Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448
(Code 1981, §15-11-523, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
Permitting state's mid-trial amendment of petition to change the charge against the juvenile from a misdemeanor to a felony was error since the amendment was done without notice and provision of a continuance to allow additional time for preparation of a defense. In re D.W, 232 Ga. App. 777, 503 S.E.2d 647 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39.1)
- Trial court erred in allowing an amendment to the delinquency petition because the state sought to make a material amendment to the petition absent proper notice and service and after the hearing had commenced and jeopardy attached pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-480(b). In the Interest of J.H., 335 Ga. App. 848, 783 S.E.2d 367 (2016).
(Code 1981, §15-11-530, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
- Amendment to Juvenile Court petition, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 6.6.
Continuance of adjudicatory hearing in Juvenile Court, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 11.3.
- For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-26 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-39, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
- As parties to their child's delinquency action pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-160,15-11-423, and15-11-530), the child's parents had the right to appeal the juvenile court's judgment and to participate in the appellate process. In the Interest of J.L.B., 280 Ga. App. 556, 634 S.E.2d 514 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).
- If, in a juvenile court proceeding, there was neither waiver of the right of a mother, nor proper service upon the parties and if the hearing is not taken under oath, or waived by any of the parties, the proceeding is an absolute nullity. McBurrough v. Dep't of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 130, 257 S.E.2d 35 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).
- Summons served upon a parent did not have to require the parent to appear in court on any fixed date in order to answer allegations in a petition to terminate the parent's parental rights. In re W.R.S., 213 Ga. App. 616, 445 S.E.2d 367 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).
If there was no service of process and notice as required by former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-26(b) and15-11-27(a) (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 15) and there was no valid waiver of notice of the pending charge by service of process or otherwise, the entire hearing is a nullity. In re W.M.F., 180 Ga. App. 397, 349 S.E.2d 265 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).
- If neither the juvenile nor the mother were represented by counsel at the dispositional hearing, neither party knew the nature of the charge filed against the minor, and neither party knew of the serious consequences which may result in the case of an adverse adjudication of the petition filed against the juvenile, it is highly unlikely that the parties understood the significance of waiving their right to prior notice of the pending charge. In re W.M.F., 180 Ga. App. 397, 349 S.E.2d 265 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).
No results found for Georgia Code 15-11-523.