O.C.G.A. § 16-3-3 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. - Mental capacity as it relates to competency to stand trial and as it relates to culpability for criminal acts, §§ 17-7-129, 17-7-130, 17-7-131. Law reviews. - For article discussing the theory of insanity in criminal law, see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 399 (1964). For annual survey on criminal law, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 79 (2013). For article, ‘‘An Empirical Assessment of Georgia’s Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard to Determine Intel-

lectual Disability in Capital Cases,’’ see 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 553 (2017). For note comparing the M’Naghten Rule and the irresistible impulse test for legal tests of insanity, see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 418 (1963). For comment, ‘‘Saving the Deific Decree Exception to the Insanity Defense in Illinois: How a Broad Interpretation of ‘Religious Command’ May Cure Establishment Clause Concerns,’’ see 46 J. Marshall L. Rev. 56 (2013).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION APPLICATION

CRIMES AND OFFENSES General Consideration

Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions decided prior to the codification of this principle by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Constitutionality. - Georgia’s insanity laws are not unconstitutional even though they fail to provide for an impulse-control-disorder insanity defense. Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 352 S.E.2d 762, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S. Ct. 3220, 96 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1987). First codified insanity defense law consistent with present law. - First codified ‘‘insanity defense’’ law of Georgia, that ‘‘[a] lunatic or person insane, without lucid intervals, shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor with which he may be charged, provided the act so charged as criminal was committed in the condition of such lunacy or insanity; but if a lunatic has lucid intervals of understanding, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals as if he had no deficiency,’’ is essentially consistent with O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3 and is still the law of Georgia. Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983). Section not limited by § 17-7-130.1. - O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3 provide the authority for any defendant to assert an insanity defense, and there is nothing in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-130.1 which limits that authority. Motes v. State, 256 Ga. 831, 353 S.E.2d 348 (1987). Distinction between insanity defense and special plea of insanity. - Tests under former Code 1933, §§ 26-702 and 26-703 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3) concern mental responsibility of defendant for crime at time alleged offense was committed; whereas, a special plea of insanity relates only to mental competency of defendant to participate in trial at time of trial; thus, the so-called special plea of insanity does not relate to mental responsibility, but to mental competency. Echols v. State, 149 Ga. App. 620, 255 S.E.2d 92 (1979). Issue raised by special plea of insanity at time of trial is not whether defendant can distinguish between right and wrong, but is whether defendant is capable at the

time of trial of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against the defendant and rightly comprehends defendant’s own condition in reference to such proceedings, and is capable of rendering defense attorneys such assistance as a proper defense to indictment preferred against the defendant demands. Echols v. State, 149 Ga. App. 620, 255 S.E.2d 92 (1979). General insanity is not a defense to a crime; the only defenses recognized in Georgia are found in O.C.G.A. § 16-3-2 (no capacity to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the act, omission, or negligence) and O.C.G.A. § 16-3-3 (delusional compulsion at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime). Gould v. State, 168 Ga. App. 605, 309 S.E.2d 888 (1983). Psychosis as establishing legal insanity. - Schizophrenia is a psychosis, but a psychosis is not the equivalent of insanity. The mere showing that a person suffers from schizophrenia or some other psychosis does not establish legal insanity. Rogers v. State, 195 Ga. App. 446, 394 S.E.2d 116 (1990). Legal insanity concerns ability to distinguish right from wrong, and delusional compulsions which overmaster one’s will. Echols v. State, 149 Ga. App. 620, 255 S.E.2d 92 (1979); Green v. State, 197 Ga. App. 16, 397 S.E.2d 590 (1990). Delusion may be defined as an absurd and unfounded belief. McKinnon v. State, 51 Ga. App. 549, 181 S.E. 91 (1935). Elements of defense of delusional compulsion. - To rely on delusional compulsion alone, one must show both that the act was the result of delusion and also that the delusion was as to a fact which, if true, would justify the act. Freeman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 742, 209 S.E.2d 127 (1974). In order for defense of delusional compulsion to be available in trial for murder there must be evidence that defendant was laboring under a delusion, that the act itself was connected with the delusion and furthermore that the delusion would, if true, justify the act. Graham v. State, 236 Ga. 378, 223 S.E.2d 803 (1976). Delusional insanity may be found when,

in consequence of a delusion brought about by mental disease, the will is so overmastered that there is no criminal intent in reference to the act, and it must appear not only that defendant was actually laboring under a delusion operating as a causative factor, but that the delusion was such that it, if true, would justify the act. Biddy v. State, 138 Ga. App. 4, 225 S.E.2d 448 (1976). In order for defense of delusional compulsion to be available in trial for murder, there must be evidence that defendant was laboring under a delusion. Wells v. State, 247 Ga. 792, 279 S.E.2d 213 (1981). To support a finding that a defendant is not guilty of a criminal act under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-3, it must appear: (1) that the defendant was laboring under a delusion; (2) that the criminal act was connected with the delusion under which the defendant was laboring; and (3) that the delusion was as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the act. Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 350 S.E.2d 21 (1986); Fulghum v. Ford, 850 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1013, 109 S. Ct. 802, 102 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1989); Martin v. State, 196 Ga. App. 869, 397 S.E.2d 301 (1990); Rogers v. State, 199 Ga. App. 545, 405 S.E.2d 541 (1991). In order for a delusional compulsion to constitute a defense to a criminal charge, it must be as to a fact which, if true, would justify the act. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gross, 188 Ga. App. 542, 373 S.E.2d 789, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 373 S.E.2d 789 (1988). Self-defense applicable to delusional compulsion defense. - General law of self-defense was properly applied to determine whether the defendant had met the justification criteria for delusional compulsion defense. Dutton v. State, 225 Ga. App. 67, 483 S.E.2d 305 (1997). Criminal act must stem from delusions. - That defendant be impressed with delusions or hallucinations is not enough; the defendant’s criminal act must stem from such mental disorder, or else the defendant’s accountability for the criminal act is measured by the general test of whether defendant could, at time of crime’s commission, distinguish between right and wrong. Mullins v. State, 216 Ga.

183, 115 S.E.2d 547 (1960). Delusion as to fact which would not excuse does not authorize acquittal. McKinnon v. State, 51 Ga. App. 549, 181 S.E. 91 (1935). Proof of multiple personalities. - In every circumstance, including the existence of multiple personalities, the law is justified in finding accountability where at the time of the criminal act the person had mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act and was not acting because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered the person’s will to resist committing the crime, which delusion would, if true, have justified the act. If these elements are found to be present the law will not inquire whether the individual possesses other personalities, fugues, or even moods in which the person would not have performed the act or perhaps did not even know the act was being performed. Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983). Fact that the defendant suffered from a multiple personality disorder did not absolve the defendant of criminal responsibility, since it was undisputed that the defendant was conscious and acting under the defendant’s own volition, and defendant was able to recognize right from wrong and was not suffering from delusional compulsions. Kirby v. State, 201 Ga. App. 116, 410 S.E.2d 333 (1991). Delusional compulsion must justify action in question. Brannen v. State, 235 Ga. 505, 220 S.E.2d 264 (1975). Burden of proof. - Insanity is an affirmative defense that accused must prove by preponderance of evidence. Grace v. Hopper, 566 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 844, 99 S. Ct. 139, 58 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1978). Insanity is an affirmative defense that the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence and this burden of proof suffers from no constitutional infirmity. Grace v. Hopper, 566 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 844, 99 S. Ct. 139, 58 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1978). There is no constitutional right to mental examination, absent reasonable showing of need therefor, as there is a basic presumption of sanity. Roach v.

General Consideration (Cont’d) Mauldin, 277 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff ’d, 391 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1095, 89 S. Ct. 884, 21 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1969). Charge must cover general insanity and delusional insanity where both are applicable. - When both defense of general insanity and defense of delusional insanity are involved, it is not only the right but the duty of the judge to give to defendant by the judge’s charge the benefit of both defenses. Reeves v. State, 196 Ga. 604, 27 S.E.2d 375 (1943). Failure to instruct on delusional compulsion was not error because the defendant never requested such a charge, the evidence did not support it, and the defense never suggested that the defendant was acting under a delusional compulsion when the crimes were committed. Heidler v. State, 273 Ga. 54, 537 S.E.2d 44 (2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 1029, 121 S. Ct. 1979, 149 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2001). Cited in Teasley v. State, 228 Ga. 107, 184 S.E.2d 179 (1971); Revill v. State, 235 Ga. 71, 218 S.E.2d 816 (1975); Roberts v. State, 137 Ga. App. 215, 223 S.E.2d 256 (1976); Moore v. State, 142 Ga. App. 145, 235 S.E.2d 577 (1977); Hill v. State, 144 Ga. App. 259, 241 S.E.2d 44 (1977); Bennett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 407, 246 S.E.2d 425 (1978); Shirley v. State, 149 Ga. App. 194, 253 S.E.2d 787 (1979); Boykin v. State, 149 Ga. App. 457, 254 S.E.2d 457 (1979); Smith v. State, 245 Ga. 44, 262 S.E.2d 806 (1980); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980); Bailey v. State, 249 Ga. 535, 291 S.E.2d 704 (1982); Bentley v. State, 162 Ga. App. 755, 293 S.E.2d 36 (1982); Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982); Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549 (11th Cir. 1983); Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 319 S.E.2d 420 (1984); O’Neal v. State, 254 Ga. 1, 325 S.E.2d 759 (1985); Eason v. State, 256 Ga. 701, 353 S.E.2d 188 (1987); Caldwell v. State, 257 Ga. 10, 354 S.E.2d 124 (1987); Dick v. Kemp, 833 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. 1987); Sciarrone v. Brownlee, 83 Bankr. 836 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); Green v. State, 208 Ga. App. 1, 429 S.E.2d 694 (1993); Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310,

454 S.E.2d 446 (1995); Trammel v. Bradberry, 256 Ga. App. 412, 568 S.E.2d 715 (2002); Hicks v. Head, 333 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2003); Radford v. State, 281 Ga. 303, 637 S.E.2d 712 (2006). Application Delusional compulsion no defense to civil action. - It is clearly error to give an exculpatory insanity or delusional compulsion charge as a defense to a civil action for assault or battery seeking compensatory damages. Continental Cas. Co. v. Parker, 167 Ga. App. 859, 307 S.E.2d 744 (1983). One having no will, conscience, or controlling mental power is not punishable for criminal acts. - Under former Code 1933, §§ 26-702 and 26-703 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3), if one’s reason and mental powers are either so deficient that one has no will, conscience, or controlling mental power, or if through overwhelming power of mental disease, one’s intellectual power is for the time obliterated, one is not a responsible moral agent, and one not punishable for criminal acts. Mendenhall v. Hopper, 453 F. Supp. 977 (S.D. Ga. 1978), aff ’d, 591 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1979). Delusions must exist during offense to warrant instruction. - When the court did not instruct the jury on delusional compulsion, it was not in error if defendant, who has a history of delusions, was not experiencing delusions at the time of the offense. Dowdy v. State, 169 Ga. App. 14, 311 S.E.2d 184 (1983). Evidence sufficient to prove delusion. - Since the evidence was overwhelming that at the time the defendant killed his wife he was operating under the delusion that she was possessed by Satan and that he, the defendant, was defending himself against Satan’s physical attacks and attempts to trap and destroy him, as well as putting an end to the evil and destruction in the world caused by Satan, this evidence demanded a finding that the defendant met the justification criterion for a defense of delusional compulsion. Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 350 S.E.2d 21 (1986). Evidence insufficient to prove delusion. - Evidence that defendant had

acted in response to inner voices which were telling him to kill himself, to kill someone else, or to ‘‘go rob something’’ did not establish a delusion ‘‘as to a fact which, if true, would justify the act.’’ McMachren v. State, 187 Ga. App. 793, 371 S.E.2d 445 (1988). Delusion from which the perpetrator was purportedly suffering at the time the perpetrator shot the decedent - i.e., that the decedent was having an affair with his wife - obviously was not as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the killing, nor would such a delusion have deprived the perpetrator of the capacity to intend the consequences of the shooting. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gross, 188 Ga. App. 542, 373 S.E.2d 789, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 373 S.E.2d 789 (1988). Expert testimony describing defendant as alert, well-oriented, calm, stable, and a very good conversationalist with no signs or history of mental illness, and stating that defendant never indicated that gang members from whom defendant was fleeing were armed and so close as to threaten defendant with imminent bodily harm supported finding that defendant’s delusion, even if true, did not justify defendant’s decision to aim a gun at a neighbor or fire in the direction of a police officer. Appling v. State, 222 Ga. App. 327, 474 S.E.2d 237 (1996). Defendant could not articulate the particulars of any delusion from which the defendant was suffering that would have justified the defendant’s actions so as to establish insanity. Buford v. State, 300 Ga. 121, 793 S.E.2d 91 (2016). Expert testimony failed to establish that the criteria for an insanity defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-3 was satisfied. Rodriquez v. State, 271 Ga. 40, 518 S.E.2d 131 (1999). Defendant failed to prove that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity should have been reached for aggravated assault and aggravated battery for shooting and injuring defendant’s neighbors; although there was evidence that defendant suffered from paranoia and delusions, the experts agreed that defendant knew that the shooting was wrong, and there was testimony that defendant appeared rational after the crime. Jackson v. State, 251

Ga. App. 448, 554 S.E.2d 592 (2001). Justification element not proved. - Defendant failed to prove the justification element of the defendant’s delusional compulsion defense since the defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault but mentally ill, because the defendant’s delusions that the mother might eventually kill the defendant and that the defendant’s mother was using thoughts to shout obscenities at the defendant were not facts that, if true, amounted to a delusion of an immediate physical threat from the mother that justified the knife attack on the defendant’s mother. VanVoorhis v. State, 234 Ga. App. 749, 507 S.E.2d 555 (1998). Defendant’s mental illness did not prove legal insanity on a bus hijacking charge because the defendant told a psychologist that the defendant grabbed the steering wheel of a moving bus because the driver was in difficulty; the trier of fact could conclude that if the defendant was motivated by a delusion that others were planning to harm the defendant, the delusion did not justify forcibly exercising control over the bus because the defendant did not tell the psychologist that the defendant took over steering the bus because of a fear of being harmed. Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 87, 611 S.E.2d 759 (2005). Failure to instruct on justification as necessary component. - Trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on justification as a necessary component of the delusional compulsion defense. Woods v. State, 291 Ga. 804, 733 S.E.2d 730 (2012). Evidence of actions following killing. - When, in arguing that the defendant did not meet the defendant’s burden of proof, the state points to actions taken by the defendant after the murder, including wiping blood from the windows and placing the blood-covered shirt and tee-shirt in the rear of the car, as well as asking about the death penalty in Georgia, these facts might be relevant to the defendant’s argument under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-2 that at the time of the crime defendant lacked the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, but the facts asserted by the state do not detract

Application (Cont’d) from the overwhelming evidence in support of the defendant’s defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-3, that at the time of the homicide defendant was acting under a delusional compulsion which overmastered the defendant’s will to resist committing the crime. Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 350 S.E.2d 21 (1986). Epilepsy can be defense to crime. - Murphy v. State, 132 Ga. App. 654, 209 S.E.2d 101 (1974). Epileptics are responsible for their acts unless reason is dethroned because of seizure of epilepsy at time of such conduct. Starr v. State, 134 Ga. App. 149, 213 S.E.2d 531 (1975). Crime committed while voluntarily intoxicated is not excused. - Though it is the general rule that insanity is ordinarily an excuse, there is an exception to this rule, and that is, when crime is committed by one in a fit of intoxication; a voluntary contracted madness is not excuse for crime. Wells v. State, 247 Ga. 792, 279 S.E.2d 213 (1981). Act resulting from narcotic withdrawal symptoms. - Evidence that defendant became addicted to narcotics in prison and that burglary of medical pharmacy was result of overwhelming passion for narcotics brought on by withdrawal symptoms does not demand conclusion either that the defendant lacked mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, or that because of mental disease defendant acted under a delusional compulsion which overmastered defendant’s will to resist committing the crime. Brand v. State, 123 Ga. App. 273, 180 S.E.2d 579 (1971). Psychotic feature of mental illness altered by drug usage. - Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the basis of an insanity defense because, although the evidence showed that the defendant suffered from mental illness, the jury was permitted to believe the state’s expert, who opined that, even if there was a psychotic feature, it was masked by the fact that the defendant voluntarily altered the defendant’s state of mind by smoking marijuana. Simon v. State, 321 Ga. App. 1, 740 S.E.2d 819 (2013).

Post-traumatic stress disorder evidence properly excluded. - Trial court did not err in excluding the defendant’s expert testimony regarding the defendant’s Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder because Georgia courts have consistently upheld the exclusion of evidence of a defendant’s diminished mental condition when offered to support other defenses or to negate the intent element of a crime. Brower v. State, 334 Ga. App. 262, 779 S.E.2d 32 (2015). Applicability of defense to crimes other than homicide. - Delusional compulsion insanity defense is not available only in cases of homicide and, consequently, the elements necessary to prove that defense are in no way dependent upon the death of the victim. Byrd v. State, 182 Ga. App. 737, 356 S.E.2d 708 (1987). Guilty but mentally ill verdict under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 allowed for accommodation to the mental health needs of the appellant who was found guilty, but was laboring under a mental illness which fell short of the legal defense of insanity and delusional compulsion promulgated O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3. Dimauro v. State, 185 Ga. App. 524, 364 S.E.2d 900 (1988). Verdict of guilty but mentally ill proper where multiple personalities shown. - Where the trial judge accepted that defendant suffers from a multiple personality disorder, but ruled that the personality (be she Phyllis or Sharon, or both) who robbed the banks did so with rational, purposeful criminal intent and with knowledge that it was wrong, there is no error in the judge’s finding that defendant was guilty but mentally ill. Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983). When the defendant’s counsel acquiesced in presenting the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict option to the jury, the defendant was estopped from contending on appeal that the option infringed on the defendant’s defense of insanity. Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986). Prejudice not shown by trial counsel’s failure to call expert. - Even if trial counsel were ineffective in not calling

a psychologist to testify for the defense that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial and that the defendant was insane at the time of the crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3, the defense expert’s testimony would not have changed the outcome; the defense expert’s opinion was contradicted by a second expert, whose opinion was based on an evaluation over an extended period of time as opposed to the defense expert’s evaluation of less than one day, and by testimony of the defendant and trial counsel that the defendant understood the basis of the charges and the nature of the proceedings and assisted in preparing the defense. Wallin v. State, 285 Ga. App. 377, 646 S.E.2d 484 (2007). Defendant failed to prove insanity at the time of the crime. - See Mitchell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 40, 369 S.E.2d 487, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 369 S.E.2d 487 (1988). There was evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was insane at the time of the crime because the state presented the testimony of a forensic psychologist that the defendant’s efforts to clean up the blood and

hide the body indicated that the defendant knew the wrongfulness of the defendant’s actions, that the defendant’s statement to police that the defendant acted in self-defense was a rational motive for the defendant’s escalating fight with the victim, and that there was no evidence that the defendant was delusional at the time of the crimes. Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 724 S.E.2d 377 (2012). Jury charge on defense of insanity rejected. - Defendant’s requested charge regarding the defense of insanity was properly denied as the defendant conceded that the defendant was not acting under a delusional compulsion, and the defendant provided no evidence to show that the defendant lacked the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong when the defendant was stabbing the victim because the defendant knowingly intended to confront the victim as the defendant believed that the victim had stolen the defendant’s Social Security check; and the defendant testified that the defendant knew exactly what the defendant was doing, the defendant knew the reason that the defendant was doing it, and the defendant believed that the defendant was justified in doing so. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 878, 804 S.E.2d 357 (2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Definitions of insanity are inapplicable to instructions to physician. - In view of fact that former Code 1933, § 27-2602 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-10-61) specifically requires that inquiry into whether person convicted of capital felony offense has become insane be directed to alleged insanity occurring subsequent to conviction, definitions of insanity as stated in former Code 1933, §§ 26-702

and 26-703 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3) are inapplicable and should not be given in written instructions to physicians appointed pursuant to Georgia law; since basic issue is the individual’s sanity at the time subsequent to conviction, or in effect, the individual’s present sanity, the appropriate test should be that as employed upon a special plea of insanity. 1976 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 76-123.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 47 et seq. ALR. - Remedy of one convicted of crime while insane, 10 A.L.R. 213; 121 A.L.R. 267. Irresistible impulse as an excuse for crime, 70 A.L.R. 659; 173 A.L.R. 391. Effect of voluntary drug intoxication

upon criminal responsibility, 73 A.L.R.2d 12. Modern status of rules as to burden and sufficiency of proof of mental irresponsibility in criminal case, 17 A.L.R.3d 146. Amnesia as affecting capacity to commit crime or stand trial, 46 A.L.R.3d 544. Drug addiction or related mental state

as defense to criminal charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 16. Admissibility and prejudicial effect of evidence, in criminal prosecution, of defendant’s involvement with witchcraft, satanism, or the like, 18 A.L.R.5th 804.

Qualification of nonmedical psychologist to testify as to mental condition or competency, 72 A.L.R.5th 529. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as defense to murder, assault, or other violent crime, 4 A.L.R.7th 5.