O.C.G.A. § 15-11-606 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. - Persons ineligible to hold civil office, § 45-2-1.

Law reviews. - For article discussing venue problems in juvenile court practice and suggesting solutions, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (1972).

For comment criticizing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), holding petitioner’s right to confrontation was preeminent to state policy protecting anonymity of juvenile offenders, see 26 Mercer L. Rev. 343 (1974).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-38, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-72, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions

in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Treatment of juvenile delinquency as class of conduct. - It is clear that the General Assembly sought to treat

matters of juvenile delinquency as a class of conduct separate and distinct from conventional criminality. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401). Juvenile court cannot find anyone guilty of crime. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401). Adjudication of delinquency when child has not attained 13 years. - Juvenile court may adjudicate a child a delinquent based upon a petition alleging that the child committed an act designated a crime under Georgia law, when that child has not yet attained the age of 13 years. K.M.S. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 683, 200 S.E.2d 916 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401). Juvenile subject to criminal adjudication if case transferred. - Juvenile whose case is properly transferred to the superior court is subject to the criminal sanctions which may be imposed in that court. Thus, an adjudication of guilt of a juvenile in superior court is a criminal adjudication. Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401). Court must recognize quasi-criminal aspects of juvenile law. - Although former statute declared that an adjudication order was noncriminal, nevertheless, the court must recognize the quasi-criminal aspects of juvenile law. M.J.W. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 350, 210 S.E.2d 842 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401). Due process must be adhered to in juvenile court proceedings. - While cases in the juvenile court are not criminal proceedings, due process must always be scrupulously adhered to. D.P. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 680, 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401). Merger doctrine inapplicable. - Because of the unique nature of juvenile court proceedings and the fact that a disposition or adjudication order is not a

conviction of a crime, the doctrine of merger is inapplicable in juvenile proceedings. In the Interest of I. H., 350 Ga. App. 394, 829 S.E.2d 437 (2019). Use of records during sentencing. - Juvenile records may be introduced during the sentencing phase of a trial. Burrell v. State, 258 Ga. 841, 376 S.E.2d 184 (1989) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2401). Out-of-state convictions for acts committed while the defendant was a juvenile could not be used as prior felony convictions for purposes of recidivist sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 because the defendant would not have been convicted of those felonies in this state, but would have been adjudicated delinquent. Miller v. State, 231 Ga. App. 869, 501 S.E.2d 42 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-38). Commitment to Department of Juvenile Justice proper. - Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-66(a)(4) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601) was not cruel and unusual punishment; the commitment was not a conviction of a crime and did not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction nor operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment. Further, the commitment was statutorily authorized. In the Interest of B. Q. L. E., 297 Ga. App. 273, 676 S.E.2d 742, cert. denied, No. S09C1197, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-72). Appeal of adjudication after disposition order expired was not moot. - Juvenile who appealed the juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency after the disposition order had expired was not required to show adverse collateral consequences in the record in order to avoid a finding of mootness; such consequences were presumed based on the uses to which a prior adjudication of delinquency could be put. In the Interest of M. F., 305 Ga. 820, 828 S.E.2d 350 (2019).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 56 et seq., 110 et seq. C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 224 et seq. U.L.A. - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 33. ALR. - Use of judgment in prior juve-

nile court proceeding to impeach credibility of witness, 63 A.L.R.3d 1112. Consideration of accused’s juvenile court record in sentencing for offense committed as adult, 64 A.L.R.3d 1291. Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 A.L.R.4th 234.