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2018 Georgia Code 16-8-16 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 8. Offenses Involving Theft, 16-8-1 through 16-8-106.

ARTICLE 1 THEFT

16-8-16. Theft by extortion.

  1. A person commits the offense of theft by extortion when he unlawfully obtains property of or from another person by threatening to:
    1. Inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other criminal offense;
    2. Accuse anyone of a criminal offense;
    3. Disseminate any information tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to impair his credit or business repute;
    4. Take or withhold action as a public official or cause an official to take or withhold action;
    5. Bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other collective unofficial action if the property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or
    6. Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense.
  2. In a prosecution under this Code section, the crime shall be considered as having been committed in the county in which the threat was made or received or in the county in which the property was unlawfully obtained.
  3. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (6) of subsection (a) of this Code section that the property obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, legal action, or other invocation of official action was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstance to which such accusation, exposure, legal action, or other official action relates or as compensation for property or lawful services.
  4. A person convicted of the offense of theft by extortion shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.

(Code 1933, § 26-1804, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 6, § 16.)

Cross references.

- Venue generally, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and § 17-2-2.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Tort action in favor of victim not created.

- Although O.C.G.A. § 16-8-16 establishes the public policy of the state, nothing within its provisions purports to create a private cause of action in tort in favor of an alleged victim. Rolleston v. Huie, 198 Ga. App. 49, 400 S.E.2d 349 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 400 S.E.2d 349 (1991).

Demurrer properly granted.

- Trial court properly granted the defendants' general demurrer as to the conspiracy to commit extortion count because the alleged extortion was based on a mere threat to file a lawsuit and there was no allegation that the threatened litigation was somehow unlawful; thus, the defendants could have admitted to all of the allegations and still have been innocent of that crime. State v. Cohen, 302 Ga. 616, 807 S.E.2d 861 (2017).

Lesser included offense.

- Theft by extortion is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery, as a matter of law; however, it may merge with armed robbery as a matter of fact. Lewis v. State, 261 Ga. App. 273, 582 S.E.2d 222 (2003).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict the defendant of theft by extortion because evidence was presented that the defendant and the defendant's accomplices took speakers from the victim's van after the defendant threatened that the victim's friend would never see the victim again unless the friend left the van and the van's keys at a gas station. Taylor v. State, 302 Ga. App. 54, 690 S.E.2d 641 (2010).

Extortion not shown.

- Debtor's claim that extortion, as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-8-16, had been committed by a bank and the bank's director and was therefore a predicate act for purposes of the debtor's civil racketeering claims was without merit since the debtor admitted that the bank's foreclosure on some of the debtor's property was prompted by the debtor's failure to repay loans taken out for that property and, as such, the foreclosure was lawful. Tucker v. Morris State Bank, F.3d (11th Cir. Nov. 14, 2005)(Unpublished).

Cited in Partain v. State, 129 Ga. App. 213, 199 S.E.2d 549 (1973); United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1973); Sanders v. State, 135 Ga. App. 436, 218 S.E.2d 140 (1975); Brooks v. State, 141 Ga. App. 725, 234 S.E.2d 541 (1977); Quillan v. State, 160 Ga. App. 167, 286 S.E.2d 503 (1981); Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982); Bramblett v. State, 191 Ga. App. 238, 381 S.E.2d 530 (1989); Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826, 780 S.E.2d 689 (2015).

ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE STATE BAR

Committing offense results in Rules of Professional Conduct violation.

- If an attorney were to indicate to an officer that as a result of the attorney's position as a member of the city council a favorable recommendation as to one of the attorney's clients would result in benefits flowing to the officer, or that an unfavorable recommendation would result in harm, the attorney would have committed the offense of bribery, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2(a)(1), or extortion, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-16(a)(4). The attorney would also have violated Rule 3.5(a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Adv. Op. No. 05-12 (July 25, 2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extortion, Blackmail and Threats, §§ 1 et seq., 22 et seq., 35 et seq., 53, 61 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 35 C.J.S., Extortion, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- The boycott as a weapon in industrial disputes, 116 A.L.R. 484.

Evidence of acquisition or possession of money, source of which is not traced, as admissible against defendant in criminal case, 123 A.L.R. 119; 91 A.L.R.2d 1046.

Extortion predicated upon statements or intimations regarding criminal liability, in connection with attempt to collect or settle a claim which defendant believed to be valid, 135 A.L.R. 728.

Criminal offense of obtaining money under false pretenses, or attempting to do so, predicated upon receipt or claim of benefits under insurance policy, 135 A.L.R. 1157.

What constitutes "loss from theft" within provisions of Internal Revenue Code concerning deduction of losses arising from theft, 62 A.L.R.2d 572.

Evidence of acquisition or possession of money, source of which is not traced, as admissible against defendant in criminal case, 91 A.L.R.2d 1046.

Criminal liability of corporation for extortion, false pretenses, or similar offenses, 49 A.L.R.3d 820.

What constitutes "property" obtained within extortion statute, 67 A.L.R.3d 1021.

Retaking of money lost at gambling as robbery or larceny, 77 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses, or allied criminal fraud by a partner, 82 A.L.R.3d 822.

Truth as defense to state charge of criminal intimidation, extortion, blackmail, threats, and the like, based upon threats to disclose information about victim, 39 A.L.R.4th 1011.

Injury to reputation or mental well-being as within penal extortion statutes requiring threat of "Injury to the Person,", 87 A.L.R.5th 715.

What constitutes tax-deductible theft loss under 26 USCS § 165, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 229.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-8-16

Total Results: 7  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 697 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 62 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2010 | 287 Ga. 448, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2051

...49, 50, 400 S.E.2d 349 (1990), the plaintiff asserted that the theft by extortion statute, which prohibits threats to disseminate information tending to impair another person's credit or business reputation, created a private civil cause of action. See id. at 50, 400 S.E.2d 349; OCGA § 16-8-16(a)(3). The Court of Appeals held that, "[a]lthough OCGA § 16-8-16 establishes the public policy of this state, nothing within its provisions purports to create a private cause of action in tort in favor of an alleged victim. Accordingly, the civil liability of [the defendant] must be determined under the applicable provisions of the tort law of this state, not the inapplicable criminal provisions of OCGA § 16-8-16." Rolleston, 198 Ga.App....
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Spears v. State, 296 Ga. 598 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 16, 2015 | 769 S.E.2d 337

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State v. Cohen, 302 Ga. 616 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 2, 2017 | 807 S.E.2d 861

...that is not relevant to the current appeal, on June 17, 2016, Brindle and her attorneys (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “defendants”) were charged in the Superior Court of Fulton County with conspiracy to commit extortion under OCGA § 16-8-16 (Count 1), conspiracy to commit unlawful surveillance (Count 2), and conducting unlawful surveillance under OCGA § 16-11-62 (Count 3)....
...0, 2012, and then sending Rogers the July 16, 2012 litigation demand letter. Through multiple motions filed on September 19, 2016 and October 19, 2016, the defendants filed a general demurrer to dismiss the indictment against them and to have OCGA §§ 16-8-16 (a) (3),4 *61716-11-62 (2),5 and 16-11-66 (a)6 declared unconstitutional....
...Following a hearing, on November 30, 2016, the trial court issued an order granting the defendants’ general demurrer to the indictment. After finding that the indictment failed to allege that the defendants had committed any crimes under the relevant statutes, the trial court went on to conclude that OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) was unconstitutionally over-broad on its face, and further declared that OCGA §§ 16-11-62 (2) and 16-11-66 (a) were unconstitutionally vague because “persons of ordinary intelligence [could not] be expected to determine what is...
...e defendants. The State appeals from this ruling, and, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that (1) while the trial court properly dismissed Count 1 of the indictment, the trial court erred by reaching the constitutional issue relating to OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) in support of this result; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the indictment and in concluding that OCGA §§ 16-11-62 (2) and 16-11-66 (a) are unconstitutionally vague. We therefore affirm the portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Count 1 of the indictment, vacate the portion of the trial court order’s finding OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) to be unconstitutionally overbroad on its face, and reverse the portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Counts 2-4 of the indictment. 1....
...g charged with the offense of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A FELONY O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8,[7] for the said accused, in the County of Fulton and State of Georgia, on the 6th day of June, 2012, did unlawfully, together, conspire to commit the crime of EXTORTION O.C.G.A. §16-8-16, and at least one of those persons did an overt act to effect the object of said conspiracy, to wit: OVERT ACTS 1. On or about the 3rd day of June, 2012, JOHN BUTTERS, an attorney authorized to practice law in Georgia, contacted Th...
...when he unlawfully obtains property of or from another person by threatening to . . . [d]isseminate any information tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to impair his credit or business repute. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3)....
...threatening to . . . [d]isseminate any information tending to subject [Rogers] to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to impair his credit or business repute” and commit an overt act to effect the objective of obtaining property from Rogers. OCGA §§ 16-8-16 (a) (3) and 16-4-8....
...e other crime (see discussion in Division 2, infra), there was no agreement to unlawfully obtain property from Rogers by “threatening” him in this case in any manner that could serve as a proper basis for a charge of illegal extortion under OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3)....
...attorney’s client). However, because any threat to “[disseminate any information tending to subject [another] person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to impair his credit or business repute” could, in theory, amount to extortion under OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3), the language of OCGA § 16-8-16 could be read to be broad enough to include “threats” of public litigation as unlawful and extortionate actions that could subject a person to criminal liability under the statute....
...DIRECTV, Inc., 276 FSupp.2d 1271, 1275-1276 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“[T]he Court is not aware of any authority holding that a demand to settle a claim before pursuing litigation amounts to extortion. In fact, such demand letters do not fit the legal definition of extortion [under OCGA § 16-8-16 (a)]”). Our construction of OCGA § 16-8-16(a)(3)isconsistentwiththis Court’s “duty to construe a statute in a manner which upholds it as constitutional, if that is possible.” (Citation omitted.) Cobb County School Dist. v. Barker, 271 Ga. 35, 37 (1) (518 SE2d 126) (1999). Indeed, if a mere threat of legitimate litigation could serve asa proper basis for a charge of extortion, OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) could be *624applied in an overbroad and unconstitutional manner that would run afoul of First Amendment principles protecting the right of individuals to petition the government for a redress of grievances....
...Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the defendants’ general demurrer to this *625Count. See Lowe, supra. In light of the trial court’s proper conclusion that Count 1 of the indictment failed to sufficiently allege a crime against the defendants under OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) as a matter of law, the trial court did not need to decide any issue regarding the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3)....
...309, 310 (444 SE2d771) (1994) (It “is well established that this court will never decide a constitutional question if the decision of the case presented can be made upon other grounds”) (citations and punctuation omitted). We therefore vacate that portion of the trial court’s order purporting to declare OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) to be unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. 2....
...ogers, although this might serve as a proper basis for a charge of extortion, the defendants would still have an opportunity to defend against such an accusation at trial by proving that they had an honest claim to the property in question. See OCGA § 16-8-16 (c) (“It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraph ......
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Smallwood v. State, 310 Ga. 445 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 12, 2020

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In the Matter of Millard C. Farmer, Jr, 307 Ga. 307 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 4, 2019

...also more recently found liable, based on the above-described conduct, in a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) action, see OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq., for multiple acts of racketeering, including attempted theft by extortion, in violation of OCGA § 16-8-16; attempted bribery, in violation of OCGA § 16-10-2; intimidation of a court officer, in violation of OCGA § 16-10-97; influencing witnesses, in violation of OCGA § 16-10-93; and employing interstate travel, in concert with others, to...
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Ellis v. State, 300 Ga. 371 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 30, 2016 | 794 S.E.2d 601

...307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also OCGA § 16-4-1 (“A person commits the offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime”); OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (4) (“A person commits the offense of theft by extortion when he unlawfully obtains property of or from another person by threatening to......

Spears v. State (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 16, 2015 | 794 S.E.2d 601