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(Code 1981, §15-11-567, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
- For article discussing the uneasy sharing of powers and responsibilities between the superior and juvenile courts in their concurrent jurisdiction over juveniles aged 13 to 18 and suggesting reforms, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (1972).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 24-2414 and 24-2415, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-30.4, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
Purpose of former statute was obviously to provide a forum in which all juveniles may receive equal treatment. Kelly v. State, 122 Ga. App. 185, 176 S.E.2d 468 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 24-2414 and 24-2415).
- Disregarding the question of whether collateral estoppel actually applied in the context of a case, the transfer of an involuntary manslaughter case, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-567), against a juvenile to the juvenile court did not collaterally estop a later transfer of the case back to the superior court under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561) because the first transfer was based on the jurisdictional restrictions in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560) and at the time of that transfer, the superior court did not consider or rule on the multiple factors in former § 15-11-30.2 on which the second transfer was based. In the Interest of C.G., 291 Ga. App. 743, 662 S.E.2d 823 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-30.4)
- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 4.
- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 373 seq.
- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 9.
(Code 1981, §15-11-580, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2201, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-34, and former Code Section 15-11-55, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
- Former statute required that in the hearing on a petition alleging deprivation the trial court shall first make the court's finding as to whether the children were deprived, and it was only after this decision had been made that the judge, in considering the disposition to be made of the children, may consider written reports which contain hearsay matter. In re J.C., 242 Ga. 737, 251 S.E.2d 299 (1978), appeal dismissed, 441 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2046, 60 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2201).
- Juvenile court erred by denying a juvenile's request to enter an Alford plea since the Georgia General Assembly did not expressly prohibit the entry of Alford pleas in juvenile court, and the juvenile court was required to construe O.C.G.A. § 15-11-580 liberally to ensure the juvenile's best interests. In the Interest of B. C., 333 Ga. App. 763, 777 S.E.2d 52 (2015).
No results found for Georgia Code 15-11-567.