they were allowed to return to the mother’s custody.”
In the Interest of M. S., 343 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 4× “, contending that the procedure violated the due-process clause and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The procedure utilized to elicit the testimony of M.”
In the Interest of G. K. J., 370 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 2× “251 (1) ( 248 SE2d 533 ) (1978) (construing former OCGA § 15-11-51); In the Interest of C. M.”
In re R. L. Y., 351 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 10× “See OCGA § 15-11-51, as recodified into OCGA § 15-11-80 by Ga.”
In the Interest of S. M., 312 S.E.2d 829 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 4× “This appeal involves the termination of parental rights pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-51 (Code Ann. § 24A-3201). The evidence adduced at the hearing revealed that appellant, the natural mother of the child, had been a drug addict for approximately 14 years, that she was at that time…”
Dep't of Human Resources v. Ammons, 426 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 4× “Although the court was authorized to terminate the parental rights of a parent based on written consent of that parent acknowledged before the court, OCGA § 15-11-51 (a) (3) repealed by Ga. L.”
In the Interest of H. L. T., 298 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 2× “§ 24A-3201(a)(2) (now OCGA § 15-11-51 (a) (2)). A deprived child “is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals;.”
In Re Jcp, 307 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 2× “We find no valid rationale for applying differing standards in arriving at the threshold determination of present deprivation.”
— 15-11-51(a) — 1 case
Heath v. McGuire, 306 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
“While associating with and concurring fully with all that is said and the outcome reached by the majority in this case, I am compelled to make additional comments on the evidentiary burden and the standard of appellate review in termination-of-parental-rights cases where one…”
— 15-11-51(a)(1) — 1 case
In Re Aw, 523 S.E.2d 88 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.