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2018 Georgia Code 15-11-26 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 15-11-26 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 15-11-26

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 11. Juvenile Code, 15-11-1 through 15-11-747.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

15-11-26. Best interests of child.

Whenever a best interests determination is required, the court shall consider and evaluate all of the factors affecting the best interests of the child in the context of such child's age and developmental needs. Such factors shall include:

  1. The physical safety and welfare of such child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing;
  2. The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between such child and each parent or person available to care for such child;
  3. The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between such child and his or her siblings, half siblings, and stepsiblings and the residence of such other children;
  4. Such child's need for permanence, including such child's need for stability and continuity of relationships with his or her parent, siblings, other relatives, and any other person who has provided significant care to such child;
  5. Such child's sense of attachments, including his or her sense of security and familiarity, and continuity of affection for such child;
  6. The capacity and disposition of each parent or person available to care for such child to give him or her love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and rearing of such child;
  7. The home environment of each parent or person available to care for such child considering the promotion of such child's nurturance and safety rather than superficial or material factors;
  8. The stability of the family unit and the presence or absence of support systems within the community to benefit such child;
  9. The mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
  10. The home, school, and community record and history of such child, as well as any health or educational special needs of such child;
  11. Such child's community ties, including church, school, and friends;
  12. Such child's background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious;
  13. The least disruptive placement alternative for such child;
  14. The uniqueness of every family and child;
  15. The risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care;
  16. Such child's wishes and long-term goals;
  17. The preferences of the persons available to care for such child;
  18. Any evidence of family violence, substance abuse, criminal history, or sexual, mental, or physical child abuse in any current, past, or considered home for such child;
  19. Any recommendation by a court appointed custody evaluator or guardian ad litem; and
  20. Any other factors considered by the court to be relevant and proper to its determination.

(Code 1981, §15-11-26, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)

Law reviews.

- For article, "Parentage Prenups and Midnups," see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 343 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Denial of petition to legitimate child.

- Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the putative father's petition to legitimate the child because, although the father was not seeking custody of the child, the juvenile court did not err in basing the court's ruling on a determination of whether the father was fit to assume immediate custody of the child as the juvenile court properly considered the father's interest in caring for the child; the father's ability to support the child if placed in the father's care; and the child's current placement as part of the best interests analysis under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26. In the Interest of J. M., 337 Ga. App. 811, 788 S.E.2d 888 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1860, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 120 (Ga. 2017).

Considerations for the court.

- Judgments terminating the parental rights of a mother and father to their three children pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310 were affirmed because of their excessive use of and history of chronic substance abuse, which caused their inability to maintain consistency in employment and the children to be dependent, their failure to comply with the court ordered plan designed to reunite the family, no due process violations occurred, and the children had bonded well with their foster families. In the Interest of E. G. M., 341 Ga. App. 33, 798 S.E.2d 639 (2017).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26

Total Results: 7  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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In the Interest of R. D. F., 466 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 29, 1996 | 266 Ga. 294, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 362

...ood cause shown" and that a hearing was set for August 19, 1994. [1] Appellee moved to dismiss the petition on August 29, 1994 on the basis that "[n]o adjudicatory hearing was fixed in the above-styled case within the time limit set out in [OCGA §] 15-11-26(a)." The juvenile court granted appellee's motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In the Interest of R.D.F., 216 Ga.App. 563, 455 S.E.2d 77 (1995). We reverse. 1. OCGA § 15-11-26(a) provides: After the petition has been filed the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition. In the event the child is not in detention, the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition. In construing OCGA § 15-11-26(a), the appellate courts have recognized that the hearing required by the statute is an adjudicatory hearing, not an arraignment hearing. In the Interest of L.A.E., 214 Ga.App. 268(1), 447 S.E.2d 627 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 265 Ga. 698, 462 S.E.2d 148 (1995). OCGA § 15-11-26(a) mandates that the hearing date be "fixed" within the applicable statutory period....
...ns within the discretion of the juvenile court. In re J.B., 183 Ga.App. 229(2), 358 S.E.2d 620 (1987); Brown v. Fulton County Dept. of Family, etc., Services, 136 Ga.App. 308(1), 220 S.E.2d 790 (1975). 2. The State contends that the language in OCGA § 15-11-26(a) is directory, rather than mandatory, insofar as it applies to children who are not in detention, and that the holding to the contrary in Sanchez, supra, is distinguishable on the basis that Sanchez applies only to children in detention....
...With a long period of time between the offense and disposition, the child may not recognize the vital causal connection between his act and his responsibility as a member of society for that act." Id. at 725, 215 S.E.2d 732. We find that the goal of OCGA § 15-11-26(a) is to render a child's disposition meaningful by providing for prompt resolution of charges brought against a delinquent or unruly child and expeditious handling of matters involving a deprived child. Construing the language in OCGA § 15-11-26(a) to be mandatory, as this Court did in Sanchez, is consistent with this goal....
...Virtually identical language was used by the Legislature and there is no indication of any intention to attach a different meaning to the same language *574 used twice in the same section. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the State that the two sentences in OCGA § 15-11-26(a) are subject to differing construction, so as to render the language mandatory for detained children and directory as to non-detained children. Compare, e.g., Carpet Transport v. Pittman, 187 Ga.App. 463, 466(1), 370 S.E.2d 651 (1988). The State's arguments that the purposes of the juvenile code are not served by a mandatory application of OCGA § 15-11-26(a) are best directed to the General Assembly. 3. The State contends the Court of Appeals erred by holding that OCGA § 15-11-26(a) constitutes a speedy trial demand so that violation of its provisions results in dismissal with prejudice. We agree. In stark contrast to OCGA §§ 17-7-170 and 17-7-171, there is no explicit language in OCGA § 15-11-26 which mandates that the failure to comply with the statutory time limits provided therein will result in an adjudication of the juvenile's non-delinquency by operation of law. If the legislature had intended that a non-compliance with OCGA § [15-11-26(a) ] would result in the automatic acquittal of a defendant in a [delinquency] case, it could have expressly provided for the comparable remedy afforded for a non-compliance with OCGA § 17-7-170....
...See also In the Interest of M.O.B., 190 Ga.App. 474, 475, 378 S.E.2d 898 (1989) (holding that unlike rulings on speedy trial motions under OCGA § 17-7-170, there is no right of direct appeal from rulings denying motion to dismiss for non-compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26). The failure to comply with OCGA § 15-11-26(a), like the failure to comply with OCGA §§ 15-11-19 and 15-11-21, results in dismissal of the petition without prejudice, [2] see Sanchez, supra at 411, 229 S.E.2d 66, and we disapprove any interpretation of Sanchez to the contrary....
...set for June 29. See In the Interest of L.A.E., supra, at 265 Ga. 698, 462 S.E.2d 148, wherein an identical summons and notice was used [3] and an adjudicatory hearing was held. The June 29 hearing was held and was within the statutory period. OCGA § 15-11-26(a). However, although the hearing scheduled was an adjudicatory hearing, appellee contends the hearing actually conducted was not an adjudicatory hearing for purposes of OCGA § 15-11-26(a)....
...As movant, appellee had the responsibility to present sufficient evidence in support of his motion to dismiss. See generally Stiles v. State, 264 Ga. 446(3), 448 S.E.2d 172 (1994). In the absence of a transcript, appellee has failed to establish that OCGA § 15-11-26(a) was violated....
...Therefore, dismissal of the delinquency petition was error. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except FLETCHER, P.J., and SEARS, J., who concur in the judgment only, and CARLEY, J., who concurs specially. CARLEY, Justice, concurring specially. OCGA § 15-11-26(a) provides that, after a delinquency petition has been filed, the juvenile court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition....
...g thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition. In this case, R.D.F., who was not in detention, moved to dismiss the delinquency petition that had been filed against him, urging a non-compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26(a). The juvenile court granted R.D.F.'s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed, "[s]ince the 60-day limit of OCGA § 15-11-26(a) is jurisdictional and must be strictly observed...." In the Interest of R.D.F., 216 Ga.App....
...Certiorari was granted and a majority of this court now reverses the Court of Appeals. I concur in that judgment of reversal. However, my analysis of why the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed differs from that of the majority. I agree with Division 1, wherein the majority holds that the only mandate of OCGA § 15-11-26(a) is that the juvenile court "fix" the hearing on the delinquency petition for a date which is within the applicable 10- or 60-day period....
...that was set. "[I]f a hearing is set within the statutory time limit, the court may in its discretion grant a continuance." Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family & Children Services, supra at 408, 229 S.E.2d 66. Thus, in order to comply with OCGA § 15-11-26(a), the juvenile court need only perform the administrative act of setting a timely hearing on the delinquency petition and, consequently, the juvenile court's non-compliance therewith can be demonstrated only by its failure to perform that administrative act. I also agree with that portion of Division 2 holding that there is no distinction between cases involving juveniles who are in detention and those who are not and that both sentences of OCGA § 15-11-26(a) must, therefore, be construed consistently....
...o be construed as establishing a mandatory juvenile court procedure. Although Sanchez does support that conclusion, I believe that, in this regard, Sanchez was wrongly decided. In support of its holding that the juvenile court's compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26(a) is mandatory, this court in Sanchez cited with approval four Court of Appeals cases. Under the rationale of those cases, OCGA *576 § 15-11-26(a) establishes a mandatory procedure because it functions in juvenile proceedings as the procedural equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute and, where our General Assembly "has defined the right to speedy trial ..., then the time limits must be strictly complied with.......
...right to a speedy trial is dismissal." J.B.H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga.App. 199, 203(1), 228 S.E.2d 189 (1976). However, the obvious focus of a criminal speedy trial statute is upon the timeliness of the criminal trial itself and, as previously discussed, OCGA § 15-11-26(a) clearly does not purport to require that the hearing on the delinquency petition actually be held within any specified time....
...mental distinction between a requirement that the juvenile court merely set a hearing for a date within a specified time period and a requirement that the juvenile court actually conduct a hearing on a date within a specified time period. Thus, OCGA § 15-11-26(a) is not analogous to a criminal speedy trial statute and the very premise of those opinions of the Court of Appeals with which Sanchez expressed agreement that the statute establishes a mandatory procedure is, therefore, erroneous. It follows that the issue for resolution is whether the juvenile court's compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26(a), which requires only that a hearing be "fixed" for, rather than held by, a specified date, is nevertheless as mandatory as a state or superior court's compliance with the non-analogous criminal speedy trial provisions of OCGA § 17-7-170....
...hority, and this is especially so where no injury appeared to have resulted from the fact that the thing was done after the time limited by the plain wording of the Act. [Cits.] Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733, 739(1), 187 S.E.2d 835 (1972). In OCGA § 15-11-26(a), there are no "negative words" which prohibit the juvenile court from setting the hearing for a date beyond the 10- or 60-day period....
...Compare OCGA § 17-7-170(b) (mandating that the criminal defendant "shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation...."). A juvenile whose hearing is set for a date beyond the 10- or 60-day period is not injured by that non-compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26(a), since the juvenile is otherwise fully protected by the constitutional right to a speedy trial....
...However, unless and until the General Assembly enacts a speedy trial statute applicable in this state's juvenile proceedings, juveniles are limited to invoking their constitutional right to a speedy trial. In my opinion, Sanchez erroneously accepted the Court of Appeals' construction of OCGA § 15-11-26(a) as the juvenile court equivalent of such a state criminal speedy trial statute and, based upon that premise, Sanchez erroneously concluded that the statute establishes a mandatory procedure. Although Division 2 of the majority opinion accepts Sanchez 's conclusion that OCGA § 15-11-26(a) establishes a mandatory juvenile court procedure, the majority ultimately rejects the premise upon which that conclusion was based. In Division 3, the majority concludes that OCGA § 15-11-26(a) is not the functional equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute so that a non-compliance therewith results in a dismissal with prejudice and disapproves "any interpretation of Sanchez to the contrary." However, Sanchez 's conclusion that OCGA § 15-11-26(a) establishes a mandatory juvenile court procedure is based upon the premise that that statute is the functional equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute. As the cases cited with approval in Sanchez implicitly hold, when OCGA *577 § 15-11-26(a) is construed as the juvenile court equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute, it is both jurisdictional and mandatory and a non-compliance therewith mandates a dismissal with prejudice....
...result in a dismissal without prejudice). Unlike the majority, I believe that the disapproval of the premise upon which Sanchez proceeded must necessarily result in a disapproval of Sanchez 's conclusion. Having rejected Sanchez 's premise that OCGA § 15-11-26(a) is the functional equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute, I also would reject Sanchez 's conclusion that compliance with that statute is mandatory. The procedural requirement of OCGA § 15-11-26(a) that a hearing on a delinquency petition merely be set for, rather than actually held by, a date within a specified time period is non-jurisdictional and directory. Accordingly, I would hold that it is immaterial whether R.D.F.'s hearing was set for a date within the 60-day time period established by OCGA § 15-11-26(a). The statutory requirement that the hearing be set for a date within that 60-day time period is directory, rather than mandatory. A non-compliance with the directory statutory time limits established by OCGA § 15-11-26(a) affords R.D.F....
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Watkins v. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 19, 1996 | 266 Ga. 269, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 676

...See OCGA § 15-11-17(a)(4); § 15-11-18; § 15-11-20(f); § 15-11-21. If the child is detained before the hearing, the parents must be notified of the allegations of deprivations, OCGA § 15-11-25, and the hearing on the deprivation petition must occur within certain deadlines, OCGA § 15-11-26....
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In the Interest of M. D. H., 300 Ga. 46 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 31, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 49

...at 395. The Court of Appeals relied primarily on this Court’s decision in In the Interest of R. D. F., 266 Ga. 294 (466 SE2d 572) (1996), which was decided before the enactment of OCGA § 15-11-521 and held that the failure to comply with former OCGA § 15-11-26 (a), which established a deadline for setting the adjudicatory hearing in juvenile cases, resulted in dismissal of the case without prejudice....
...We have yet to address this question as to OCGA § 15-11-521 (b), but as the Court of Appeals’ panel recognized in M. D. H., this Court considered the same question when we interpreted a similar statute in the former Juvenile Code in R. D. F. Former OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) said: After the petition has been filed the court shall fix a time for [the adjudicatory] hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition. In the event the child is not in detention, the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition. Like OCGA § 15-11-521 (b), former OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) used mandatory language — the court “shall fix a time ....
...that the legislature meant to impose a consequence for failing to meet such an explicit deadline in the Juvenile Code. See 266 Ga. at 295-296. We disagreed, however, with the consequence the Court of Appeals had imposed in deciding R. D. F. on direct appeal — dismissal with prejudice — which treated former OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) as similar to OCGA §§ 17-7-170 *51and 17-7-171, the statutes governing speedy trial demands in criminal cases. See R. D. F., 266 Ga. at 296. In an opinion by Justice Hunstein, the Court reversed that holding based on the absence in former OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) of aclear directive to dismiss with prejudice like the one in OCGA §§ 17-7-170 and 17-7-171....
...Those two statutes explicitly say that if the deadline to provide a properly demanded speedy trial is not met, the defendant “shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged.” OCGA §§ 17-7-170 (b) (non-capitalcases), 17-7-171 (b) (capitalcases). By contrast, former OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) lacked such explicit acquittal language. We reasoned: If the legislature had intended that a non-compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) would result in the automatic acquittal of a defendant in a delinquency case, it could have expressly provided for the comparable remedy afforded for a non-compliance with OCGA § 17-7-170....
...at 296 (citation and punctuation omitted). We also noted that former OCGA § 15-11-21, a related statute analogous to current OCGA § 15-11-521 (b), similarly lacked an explicit direction to dismiss with prejudice.4 Thus, the Court concluded that a violation of former OCGA § 15-11-26 (a), as well as former OCGA § 15-11-21, required dismissal but without prejudice....
...First, subsection (a) of OCGA § 15-11-521 provides explicitly for dismissal without prejudice as the consequence for missing that subsection’s deadline, but subsection (b) does not. Because of that distinction within the same Code section, which did not exist in former OCGA § 15-11-26 or OCGA § 15-11-21, M....
...Decided October 31, 2016. Carver & DeBord, Cory P. DeBord, for M. D. H. Bethany A. Begnaud, for D. V. H. Conclusion 6. Timely proceedings are of undoubted importance in juvenile cases. See R. D. F., 266 Ga. at 295 (explaining that the goal of former OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) was to provide for “prompt resolution of charges brought against a delinquent or unruly child and expeditious handling of matters involving a deprived child”)....
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In re M. A. F., 254 Ga. 748 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 1985 | 334 S.E.2d 668

...The appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus in the superior court. After it was transferred to the juvenile court, she filed a motion there to dismiss the order of April 19,1984, which gave custody to the NCDFCS. She alleged lack of notice and hearing as required by OCGA § 15-11-26. A hearing on the petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and father and the legal father3 was held on May 10, 1984....
...e of requesting counsel is unable without undue financial hardship to provide for full payment of legal counsel and all other necessary expenses for representation.” OCGA § 15-11-30 (a). The appellant was a necessary party to the proceeding, OCGA § 15-11-26 (b), and the summons was required to state that a “party is entitled to counsel in the proceeding and that the court will appoint counsel if the party is unable without undue hardship to employ counsel.” OCGA § 15-11-26 (e)....
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In the Interest of L. A. E., 265 Ga. 698 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 2, 1995 | 462 S.E.2d 148, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 3062

...uest that bond be granted. After the March 30 hearing was continued, L. A. E. filed a motion claiming that dismissal of the petition was mandated because the juvenile court did not fix an adjudicatory hearing on the petition in accordance with OCGA § 15-11-26 (a). The juvenile court denied the motion, ruling that the proceedings fixed on March 24 and commenced on March 30 satisfied the requirements of that Code section. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the March 30 hearing did not satisfy OCGA § 15-11-26 (a), because it was “merely ......
...an arraignment hearing.”5 Construing the requirement that an adjudicatory hearing be fixed within ten days as jurisdictional and analogous to the right to a speedy trial, the Court of Appeals ruled that the proper remedy for a failure to comply with OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) was dismissal of the petition.6 For the reasons discussed below, we now reverse. 1. OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) states that after a petition of delinquency has been filed, “the [juvenile] court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition.” The hearing specified in this Code section must be adjudicatory in nature.7 In this case, on March 24 the juvenile court fixed a hearing on the petition to commence on March 30, well within the ten-day period required by OCGA § 15-11-26 (a)....
...11 When the facts relative to the March 24 fixing of the March 30 hearing are considered in light of these codified definitions, it is clear that the hearing was not intended to be “merely an arraignment,” but rather to be adjudicatory in nature, and therefore satisfied OCGA § 15-11-26 (a)....
...Slaton, District Attorney, Sally A. Butler, Carl P. Greenberg, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant. Mark R. Pollard, for appellee. Because the hearing commenced on March 30, 1993 was adjudicatory and not merely an arraignment, it satisfied the requirements of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the juvenile court’s denial of L. A. E.’s motion to dismiss is affirmed. 2. Because we have found the hearing in this matter satisfied the requirements of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a), we shall reserve ruling at this time whether a failure to comply with that Code section requires a dismissal of the petition. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, J., who concurs in the judgment only. OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) states that “[a]fter [a] petition [of delinquency] has been filed the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition.” The murder occurred and L....
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DeKalb Cnty. v. Adams, 272 Ga. 401 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 1, 2000 | 529 S.E.2d 610, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 1606

...ult. The examples Adams cites for the proposition that a court has the inherent power to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants and compel payment from county funds all involve either statutory authority or a constitutional mandate. E.g., OCGA § 15-11-26 (e) (counsel in adjudication of delinquency proceedings); OCGA § 15-11-85 (counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings); OCGA §§ 37-3-150, 37-4-110 (counsel in proceedings regarding the mentally ill and mentally retarded); Vaughn v....
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In Re Maf, 334 S.E.2d 668 (Ga. 1985).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 1985 | 254 Ga. 748

...The appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus in the superior court. After it was transferred to the juvenile court, she filed a motion there to dismiss the order of April 19, 1984, which gave custody to the NCDFCS. She alleged lack of notice and hearing as required by OCGA § 15-11-26....
...ime of requesting counsel is unable without undue financial hardship to provide for full payment of legal counsel and all other necessary expenses for representation." OCGA § 15-11-30 (a). The appellant was a necessary party to the proceeding, OCGA § 15-11-26 (b), and the summons was required to state that a "party is entitled to counsel in the proceeding and that the court will appoint counsel if the party is unable without undue hardship to employ counsel." OCGA § 15-11-26 (e)....