Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 50-18-72 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 50 STATE GOVERNMENT

Section 18. State Printing and Documents, 50-18-1 through 50-18-135.

ARTICLE 4 INSPECTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS

50-18-72. When public disclosure not required.

  1. Public disclosure shall not be required for records that are:
    1. Specifically required by federal statute or regulation to be kept confidential;
    2. Medical or veterinary records and similar files, the disclosure of which would be an invasion of personal privacy;
    3. Except as otherwise provided by law, records compiled for law enforcement or prosecution purposes to the extent that production of such records is reasonably likely to disclose the identity of a confidential source, disclose confidential investigative or prosecution material which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or persons, or disclose the existence of a confidential surveillance or investigation;
    4. Records of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity, other than initial police arrest reports and initial incident reports; provided, however, that an investigation or prosecution shall no longer be deemed to be pending when all direct litigation involving such investigation and prosecution has become final or otherwise terminated; and provided, further, that this paragraph shall not apply to records in the possession of an agency that is the subject of the pending investigation or prosecution; and provided, further, that the release of booking photographs shall only be permissible in accordance with Code Section 35-1-18;
    5. Individual Georgia Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reports, except upon the submission of a written statement of need by the requesting party to be provided to the custodian of records and to set forth the need for the report pursuant to this Code section; provided, however, that any person or entity whose name or identifying information is contained in a Georgia Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Report shall be entitled, either personally or through a lawyer or other representative, to receive a copy of such report; and provided, further, that Georgia Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reports shall not be available in bulk for inspection or copying by any person absent a written statement showing the need for each such report pursuant to the requirements of this Code section. For the purposes of this subsection, the term "need" means that the natural person or legal entity who is requesting in person or by representative to inspect or copy the Georgia Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Report:
      1. Has a personal, professional, or business connection with a party to the accident;
      2. Owns or leases an interest in property allegedly or actually damaged in the accident;
      3. Was allegedly or actually injured by the accident;
      4. Was a witness to the accident;
      5. Is the actual or alleged insurer of a party to the accident or of property actually or allegedly damaged by the accident;
      6. Is a prosecutor or a publicly employed law enforcement officer;
      7. Is alleged to be liable to another party as a result of the accident;
      8. Is an attorney stating that he or she needs the requested reports as part of a criminal case, or an investigation of a potential claim involving contentions that a roadway, railroad crossing, or intersection is unsafe;
      9. Is gathering information as a representative of a news media organization; provided, however, that such representative submits a statement affirming that the use of such accident report is in compliance with Code Section 33-24-53. Any person who knowingly makes a false statement in requesting such accident report shall be guilty of a violation of Code Section 16-10-20;
      10. Is conducting research in the public interest for such purposes as accident prevention, prevention of injuries or damages in accidents, determination of fault in an accident or accidents, or other similar purposes; provided, however, that this subparagraph shall apply only to accident reports on accidents that occurred more than 60 days prior to the request and which shall have the name, street address, telephone number, and driver's license number redacted; or
      11. Is a governmental official, entity, or agency, or an authorized agent thereof, requesting reports for the purpose of carrying out governmental functions or legitimate governmental duties;
    6. Jury list data, including, but not limited to, persons' names, dates of birth, addresses, ages, race, gender, telephone numbers, social security numbers, and when it is available, the person's ethnicity, and other confidential identifying information that is collected and used by The Council of Superior Court Clerks of Georgia for creating, compiling, and maintaining state-wide master jury lists and county master jury lists for the purpose of establishing and maintaining county jury source lists pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 12 of Title 15; provided, however, that when ordered by the judge of a court having jurisdiction over a case in which a challenge to the array of the grand or trial jury has been filed, The Council of Superior Court Clerks of Georgia, superior court clerk, or jury clerk shall provide data within the time limit established by the court for the limited purpose of such challenge. The Council of Superior Court Clerks of Georgia, superior court clerk, or jury clerk shall not be liable for any use or misuse of such data;
    7. Records consisting of confidential evaluations submitted to, or examinations prepared by, a governmental agency and prepared in connection with the appointment or hiring of a public officer or employee;
    8. Records consisting of material obtained in investigations related to the suspension, firing, or investigation of complaints against public officers or employees until ten days after the same has been presented to the agency or an officer for action or the investigation is otherwise concluded or terminated, provided that this paragraph shall not be interpreted to make such investigatory records privileged;
    9. Real estate appraisals, engineering or feasibility estimates, or other records made for or by the state or a local agency relative to the acquisition of real property until such time as the property has been acquired or the proposed transaction has been terminated or abandoned;
    10. Pending, rejected, or deferred sealed bids or sealed proposals and detailed cost estimates related thereto until such time as the final award of the contract is made, the project is terminated or abandoned, or the agency in possession of the records takes a public vote regarding the sealed bid or sealed proposal, whichever comes first;
    11. Records which identify persons applying for or under consideration for employment or appointment as executive head of an agency or of a unit of the University System of Georgia; provided, however, that at least 14 calendar days prior to the meeting at which final action or vote is to be taken on the position of executive head of an agency or five business days prior to the meeting at which final action or vote is to be taken on the position of president of a unit of the University System of Georgia, all documents concerning as many as three persons under consideration whom the agency has determined to be the best qualified for the position shall be subject to inspection and copying. Prior to the release of these documents, an agency may allow such a person to decline being considered further for the position rather than have documents pertaining to such person released. In that event, the agency shall release the documents of the next most qualified person under consideration who does not decline the position. If an agency has conducted its hiring or appointment process without conducting interviews or discussing or deliberating in executive session in a manner otherwise consistent with Chapter 14 of this title, it shall not be required to delay final action on the position. The agency shall not be required to release such records of other applicants or persons under consideration, except at the request of any such person. Upon request, the hiring agency shall furnish the number of applicants and the composition of the list by such factors as race and sex. The agency shall not be allowed to avoid the provisions of this paragraph by the employment of a private person or agency to assist with the search or application process;
    12. Reserved;
    13. Records that are of historical research value which are given or sold to public archival institutions, public libraries, or libraries of a unit of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia when the owner or donor of such records wishes to place restrictions on access to the records. No restriction on access, however, may extend more than 75 years from the date of donation or sale. This exemption shall not apply to any records prepared in the course of the operation of state or local governments of the State of Georgia;
    14. Records that contain information from the Department of Natural Resources inventory and register relating to the location and character of a historic property or of historic properties as those terms are defined in Code Sections 12-3-50.1 and 12-3-50.2 if the Department of Natural Resources through its Division of Historic Preservation determines that disclosure will create a substantial risk of harm, theft, or destruction to the property or properties or the area or place where the property or properties are located;
    15. Records of farm water use by individual farms as determined by water-measuring devices installed pursuant to Code Section 12-5-31 or 12-5-105; provided, however, that compilations of such records for the 52 large watershed basins as identified by the eight-digit United States Geologic Survey hydrologic code or an aquifer that do not reveal farm water use by individual farms shall be subject to disclosure under this article;
    16. Agricultural or food system records, data, or information that are considered by the Department of Agriculture to be a part of the critical infrastructure, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the release of such records, data, or information to another state or federal agency if the release of such records, data, or information is necessary to prevent or control disease or to protect public health, safety, or welfare. As used in this paragraph, the term "critical infrastructure" shall have the same meaning as in 42 U.S.C. Section 5195c(e). Such records, data, or information shall be subject to disclosure only upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction;
    17. Records, data, or information collected, recorded, or otherwise obtained that is deemed confidential by the Department of Agriculture for the purposes of the national animal identification system, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the release of such records, data, or information to another state or federal agency if the release of such records, data, or information is necessary to prevent or control disease or to protect public health, safety, or welfare. As used in this paragraph, the term "national animal identification program" means a national program intended to identify animals and track them as they come into contact with or commingle with animals other than herdmates from their premises of origin. Such records, data, or information shall be subject to disclosure only upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction;
    18. Records that contain site-specific information regarding the occurrence of rare species of plants or animals or the location of sensitive natural habitats on public or private property if the Department of Natural Resources determines that disclosure will create a substantial risk of harm, theft, or destruction to the species or habitats or the area or place where the species or habitats are located; provided, however, that the owner or owners of private property upon which rare species of plants or animals occur or upon which sensitive natural habitats are located shall be entitled to such information pursuant to this article;
    19. Records that reveal the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, security codes, e-mail addresses, or any other data or information developed, collected, or received by counties or municipalities in connection with neighborhood watch or public safety notification programs or with the installation, servicing, maintaining, operating, selling, or leasing of burglar alarm systems, fire alarm systems, or other electronic security systems; provided, however, that initial police reports and initial incident reports shall remain subject to disclosure pursuant to paragraph (4) of this subsection;
      1. Records that reveal an individual's social security number, mother's birth name, credit card information, debit card information, bank account information, account number, utility account number, password used to access his or her account, financial data or information, insurance or medical information in all records, unlisted telephone number if so designated in a public record, personal e-mail address or cellular telephone number, day and month of birth, and information regarding public utility, television, Internet, or telephone accounts held by private customers, provided that nonitemized bills showing amounts owed and amounts paid shall be available. Items exempted by this subparagraph shall be redacted prior to disclosure of any record requested pursuant to this article; provided, however, that such information shall not be redacted from such records if the person or entity requesting such records requests such information in a writing signed under oath by such person or a person legally authorized to represent such entity which states that such person or entity is gathering information as a representative of a news media organization for use in connection with news gathering and reporting; and provided, further, that such access shall be limited to social security numbers and day and month of birth; and provided, further, that the news media organization exception in this subparagraph shall not apply to paragraph (21) of this subsection.
      2. This paragraph shall have no application to:
        1. The disclosure of information contained in the records or papers of any court or derived therefrom including without limitation records maintained pursuant to Article 9 of Title 11;
        2. The disclosure of information to a court, prosecutor, or publicly employed law enforcement officer, or authorized agent thereof, seeking records in an official capacity;
        3. The disclosure of information to a public employee of this state, its political subdivisions, or the United States who is obtaining such information for administrative purposes, in which case, subject to applicable laws of the United States, further access to such information shall continue to be subject to the provisions of this paragraph;
        4. The disclosure of information as authorized by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction upon good cause shown to have access to any or all of such information upon such conditions as may be set forth in such order;
        5. The disclosure of information to the individual in respect of whom such information is maintained, with the authorization thereof, or to an authorized agent thereof; provided, however, that the agency maintaining such information shall require proper identification of such individual or such individual's agent, or proof of authorization, as determined by such agency;
        6. The disclosure of the day and month of birth and mother's birth name of a deceased individual;
        7. The disclosure by an agency of credit or payment information in connection with a request by a consumer reporting agency as that term is defined under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. Section 1681, et seq.);
        8. The disclosure by an agency of information in its records in connection with the agency's discharging or fulfilling of its duties and responsibilities, including, but not limited to, the collection of debts owed to the agency or individuals or entities whom the agency assists in the collection of debts owed to the individual or entity;
        9. The disclosure of information necessary to comply with legal or regulatory requirements or for legitimate law enforcement purposes; or
        10. The disclosure of the date of birth within criminal records.
      3. Records and information disseminated pursuant to this paragraph may be used only by the authorized recipient and only for the authorized purpose. Any person who obtains records or information pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph and knowingly and willfully discloses, distributes, or sells such records or information to an unauthorized recipient or for an unauthorized purpose shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as provided in Code Section 17-10-4. Any person injured thereby shall have a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
      4. In the event that the custodian of public records protected by this paragraph has good faith reason to believe that a pending request for such records has been made fraudulently, under false pretenses, or by means of false swearing, such custodian shall apply to the superior court of the county in which such records are maintained for a protective order limiting or prohibiting access to such records.
      5. This paragraph shall supplement and shall not supplant, overrule, replace, or otherwise modify or supersede any provision of statute, regulation, or law of the federal government or of this state as now or hereafter amended or enacted requiring, restricting, or prohibiting access to the information identified in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and shall constitute only a regulation of the methods of such access where not otherwise provided for, restricted, or prohibited;
    20. Records concerning public employees that reveal the public employee's home address, home telephone number, day and month of birth, social security number, insurance or medical information, mother's birth name, credit card information, debit card information, bank account information, account number, utility account number, password used to access his or her account, financial data or information other than compensation by a government agency, unlisted telephone number if so designated in a public record, and the identity of the public employee's immediate family members or dependents. This paragraph shall not apply to public records that do not specifically identify public employees or their jobs, titles, or offices. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "public employee" means any officer, employee, or former employee of:

      (21.1) (A) Records of the Department of Human Services concerning any foster parent or former foster parent that reveal his or her home address, home telephone number, day and month of birth, social security number, insurance or medical information, mother's birth name, credit card information, debit card information, bank account information, account number, utility account number, password used to access his or her account, financial data or information other than compensation by a government agency, or unlisted telephone number if so designated in a public record or that reveal the identity of his or her immediate family members or dependents.

      1. The State of Georgia or its agencies, departments, or commissions;
      2. Any county or municipality or its agencies, departments, or commissions;
      3. Other political subdivisions of this state;
      4. Teachers in public and charter schools and nonpublic schools; or
      5. Early care and education programs administered through the Department of Early Care and Learning;
      6. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "foster parent or former foster parent" means individuals who were approved to serve in such capacity by the Division of Family and Children Services of the Department of Human Services or a child-placing agency licensed in accordance with Code Section 49-5-12;
    21. Records of the Department of Early Care and Learning that contain the:
      1. Names of children and day and month of each child's birth;
      2. Names, addresses, telephone numbers, or e-mail addresses of parents, immediate family members, and emergency contact persons; or
      3. Names or other identifying information of individuals who report violations to the department;
    22. Public records containing information that would disclose or might lead to the disclosure of any component in the process used to execute or adopt an electronic signature, if such disclosure would or might cause the electronic signature to cease being under the sole control of the person using it. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "electronic signature" has the same meaning as that term is defined in Code Section 10-12-2;
    23. Records acquired by an agency for the purpose of establishing or implementing, or assisting in the establishment or implementation of, a carpooling or ridesharing program, including, but not limited to, the formation of carpools, vanpools, or buspools, the provision of transit routes, rideshare research, and the development of other demand management strategies such as variable working hours and telecommuting;
      1. Records the disclosure of which would compromise security against sabotage or criminal or terrorist acts and the nondisclosure of which is necessary for the protection of life, safety, or public property, which shall be limited to the following:
        1. Security plans and vulnerability assessments for any public utility, technology infrastructure, building, facility, function, or activity in effect at the time of the request for disclosure or pertaining to a plan or assessment in effect at such time;
        2. Any plan for protection against terrorist or other attacks that depends for its effectiveness in whole or in part upon a lack of general public knowledge of its details;
        3. Any document relating to the existence, nature, location, or function of security devices designed to protect against terrorist or other attacks that depend for their effectiveness in whole or in part upon a lack of general public knowledge;
        4. Any plan, blueprint, or other material which if made public could compromise security against sabotage, criminal, or terroristic acts; and
        5. Records of any government sponsored programs concerning training relative to governmental security measures which would identify persons being trained or instructors or would reveal information described in divisions (i) through (iv) of this subparagraph.
      2. In the event of litigation challenging nondisclosure pursuant to this paragraph by an agency of a document covered by this paragraph, the court may review the documents in question in camera and may condition, in writing, any disclosure upon such measures as the court may find to be necessary to protect against endangerment of life, safety, or public property.
      3. As used in division (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the term "activity" means deployment or surveillance strategies, actions mandated by changes in the federal threat level, motorcades, contingency plans, proposed or alternative motorcade routes, executive and dignitary protection, planned responses to criminal or terrorist actions, after-action reports still in use, proposed or actual plans and responses to bioterrorism, and proposed or actual plans and responses to requesting and receiving the National Pharmacy Stockpile;

      (25.1) School safety plans prepared pursuant to Code Section 20-2-1185, whether in the possession of a local school system, a local law enforcement agency, a local emergency management agency, the Department of Education, the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency, or any other public entity;

    24. Unless the request is made by the accused in a criminal case or by his or her attorney, public records of an emergency 9-1-1 system, as defined in paragraph (5) of Code Section 46-5-122, containing information which would reveal the name, address, or telephone number of a person placing a call to a public safety answering point. Such information may be redacted from such records if necessary to prevent the disclosure of the identity of a confidential source, to prevent disclosure of material which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or persons, or to prevent the disclosure of the existence of a confidential surveillance or investigation;

      (26.1) In addition to the exemption provided by paragraph (26) of this subsection, audio recordings of a 9-1-1 telephone call to a public safety answering point which contain the speech in distress or cries in extremis of a caller who died during the call or the speech or cries of a person who was a minor at the time of the call, except to the following, provided that the person seeking the audio recording of a 9-1-1 telephone call submits a sworn affidavit that attests to the facts necessary to establish eligibility under this paragraph:

      (26.2) Audio and video recordings from devices used by law enforcement officers in a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy when there is no pending investigation, except to the following, provided that the person seeking the audio or video recording submits a sworn affidavit that attests to the facts necessary to establish eligibility under this paragraph:

      1. A duly appointed representative of a deceased caller's estate;
      2. A parent or legal guardian of a minor caller;
      3. An accused in a criminal case when, in the good faith belief of the accused, the audio recording of the 9-1-1 telephone call is relevant to his or her criminal proceeding;
      4. A party to a civil action when, in the good faith belief of such party, the audio recording of the 9-1-1 telephone call is relevant to the civil action;
      5. An attorney for any of the persons identified in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this paragraph; or
      6. An attorney for a person who may pursue a civil action when, in the good faith belief of such attorney, the audio recording of the 9-1-1 telephone call is relevant to the potential civil action;
      7. A duly appointed representative of a deceased's estate when the decedent was depicted or heard on such recording;
      8. A parent or legal guardian of a minor depicted or heard on such recording;
      9. An accused in a criminal case when, in the good faith belief of the accused, such recording is relevant to his or her criminal proceeding;
      10. A party to a civil action when, in the good faith belief of such party, such recording is relevant to the civil action;
      11. An attorney for any of the persons identified in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this paragraph; or
      12. An attorney for a person who may pursue a civil action when, in the good faith belief of such attorney, such recording is relevant to the potential civil action;
    25. Records of athletic or recreational programs, available through the state or a political subdivision of the state, that include information identifying a child or children 12 years of age or under by name, address, telephone number, or emergency contact, unless such identifying information has been redacted;
    26. Records of the State Road and Tollway Authority which would reveal the financial accounts or travel history of any individual who is a motorist upon any toll project;
    27. Records maintained by public postsecondary educational institutions in this state and associated foundations of such institutions that contain personal information concerning donors or potential donors to such institutions or foundations; provided, however, that the name of any donor and the amount of donation made by such donor shall be subject to disclosure if such donor or any entity in which such donor has a substantial interest transacts business with the public postsecondary educational institution to which the donation is made within three years of the date of such donation. As used in this paragraph, the term "transact business" means to sell or lease any personal property, real property, or services on behalf of oneself or on behalf of any third party as an agent, broker, dealer, or representative in an amount in excess of $10,000.00 in the aggregate in a calendar year; and the term "substantial interest" means the direct or indirect ownership of more than 25 percent of the assets or stock of an entity;
    28. Records of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority or of any other transit system that is connected to that system's TransCard, SmartCard, or successor or similar system which would reveal the financial records or travel history of any individual who is a purchaser of a TransCard, SmartCard, or successor or similar fare medium. Such financial records shall include, but not be limited to, social security number, home address, home telephone number, e-mail address, credit or debit card information, and bank account information but shall not include the user's name;
    29. Building mapping information produced and maintained pursuant to Article 10 of Chapter 3 of Title 38;
    30. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (4) of this subsection, any physical evidence or investigatory materials that are evidence of an alleged violation of Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 12 of Title 16 and are in the possession, custody, or control of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies;
    31. Records that are expressly exempt from public inspection pursuant to Code Sections 47-1-14 and 47-7-127;
    32. Any trade secrets obtained from a person or business entity that are required by law, regulation, bid, or request for proposal to be submitted to an agency. An entity submitting records containing trade secrets that wishes to keep such records confidential under this paragraph shall submit and attach to the records an affidavit affirmatively declaring that specific information in the records constitute trade secrets pursuant to Article 27 of Chapter 1 of Title 10. If such entity attaches such an affidavit, before producing such records in response to a request under this article, the agency shall notify the entity of its intention to produce such records as set forth in this paragraph. If the agency makes a determination that the specifically identified information does not in fact constitute a trade secret, it shall notify the entity submitting the affidavit of its intent to disclose the information within ten days unless prohibited from doing so by an appropriate court order. In the event the entity wishes to prevent disclosure of the requested records, the entity may file an action in superior court to obtain an order that the requested records are trade secrets exempt from disclosure. The entity filing such action shall serve the requestor with a copy of its court filing. If the agency makes a determination that the specifically identified information does constitute a trade secret, the agency shall withhold the records, and the requester may file an action in superior court to obtain an order that the requested records are not trade secrets and are subject to disclosure;
    33. Data, records, or information of a proprietary nature produced or collected by or for faculty or staff of state institutions of higher learning, or other governmental agencies, in the conduct of, or as a result of, study or research on commercial, scientific, technical, or scholarly issues, whether sponsored by the institution alone or in conjunction with a governmental body or private concern, where such data, records, or information has not been publicly released, published, copyrighted, or patented;
    34. Any data, records, or information developed, collected, or received by or on behalf of faculty, staff, employees, or students of an institution of higher education or any public or private entity supporting or participating in the activities of an institution of higher education in the conduct of, or as a result of, study or research on medical, scientific, technical, scholarly, or artistic issues, whether sponsored by the institution alone or in conjunction with a governmental body or private entity, until such information is published, patented, otherwise publicly disseminated, or released to an agency whereupon the request must be made to the agency. This paragraph shall apply to, but shall not be limited to, information provided by participants in research, research notes and data, discoveries, research projects, methodologies, protocols, and creative works;
    35. Any record that would not be subject to disclosure, or the disclosure of which would jeopardize the receipt of federal funds, under 20 U.S.C. Section 1232g or its implementing regulations;
    36. Unless otherwise provided by law, records consisting of questions, scoring keys, and other materials constituting a test that derives value from being unknown to the test taker prior to administration which is to be administered by an agency, including, but not limited to, any public school, any unit of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, any public technical school, the State Board of Education, the Office of Student Achievement, the Professional Standards Commission, or a local school system, if reasonable measures are taken by the owner of the test to protect security and confidentiality; provided, however, that the State Board of Education may establish procedures whereby a person may view, but not copy, such records if viewing will not, in the judgment of the board, affect the result of administration of such test. These limitations shall not be interpreted by any court of law to include or otherwise exempt from inspection the records of any athletic association or other nonprofit entity promoting intercollegiate athletics;
    37. Records disclosing the identity or personally identifiable information of any person participating in research on commercial, scientific, technical, medical, scholarly, or artistic issues conducted by the Department of Community Health, the Department of Public Health, the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, or a state institution of higher education whether sponsored by the institution alone or in conjunction with a governmental body or private entity;
    38. Any permanent records maintained by a judge of the probate court pursuant to Code Section 16-11-129, relating to weapons carry licenses, or pursuant to any other requirement for maintaining records relative to the possession of firearms, except to the extent that such records relating to licensing and possession of firearms are sought by law enforcement agencies or a judge of the probate court as provided by law;
    39. Records containing communications subject to the attorney-client privilege recognized by state law; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply to the factual findings, but shall apply to the legal conclusions, of an attorney conducting an investigation on behalf of an agency so long as such investigation does not pertain to pending or potential litigation, settlement, claims, administrative proceedings, or other judicial actions brought or to be brought by or against the agency or any officer or employee; and provided, further, that such investigations conducted by hospital authorities to ensure compliance with federal or state law, regulations, or reimbursement policies shall be exempt from disclosure if such investigations are otherwise subject to the attorney-client privilege. Attorney-client communications, however, may be obtained in a proceeding under Code Section 50-18-73 to prove justification or lack thereof in refusing disclosure of documents under this Code section provided the judge of the court in which such proceeding is pending shall first determine by an in camera examination that such disclosure would be relevant on that issue. In addition, when an agency withholds information subject to this paragraph, any party authorized to bring a proceeding under Code Section 50-18-73 may request that the judge of the court in which such proceeding is pending determine by an in camera examination whether such information was properly withheld;
    40. Confidential attorney work product; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply to the factual findings, but shall apply to the legal conclusions, of an attorney conducting an investigation on behalf of an agency so long as such investigation does not pertain to pending or potential litigation, settlement, claims, administrative proceedings, or other judicial actions brought or to be brought by or against the agency or any officer or employee; and provided, further, that such investigations conducted by hospital authorities to ensure compliance with federal or state law, regulations, or reimbursement policies shall be exempt from disclosure if such investigations are otherwise subject to confidentiality as attorney work product. In addition, when an agency withholds information subject to this paragraph, any party authorized to bring a proceeding under Code Section 50-18-73 may request that the judge of the court in which such proceeding is pending determine by an in camera examination whether such information was properly withheld;
    41. Records containing tax matters or tax information that is confidential under state or federal law;
    42. Records consisting of any computer program or computer software used or maintained in the course of operation of a public office or agency; provided, however, that data generated, kept, or received by an agency shall be subject to inspection and copying as provided in this article;
    43. Records pertaining to the rating plans, rating systems, underwriting rules, surveys, inspections, statistical plans, or similar proprietary information used to provide or administer liability insurance or self-insurance coverage to any agency;
    44. Documents maintained by any agency, as such term is defined in subparagraph (a)(1)(A) of Code Section 50-14-1, which pertain to an economic development project until the economic development project is secured by binding commitment, provided that any such documents shall be disclosed upon proper request after a binding commitment has been secured or the project has been terminated. No later than five business days after the Department of Economic Development secures a binding commitment and the department has committed the use of state funds from the OneGeorgia Authority or funds from Regional Economic Business Assistance for the project pursuant to Code Section 50-8-8, or other provisions of law, the Department of Economic Development shall give notice that a binding commitment has been reached by posting on its website notice of the project in conjunction with a copy of the Department of Economic Development's records documenting the bidding commitment made in connection with the project and the negotiation relating thereto and by publishing notice of the project and participating parties in the legal organ of each county in which the economic development project is to be located. As used in this paragraph, the term "economic development project" means a plan or proposal to locate a business, or to expand a business, that would involve an expenditure of more than $25 million by the business or the hiring of more than 50 employees by the business;
    45. Records related to a training program operated under the authority of Article 3 of Chapter 4 of Title 20 disclosing an economic development project prior to a binding commitment having been secured, relating to job applicants, or identifying proprietary hiring practices, training, skills, or other business methods and practices of a private entity. As used in this paragraph, the term "economic development project" means a plan or proposal to locate a business, or to expand a business, that would involve an expenditure of more than $25 million by the business or the hiring of more than 50 employees by the business;
    46. Records that are expressly exempt from public inspection pursuant to Code Section 47-20-87;
    47. Data, records, or information acquired by the Commissioner of Labor or the Department of Labor as part of any investigation required pursuant to Code Section 39-2-18, relating to minors employed as actors or performers; or
    48. Held by the Georgia Superior Court Clerks' Cooperative Authority or any other public or private entity for and on behalf of a clerk of superior court; provided, however, that such records may be obtained from a clerk of superior court unless otherwise exempted from disclosure.
  2. This Code section shall be interpreted narrowly so as to exclude from disclosure only that portion of a public record to which an exclusion is directly applicable. It shall be the duty of the agency having custody of a record to provide all other portions of a record for public inspection or copying.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, an exhibit tendered to the court as evidence in a criminal or civil trial shall not be open to public inspection without approval of the judge assigned to the case.
    2. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section, in the event inspection is not approved by the court, in lieu of inspection of such an exhibit, the custodian of such an exhibit shall, upon request, provide one or more of the following:
      1. A photograph;
      2. A photocopy;
      3. A facsimile; or
      4. Another reproduction.
    3. The provisions of this article regarding fees for production of a record, including, but not limited to, subsections (c) and (d) of Code Section 50-18-71, shall apply to exhibits produced according to this subsection.
  3. Any physical evidence that is used as an exhibit in a criminal or civil trial to show or support an alleged violation of Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 12 of Title 16 shall not be open to public inspection except by court order. If the judge approves inspection of such physical evidence, the judge shall designate, in writing, the facility owned or operated by an agency of the state or local government where such physical evidence may be inspected. If the judge permits inspection, such property or material shall not be photographed, copied, or reproduced by any means. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years, a fine of not more than $100,000.00, or both.

(Ga. L. 1967, p. 455, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 163, § 1; Code 1981, §50-18-72, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 1789, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1090, § 2; Ga. L. 1987, p. 377, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 13, § 50; Ga. L. 1988, p. 243, § 3; Ga. L. 1989, p. 553, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 827, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 341, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1061, § 8; Ga. L. 1993, p. 968, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1336, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1669, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 704, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 50; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1052, § 2; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1652, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 552, §§ 4, 4.1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 809, §§ 4, 5; Ga. L. 1999, p. 1222, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 50; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1556, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 50; Ga. L. 2001, p. 327, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 331, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 491, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 13; Ga. L. 2002, p. 415, § 50; Ga. L. 2003, p. 602, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 880, § 2; Ga. L. 2004, p. 107, § 22; Ga. L. 2004, p. 161, § 15; Ga. L. 2004, p. 341, § 1A; Ga. L. 2004, p. 410, § 9; Ga. L. 2004, p. 770, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 30-2/HB 501; Ga. L. 2005, p. 558, § 1/HB 437; Ga. L. 2005, p. 595, § 1/SB 121; Ga. L. 2005, p. 660, § 11/HB 470; Ga. L. 2005, p. 1133, § 1/HB 340; Ga. L. 2006, p. 72, § 50/SB 465; Ga. L. 2006, p. 536, § 1/HB 955; Ga. L. 2007, p. 87, § 1/SB 212; Ga. L. 2007, p. 160, § 1/HB 101; Ga. L. 2008, p. 564, § 2/SB 33; Ga. L. 2008, p. 829, § 4/HB 1020; Ga. L. 2009, p. 8, § 50/SB 46; Ga. L. 2009, p. 37, §§ 1, 1.1, 1.2/SB 26; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 1-4/HB 228; Ga. L. 2009, p. 698, § 7/HB 126; Ga. L. 2010, p. 243, §§ 1, 2/HB 1086; Ga. L. 2010, p. 286, § 23/SB 244; Ga. L. 2010, p. 415, § 2/HB 249; Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 2-21/SB 308; Ga. L. 2011, p. 59, §§ 3-1, 1-68/HB 415; Ga. L. 2011, p. 611, § 1/HB 261; Ga. L. 2011, p. 705, § 5-29/HB 214; Ga. L. 2012, p. 211, § 4/SB 402; Ga. L. 2012, p. 218, § 2/HB 397; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 50/HB 942; Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 50/HB 79; Ga. L. 2014, p. 418, § 2/HB 828; Ga. L. 2014, p. 451, § 15/HB 776; Ga. L. 2014, p. 692, § 1/HB 449; Ga. L. 2014, p. 742, § 2/HB 845; Ga. L. 2014, p. 866, § 50/SB 340; Ga. L. 2015, p. 805, § 13/HB 492; Ga. L. 2015, p. 943, § 5/HB 366; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1046, § 5/SB 94; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1065, § 2-3/SB 135; Ga. L. 2016, p. 6, § 2/SB 323; Ga. L. 2018, p. 753, § 3/HB 763; Ga. L. 2018, p. 927, § 4-1/HB 906.)

The 2011 amendments. The first 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, added paragraph (a)(4.2); and, effective May 3, 2011, in subparagraph (a)(15)(A), deleted "and" at the end of division (a)(15)(A)(iii), substituted "; and" for a period at the end of division (a)(15)(A)(iv), and added division (a)(15)(A)(v). The second 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in subparagraph (a)(15)(A), deleted "and" at the end of division (a)(15)(A)(iii), substituted "; and" for a period at the end of division (a)(15)(A) (iv), and added division (a)(15)(A)(v). The third 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, inserted "the Department of Public Health," in the first sentence of paragraph (c)(2). See Editor's notes for applicability.

The 2012 amendments. The first 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, deleted "or" at the end of paragraph (a)(22), substituted "; or" for the period at the end of paragraph (a)(23), and added paragraph (a)(24) (now paragraph (a)(48)). The second 2012 amendment, effective April 17, 2012, rewrote this Code section. See Editor's notes for applicability. The third 2012 amendment, effective May 1, 2012, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "upon any toll" for "upon such toll" in paragraph (a)(18) (now paragraph (a)(28)).

The 2013 amendment, effective April 24, 2013, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in paragraph (a)(35).

The 2014 amendments. The first 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added the proviso at the end of subparagraph (a)(5)(I) and substituted "60 days" for "30 days" near the end of subparagraph (a)(5)(J). The second 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, in paragraph (a)(6), in the first sentence, substituted "The Council" for "the Council" near the middle and substituted "The Council of Superior Court Clerks of Georgia, superior court clerk, or jury clerk shall" for "the Council of Superior Court Clerks of Georgia or the clerk of the county board of jury commissioners of any county shall" and substituted the present provisions of the second sentence for the former provisions, which read: "Neither the Council of Superior Court Clerks of Georgia nor the clerk of a county board of jury commissioners shall be liable for any use or misuse of such data". The third 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added paragraph (a)(26.1). The fourth 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added the proviso at the end of paragraph (a)(4). The fifth 2014 amendment, effective April 29, 2014, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "paragraph (5)" for "paragraph (3)" in paragraph (a)(26).

The 2015 amendments. The first 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, inserted "or a judge of the probate court" near the end of paragraph (a)(40). The second 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, added paragraph (a)(49). The third 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, added paragraph (a)(26.2). The fourth 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, added paragraph (a)(49). See the Code Commission note regarding the effect of these amendments.

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted "any agency, as such term is defined in subparagraph (a)(1)(A) of Code Section 50-14-1, which pertain" for "the Department of Economic Development pertaining" near the beginning of the first sentence of paragraph (a)(46).

The 2018 amendments. The first 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added paragraph (a)(25.1). The second 2018 amendment, effective May 8, 2018, substituted "Reserved." for the former provisions of paragraph (a)(12), which read: "Related to the provision of staff services to individual members of the General Assembly by the Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment Office, the Senate Research Office, or the House Budget and Research Office, provided that this exception shall not have any application to records related to the provision of staff services to any committee or subcommittee or to any records which are or have been previously publicly disclosed by or pursuant to the direction of an individual member of the General Assembly;" and added paragraph (a)(21.1).

Cross references.

- Privilege against self incrimination, § 24-5-506.

Confidentiality of records of medical peer review groups, § 31-7-133.

Confidentiality of portions of license applications directed to joint-secretary, § 43-1-2(k).

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2008, paragraph (a)(21), as enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 829, § 4, was redesignated as paragraph (a)(22); "or" was deleted at the end of paragraph (a)(20); and "; or" was substituted for a period at the end of paragraph (a)(21).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2012, "or" was deleted at the end of paragraph (a)(46), "; or" was substituted for a period at the end of paragraph (a)(47), and paragraph (a)(24) as added by Ga. L. 2012, p. 211, § 1/SB 402 was redesignated as paragraph (a)(48).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2015, paragraph (a)(49), as added by Ga. L. 2015, p. 1065, § 2-3/SB 135, was redesignated as paragraph (a)(50), "or" was deleted at the end of paragraph (a)(48), and "; or" was substituted for the period at the end of paragraph (a)(49).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2018, a semicolon was substituted for a period at the end of paragraph (a)(12).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1999, p. 809, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the social security numbers on driver's licenses and other pertinent personal identifying information appearing on Georgia Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reports is often used for fraudulent purposes and for invading the privacy of individuals; therefore, access to the Georgia Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reports should be restricted.

Ga. L. 2004, p. 410, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'State and Local Tax Revision Act of 2004.'"

Ga. L. 2004, p. 161, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that "all appointments of guardians of the person or property made pursuant to former Title 29 shall continue in effect and shall thereafter be governed by the provisions of this Act."

Ga. L. 2005, p. 595, § 2/SB 121, not codified by the General Assembly, makes paragraph (a)(18) of this Code section applicable to all requests for copies of records or to inspect records filed or submitted on or after May 2, 2005, and that are pending on May 2, 2005.

Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 3-1/SB 308, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment of this Code section by that Act shall apply to all offenses committed on and after June 4, 2010, and shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before June 4, 2010, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecution.

Ga. L. 2011, p. 59, § 1-1/HB 415, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Jury Composition Reform Act of 2011.'"

Ga. L. 2011, p. 59, § 4-1(b)/HB 415, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section by that Act shall apply to open records requests pending on May 3, 2011, or made on and after May 3, 2011.

Ga. L. 2012, p. 211, § 1/SB 402, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Employees' Retirement System of Georgia Enhanced Investment Authority Act.'"

Ga. L. 2012, p. 218, § 18/HB 397, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that "the provisions of paragraph (47) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-18-72 as enacted by this Act shall apply to any request for public records made prior to the effective date of this Act. Agencies shall be permitted to assert the provisions of paragraph (47) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-18-72 as enacted by this Act as a basis for withholding documents covered by that paragraph in any pending or subsequently filed litigation regarding a request that occurred prior to the effective date of this Act." This Act became effective April 17, 2012.

Law reviews.

- For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 25 (1997). For survey article on local government law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 285 (2007). For survey article on zoning and land use law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 493 (2007). For article, "Must Government Contractors 'Submit' to Their Own Destruction?: Georgia's Trade Secret Disclosure Exemption and United HealthCare of Georgia, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Community Health," see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 825 (2009). For article on the 2011 amendment of this Code section, see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 147 (2011). For article, "Crimes and Offenses," see 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 131 (2011). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 139 (2012). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 79 (2015). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Georgia St. U. L. Rev. 31 (2016). For annual survey on local government law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 205 (2017). For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 324 (1989). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 344 (1992). For note on 2000 amendment of this Code section, see 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 316 (2000). For note on the 2001 amendment to this Code section, see 18 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 328 (2001). For comment, "Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection," see 41 Emory L.J. 1185 (1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Intent of General Assembly was to afford to public at large access to public records with the exceptions of certain information which the law exempts from disclosure. Griffin-Spalding County Hosp. Auth. v. Radio Station WKEU, 240 Ga. 444, 241 S.E.2d 196 (1978).

This section manifests the intent of the General Assembly that reports which include the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy are to be exempted from the disclosure requirements of the law; the right of privacy, protectable in tort, however extends only to unnecessary public scrutiny. Athens Observer, Inc. v. Anderson, 245 Ga. 63, 263 S.E.2d 128 (1980).

Construction.

- Georgia Supreme Court concludes that the right of access afforded by the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b), et seq., is a public right of the people as a whole and, as such, it could not vest in any particular persons, whether upon the making of a request for public records, or upon the filing of an action to enforce the public right; thus, there is no constitutional impediment to the retroactive modification of the Act by subsequent legislation. Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

Construction of statutory exemptions.

- Any purported statutory exemption from disclosure under the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., must be narrowly construed. Hardaway Co. v. Rives, 262 Ga. 631, 422 S.E.2d 854 (1992); City of Brunswick v. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, 214 Ga. App. 150, 447 S.E.2d 41 (1994).

Supreme Court of Georgia interpreted O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(47) to provide that Quick Start records disclosing an economic development project are excepted only to the extent that no binding commitment has been secured, but the exception for Quick Start records relating to job applicants or identifying proprietary hiring practices, training, skills, or other business methods and practices of a private entity is not so limited. Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

Statutory exception in O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(47) may constitutionally be applied retroactively. Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

In a suit wherein requestors sought access to Quick Start records under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(47), the statute applied retroactively to the case but the case required a remand for the trial court to sort out the extent to which the specific parts of the requests sought only records that were excepted under § 50-18-72(a)(47) and to dismiss the lawsuit as to those parts of the requests. Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(47), provides explicitly that § 50-18-72(a)(47) shall apply retroactively to any request for public records made prior to the effective date of the Act. Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

Exemption for law enforcement records.

- O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) exempts law enforcement records from disclosure to the extent the records are part of a pending investigation. A seemingly inactive investigation which has not yet resulted in a prosecution logically remains undecided, and is therefore "pending" until the investigation is concluded and the file closed. Unified Gov't v. Athens Newspapers, LLC, 284 Ga. 192, 663 S.E.2d 248 (2008).

Failure to cite exemption.

- Under the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., a city could not rely on the exemption under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) because the city had not cited the statute in a timely written response as required by § 50-18-72(h). The city's response was untimely and not in writing, and in citing the statute in the city's answer, the city failed to cite the subsection and paragraph relied upon. Jaraysi v. City of Marietta, 294 Ga. App. 6, 668 S.E.2d 446 (2008).

Time for responding to records request.

- Under O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70(f) and50-18-72(h), the three-day time period to respond to a records request commences upon delivery of the request to the agency, rather than the particular employee in charge of the records. Unified Gov't v. Athens Newspapers, LLC, 284 Ga. 192, 663 S.E.2d 248 (2008).

When a city did not comply with the three-business-day time restriction for responding to an open records request, the city violated the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., even if the city later made all of the requested documents available, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the city. Jaraysi v. City of Marietta, 294 Ga. App. 6, 668 S.E.2d 446 (2008).

Inquiries under Open Records Act.

- In suits under the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., the first inquiry is whether the records are "public records"; if the records are, the second inquiry is whether the records are protected from disclosure under the list of exemptions or under any other statute; if the records are not exempt, then the question is whether the records should be protected by court order, but only if there is a claim that disclosure would invade individual privacy. Hardaway Co. v. Rives, 262 Ga. 631, 422 S.E.2d 854 (1992).

As a police department's investigation of an unsolved rape and murder remained "pending" under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) until the file was closed, the county was not obliged to disclose records of the investigation to a newspaper under the Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq. Unified Gov't v. Athens Newspapers, LLC, 284 Ga. 192, 663 S.E.2d 248 (2008).

Records open to public inspection unless closed by specific exception.

- Underlying implication of this section is that all records of all state, county, and municipal authorities are open to public inspection unless closed by a specific exception, and that the records of hospital authorities are not in any respect different from those of other authorities when the issue is one of whether the particular record is open to public inspection under the general provisions of this article or is closed to public inspection under a specific statutory exception. Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83, 263 S.E.2d 119, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 446 U.S. 979, 100 S. Ct. 2958, 64 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1980).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the corporation on the corporation's request that the individual disclose to the corporation the individual's tax records so that the corporation could evaluate whether the individual was properly awarded a city contract based on the city's designation of the individual's business as a disadvantaged business; the corporation sought the information for a legitimate, limited purpose and the individuals could not show a specific exception that would bar disclosure of those records. City of Atlanta v. Corey Entm't, Inc., 278 Ga. 474, 604 S.E.2d 140 (2004).

Agency limited to authority cited in denial of initial request.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(h), in denying a request for records under the Open Records Act (ORA), an agency was allowed to rely only on the legal authority specified in a response denying an initial request so an insurance commissioner was not allowed to deny an ORA request for records relating to an investigation of an insurer only on the insurer's proffered basis of the pendency of the investigation, and as the insurer had already been given the chance to review the report and resolve the matter, but later withdrew the insurer's request for a hearing, the commissioner's general policy of not releasing reports until the subject of the investigation had a chance to review the report and resolve the matter was unauthorized. Hoffman v. Oxendine, 268 Ga. App. 316, 601 S.E.2d 813 (2004).

Construed with 42 U.S.C

§ 1395bb(a). - There is no requirement under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 that a report generated by or used by the state for state purposes be exempted from disclosure merely because that report would be kept confidential if generated or used by the federal government for federal purposes. Georgia Hosp. Ass'n v. Ledbetter, 260 Ga. 477, 396 S.E.2d 488 (1990).

Right to privacy determined by examining tort of invasion of privacy.

- Invasion of personal privacy encompassed as an exception to the right of the public to access is to be determined by an examination of the tort of invasion of privacy. Harris v. Cox Enters., Inc., 256 Ga. 299, 348 S.E.2d 448 (1986).

Limits of right of privacy.

- Right of privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter though of a private nature when the publication is made under circumstances which would render it a privileged communication according to the law of libel and slander. Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425, 226 S.E.2d 292 (1976).

Cited in Northside Realty Assocs. v. Community Relations Comm'n, 240 Ga. 432, 241 S.E.2d 189 (1978); Atchison v. Hospital Auth., 245 Ga. 494, 265 S.E.2d 801 (1980); City of Atlanta v. Pacific & S. Co., 257 Ga. 587, 361 S.E.2d 484 (1987); McBride v. Wetherington, 199 Ga. App. 7, 403 S.E.2d 873 (1991); Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2003); Walker v. Johnson, 282 Ga. 168, 646 S.E.2d 44 (2007).

Application

Privacy rights of a private transportation company and school bus drivers could not outweigh the public interest in the disclosure of information in personnel records regarding the drivers. Hackworth v. Board of Educ., 214 Ga. App. 17, 447 S.E.2d 78 (1994).

Confidential tax information not disclosable.

- Confidential tax information in an investigative file of the Attorney General was not subject to disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72. Bowers v. Shelton, 265 Ga. 247, 453 S.E.2d 741 (1995).

Election records.

- Trial court properly held that a CD-ROM that contained passwords, encryption codes, and other security information would compromise election security and thus was exempt from disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(15)(A)(iv). Although the requestor argued that the state could copy the CD-ROM without including such information, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(d) provided that an agency was not required to create records that were not in existence at the time of the request. Smith v. DeKalb County, 288 Ga. App. 574, 654 S.E.2d 469 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0596, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 291 (Ga. 2008).

Law enforcement records.

- Incident reports of a city police department were exempt from disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(3) to the extent the reports contained confidential information, even though the reports would not be exempted under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) as not being part of a pending investigation or prosecution. Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Brunswick, 265 Ga. 413, 457 S.E.2d 176 (1995).

In an action by newspapers for disclosure of certain incident reports of a city police department, it was not error to bar the newspapers from an ex parte hearing held to determine the extent to which the reports might contain confidential information that would be exempt from disclosure; affirming City of Brunswick v. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, 214 Ga. App. 150, 447 S.E.2d 41 (1994). Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Brunswick, 265 Ga. 413, 457 S.E.2d 176 (1995).

Law enforcement personnel.

- When a complaint was delivered to a sheriff's captain who delivered the complaint to the deputy named as a defendant in the complaint, service upon the deputy was insufficient since the prohibition against disclosure of the home address of a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 did not validate the delivery to the captain as service under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(7). Melton v. Wiley, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2008)(Unpublished).

Incident reports maintained by a city on a series of sexual assaults could be exempted from disclosure if disclosure would reveal confidential information or endanger the lives of various individuals. City of Brunswick v. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, 214 Ga. App. 150, 447 S.E.2d 41 (1994), aff'd, 265 Ga. 413, 457 S.E.2d 176 (1995).

Police reports concerning rape were not protected by the "similar file" exemption of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(2), because the documents were expressly governed by O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) and concerned a subject of "legitimate public inquiry." Doe v. Board of Regents, 215 Ga. App. 684, 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994).

University police reports concerning incident of alleged rape were public records obtainable by a student newspaper; the reports were not exempt under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4), since the reports were not the subject of a pending investigation and involved a matter which had been terminated. Doe v. Board of Regents, 215 Ga. App. 684, 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994).

No First Amendment right to accident reports.

- Private investigator seeking information for commercial solicitation has no first amendment constitutional right of special access to motor vehicle accident reports. Spottsville v. Barnes, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2001).

Use of medical records in relevant court proceedings.

- Although unauthorized publicity of the contents of hospital records, a patient's health, patient's anatomical debilities, and the opinions, diagnoses, and tests of the patient's doctors would fall within the restriction of this section, the section does not preclude the use of the records in relevant court proceedings, nor does the section provide a basis for a tort action for invasion of privacy when such material is admitted into evidence. Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425, 226 S.E.2d 292 (1976) see O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72).

Discovery request of voir dire notes premature.

- Defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., seeking discovery of the district attorney's voir dire notes was premature as the defendant still retained the right to do so in a habeas proceeding. Hall v. Madison, 263 Ga. 73, 428 S.E.2d 345 (1993).

Private information protected.

- Various factors weigh on the question of whether personal privacy protects information from disclosure. Among other things, the court should consider whether the information is unsubstantiated and based on hearsay, whether the information does not relate or relates only incidentally to the subject matter of the public record, and the remoteness in time of the events referred to. Harris v. Cox Enters., Inc., 256 Ga. 299, 348 S.E.2d 448 (1986).

Eminent domain cases.

- Property has been "acquired" for purposes of the exemption set forth in O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(6) only after condemnation proceedings, including any litigation, have been completed. Real estate appraisals obtained by the Department of Transportation were not subject to disclosure when only the declaration of taking was filed and money was paid into court. Black v. Georgia DOT, 262 Ga. 342, 417 S.E.2d 655 (1992).

Pending-prosecution exemption of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) refers to imminent adjudicatory proceedings of finite duration. The last phrase of that exemption is but one example of when a prosecution should not be considered "pending" for purposes of the exception. Parker v. Lee, 259 Ga. 195, 378 S.E.2d 677 (1989).

Invasion of privacy rights of murder victims.

- In determining whether an invasion of the privacy rights of murder victims is warranted or unwarranted, the question can be stated in terms of whether the privacy interests of the deceased are outweighed by the interests of the public favoring disclosure. Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 257 Ga. 156, 356 S.E.2d 640 (1987).

"Investigative notes" not releasable.

- "Investigative notes" are not within the category of law enforcement and prosecutorial documents authorized for release under the Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq.; investigative notes are "notes" not "reports," and cannot be classified as police arrest reports, accident reports, or incident reports. Lebis v. State, 212 Ga. App. 481, 442 S.E.2d 786 (1994).

Investigatory reports.

- Investigatory report concerning claims of misconduct against an employee of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles was a public record and was not exempt from disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72. Fincher v. State, 231 Ga. App. 49, 497 S.E.2d 632 (1998).

Hospital authority claimed certain records of its internal investigation of alleged sexual misconduct by its employees were exempt from disclosure under the attorney work product doctrine, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(e)(2) of the Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq. This claim failed, as the investigation, despite the involvement of counsel for the authority, was commenced not in response to any claims or threat of litigation, but because the authority received anonymous complaints from its employees about inappropriate sexual activity. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Miller & Billips, 293 Ga. App. 601, 667 S.E.2d 455 (2008).

County's sheriff and district attorney were not required to release records relating to an inmate's death in custody under the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq., because the records came within the "pending prosecution" exemption to disclosure in O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4). The exception for agencies under investigation did not apply because "agency," as defined in O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1(a)(1)(C) and50-18-70(b), was not synonymous with "employee," and the agency itself was not under investigation. Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. St. Lawrence, 337 Ga. App. 428, 787 S.E.2d 778 (2016).

Retrial possibility not grounds for nondisclosure of investigatory files.

- When a murder conviction and death sentence resulting from the prosecution have been affirmed on appeal, but a rape conviction has been reversed on a ground that leaves the state free to retry the defendant, the possible retrial of the defendant does not warrant nondisclosure to the defendant of criminal investigatory files since the agency custodians of the files at issue failed to carry the agency's burden of showing an imminent proceeding on the rape charge against the defendant to exempt such files from disclosure pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4). Parker v. Lee, 259 Ga. 195, 378 S.E.2d 677 (1989).

Tenants' rights of privacy protected from disclosure of certain information.

- O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 forbids disclosure to the general public from housing authority records or files of any information which would invade the constitutional, statutory, or common-law rights of the tenants to privacy. Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83, 263 S.E.2d 119, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 446 U.S. 979, 100 S. Ct. 2958, 64 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1980).

Ad valorem property tax records not confidential.

- Ad valorem property tax records are not similar to medical records for the purpose of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 and are not required to be kept confidential. Pensyl v. Peach County, 252 Ga. 450, 314 S.E.2d 434 (1984).

County hospital employees' information disclosure.

- Disclosure of the names, salaries, and job titles of county hospital employees is not an invasion of personal privacy as contemplated by the General Assembly to permit an exemption from disclosure, nor is the public interest in disclosure outweighed by benefits to the hospital accruing from nondisclosure. Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Southeastern Newspapers Corp., 252 Ga. 19, 311 S.E.2d 806 (1984).

Mere placement of records of Georgia Bureau of Investigation's investigation in the personnel file of an investigated public employee did not transform the records into personnel-related records. Irvin v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 253 Ga. 43, 316 S.E.2d 449 (1984).

Records of Georgia DOT.

- Neither the "state matter" privilege nor the "secret of state" privilege exempted cost estimates of the DOT from disclosure under the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq. Hardaway Co. v. Rives, 262 Ga. 631, 422 S.E.2d 854 (1992).

Applications for position of university president.

- Applications submitted by candidates for the position of Georgia State University president, and the resumes and vitae, which were products of the applicants themselves, although those materials were materials upon which, in part, "confidential evaluations" were based, were not evaluations. Hence, those materials were not exempt from disclosure. Board of Regents v. Atlanta Journal, 259 Ga. 214, 378 S.E.2d 305 (1989).

Records containing city cellular telephone bills, including numbers assigned to city cellular telephones, were not exempt from disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(2). Dortch v. Atlanta Journal, 261 Ga. 350, 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991).

Trade secrets.

- After a company made reasonable efforts to restrict the dissemination of trade secret information except for providing the information to the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, trade secret status was not lost simply because the company did not notify the EPD each time that the company provided EPD with information containing trade secrets. Theragenics Corp. v. Department of Natural Resources, 244 Ga. App. 829, 536 S.E.2d 613 (2000), aff'd,. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Theragenics Corp., 273 Ga. 724, 545 S.E.2d 904 (2001).

Given the highly competitive nature of the asphalt industry in the State of Georgia, the trial court did not err in permanently enjoining the DOT from giving unredacted copies of documents, which contained trade secrets and confidential technical specifications relating to the mix design, to a competitor of a group of contractors; further, the public could ascertain whether a contractor's asphalt product met DOT requirements by examining information on the forms, which was not included in the trial court's injunction, and the records did not fall within the exception to Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., disclosure because the contractors were not required by law to submit the information to the DOT. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. E. R. Snell Contr., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 546, 639 S.E.2d 372 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 140 (2007).

Trade secrets exemption of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(b)(1) means that public records are exempt from disclosure if the records constitute trade secrets, even if the records are submitted to a public agency, so long as the submission was "required by law"; under this construction, public records that remain in the sole possession of a private entity are exempt from disclosure if the records otherwise qualify as trade secrets under the two-part test set forth in O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4). As such, the trial court erred in concluding that documents of the administrator of the State Health Benefit Plan could not be exempt from disclosure because the documents were never "required by law to be submitted" to the Georgia Department of Community Health. United HealthCare of Ga., Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 293 Ga. App. 84, 666 S.E.2d 472 (2008).

By voluntarily entering into a public contract to administer public funds, the administrator of the State Health Benefit Plan did not waive the right to have the administrator's documents protected as trade secrets. A private entity's voluntary participation in a government contract did not, standing alone, strip the entity's documents of its trade secret status. United HealthCare of Ga., Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 293 Ga. App. 84, 666 S.E.2d 472 (2008).

Bidder on a public project failed to provide any evidence to support the bidder's claim that the detailed pricing information in the bidder's unredacted price proposal would enable a competitor to deduce how the bidder designed the bidder's systems and, therefore, merited protection under the trade secrets exemption to the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(b)(1). State Rd. & Tollway Auth. v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 306 Ga. App. 487, 702 S.E.2d 486 (2010).

Nondisclosure of research correspondence.

- Trial court erred in ruling that the university had the discretion to release the research correspondence in response to the intervenor's open record request, even if the plaintiff brought a suit to enjoin the disclosure and demonstrated that the correspondence was exempt from disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72, because, pursuant to the case law, the plaintiff was entitled to enjoin the university from disclosing the research correspondence to the intervenor as the plaintiff showed that the correspondence fell within one or both of the research exceptions found in the Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70, et seq., and the nondisclosure of statutorily excepted information was mandatory rather than discretionary under the Act. Consumer Credit Research Found. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 341 Ga. App. 323, 800 S.E.2d 24 (2017).

Foundation that had partnered with a state university to study the effect of payday loans on consumer financial health could not prevent the disclosure of university records of the study under the Open Records Act's, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq., exemptions for certain research materials, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(35) and (36), because those exemptions did not prohibit release. Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Found., 303 Ga. 828, 815 S.E.2d 841 (2018).

Attorney fees.

- Trial court erred in entering summary judgment for a county and a county manager in an employee's suit for attorney fees arising out of a Georgia Open Records Act (ORA), O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., request as the employee showed that the ORA was violated as the manager did not respond to the request within the required three-day period; the case was remanded for a determination of whether the ORA violation was without substantial justification or whether special circumstances existed that counseled against awarding attorney fees. Wallace v. Greene County, 274 Ga. App. 776, 618 S.E.2d 642 (2005).

County's summary judgment motion was properly denied as: (1) the county violated the Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., by failing to respond to a bidder's request within three business days; (2) the county did not produce any documents for over a month and did not provide all requested documents until after a civil suit for attorney's fees was filed; and (3) the county further failed to explain the county's dilatory conduct in any evidence submitted with the county's summary judgment motion. Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall County, 281 Ga. App. 825, 637 S.E.2d 763 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0306, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 214 (Ga. 2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Trade secrets and confidential business information.

- Trade secrets and other confidential business information received by the state energy office from the federal government and businesses in the private sector are not within the purview of O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 18, T. 50, and may be treated as confidential by that state agency. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-113.

Disclosure requirements applicable to state trade secrets.

- Trade secrets of any state department, agency, board, bureau, commission, or authority are not exempt from public disclosure under the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., although information in the possession of such entity which is a trade secret of others must be protected from disclosure. If it is not clear that the requested information constitutes a trade secret of another, the entity contending that the information is a trade secret may exercise the entity's rights to protect the information pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-762. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-15.

Former prison inmate's prison medical records.

- Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Corrections) may supply copies of former inmate's prison medical records to person other than an inmate who is neither a doctor nor the agent of a hospital. As a condition precedent to delivery of such records, however, the department should demand proof of the requesting party's authority and might also condition delivery upon tender of payment sufficient to cover the department's expenses in copying the material requested. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-77.

Reports prepared in evaluating disability claim.

- If the medical board of the Employees' Retirement System determines that the examining physician has met the criteria of O.C.G.A. § 31-33-2(c) in recommending nondisclosure of medical records prepared in the evaluation of a claim for disability retirement benefits, it is appropriate to refuse copies of those reports to the applicant who was examined. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-19.

Department of Natural Resources' satellite imagery database.

- Department of Natural Resources is not required to provide public access to raw or unenhanced satellite data purchased from EOSAT (a firm that markets unenhanced satellite data), but it must provide public access to the enhanced database of satellite imagery. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-13.

Voter registration cards.

- Construing former O.C.G.A. § 21-2-242 with O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-217(a),21-2-234, and50-18-70 et seq., registration cards must be subject to disclosure in accordance with the provisions of the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq. However, in accordance with the federal Privacy Act of 1974, Section 7(b) (5 U.S.C. § 552 as note), if a registrar is going to require disclosure of a social security number on a voter registration card, the individual registering to vote should be informed as to whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, under what statutory authority the disclosure is requested, and the uses to which the disclosure will be put. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-5.

Social security number of a voter is required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-217(a) to be recorded on a voter registration card, if the number is known at the time of application, and must be disclosed under an Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., request. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-5.

Voter's unlisted telephone number included on voter registration card.

- Voter registrars have no authority to request the inclusion of a telephone number on a voter registration card, and in the absence of statutory authority either to require or to request that an elector provide a telephone number, whether listed or unlisted, for a voter registration card, the disclosure of an unlisted number pursuant to an Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., request may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Hence, a voter's unlisted telephone number should not be disclosed by voter registrars under an Open Records Act request. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-5.

Prerequisites to disclosure of information in medical files.

- No information contained in confidential medical files should be released to a requesting party unless some prior assurance is given that the requesting party is either the subject of the file in question or that the requesting party has in fact been authorized by that person to receive the information which the requesting party seeks. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-77.

Subsequent Injury Trust Fund Board meetings.

- Portion of Subsequent Injury Trust Fund Board meetings in which the medical and rehabilitation records of an individual are discussed are not subject to the Open Meetings Law, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq. 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-8.

Public project records exempt from disclosure.

- When a public agency is assembling more than one parcel of real property for a public project, records relative to that "transaction" and "property" as a whole are exempt from disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(6) until all the property to be acquired is acquired or is abandoned or terminated from the project. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-10.

Community development block grant program information.

- Information provided to the Department of Community Affairs in connection with the community development block grant program is not exempt from disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 unless such information constitutes a trade secret. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. 89-35.

Burden of explaining why public records not subject to disclosure.

- If there is a request for identifiable public records, the burden is cast upon the custodian of those records to explain why the records should not be disclosed. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-5.

Contracts with federal agencies.

- Agencies covered by the Georgia Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., may not by contract with a federal agency create an exception to the Act and make otherwise public documents in the hands of the agency confidential unless the contract provision is mandated by federal law or regulation. 2005 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U2005-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity, construction, and application of statutory provisions relating to public access to police records, 82 A.L.R.3d 19.

When are government records "similar files" exempt from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act provision (5 USCS § 552(b)(6)) exempting certain personnel, medical, and "similar" files, 106 A.L.R. Fed. 94.

What is agency subject to Privacy Act Provisions (5 USCA § 552a), 150 A.L.R. Fed. 521.

What are "records" of agency which must be made available under Freedom of Information Act (5 USCA § 552(a)(3)), 153 A.L.R. Fed. 571.

What are interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)), 168 A.L.R. Fed. 143.

What matters are exempt from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)) as "specifically authorized under criteria established by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy,", 169 A.L.R. Fed. 495.

What constitutes "confidential source" within Freedom of Information Act exemption permitting nondisclosure of confidential source and, in some instances, of information furnished by confidential source (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)), 171 A.L.R. Fed. 193.

Construction and application of FOIA exemption 7(f), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(F), which permits withholding of information compiled for law enforcement purposes if disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger life or physical safety, 184 A.L.R. Fed. 435.

Use of affidavits to substantiate federal agency's claim of exemption from request for documents under Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552), 187 A.L.R. Fed. 1

When are government records reasonably "expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings" so as to be exempt from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act provision (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(a)) exempting any information "compiled for law enforcement purposes" whenever it "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,", 189 A.L.R. Fed. 1

Disclosure of electronic data under state public records and freedom of information acts, 54 A.L.R.6th 653.

Construction and application of public domain or official acknowledgment doctrine allowing courts to disregard FOIA exemption, other than law enforcement exemption, based on prior public release of requested records, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1.

Construction and application of public domain doctrine allowing courts to disregard FOIA law enforcement exemption based on prior public release of requested records, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 5.

Construction and application of exemption 7(E) of Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(E), for records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes to extent that production of such law enforcement records or information would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of law, 70 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 493.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 488 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 18, 2013 | 751 S.E.2d 337, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3507

...lable for inspection, and Coleman, Bolston, Durden, and Strawbridge then filed a lawsuit to compel their production.4 In 2012, while the lawsuit was pending, the General Assembly amended the Open Records Act, and among other revisions, it added OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47), which excepts certain records concerning the Quick Start program from public inspection....
...But we cannot say from the pleadings alone that every record requested is excepted from public inspection under paragraph 72 (a) (47), and so, we also remand for the trial court to determine the extent to which the requested records are so excepted. 1. We first consider whether OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47) — on its face, and assuming its constitutionality — applies at all in this case.7 *172Paragraph 72 (a) (47) excepts the following records from public inspection under the Open Records Act: Records related to a training progr...
...isclosing an economic development project prior to a binding commitment having been secured, relating to job applicants, or identifying proprietary hiring practices, training, skills, or other business methods and practices of a private entity. OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47).* ******8 No one disputes that the technical and vocational training provided to Kia workers by the Technical College System as a part of its Quick Start program is a “training program operated under the authority of Article 3 of Chapter 4 of Title 20.” See OCGA § 20-4-40 et seq....
...Kia to open its facility in West Point was secured years ago, before they asked to inspect any records, paragraph 72 (a) (47) does not apply at all, they say, in this case. About this, the appellees are mistaken. (a) We consider first whether OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47) applies by its terms only for so long as “[no] binding commitment ha[s] been secured.” When we consider the meaning of a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Arby’s Restaurant Group, Inc....
...Applying these principles, if the statutory text is “clear and unambiguous,” we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end. See Opensided MRI of Atlanta v. Chandler, 287 Ga. 406, 407 (696 SE2d 640) (2010). Here, OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47) naturally and reasonably admits of only one meaning, and it is not the one that the appellees urge....
...een secured,” but the exception for Quick Start records “relating to job applicants” or “identifying proprietary hiring practices, training, skills, or other business methods and practices of a private entity” is not so limited.10 See OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47)....
...The Technical College System and Kia rely in this case upon the latter parts of the exception, and their reliance upon those parts is not foreclosed by the fact that Kia committed long ago to open its facility in West Point.* 11 (b) With this understanding of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47), we next consider the extent to which this statutory exception — on its face, and again assuming its constitutionality — applies in a lawsuit pending at the time of its enactment and arising from a request made before its enactment....
...54, 55 (2) (365 SE2d 273) (1988) (“Generally statutes prescribe for the future and that is the construction to be given unless there is a clear contrary intention shown.” (Citations omitted)). Such a clear indication appears in the amendment that enacted paragraph 72 (a) (47), which provides explicitly that “[OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47)] shall apply to any request for public records made prior to the effective date of this Act.” Ga....
...ctively, our Constitution forbids statutes that apply retroactively so as to “injuriously affect the vested rights of citizens.”13 Bullard v. Holman, 184 Ga. 788, 792 (2) (193 SE 586) (1937). The appellees argue that, applied retroactively, OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47) impairs their “vested right” to inspect the records that they requested....
...As such, it could not vest in any particular persons, whether upon the making of a request for public records, or upon the filing of an action to enforce the public right. Accordingly, there is no constitutional impediment to the retroactive modification of the Act by subsequent legislation.21 The statutory exception in OCGA § 50-18-72 *185(a) (47) constitutionally may be applied in this case,22 and the trial court erred when it concluded otherwise. 3. Having concluded that OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47) applies in this case, and having concluded that nothing in our Constitution forbids its application, we now turn to the implications of these conclusions for the motions of the Technical College System and Kia to dismiss this lawsuit. At least some of the records at issue in the lawsuit are records to which OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47) applies....
...and we must remember that this lawsuit is before us only upon motions to dismiss. We certainly can conceive, for instance, of records that could exist, that might be responsive to parts 7 and 8 of the requests, and that would not be excepted by OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47), even if some other exception might apply....
...Paragraph 72 (a) (47) goes on to define “economic development project” as “a plan or proposal to locate a business, or to expand a business, that would involve an expenditure of more than $25 million by the business or the hiring of more than 50 employees by the business.” OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47). That is not to say that we adhere unyieldingly to the rules of grammar when contrary indicia of meaning appear in the statutory text....
...at 653-654 (Nahmias, J., concurring specially); Sumter County v. Allen, 193 Ga. 171, 176 (17 SE2d 567) (1941). In other cases, we have found the grammatical signals to be ambiguous. See, e.g., Haley v. State, 289 Ga. 515, 524 (2) (b) (712 SE2d 838) (2011). Our understanding of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47) squares with common sense....
...633, 634 (1) (514 SE2d 11) (1999) (“The construction of statutes must square with common sense and sound reasoning.” (Citation and punctuation omitted)). The appellees also advance a number of policy arguments in support of their mistaken understanding of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47), urging us to strike the balance that they prefer between the public interest in open government and the public interest in the secrecy that sometimes may be necessary to promote economic development....
...The General Assembly has defined the records that presumptively are available for public inspection broadly, and it has defined exceptions narrowly. In all, the separately enumerated paragraphs of exceptions contained within the Open Records Act itself now number 48, see OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (l)-(48), and other exceptions can be found elsewhere in the Code....
...business community, or to the public generally. To the extent that the General Assembly has had the foresight to anticipate the disclosure of such records, and the potential harm that might follow, it has enacted exceptions for them. See, e.g., OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (3) (exception for law enforcement records “reasonably likely to disclose the identity of a confidential source”); (a) (14) (exception for Department of Natural Resources records relating to “the location and character of a hist...
...S. at 267-268 (IV) (A) (“Retroactivity provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes, [including] to respond to emergencies [and] to correct mistakes . . . .”). The appellees also claim that the retroactive application of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47) would amount to an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts, but these claims do not warrant much discussion....
...at 603 (2); Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U. S. at 431-432. We see no unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. When it undertakes to determine the extent to which the specific parts of the requests seek only records that are excepted by OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (47), the trial court should bear in mind that this case is only at the pleadings stage....
Copy

Propst v. State, 299 Ga. 557 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 47 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2016 | 788 S.E.2d 484

Copy

Whatley v. Terry, 668 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 6, 2008 | 284 Ga. 555, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3160

...[2] An unofficial transcript of the recording is also in the record, but our quotations from the recording are drawn from our review of the recording itself. We note, however, that there are no differences between the unofficial transcripts and the original evidence that affect our decision. [3] See OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4); Parker v....
Copy

City of Marietta v. Summerour, 302 Ga. 645 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 30, 2017 | 807 S.E.2d 324

...since the date of the original appraisal.”). The City also argues that interpreting subsection (3) to require disclosure of an appraisal summary before condemnation proceedings are commenced would be inconsistent with the Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (9), which, at the time Section 22-1-9 was enacted, exempted real estate appraisals from public disclosure until condemnation proceedings have been concluded, i.e., “until such time as the property has been acquired or the proposed transaction has been terminated or abandoned.” Black v....
Copy

Bowers v. Shelton, 265 Ga. 247 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 1995 | 453 S.E.2d 741

...y to withhold certain information, and were not meant to mandate nondisclosure. The Georgia Act relating to the inspection of public records, OCGA § 50-18-70 et seq., requires disclosure of public records, with certain exceptions enumerated at OCGA § 50-18-72 (a)....
...OCGA § 50-18-70 (b). In suits under the Open Records Act, the first inquiry is whether the records are "public records." [Cit.] If they are public records, the second inquiry is whether they are protected from public disclosure pursuant to OCGA §§ 50-18-70 or 50-18-72. [Cit.] If they are not exempt under the list of exemptions found in § 50-18-72 or under any other statute, then the question is whether they should be protected by court order under § 50-18-70, [cit.], but only if there is a claim that disclosure of the public records would invade individual privacy....
...] the personal financial documents contained therein are clearly protected from public disclosure. The Act specifically provides that "[t]his article shall not be construed to repeal: . . . [s]tate laws making certain tax matters confidential." OCGA § 50-18-72 (e) (3)....
...t or return required by law to be submitted to the Georgia Department of Revenue. [9] The Act requiring the inspection of public records has in no manner abrogated the mandate of OCGA § 48-7-60 (a) that tax information be maintained inviolate. OCGA § 50-18-72 (e) (3)....
Copy

Evans v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 297 Ga. 318 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2015 | 773 S.E.2d 725

...On July 23, 2013, Evans submitted a request to the GBI under the Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-70 et seq., for materials from its investigative file that pertained to him. The GBI declined to produce the materials, citing an exemption for pending investigations. See OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4).1 Evans then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the GBI to produce these materials. After a hearing, the trial court found that Evans was not entitled to the materials he seeks because the Open Records Act exempts from disclosure records of “law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation . . . [A]n investigation or prosecution shall no longer be deemed 1 At the time of the trial court’s order, OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) read in pertinent part: (a) Public disclosure shall not be required for records that are: ... (4) Records of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending...
...of the pending investigation or prosecution; .... 2 to be pending when all direct litigation involving such investigation and prosecution has become final or otherwise terminated.” OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4)....
...192, 195 (1) (633 SE2d 248) (2008) (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Again, the Act contains an express exemption from disclosure for “[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity . . . .” OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4). And, it is uncontroverted that the GBI is a law enforcement agency within the meaning of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a). Evans argues that in order for the GBI to assert the “pending investigation” exemption, it must meet the burden to show that at least one of the three persons whose alleged activity is addressed in the file is faced with a prosecution that “is imminent and of a finite duration.” Parker v....
...f of an agency or when such documents have been transferred to a private person or entity by an agency for storage or future governmental use. 4 which Evans relies, concerns OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4)’s “pending prosecution” exemption, not the “pending investigation” exemption, a distinction this Court made clear in Unified Gov’t, supra....
...or prosecution” and cannot otherwise be characterized as the initial arrest . . . or incident report. [Cit.] Id. at 195 (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court did not err in concluding that, under the circumstances presented, the pending investigation exemption of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) removed from mandatory disclosure the materials that Evans requested.3 Judgment affirmed....
Copy

Unified Gov't v. Athens Newspapers, LLC., 663 S.E.2d 248 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2008 | 284 Ga. 192, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2132, 36 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1968

...ng the submission of a report to the FBI's Violent Criminal Apprehension Program and regular computerized checks of DNA profiles obtained from the crime scene against state and federal DNA databases. Pursuant to the exemption from disclosure in OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) for records in pending investigations and prosecutions, Appellant refused to produce any of the requested investigatory records other than the initial incident report....
...ses. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant, finding as a matter of law that the investigation into Ms. Stone's death is still pending and subject to exemption from disclosure under OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4), and that Appellant's response to Appellee's request was not untimely....
...ecords. Athens Newspapers v. Unified Govt. of Athens-Clarke County, supra at 471(3), 643 S.E.2d 774. Having granted certiorari to review these rulings, we affirm in part and reverse in part, holding that an investigation remains "pending" under OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) until the file is closed, and that the three-day time period of OCGA § 50-18-70(f) commences upon delivery of the request to the agency, rather than the particular employee in charge of the records....
...sclosure of a public record, must be an imminent adjudicatory proceeding of finite duration. [Cit.]" Parker v. Lee, supra at 197(2), 378 S.E.2d 677. In 1988, the legislature codified the exemptions for pending investigations and prosecutions in OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)....
...nd initial incident reports; provided, however, that an investigation or prosecution shall no longer be deemed to be pending when all direct litigation involving said investigation and prosecution has become final or otherwise terminated. . . . OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4). This subsection was first construed in Parker, which "interpret[ed] the pending-prosecution exemption of OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) to refer to imminent adjudicatory proceedings of finite duration." Parker v....
...n connection and harmony with existing judicial decisions where possible. [Cit.]" Parker v. Lee, supra. Because Parker involved the "pending prosecution" exemption, the relevant prior case law consisted of Napper, and Parker did indeed "[c]onstru[e] § 50-18-72(a)(4) consistently with Napper ....
...Thus, Napper itself made a distinction between a pending investigation and a pending prosecution, and nowhere in Parker is that distinction questioned. It is clear, therefore, that, under Houston and Napper, an investigation is "pending" until it "is concluded and the file closed." Under Parker, the exemption in OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4), if possible, should be construed consistently with this definition....
...Although exemptions from disclosure under the Open Records Act are narrowly construed, the Act obviously should not be construed "in derogation of its express terms. . . ." The Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Barrett & Farahany, 271 Ga.App. 501, *251 503(1)(a), 610 S.E.2d 138 (2005). OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) provides an exemption for law enforcement records in "any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity....
...." Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (7th ed.1999). "`[T]he term "pending" means nothing more than "remaining undecided."' [Cit.]" Fidelity Investment Co. v. Anderson, 66 Ga.App. 57, 58, 17 S.E.2d 84 (1941). This definition is consistent with both Parker and the final clause of OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4), which incorporated the holding of Napper....
...Some exemptions "apply even after an investigation has ended. [Cits.]" 76 CJS, Records § 126. See also Williams v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 337, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 882, 852 P.2d 377, 388(II)(B) (1993). Thus, the "pending investigation" exemption of OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) is hardly an extreme exemption from public disclosure requirements....
...the ground that if access to materials is limited to police personnel, statements of witnesses and suspects and other evidence can be checked against information known only to investigators. Contrary to the dissent, we do not "recognize[] that OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) so greatly superseded the analysis in Houston that Houston no longer reflects valid Georgia law." (Dissent, p. 255) Rather, OCGA § 50-18-72(a) altered the holding of that case in only one respect....
...In Houston, supra at 766, 229 S.E.2d 624, this Court required the trial court to examine the particular investigative files and "balanc[e] the public interest in favor of disclosure against the public interest in favor of non-disclosure. . . ." With the subsequent addition of OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4), however, [t]his approach cannot be followed ....
...restrictions. Instead, the General Assembly made the legislative judgment that the only records in any pending investigations that must be disclosed in the public interest are "initial police arrest reports and initial incident reports. . . ." OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)....
...road. . . . Requests for broader disclosure must be directed to the Legislature. Williams v. Superior Court, supra at 393(II)(B). Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring the disclosure of the relevant records. 2. OCGA §§ 50-18-70(f) and 50-18-72(h) "`require an affirmative response to an open records request within three business days.' [Cit.]" Benefit Support v....
...Although OCGA § 50-18-70(f) refers to the "individual" in control of the public *253 record, the restrictive signification "private or natural person" is not necessarily inherent in the word "individual." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 696 (5th ed.1979). Furthermore, both OCGA § 50-18-70(f) and OCGA § 50-18-72(h) refer to action, within three business days, by "the public officer or agency" in control of the requested records....
...te and emphasis omitted.) City of Atlanta v. Corey Entertainment, 278 Ga. 474, 476(1), 604 S.E.2d 140 (2004). At issue in this case is the construction to be given the exemption for pending investigations or prosecutions in subsection (a)(4) of OCGA § 50-18-72 of the Open Records Act....
...`reinterpretation' would be no different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that the General Assembly itself placed in the statute," Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137, 139(1), 637 S.E.2d 14 (2006), I would construe OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) as applying only to those *254 investigations and prosecutions being actively, definitely and imminently pursued....
...Because the majority's holding in Division 2 is wholly consistent with the purpose of the Open Records Act, I concur fully in that division. In Parker v. Lee, supra, 259 Ga. at 195, 378 S.E.2d 677, this Court expressly declined to apply a limited construction to OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)....
...ge. [1] Id. at 196, 350 S.E.2d 570. Parker's request for the rape investigatory file was denied on the basis that "Parker's indictment for rape [was] outstanding," id, and thus came within the "pending investigation or prosecution" exemption in OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)....
...The factual circumstances reflecting a "pending" matter were far stronger in Parker v. Lee, supra, than in the instant case, given that an accused had been identified, an indictment had been obtained and evidence sufficient to support a conviction had been compiled. Had this Court construed OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) using the strict dictionary definition the majority applies in this case, there is no question that the rape prosecution in Parker v....
...The principle is particularly applicable where an amendment is presented to the legislature and the statute is amended in other particulars. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., supra, 281 Ga. at 139(1), 637 S.E.2d 14. The Legislature has taken no action to amend the language in OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) or otherwise alter any aspect of the interpretation given that language 19 years ago in Parker v....
...Lee , even though in 16 of those 19 years it has revisited that statute to add or amend other provisions. Instead, the majority "distinguishes" Parker v. Lee on the basis that it deals with prosecutions, not investigations. That distinction is not supported by the plain language in OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)....
...suffice when it comes to investigations: only official closure of the file by the government authority in charge of the investigation can authorize access of the investigation information to the public. Because nothing in the plain language of OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) supports the majority's creation of two separate exemptions, it turns to Houston v....
...764, 229 S.E.2d 624 (1976) and asserts that the exemption must be construed "in connection and harmony with" this decision. Maj. Op., p. 250. I agree with the majority that this Court in Houston "recognized the need for a strong `pending investigation' exemption." Id. at p. 250. However, the legislative history of OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) clearly shows that the General Assembly did not agree with this Court, given that the exemption was not added to the Open Records Act until 12 years after Houston was rendered. Rather than construing subsection (a)(4) in light of Houston, I would recognize that the Legislature by enacting that exemption expressly rejected Houston and the balancing test it proposed. Indeed, the majority itself recognizes that OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) so greatly superseded the analysis in Houston that Houston no longer reflects valid Georgia law. Maj. Op. p. 252. The majority holds that a criminal investigation is no longer deemed to be pending only when the investigative file is closed. Maj. Op., p. 251. Nothing in OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) supports the majority's holding that closing of the file is the exclusive means of proving that an investigation has ceased to be "pending" for purposes of the exemption....
...rrowly. City of Atlanta v. Corey Entertainment, supra, 278 Ga. at 476(1), 604 S.E.2d 140. It is contrary to both the purpose and the spirit of the Open Records Act by limiting rather than promoting freedom of information. I would recognize that OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4), like its Federal counterpart, is particularly important, both because of the potency of the police power and because police abuse is the type of government corruption that the FOIA [and OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)] ha[ve] been successful in allowing the public to see....
...167(5), 336 S.E.2d 242 (1985) (evidence sufficient to uphold Parker's rape verdict). [2] That final phrase states that an investigation or prosecution "shall no longer be deemed to be pending when all direct litigation involving said investigation and prosecution has become final or otherwise terminated." OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)....
Copy

City of Atlanta v. Corey Ent., Inc., 604 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 12, 2004 | 278 Ga. 474

...Corey Entertainment brought suit in Fulton County Superior Court seeking to compel the City to produce Fouch's tax returns. Fouch intervened as a defendant. The City and Fouch argued that federal regulations prohibited the disclosure of the tax returns, and that they were therefore exempted from disclosure under OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(1)....
...[2] 49 U.S.C. § 47107(e)(1). [3] 49 C.F.R. § 26.5. [4] Athens Observer Inc. v. Anderson, 245 Ga. 63, 66, 263 S.E.2d 128 (1980). [5] OCGA § 50-18-70(b). [6] OCGA § 50-18-70(a). [7] Hardaway Co. v. Rives, 262 Ga. 631, 634, 422 S.E.2d 854 (1992). [8] OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(1)....
Copy

Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc, 849 S.E.2d 660 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 6, 2020 | 310 Ga. 279

...OCGA § 50-18-70 (b). 5 The Act allows members of the public to inspect and copy these records, provides certain disclosure exceptions, and prescribes civil and criminal penalties for Act violations. See OCGA §§ 50-18-71, - 50-18-72, 50-18--74 (a)....
Copy

Campaign for Acct. v. Consum. Credit Rsch. Found., 815 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2018

...ts reading of this Court's decision in Bowers v. Shelton, 265 Ga. 247, 453 S.E.2d 741 (1995), that Georgia's Open Records Act prohibits the disclosure of all information that is not required to be disclosed based on the ORA exemptions listed in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a)....
...gents of the University System of Georgia (the Board), because KSU is part of the university system. CCRF amended its complaint in April 2016. CCRF sought a declaratory judgment that the records requested by CFA are exempt from disclosure under OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (35) and (36) and a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from disclosing the records....
...n ruling that KSU had the discretion to release the research correspondence in response to CFA's open record request, even if [CCRF] brought suit to enjoin the disclosure and demonstrated that the correspondence was exempt from disclosure under OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (35) or (36)....
...om disclosure." OCGA § 50-18-71 (a). Government agencies therefore have a duty to disclose public records unless relieved of that duty by a specific exemption or court order.2 Many of the exemptions from disclosure provided by law are found in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a), which says: "Public disclosure shall not be required for records that are: ...," followed by a list of over 50 enumerated types of records. On that list are two exemptions dealing with certain records collected or produced "in the conduct of, or as a result of, study or research" by certain state agencies and affiliated individuals, including state universities and their faculty members. OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (35) & (36).3 CCRF argues that because the records CFA seeks are covered by these open records exemptions in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a), the Board cannot disclose the records. Our analysis will proceed, as the trial court's did, on the assumption that the requested records fit within one or both of these OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions. CCRF contends that the phrase "exempted from disclosure" in OCGA § 50-18-71 (a) means "prohibited from disclosure," and that "disclosure shall not be required " as used in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) means "disclosure shall be prohibited ." Reading the statutory text as CCRF suggests would be contrary, however, to the English language....
...And a daughter surprising her father with a birthday visit after he had told her that a visit was not required would be rather confused if she found the door barred by her angry father shouting that she should have understood that her visit was prohibited . Read naturally and reasonably, OCGA §§ 50-18-71 (a) and 50-18-72 (a) do not prohibit disclosure of records simply because those records are not required to be disclosed by a specific exemption from the ORA's general disclosure duty. CCRF next maintains that we must adopt its interpretation of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) because it is well understood that at least some of the records included in the OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions cannot be lawfully disclosed. And, CCRF argues, what applies to one exemption must be applied to all, meaning that every record that comes within a OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemption cannot be disclosed. CCRF points to subsection (a) (1)-the very first exemption listed in OCGA § 50-18-72 -which applies to records that are "[s]pecifically required by federal statute or regulation to be kept confidential." CCRF asserts that if we conclude that an agency may, in its discretion, disclose records covered by the OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions, we would be concluding that records required to be kept confidential by federal statutes and regulations can instead be legally disclosed. That is true only in this limited sense: OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (1) does not prohibit disclosure of the records to which it applies, so an agency that decides to release documents that a federal statute or regulation requires to be kept confidential would not violate the Open Records Act ....
...The agency would, however, violate the federal statute or regulation . The fact that the Georgia statute does not add an extra prohibition on top of the federal statute or regulation does not create any conflict or inconsistency with the federal law. The same is true of other OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions that invoke the confidentiality requirements of other laws, like the tax statute discussed below in relation to Bowers. CCRF also argues that if the ordinary understanding of "shall not be required" is applied to OCGA § 50-18-72 (a), it would render other language in the statute surplusage....
...ill v. Georgia Community Support & Solutions, Inc., 281 Ga. 439, 441, 638 S.E.2d 278 (2006) ("Courts should give a sensible and intelligent effect to every part of a statute and not render any language superfluous."). CCRF points to language in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (16), which deals with agricultural or food system records that are part of the critical infrastructure, and (17), which deals with confidential records of the national animal identification system....
...of these subsections say that such critical infrastructure and national animal identification system records "shall be subject to disclosure only upon [a court] order." Thus, these subsections are different from most of the other exemptions in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) -including (a) (35) and (36)-because they have language expressly prohibiting disclosure without a court order....
...articular subsections expressly prohibits disclosure without a court order, unless the disclosure fits within the limited grant of discretion to disclose to another government agency. Express disclosure prohibitions are found in a couple other OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions as well, supporting the conclusion that such prohibitions do not automatically apply to every exemption in the list. See OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (5) ("Georgia Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reports shall not be available in bulk for inspection or copying by any person absent a written statement showing the need for each such report pursuant to the requirements of this Code section."), (34) ("[T]he agency shall withhold [certain trade secret] records")....
...(Emphasis added.)6 If agencies were required to withhold every record that is exempted from disclosure, there would never be an occasion where they could "decide to withhold" a record. This provision makes sense, however, if the many provisions of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) that do not themselves expressly prohibit disclosure are read, consistent with their text, to merely exempt the records they cover from mandatory disclosure....
...But we concluded that the ORA "materially differs from the FOIA" because the Georgia statute expressly creates a cause of action " 'to enforce compliance' " with the act. Id. at 248-249, 453 S.E.2d 741 (quoting OCGA § 50-18-73 (a) ). In discussing this issue, we noted that the ORA "has certain exceptions enumerated at OCGA § 50-18-72 (a)." Bowers, 265 Ga....
...said the ORA "mandates" nondisclosure or what it meant by "certain excepted information." CCRF argues that, like the Court of Appeals, we should read "certain excepted information" to refer broadly to all information excepted from disclosure by OCGA § 50-18-72 (a)....
...e requirement. This narrower reading comports with the statutory text, which at the time of Bowers expressly prohibited disclosure in some but not all exemptions (as the current version of the ORA does as well). When Bowers was decided in 1995, OCGA § 50-18-72 expressly said that it did not repeal the laws prohibiting disclosure of records covered by attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, and tax matters....
...without approval of the judge assigned to the case."8 Moreover, if "certain excepted information" is read to refer only to provisions that themselves "mandate[ ] the nondisclosure" of the records to which they apply, Bowers's statement does not contradict the plain language of the current version of OCGA § 50-18-72, as we have discussed in Division 2 above....
...mation be maintained inviolate" and the Open Records Act at that time expressly said that it " 'shall not be construed to repeal ... [s]tate laws making certain tax matters confidential.' " Bowers, 265 Ga. at 250, 453 S.E.2d 741 (quoting former OCGA § 50-18-72 (e) )....
...Thus, the holding in Bowers's second division-that the tax information in question could not be disclosed-was based on a provision that expressly prohibited disclosure. This holding does not help CCRF. The two Open Records Act exemptions on which CCRF relies, OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (35) and (36), do not contain any language prohibiting disclosure, and CCRF has not identified any other law that prohibits disclosure of the records involved in this case.10 4....
...he ORA and independent state and federal statutes-from disclosing a wide range of information. Just as the tax information in Bowers was protected by OCGA § 48-7-60 (a), a company that worries about the release of its trade secrets can rely on OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (34)....
...The ORA cannot remedy that oversight for CCRF.11 Finally, it appears that the interpretation of the Open Records Act that CCRF claims we must continue to follow to keep the heavens from falling has never actually been followed. If every public record covered by an exemption listed in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) were prohibited from disclosure, then many government agencies have been blatantly and routinely violating the ORA for years without any apparent concern....
...For example, in an effort to obtain the public's assistance in identifying and apprehending criminals, Georgia's law enforcement agencies regularly disclose sketches of and other information about suspects in ongoing investigations, even though OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) exempts from ORA's disclosure requirement "[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity, other than initial police arrest reports an...
...een the general understanding and practical application of Georgia's open records law. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that all records that are exempted from the Open Records Act's general disclosure requirement under OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) are prohibited from disclosure to the public....
...but it has long been referred to as the Open Records Act. See Bowers, 265 Ga. at 247-248, 453 S.E.2d 741. The Open Records Act defines the government agencies covered by its provisions in OCGA § 50-18-70 (b) (1). Subsections (35) and (36) of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) say in full: (35) Data, records, or information of a proprietary nature produced or collected by or for faculty or staff of state institutions of higher learning, or other governmental agencies, in the conduct of, or as a result of,...
...rack them as they come into contact with or commingle with animals other than herdmates from their premises of origin. Such records, data, or information shall be subject to disclosure only upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction[.] OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (16) & (17). Further supporting this interpretation of OCGA § 50-18-72 are two provisions outside subsection (a) that also expressly prohibit disclosure without a court order. See OCGA § 50-18-72 (c) (1) ("[A]n exhibit tendered to the court as evidence in a criminal or civil trial shall not be open to public inspection without the approval of the judge."), (d) (prohibiting public inspection except by court order of "[a]ny physical...
...We note that the Open Records Act has not been applied to court records. See Undisclosed LLC v. State, 302 Ga. 418, 422 n.4, 807 S.E.2d 393 (2017) ; Green v. Drinnon, Inc., 262 Ga. 264, 264, 417 S.E.2d 11 (1992). Notably, with the exception of certain trade secrets, see OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (34), the Open Records Act does not reciprocally require that an agency notify any third party that may have an interest in records not being disclosed when the agency has decided to disclose those records pursuant to an open records request....
...The ORA exceptions at that time were much different: " 'records that are specifically required by the federal government to be kept confidential or [ ] medical or veterinary records and similar files, the disclosure of which would be an invasion of personal privacy.' " Id. (quoting former OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) )....
...See id. The Open Records Act has been amended several times since Bowers, including adding dozens of record categories to the list of exemptions and rearranging some provisions. As noted in footnote 5 above, the provision addressing evidence used in trials is now found in OCGA § 50-18-72 (c) (1). CCRF asserts that its broad interpretation of Bowers has been consistently followed....
Copy

Walker v. Johnson, 646 S.E.2d 44 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 14, 2007 | 282 Ga. 168, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1469

...Neither Johnson nor his counsel were aware of the tapes as a result of the State's failure to provide them in discovery, and the tapes were obtained only after the denial of Johnson's direct appeal when Johnson's father filed an Open Records Request. See OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)....
Copy

Campaign for Acct. v. Consum. Credit Rsch. Found. (two Cases), 303 Ga. 828 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2018

...this Court’s decision in Bowers v. Shelton, 265 Ga. 247 (453 SE2d 741) (1995), that Georgia’s Open Records Act (ORA) prohibits the disclosure of all information that is not required to be disclosed based on the ORA exemptions listed in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a)....
...s of the University System of Georgia (the Board), because KSU is part of the university system. CCRF amended its complaint in April 2016. CCRF sought a declaratory judgment that the records requested by CFA are exempt from disclosure under OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (35) and (36) and a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from disclosing the records....
...research correspondence in response to CFA’s open record request, even if [CCRF] brought suit to enjoin the disclosure and demonstrated that the correspondence was exempt from disclosure 3 under OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (35) or (36)....
...closure.” OCGA § 50-18-71 (a). Government agencies therefore have a duty to disclose public records unless relieved of that duty by a specific exemption or court order.2 Many of the exemptions from disclosure provided by law are found in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a), which says: “Public disclosure shall not be required for records that are: ....
...OCGA § 50-18-70 (b) (1). 4 produced “in the conduct of, or as a result of, study or research” by certain state agencies and affiliated individuals, including state universities and their faculty members. OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (35) & (36).3 CCRF argues that because the records CFA seeks are covered by these open records exemptions in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a), the Board cannot disclose the records. Our analysis will proceed, as the trial court’s did, on the assumption that the requested records fit within one or both of these OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions. CCRF contends that the phrase “exempted from disclosure” in OCGA § 50-18-71 (a) means “prohibited from disclosure,” and that “disclosure shall not 3 Paragraphs (35) and (36) of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) say in full: (35) Data, records, or information of a proprietary nature produced or collected by or for faculty or staff of state institutions of higher learning, or other governmental agencies, in the condu...
...This paragraph shall apply to, but shall not be limited to, information provided by participants in research, research notes and data, discoveries, research projects, methodologies, protocols, and creative works[.] 5 be required” as used in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) means “disclosure shall be prohibited.” Reading the statutory text as CCRF suggests would be contrary, however, to the English language....
...And a daughter surprising her father with a birthday visit after he had told her that a visit was not required would be rather confused if she found the door barred by her angry father shouting that she should have understood that her visit was prohibited. Read naturally and reasonably, OCGA §§ 50-18-71 (a) and 50-18-72 (a) do not prohibit disclosure of records simply because those records are not required to be disclosed by a specific exemption from the ORA’s general disclosure duty. CCRF next maintains that we must adopt its interpretation of OCGA § 50- 18-72 (a) because it is well understood that at least some of the records included in the OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions cannot be lawfully disclosed. And, CCRF argues, what applies to one exemption must be applied to all, meaning that every record that comes within an OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemption cannot be disclosed. CCRF points to paragraph (a) (1) — the very first exemption listed in OCGA § 50-18-72 — which applies to records that are “[s]pecifically 7 required by federal statute or regulation to be kept confidential.” CCRF asserts that if we conclude that an agency may, in its discretion, disclose records covered by the OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions, we would be concluding that records required to be kept confidential by federal statutes and regulations can instead be legally disclosed....
...The agency would, however, violate the federal statute or regulation. The fact that the Georgia statute does not add an extra prohibition on top of the federal statute or regulation does not create any conflict or inconsistency with the federal law. The same is true of other OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) exemptions that invoke the confidentiality requirements of other laws, like the tax statute discussed below in relation to Bowers. CCRF also argues that if the ordinary understanding of “shall not be required” is applied to OCGA § 50-18-72 (a), it would render other language in the statute surplusage....
... language mere surplusage”); Berryhill v. Ga. Community Support & Solutions, 281 Ga. 439, 441 (638 SE2d 278) (2006) (“Courts should give a sensible and intelligent effect to every part of a statute and not render any language superfluous.”). CCRF points to language in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (16), which deals with agricultural or food system records that are part of the critical infrastructure, and (17), which deals with confidential records of the national animal identification system....
...final sentences of these paragraphs say that such critical infrastructure and national animal identification system records “shall be subject to disclosure only upon [a court] order.” Thus, these paragraphs are different from most of the other exemptions in OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) — including (a) (35) and (36) — because they have language expressly prohibiting disclosure without a court order....
...e other OCGA § 50- or commingle with animals other than herdmates from their premises of origin. Such records, data, or information shall be subject to disclosure only upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction[.] OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (16) & (17). 10 18-72 (a) exemptions as well, supporting the conclusion that such prohibitions do not automatically apply to every exemption in the list. See OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (5) (“Georgia Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reports shall not be available in bulk for inspection or copying by any person absent a written statement showing the need for each such report pursuant to the requirements of this Co...
...the requested record or records from disclosure by Code section, subsection, and paragraph within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed three business days . . . . 5 Further supporting this interpretation of OCGA § 50-18-72 are two provisions outside subsection (a) that also expressly prohibit disclosure without a court order. See OCGA § 50-18-72 (c) (1) (“[A]n exhibit tendered to the court as evidence in a criminal or civil trial shall not be open to public inspection without the approval of the judge....
... (Emphasis supplied.)6 If agencies were required to withhold every record that is exempted from disclosure, there would never be an occasion where they could “decide to withhold” a record. This provision makes sense, however, if the many provisions of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) that do not themselves expressly prohibit disclosure are read, consistent with their text, to merely exempt the records they cover from mandatory disclosure....
...247, the records at issue in this case cannot be disclosed. Although Bowers used some imprecise language that understandably led the Court of Appeals astray, that opinion does not mandate the linguistic 6 Notably, with the exception of certain trade secrets, see OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (34), the Open Records Act does not reciprocally require that an agency notify any third party that may have an interest in records not being disclosed when the agency has decided to disclose those records pursuant to an open records request....
...But we concluded that the ORA “materially differs from the FOIA” because the Georgia statute expressly creates a cause of action “‘to enforce compliance’” with the act. Id. at 248-249 (quoting OCGA § 50-18-73 (a)). In discussing this issue, we noted that the ORA “has certain exceptions enumerated at OCGA § 50-18-72 (a).” Bowers, 265 Ga....
...The ORA exceptions at that time were much different: “‘records that are specifically required by the federal government to be kept confidential or . . . medical or veterinary records and similar files, the disclosure of which would be an invasion of personal privacy.’” Id. (quoting former OCGA § 50-18-72 (a))....
...The Court rejected that notion, explaining that the Open Records Act merely required redaction of existing records. See id. 14 “certain excepted information” to refer broadly to all information excepted from disclosure by OCGA § 50-18-72 (a)....
...This narrower reading comports with the statutory text, which at the time of Bowers expressly prohibited disclosure in some but not all exemptions (as the current version of the ORA does as well). When Bowers was decided in 1995, OCGA § 50-18-72 expressly said that it did not repeal the laws prohibiting disclosure of records covered by attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, and tax matters. See former OCGA § 50-18-72 (e) (1)-(3)....
...The ORA has been amended several times since Bowers, including adding dozens of record categories to the list of exemptions and rearranging some provisions. As noted in footnote 5 above, the provision addressing evidence used in trials is now found in OCGA § 50-18-72 (c) (1). 15 to provisions that themselves “mandate[ ] the nondisclosure” of the records to which they apply, Bowers’s statement does not contradict the plain language of the current version of OCGA § 50-18-72, as we have discussed in Division 2 above....
...OCGA § 48-7-60 (a) required that “tax information be maintained inviolate” and the ORA at that time expressly said that it “‘shall not be construed to repeal . . . [s]tate laws making certain tax matters confidential.’” Bowers, 265 Ga. at 250 (quoting former OCGA § 50-18-72 (e))....
...nd independent state and federal statutes — from disclosing a wide range of information. Just as the tax information in Bowers was protected by OCGA § 48-7-60 (a), a company that worries about the release of its trade secrets can rely on OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (34)....
...For example, in an effort to obtain the public’s assistance in identifying and apprehending criminals, Georgia’s law enforcement agencies regularly disclose sketches of and other information about suspects in ongoing investigations, even though OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) exempts from ORA’s disclosure requirement “[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity, other than initial police arrest rep...
...application of Georgia’s open records law. 20 For these reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that all records that are exempted from the ORA’s general disclosure requirement under OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) are prohibited from disclosure to the public....
Copy

Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Brunswick, 265 Ga. 413 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 22, 1995 | 457 S.E.2d 176, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2085, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 1765

...City of Brunswick v. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, 214 Ga. App. 150 (447 SE2d 41) (1994). We granted the petitions for certiorari to determine the extent to which records, which are otherwise non-exempt from disclosure under the provisions of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4), are exempted from disclosure under the provisions of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (3). 1. OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (3) provides, in relevant part, that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law," public disclosure shall not be required for records compiled for law enforcement or prosecution purposes to the extent that production of such records woul...
...ity of a confidential source, disclose confidential investigative or prosecution material which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or persons, or disclose the existence of a confidential surveillance or investigation.. . . OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) provides, in relevant part, that public disclosure shall not be required for [r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity, other than initial police arrest *414 reports, accident reports, and incident reports . . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, both subsections (a) (3) and (a) (4) of OCGA § 50-18-72 address the exemption of law enforcement and prosecution records from public disclosure....
...Atlanta Journal & Constitution, supra at 153 (3). It follows that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's ruling that the incident reports are exempted from disclosure *415 to the extent they contain the type of confidential information specified in subsection (a) (3) of OCGA § 50-18-72....
...he statutory construction issue. The apparent purpose of the ex parte hearing was merely to determine the extent to which the reports might contain such "confidential" information as would be exempted from disclosure under subsection (a) (3) of OCGA § 50-18-72 and should be edited to prevent the disclosure of such "confidential" information....
Copy

Schulten, Ward & Turner, LLP v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 535 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 11, 2000 | 272 Ga. 725, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3561

...fferson, informed Schulten that the Authority could not honor the request, having "determined that any documents which may be responsive to [the] request are exempt from public disclosure pursuant to" the medical records exemption *245 found in OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(2)....
...constraints, the public officer or agency, "if access to such record or records is denied ..., shall specify in writing the specific legal authority exempting such record or records from disclosure, by Code section, subsection, and paragraph." OCGA § 50-18-72(h)....
...est for access to public records does not require the public officer or agency to specify in writing that such records were never created. Zinngrabe v. School Dist. of Sevastopol, supra at 735. Likewise, we limit to its terms the requirement of OCGA § 50-18-72(h) that the legal authority for an exemption of records from disclosure be timely specified in writing....
...of Education, 209 Wis.2d 377, 565 N.W.2d 140, 144(d) (App.1997) (additionally limiting the same provision construed in Zinngrabe ). An exemption from disclosure is not applicable where the records cannot be disclosed because they do not exist. Thus, OCGA § 50-18-72(h) is not applicable here, because there was no denial of access to records, no exemption of records, and no violation of the Act....
Copy

Decatur Cnty. v. Bainbridge Post Searchlight, Inc., 632 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 6, 2006 | 280 Ga. 706, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 2191, 34 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2468

...The majority's conclusion that the fact that the grand jury allowed the proposed presentments to physically leave the grand jury room amounts to a waiver of the confidentiality is equally unpersuasive and unsupported by statutory framework or legislative intent. [1] OCGA § 50-18-72 enumerates specific exemptions to protected documents and the notion of confidential documents taking on a public form is not present....
Copy

Georgia Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Theragenics Corp., 545 S.E.2d 904 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 30, 2001 | 273 Ga. 724, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 1470

...However, Theragenics provided its proprietary information to EPD only because governmental regulatory requirements compelled it to do so. Thus, the reasonableness of the *906 disclosure under those particular circumstances requires a consideration of the obligations imposed on EPD by the Open Records Act. OCGA § 50-18-72(b)(1) clearly provides that any trade secrets that Theragenics was required to provide to EPD are not thereafter to be disclosed by that agency to anyone seeking access pursuant to the Open Records Act....
...Thus, EPD was responsible for protecting the trade secrets which Theragenics was compelled to provide to it, and that agency had "the duty ... to provide all other portions of [Theragenics's] record for public inspection or copying." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 50-18-72(g)....
...e regulated party of the request and solicit a designation from that source as to those matters deemed confidential. Once that determination is made, either by the custodian or by the filer itself, the former need only "specify in writing" that OCGA § 50-18-72(b)(1) is "the specific legal authority exempting such record or records from disclosure...." OCGA § 50-18-72(h)....
Copy

Gonzalez v. Miller, 907 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. 2024).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 22, 2024 | 320 Ga. 170

...t, ruling that three exhibits “indicate compliance by the defendant. The court will not grant any further relief as to the three requests listed in Exhibit[s] 63, 64 and 92.” Gonzalez also claimed a pending-prosecution exception pursuant to OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) for the documents requested in Exhibit 87....
...under the [ORA]”); Hall v. Madison, 263 Ga. 73, 74 (428 SE2d 345) (1993) (A prosecutor was not required to disclose his voir dire notes following an ORA request, because “[a]ttorney work product falls within an exception to the Public Records Act. OCGA § 50-18-72 (e) (2).”); Parker v....

Evans v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2015 | 320 Ga. 170

...On July 23, 2013, Evans submitted a request to the GBI under the Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-70 et seq., for materials from its investigative file that pertained to him. The GBI declined to produce the materials, citing an exemption for pending investigations. See OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4).1 Evans then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the GBI to produce these materials. After a hearing, the trial court found that Evans was not entitled to the materials he seeks because the Open Records Act exempts from d...
...ry agencies in any pending investigation. . . . [A]n investigation or prosecution shall no longer be deemed to be pending when all direct litigation involving such investigation and 1 At the time of the trial court’s order, OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) read in pertinent part: (a) Public disclosure shall not be required for records that are: ... (4) Records of law enforcement, prosecution, or r...
...that is the subject of the pending investigation or prosecution[.] ... 2 prosecution has become final or otherwise terminated.” OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4)....
...192, 195 (1) (633 SE2d 248) (2008) (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Again, the Act contains an express exemption from disclosure for “[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity . . . .” OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4)....
...the three persons whose alleged activity is addressed in the file is faced with a prosecution that “is imminent and of a finite duration.” Parker v. Lee, 259 Ga. 195, 198 (5) (378 SE2d 677) (1989). However, Parker, and the principle upon which Evans relies, concerns OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4)’s “pending prosecution” exemption, not the “pending investigation” exemption, a distinction this Court when such documents have been transferred to a private person or entity by an agency for storage or f...
...or prosecution” and cannot otherwise be characterized as the initial arrest . . . or incident report. [Cit.] Id. at 195 (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court did not err in concluding that, under the circumstances presented, the pending investigation exemption of OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4) removed from mandatory disclosure the materials that Evans requested.3 Judgment affirmed....
Copy

Walker v. Johnson, 644 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 2007).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 14, 2007

...Neither Johnson nor his counsel were aware of the tapes as a result of the State's failure to provide them in discovery, and the tapes were obtained only after the denial of Johnson's direct appeal when Johnson's father filed an Open Records Request. See OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (4)....
Copy

Dye v. Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 2001).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2001 | 274 Ga. 257, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2928, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2534

...Where information is entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts. [Cit.] Id., 491 U.S. at 534, 109 S.Ct. 2603. Although in Georgia initial police reports are subject to the Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4), the Legislature has made no provision to exempt the disclosure of the names and identities of victims of sex crimes from the Act's purview. See OCGA § 50-18-72....