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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 3; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1105, § 2; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1980, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1046, § 3/SB 94.)
The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, substituted the present provisions of paragraph (a)(5) for the former provisions, which read: "Any item, substance, object, thing, or matter, other than the private papers of any person, which is tangible evidence of the commission of the crime for which probable cause is shown."; and, in subsection (b), in the first sentence, substituted "shall preclude such officer" for "shall be construed to preclude him" near the beginning and added ", the United States, or another state." at the end and added the last two sentences.
- For annual survey on criminal law, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 79 (2013). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 79 (2015). For note on 1990 amendment of this Code section, see 7 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 261 (1990). For comment on Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 597 (1965), see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (1966). For comment discussing satisfaction of probable cause requirement for issuance of search warrant by reasonable inference in light of Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 234 S.E.2d 911 (1977), see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 347 (1977).
- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, Ch. 27-3 and Ga. L. 1951, p. 291, § 8 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- O.C.G.A.17-5-22 (when considered with O.C.G.A. §§ 17-5-21 and § 17-7-20) means that the authority of a judicial officer to issue a search warrant to be executed within the area of the officer's jurisdiction does not vanish when the officer physically steps into an area where the officer's authority is restricted within the county in which the officer serves. State v. Varner, 248 Ga. 347, 283 S.E.2d 268 (1981).
- Sexually explicit VCR tapes and photographs, although in the private possession of the defendant, were seizable as evidentiary items used in accomplishing a crime, aggravated sodomy, and such tapes could also be used to show bent of mind of the defendant to commit such crimes. Tyler v. State, 176 Ga. App. 96, 335 S.E.2d 691 (1985).
- Evidence of another crime, discovered while searching pursuant to a valid search warrant, may be lawfully seized. Bing v. State, 178 Ga. App. 288, 342 S.E.2d 762 (1986).
- While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," the term means less than evidence which would justify condemnation, and a finding of probable cause may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965).
- Whether by recitals in the affidavit or by an independent showing before the magistrate, the facts must be such as to lead a man of prudence and caution to believe that the offense has been committed. Mere speculation, conjecture, or opinion is not enough, nor is mere rumor. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965).
- Determination as to whether there is probable cause is not to be made by one who applies for issuance of the warrant; it must be made by the magistrate from a consideration of the facts submitted under oath. It must exist before the search is made and cannot be supplied by after-discovered facts. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965).
- Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued by a probate court judge was properly denied because the probate court judge was authorized to hold a court of inquiry under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-20 and, therefore, was authorized to issue a search warrant under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(a). O.C.G.A. § 40-13-21(b), assuming it required the state court to issue a warrant, pertained to the jurisdiction of probate courts in misdemeanor traffic cases and did not apply in this felony case. Joyner v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Aug. 3, 2018).
- While probable cause may be made to appear by a showing under oath before the magistrate when issuance of the warrant is sought, it is better, even necessary, that the facts then made to appear as showing probable cause be incorporated in the affidavit. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965).
- At common law, justices of the peace had general power to issue search warrants for stolen goods. So long as a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause is made, there is no constitutional inhibition against designation by the General Assembly of persons other than a justice of the peace for doing it. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965).
Juvenile court probation officer has no authority to apply for a search warrant. Huff v. Walker, 125 Ga. App. 251, 187 S.E.2d 343 (1972) (decided under Ga. L. 1951, p. 291, § 8).
- Warrant for the seizure of private papers that did not clearly limit the items to be seized to those involving the named participants was overly broad and allowed for an impermissible exercise of discretion by the searching officers. Grant v. State, 220 Ga. App. 604, 469 S.E.2d 826 (1996).
Defendant's rights were not violated when the contents of a handwritten letter were not used against the defendant and only the characteristics of the handwriting were used by a handwriting expert for comparison purposes. Hale v. State, 220 Ga. App. 667, 469 S.E.2d 871 (1996).
Private papers, as referred to in O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21, are restricted to those covered by an applicable privilege, and slips of paper listing pornographic internet sites were not within the coverage. Walsh v. State, 236 Ga. App. 558, 512 S.E.2d 408 (1999).
Defendant's assertion that the contents of a notebook were private papers exempt from seizure under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21 was rejected since the contents were voluntarily handed over to the police for review. Heckman v. State, 276 Ga. 141, 576 S.E.2d 834 (2003).
- As to the defendant's conviction for possession with the intent to distribute, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress papers found in a residence because O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21 authorizes the seizure of certain private papers, but the defendant's judgment of divorce, a public record, was not a private paper subject to suppression. Flemister v. State, 317 Ga. App. 749, 732 S.E.2d 810 (2012).
- Defendant's argument that the defendant's medical records could not have been obtained via search warrant because the records constituted "private papers," which were exempt from search warrants pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21, was unavailing; medical records could have been properly seized pursuant to a search warrant. Brogdon v. State, 299 Ga. App. 547, 683 S.E.2d 99 (2009), aff'd, 287 Ga. 528, 697 S.E.2d 211 (2010).
- Search warrant is an appropriate vehicle for obtaining a blood sample from a defendant. State v. Slavny, 195 Ga. App. 818, 395 S.E.2d 56 (1990).
- Fruits of a search warrant allowing the police to use a thermal scanning device to search the defendant's home for anomalous heat loss were not suppressed because "anomalous heat loss" was tangible evidence, under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(a)(5), as "anomalous heat loss" was definable and measurable and could, at least in some cases, be perceived through the sense of touch. Brundige v. State, 310 Ga. App. 900, 714 S.E.2d 681 (2011), aff'd, 291 Ga. 677, 735 S.E.2d 583 (2012).
- Giving the word tangible full effect, the Supreme Court of Georgia finds that it appears that the Georgia General Assembly intends tangible evidence under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21 to mean evidence that is essentially an object with material form that could be touched by a person. Brundige v. State, 291 Ga. 677, 735 S.E.2d 583 (2012).
- Search warrant for defendant's trailer was supported by probable cause given multiple calls from concerned citizens that the defendant was firing a gun outside the defendant's home at all hours and the defendant's prior convictions for felony drug and firearms offenses, and marijuana plants outside a second trailer gave probable cause for a warrant for that trailer. State v. Dotson, 337 Ga. App. 284, 787 S.E.2d 262 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1717, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 829 (Ga. 2016).
- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress because the court did not err in determining that the law-enforcement officers who searched the defendant's home had reasonable suspicion to suspect criminal activity or violations of probation based on the probation officer's concerns that the defendant was using drugs and attempting to avoid detection; thus, the search was conducted for probationary purposes, rather than for law-enforcement purposes. Whitfield v. State, 337 Ga. App. 167, 786 S.E.2d 547 (2016).
Cited in Hutto v. State, 116 Ga. App. 140, 156 S.E.2d 498 (1967); Neal v. State, 118 Ga. App. 407, 164 S.E.2d 150 (1968); Patterson v. State, 124 Ga. App. 465, 184 S.E.2d 228 (1971); Vaughn v. State, 126 Ga. App. 252, 190 S.E.2d 609 (1972); Young v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 653, 193 S.E.2d 854 (1972); Fowler v. State, 128 Ga. App. 501, 197 S.E.2d 502 (1973); Simmons v. State, 233 Ga. 429, 211 S.E.2d 725 (1975); Butler v. State, 134 Ga. App. 131, 213 S.E.2d 490 (1975); Pope v. State, 134 Ga. App. 455, 214 S.E.2d 686 (1975); Granger v. State, 235 Ga. 681, 221 S.E.2d 451 (1975); State v. McDonald, 142 Ga. App. 359, 235 S.E.2d 776 (1977); Reynolds v. State, 142 Ga. App. 549, 236 S.E.2d 525 (1977); Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 807, 243 S.E.2d 1 (1978); Toole v. State, 146 Ga. App. 305, 246 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Contreras v. State, 242 Ga. 369, 249 S.E.2d 56 (1978); Branch v. State, 248 Ga. 300, 282 S.E.2d 894 (1981); Suddeth v. State, 162 Ga. App. 460, 291 S.E.2d 430 (1982); Reed v. State, 163 Ga. App. 233, 293 S.E.2d 469 (1982); Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 808, 301 S.E.2d 633 (1983); Bogan v. State, 165 Ga. App. 851, 303 S.E.2d 48 (1983); Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621 (1984); Mosley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 30, 348 S.E.2d 555 (1986); Rush v. State, 188 Ga. App. 520, 373 S.E.2d 377 (1988); Cayce v. State, 192 Ga. App. 97, 383 S.E.2d 648 (1989); Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 382, 405 S.E.2d 648 (1991); Hightower v. State, 205 Ga. App. 305, 422 S.E.2d 28 (1992); Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 422 S.E.2d 546 (1992); Felix v. State, 234 Ga. App. 509, 507 S.E.2d 172 (1998); State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61 (1999); Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 767, 658 S.E.2d 386 (2008); Carson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 515, 724 S.E.2d 821 (2012).
- Proceedings for issuance of search warrants are to be strictly construed, and every constitutional and statutory requirement must be fully met, including all formalities required by statute, before a valid search warrant may issue. Moreover, a section prescribing the method of issuing search warrants must be read and construed in the light of, and conform in all essential respects to, the provisions of the Constitution granting immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. Pruitt v. State, 123 Ga. App. 659, 182 S.E.2d 142 (1971).
- It is only after requirements of this section are met that the warrant may be issued and the search instituted. Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 160 S.E.2d 368 (1968).
- Police officer employed by county is an "officer of the state or its political subdivisions charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws" within the meaning of this section. Hawkins v. State, 130 Ga. App. 426, 203 S.E.2d 622 (1973).
- Common-sense reading of the entire affidavit is all that is required. Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973).
- Affidavits for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a common-sense and realistic fashion and technical requirements of elaborate specificity have no proper place in this area. Driscoll v. State, 129 Ga. App. 702, 201 S.E.2d 11 (1973).
- Although in a particular case it may not be easy for the court to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. Bradley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 271, 205 S.E.2d 463 (1974).
- When grounds for a search warrant appear on the face of the printed search warrant form, the fact that the grounds may be stated in the wrong place on the form is immaterial. Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973).
There is no requirement that probable cause for the issuance of a warrant be set out only in that section of the printed affidavit form designated "probable cause." The affidavit is to be read as a whole. Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973).
- It is not necessary that all the information relied upon in seeking a warrant must appear within an affidavit. Hornsby v. State, 124 Ga. App. 724, 185 S.E.2d 623 (1971).
- There is no requirement that exculpatory material be included in an ex parte application for a search warrant. Hayes v. State, 182 Ga. App. 319, 355 S.E.2d 700 (1987).
Written complaint must be signed by the attesting officer in order to be valid. State v. Barnett, 136 Ga. App. 122, 220 S.E.2d 730 (1975).
- General warrant, one which does not sufficiently specify the place or the person to be searched, is void. Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487 (1970).
- Warrant should not leave the place to be searched to the discretion of the officer. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980).
- If a search as it was actually conducted is lawful, it is not rendered invalid merely because the warrant pursuant to which the search was made was overbroad or founded upon erroneous beliefs. Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973).
- Description is sufficient if prudent officer executing the warrant can locate the person and place definitely and with reasonable certainty. Buck v. State, 127 Ga. App. 72, 192 S.E.2d 432 (1972); Cooksey v. State, 149 Ga. App. 572, 254 S.E.2d 892 (1979); State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980); Barfield v. State, 160 Ga. App. 228, 286 S.E.2d 516 (1981).
Description in the warrant itself must be sufficient to enable the officer who serves the warrant to ascertain with reasonable certainty and identify the place intended. Vaughn v. State, 141 Ga. App. 453, 233 S.E.2d 848 (1977).
- Lack of description of the person to be searched does not void the search and seizure of items found in a search of the place. Holloway v. State, 134 Ga. 498, 215 S.E.2d 262 (1975).
Lack of description of the person to be searched does not void the search and seizure of items found in a search of the place; even a "John Doe" warrant is legally sufficient "for a search of described premises." Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d 154 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).
Although the search warrant only described the defendant as a "black male unknown," it was not an invalid warrant. A warrant is sufficient if it particularly describes the place or person, or both, to be searched and things to be seized. The warrant had a very specific description of the location of the defendant's residence - the place from which the defendant was observed leaving. Smith v. State, 187 Ga. App. 231, 369 S.E.2d 549 (1988).
- Search warrant otherwise sufficient is not rendered invalid by the omission of the name of the owner or occupant of the premises to be searched. Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d 154 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).
- When the name of the owner or the occupant is not given, the description of the premises must be exact. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980).
- It is not fatal to list the owner of the premises, rather than the occupant of the premises, when the primary object of the warrant is the search of the premises. Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d 154 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).
- When a search warrant clearly authorized the search of the premises described in the caption of the warrant, the failure to reflect the street address or description in the body of the warrant is a technical irregularity which did not affect the substantial rights of the defendants and did not authorize suppression of the evidence. Latimer v. State, 134 Ga. App. 372, 214 S.E.2d 390 (1975).
- Description in warrant itself can be sufficient to enable the officer who served the warrant to ascertain with reasonable certainty the identity of the place intended, despite the omission of the county and state therein. Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 399, 270 S.E.2d 822 (1980).
- Search warrant, in giving specific directions on how to find the house, the street address, a house description ("one-story frame dwelling"), and the description and license number of the appellant's car, gives a sufficient description. Cooksey v. State, 149 Ga. App. 572, 254 S.E.2d 892 (1979).
- Though specificity is to be desired, when circumstances make an exact description of instrumentalities a virtual impossibility, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of items the officer is seeking. Dugan v. State, 130 Ga. App. 527, 203 S.E.2d 722 (1974); Cooper v. State, 212 Ga. App. 34, 441 S.E.2d 448 (1994).
- When both the affidavit and the warrant recited probable cause to believe drugs would be found on the person of the named defendant and on the premises under the defendant's possession, custody, and control, namely hotel room 327, the search of room 337 of the hotel constituted a reasonable search under the warrant, without amendment, upon the discovery before the warrant's execution that the defendant was registered in room 337, and the actions of the officer in phoning the issuing magistrate and obtaining authorization to make the correction were reasonable and proper. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980).
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol-content test that was obtained via the seizure of the defendant's blood samples and pursuant to a search warrant because the warrant was narrowly drafted to seek only the blood samples and medical records from the hospital where the defendant was treated on the night of the accident; even if the warrant could be construed as authorizing a broader seizure of all of the defendant's medical records instead of only those relevant to the defendant's treatment related to the accident, the defendant failed to show that any such broader seizure occurred and, thus, failed to show any harm. Jones v. State, 313 Ga. App. 590, 722 S.E.2d 202 (2012).
- Affidavit and warrant, each headed "Gwinnett County," contained a description sufficient to enable an officer who served a warrant to ascertain with reasonable certainty the identity of the place intended, which is more specifically known as Tucker, Georgia. Mosier v. State, 160 Ga. App. 415, 287 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
Information provided in an affidavit and a search warrant issued was not insufficient to set out with exactitude a description of the premises to be searched. Martin v. State, 165 Ga. App. 760, 302 S.E.2d 614 (1983).
With regard to the defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, even if the defendant had not waived the issue of defense counsel being ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, the challenge was meritless since the search warrant properly named the package the police sought to seize, which the defendant picked up at a mailing store, and the warrant did not need to name the defendant's vehicle, which the defendant entered into with the package. Ferguson v. State, 292 Ga. App. 7, 663 S.E.2d 760 (2008).
- Fact that a taped "affidavit" was not in written form when the affidavit was presented to the magistrate was a technical defect; accordingly, the court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Williams v. State, 188 Ga. App. 334, 373 S.E.2d 42 (1988).
- GBI agent was authorized to rely on information regarding sexually explicit images of children as reported by an internet service provider (ISP) pursuant to the ISP's statutory reporting obligation set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b)(1); the ISP's report was the equivalent of one made from a law-abiding concerned citizen, and therefore was afforded a preferred status insofar as testing the credibility of the information. Manzione v. State, 312 Ga. App. 638, 719 S.E.2d 533 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0485, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 308 (Ga. 2012).
- Given the complete lack of information regarding the anonymous informant, the informant's motives, or the basis for the informant's knowledge, the informant's allegations, standing alone, were insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of the defendant's home and, thus, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of the defendant's home. Wiggins v. State, 331 Ga. App. 447, 771 S.E.2d 135 (2015).
- Task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision, whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Farmer, 177 Ga. App. 18, 338 S.E.2d 489 (1985); Hayes v. State, 182 Ga. App. 319, 355 S.E.2d 700 (1987).
- Law requires that the question of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant must be independently determined by a neutral and detached magistrate and not by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Patterson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 753, 191 S.E.2d 584 (1972).
- Determination of whether or not there was a sufficient showing of probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant depends on the resolution of two questions: first, whether or not the facts as stated in the affidavit constitute a sufficient showing of probable cause and, second, whether in the light of all of the sworn evidence placed before the magistrate, the magistrate was justified in issuing the warrant. Campbell v. State, 226 Ga. 883, 178 S.E.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002, 91 S. Ct. 1246, 28 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1971).
Duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed when the magistrate issued the warrant, while the issuing magistrate must make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. In determining if an affidavit contained sufficient information for a magistrate to determine that probable cause existed to issue a search warrant, the reviewing court may consider the remainder of an affidavit after a portion has been excised in combination with the totality of the circumstance. Porter v. State, 264 Ga. App. 526, 591 S.E.2d 436 (2003).
Denial of the defendant's suppression motion was error as a search warrant was based upon the statements of a confidential informant (CI) whose reliability, credibility, and source of information were unknown, law enforcement officers had failed to corroborate the CI's claim that the defendant was selling drugs from the residence, and the officers did not observe the CI's conduct before or after the controlled buy. Chatham v. State, 323 Ga. App. 51, 746 S.E.2d 605 (2013).
- Law requires that sufficient facts be set forth in the affidavit required by this section to enable the magistrate to make an independent determination as to whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant. McMahan v. State, 125 Ga. App. 491, 188 S.E.2d 183 (1972).
- When facts fail to show when taken as a whole the reasonable likelihood of any criminal activity within the defendant's home, the requirement of probable cause has not been met. McMahan v. State, 125 Ga. App. 491, 188 S.E.2d 183 (1972).
- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 to suppress evidence in a prosecution for felony murder and other charges; the search warrant was supported by probable cause pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(a) as the application listed the salient evidence sought, and gave a reason why the evidence, including pornographic materials, was salient as the evidence indicated that the defendant choked a girlfriend after they got into an argument over the defendant watching pornography in their home. Lemon v. State, 279 Ga. 618, 619 S.E.2d 613 (2005).
- Probable cause finding must be based on more than the conclusion that a crime was committed and that the items sought are connected with the crime. The magistrate must also have a sufficient reason to believe that the items will be found in the place to be searched. Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 234 S.E.2d 911 (1977).
- In reaching a judgment on probable cause for a search warrant, a judge must use a common-sense approach because the judge is dealing with a probability and not a certainty that a crime has been committed. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591 (1975).
Probable cause means reasonable grounds and is that apparent state of facts which seems to exist after reasonable and proper inquiry. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976); State v. Johnson, 152 Ga. App. 115, 262 S.E.2d 197 (1979).
- Test is whether it would justify a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed, and this requires merely a probability - less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion or possibility. Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973); Baxter v. State, 134 Ga. App. 286, 214 S.E.2d 578, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895, 96 S. Ct. 194, 46 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1975); Brown v. State, 151 Ga. App. 830, 261 S.E.2d 717 (1979); Lewis v. State, 255 Ga. 101, 335 S.E.2d 560 (1985).
- Considerably less is required to show probable cause for search or arrest than is required to prove guilt. Hornsby v. State, 124 Ga. App. 724, 185 S.E.2d 623 (1971).
Affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial. Davis v. State, 127 Ga. App. 76, 192 S.E.2d 538 (1972).
"Reasonable cause" necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused's guilt upon a trial. Baxter v. State, 134 Ga. App. 286, 214 S.E.2d 578, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895, 96 S. Ct. 194, 46 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1975).
Law sanctions a difference between the methods permitted to prove the ultimate issue of guilt and that of probable cause for search or arrest. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591 (1975).
When dealing with probable cause, as the name implies, one deals with probabilities, not certainty, and the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause is not that level which is necessary for proof of guilt in a trial. Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S. Ct. 285, 62 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1979).
- Judge may consider the totality of the information to determine if probable cause exists before issuing a search warrant. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591 (1975).
- In determining whether the magistrate was justified in issuing the search warrant, the court is not limited to the facts on the face of the affidavit, and is free to make judgments on the veracity of any or all of the evidence. Campbell v. State, 226 Ga. 883, 178 S.E.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002, 91 S. Ct. 1246, 28 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1971).
Not only what is stated in the affidavit for the search warrant but also the totality of the sworn circumstances before the magistrate may be considered in establishing probable cause. Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973); Franklin v. State, 135 Ga. App. 718, 218 S.E.2d 641 (1975); Brown v. State, 151 Ga. App. 830, 261 S.E.2d 717 (1979).
- Information gathered by arresting and investigating officers can be used to support probable cause. Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d 154 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).
- Defendant's motion to suppress was improperly denied as the application and affidavit for the search warrant contained insufficient information to allow a finding of probable cause to search the residence because the confidential informant had not assisted law enforcement before; the investigator only corroborated the information that was readily available to the general public; the investigator did nothing to independently confirm the informant's tip that there were items commonly associated with methamphetamine production in the trash can outside the residence; and the independent investigation did not establish the informant's reliability to any meaningful degree. Nichols v. State, 336 Ga. App. 287, 783 S.E.2d 918 (2016).
- Although there is some controversy as to whether or not the odor of burning marijuana by itself supplies sufficient probable cause for a search or an arrest, it may be considered and may be part of a totality of circumstances sufficient to validate one. State v. Medders, 153 Ga. App. 680, 266 S.E.2d 331 (1980).
- While odor of marijuana smoke alone does not authorize a search without a warrant, a "sufficiently distinctive" odor recognized by one "qualified to know the odor" may form a proper basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Clare v. State, 135 Ga. App. 281, 217 S.E.2d 638 (1975).
- Suspicion that drugs were being used on the premises is insufficient to constitute probable cause under this section. Clare v. State, 135 Ga. App. 281, 217 S.E.2d 638 (1975).
Absent testimony which stated objective facts which corroborated as both true and current the information supplied by the defendant's neighbors about suspected drug activity at the defendant's home, the affiant had only a mere suspicion that contraband was being kept on the premises; thus, the warrant to search for drugs was not supported by probable cause. Banks v. State of Ga., 277 Ga. 543, 592 S.E.2d 668 (2004).
- Information provided by police officers, arising out of an official investigation, may be used to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
- Magistrate may rely on law enforcement officer's knowledge of a suspect's reputation in issuing a search warrant. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
- Local law enforcement officers participating in a common investigation are reliable informants. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
- Information supporting a finding of probable cause may be presented to the magistrate by means of an affidavit or by oral testimony. Bradley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 271, 205 S.E.2d 463 (1974); Franklin v. State, 135 Ga. App. 718, 218 S.E.2d 641 (1975).
This section authorizes a qualified judicial officer to issue a search warrant upon the written complaint of any state law enforcement officer under oath or affirmation which states facts sufficient to show probable cause to justify a search; although, the judicial officer may receive additional information by oral testimony that section does not require that the officer do so. All that is necessary is that the affidavit or the testimony, or both, provide probable cause for the search. State v. Barber, 148 Ga. App. 743, 252 S.E.2d 911 (1979).
- When the magistrate does not administer any oath until after the affidavit is signed, the oath covers only the truthfulness of the statements contained in the written affidavit and not the oral statements given to show probable cause. Riggins v. State, 136 Ga. App. 279, 220 S.E.2d 775 (1975).
- Affidavit to obtain a search warrant is not insufficient merely because the affiant relies on information obtained from others to show probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. DePalma v. State, 228 Ga. 272, 185 S.E.2d 53 (1971).
Probable cause for the issuance of an arrest or search warrant may be founded upon hearsay. Hornsby v. State, 124 Ga. App. 724, 185 S.E.2d 623 (1971).
- Hearsay and even hearsay upon hearsay may be sufficient to furnish the basis for the issuance of a valid warrant if the magistrate is informed of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant's underlying conclusions and the magistrate's belief that the informant was credible or the information reliable. State v. Griffin, 154 Ga. App. 361, 268 S.E.2d 412 (1980).
- Fact that an affidavit for issuance of a warrant was based upon information received by the affiant from another police officer, who in turn received the information from informants, does not preclude a finding of probable cause if the reliability of such informants is established. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).
- Hearsay can be the basis for issuance of a warrant so long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591 (1975).
Hearsay may support the issuance of a valid warrant if the magistrate is informed of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant's conclusions and the affiant's belief that the informant was credible or the informant's information reliable. There must be a substantial basis for crediting such hearsay. Smith v. State, 136 Ga. App. 17, 220 S.E.2d 11 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 938, 96 S. Ct. 1671, 48 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1976).
- Constitution requires that there be presented to the judicial officer issuing the search warrant some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the officer applying for the warrant and, if the officer relies on an informant, some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the officer's informant was reliable. Wood v. State, 118 Ga. App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233 (1968).
Affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant so long as the magistrate is informed of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant's conclusions and the affiant's belief that any informant involved whose identity need not be disclosed was credible or the informant's information reliable. Davis v. State, 127 Ga. App. 76, 192 S.E.2d 538 (1972).
- General tests to be applied to determine the sufficiency of the affidavit's facts and circumstances to show probable cause are: (1) that the affidavit gives reasons for the informer's reliability; (2) that the affidavit either specifically states how the informer obtained the information or the tip describes the criminal activity in such detail that the magistrate may know that it is more than a "casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation"; and (3) a time period closely related to the commission of the offense must be affirmatively stated within the affidavit to show that the information contained therein is not stale. Bradley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 271, 205 S.E.2d 463 (1974); State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52 (1980).
- If hearsay such as an informer's tip is relied upon for probable cause, the sworn information placed before the justice of the peace must adequately set forth: (1) the underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge the validity of the information; and (2) the informant's credibility or reliability. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).
- When the hearsay of an informant is relied upon, the affidavit must give the reasons for the informer's reliability and must either state how the informer obtained the information or the tip must describe the criminal activity in such detail that the magistrate may know it is more than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation. Hornsby v. State, 124 Ga. App. 724, 185 S.E.2d 623 (1971).
- Affidavit upon which a search warrant is issued must give the reasons for the informer's reliability and must either state how the informer obtained the information or the tip must describe the criminal activity in such detail that the magistrate may know it is more than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation. Sams v. State, 121 Ga. App. 46, 172 S.E.2d 473, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865, 91 S. Ct. 100, 27 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1970).
- Affidavit on which the warrant issues, when the warrant depends for the warrant's efficacy upon statements made by others, must either specifically state how the informer obtained the information or the tip should describe the criminal activity in such detail that the magistrate may know it is more than a casual rumor or an accusation based merely on reputation. Dresch v. State, 125 Ga. App. 110, 186 S.E.2d 496 (1971).
One of the general tests to determine the sufficiency to show probable cause is that the affidavit either specifically states how the informer obtained the information or the tip describes the criminal activity in such detail that the magistrate may know that it is more than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation. Cochran v. State, 136 Ga. App. 94, 220 S.E.2d 83 (1975).
- Rumors or information from unidentified persons cannot form the basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Thornton v. State, 125 Ga. App. 374, 187 S.E.2d 583 (1972).
- It clearly is the better practice, if an informant has obtained the information through personal observation or contact or through some other reliable manner, to include this fact in the affidavit or so inform the magistrate considering the affidavit's issuance; however, the failure to include a statement of the informant's "basis of knowledge" in the affidavit or to specifically inform the magistrate of that basis by sworn testimony does not always cause the resulting warrant to be fatally defective. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).
- In determining the reliability of the manner in which an informant obtained the information, determination of whether the tip meets the "sufficient detail" test is based exclusively on what information came from the informant without reference, at this point, to independent verification of the informant's information. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).
- If a tip is sufficiently detailed so as to show a reliable basis for the informant's information, independent police work can corroborate the details of the tip. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).
- Magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue warrant given affidavit based on various arrestees' information which showed that prescription drugs were being sold at the defendant's residence. Smith v. State, 207 Ga. App. 463, 428 S.E.2d 403 (1993).
- Underlying circumstances requirement is designed to locate the original source of the incriminating information and to examine the validity or reliability of that information, but is not concerned with the overall reliability of the informant personally. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).
- Reliable manner of the acquisition of the information having been demonstrated, it must now be determined whether the individual supplying this "reliable" information is a truthful person. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).
- Hearsay may support the issuance of a valid warrant if the magistrate is informed of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant's conclusions and the affiant's belief that the informant was credible or the information reliable. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).
- It is not enough simply to recite that from information received from a reliable informant the affiant has come to suspect or to believe that a named person is in possession of contraband items. Courson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 373, 187 S.E.2d 554 (1972).
When the information upon which an officer seeks the issuance of a search warrant comes from an informant who is not named, it is essential that sufficient facts be stated with specificity to indicate that the informant was reliable. Courson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 373, 187 S.E.2d 554 (1972).
- Statement that the informant provided information in the past which has proven to be correct is not sufficient when standing alone and unaccompanied by any further specifics as to the type of information provided, the use to which it was put, or the length of time which has elapsed since the information was furnished, but only one of these three specifics (type of information, use to which it was put, and elapsed time since the information was furnished) must be present. Kouder v. State, 154 Ga. App. 597, 269 S.E.2d 92 (1980).
Information that the affiant knew the informer for over five years, that the informer was concerned about the drug problem, was known to be reliable and truthful, and had seen marijuana at the defendant's house within the past 96 hours, sufficiently established the reliability of both the tip and the tipster. Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 399, 270 S.E.2d 822 (1980).
- When the search warrant is based upon an informant's information, the law requires that there be particular facts or circumstances which justify concluding that the informant is a reliable and trustworthy person; and a warrant, in stating that the informant had a past history of reliability in similar matters which had led to three arrests and to the confiscation of illegal drugs, met this test. Cooksey v. State, 149 Ga. App. 572, 254 S.E.2d 892 (1979).
- Informant's lack of previous contact with the authorities is not fatal to the informant's veracity. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).
- There is a sufficient showing of credibility and thus probability of truthfulness to authorize issuance of a search warrant when the affiant can state to the magistrate that the affiant's investigation shows that the informant is a law-abiding citizen or the informant is personally known to the affiant to be a law-abiding citizen. Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 399, 270 S.E.2d 822 (1980).
- Personal observation by the affiant that known violators of the law sought to be enforced frequented the defendant's home, plus information from an informant who had proven reliable in the past of specific facts sufficient to constitute probable cause will authorize the issuance of the warrant. Wood v. State, 118 Ga. App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233 (1968).
Information received from an informant, who has proven to be reliable in the past, in conjunction with the affiant's personal observation that violators of the law sought to be enforced frequent the place to be searched is sufficient to sustain a search warrant. Thornton v. State, 125 Ga. App. 374, 187 S.E.2d 583 (1972).
When an officer's investigation of the information received from the officer's informants corroborates the informants' allegations against the defendant, the reliability of the informants is sufficiently established to justify the issuance of a search warrant. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).
Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to pursue a motion to suppress the drug evidence as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant because any deficiency in the affidavit with respect to an informant's veracity was not fatal as the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge were merely several of a number of relevant factors that the appellate court had to review; and the informant's tip that marijuana was being sold out of a particular apartment was sufficiently corroborated by the police officers' detection of a strong odor of unburned marijuana emanating from the apartment that the informant had identified as selling the marijuana. Coleman v. State, 337 Ga. App. 304, 787 S.E.2d 274 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1735, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 801 (Ga. 2016).
- Existence or nonexistence of probable cause must be judged as of the time it is presented to the magistrate. Minor factual inaccuracies which are only peripherally relevant to the showing will not void the warrant when the inaccuracies' presence in the affidavit is not such as to reflect on the credibility of the affiant. Dresch v. State, 125 Ga. App. 110, 186 S.E.2d 496 (1971).
- When, on the hearing of a motion to suppress evidence, the testimony of an informant is consistent with the material allegations in the affidavit, factual inaccuracies of peripheral relevance that are not the personal observations of the affiant do not destroy an otherwise adequate showing of probable cause. Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 182 S.E.2d 779 (1971).
- Affidavit based on informer's tip is fatally defective as basis for search warrant when an affidavit recites absolutely nothing which would show the informer's reliability nor states how the informer obtained information, and under Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) evidence thus obtained must be suppressed. Grebe v. State, 125 Ga. App. 873, 189 S.E.2d 698 (1972).
Declaration against penal interest by an informant, based on personal observation, in itself provides a substantial basis for the magistrate to credit that statement given in an affidavit for a search warrant. Tomlinson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 117, 527 S.E.2d 626 (2000).
- When an affidavit fails to show that a tip, even if from a reliable informer, relates to an offense or offenses closely related in time to the date of the affidavit, and does not show when, from whom, and under what circumstance the informer purchased the substance identified as heroin, it is deficient as a basis for probable cause. Gilliam v. State, 124 Ga. App. 843, 186 S.E.2d 290 (1971).
- Warrant may issue based upon the hearsay of an informant. However, the time period involved must be closely enough related to the commission of the offense as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant. State v. Clark, 141 Ga. App. 886, 234 S.E.2d 713 (1977).
- Proof of probable cause must be of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time. Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 172 S.E.2d 447 (1970).
Requirement for timely execution of a search warrant under Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 5 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-25) indicates the legislative intent, as well as constitutional demand, that probable cause relate to current and not stale information. Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 172 S.E.2d 447 (1970).
Occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant. Kouder v. State, 154 Ga. App. 597, 269 S.E.2d 92 (1980).
- In determining probable cause, it is clear that no iron-clad time rule should be established. It is a determination based on probabilities and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. State v. Boswell, 131 Ga. App. 657, 206 S.E.2d 682 (1974).
- A "five-day interval between the date of the affidavit and the date of the information" will not render a warrant invalid on the ground that the information was stale. Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d 154 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).
- Use of the present tense in an affidavit to support a search warrant is sufficient to show that the facts recited are current and not stale. State v. Clark, 141 Ga. App. 886, 234 S.E.2d 713 (1977).
- Since the "staleness" objection to information upon which a warrant is issued is without merit when the affidavit states that the activity is occurring, a fortiori there cannot be "staleness" when it is stated the activity will occur in the immediate future. Danford v. State, 133 Ga. App. 890, 212 S.E.2d 501 (1975).
- Laying aside the question of whether the information in the affidavit was stale or too remote in point of time, in deciding whether there was probable cause, one looks to the affidavit to determine whether a reasonably prudent and discreet magistrate would be led to believe from the facts stated that a crime was probably being committed or probably had been committed. McMahan v. State, 125 Ga. App. 491, 188 S.E.2d 183 (1972).
- "Staleness" as relates to probable cause is measured by the probability that the thing to be seized is located at the place to be searched and it involves the interval between (i) the time when the thing to be seized is indicated by the evidence or information to be at the place to be searched and (ii) the time when the search warrant is issued. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981); Shrader v. State, 159 Ga. App. 522, 284 S.E.2d 37 (1981).
- Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant to find items used in mistreatment of deceased child was present based on testimony of social worker who had questioned deceased child's mother, and affidavit of investigator who had interviewed sister of deceased child. Lewis v. State, 255 Ga. 101, 335 S.E.2d 560 (1985).
- Hearsay of police officer investigating aggravated sodomy and child molestation case as to what the victim told the officer is a permissible basis for issuance of a warrant. Tyler v. State, 176 Ga. App. 96, 335 S.E.2d 691 (1985).
- See Thomas v. State, 183 Ga. App. 819, 360 S.E.2d 75 (1987); Abraha v. State, 271 Ga. 309, 518 S.E.2d 894 (1999); Felix v. State, 241 Ga. App. 323, 526 S.E.2d 637 (1999).
Search warrant affidavit stating victims were shot with the same type of handgun; two were wrapped in large plastic bags sealed with tape; all three were crack addicts who dealt with and purchased cocaine from defendant; a photograph of defendant was found on one victim's body; defendant admitted owning guns and selling narcotics to the victims and claimed to be on a "hit list" of a rival drug dealer and sought protection for the dealer and the dealer's family but did not tell police about the motel room defendant leased provided a substantial basis to conclude probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant for the motel room to search for weapons, ammunition, blood, rope, tape, and garbage bags under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(a). Fitz v. State, 275 Ga. 349, 566 S.E.2d 668 (2002).
In a defendant's prosecution for malice murder in which the defendant's spouse was the victim, a motion to suppress evidence seized from the defendant's Florida home was properly denied because even after excision of information from an unreliable informant, the reconstituted affidavit provided probable cause to issue a search warrant under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(a) based on an affidavit containing information about the defendant's pending divorce from the spouse and phone calls to and from the defendant at the time of the murder. Sullivan v. State, 284 Ga. 358, 667 S.E.2d 32 (2008).
With regard to a defendant's convictions on multiple counts of rape and related crimes, the magistrate was presented with facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime was being committed or had been committed to support the search of the defendant's home since, even excluding the photographic line-up identification of the defendant that was made by one victim that the state conceded was illegal, there was remaining additional evidence to have established probable cause to have searched the defendant's home. Namely, the same victim's cell phone was taken by the perpetrator and a phone call was made to the defendant's home from the cell phone, the physical description of the perpetrator by the victim matched the defendant's appearance, as did the victim's description of the perpetrator's vehicle, which matched the defendant's vehicle. Baker v. State, 295 Ga. App. 162, 671 S.E.2d 206 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0571, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 183 (Ga. 2009).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in a hotel suite because under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate was authorized to make a pragmatic, commonsense judgment that there was a fair probability that a search of the suite would produce evidence that the occupants were in possession of drugs; a detective interviewed a member of the hotel's housekeeping staff who had seen drugs in the suite, and the affidavit showed that the witness, who was identified by name in the affidavit, reported that a guest in the room requested that the suite be cleaned while the guests went to get something to eat and that immediately upon entering the suite, the housekeeper observed a large quantity of what appeared to be marijuana and other drugs lying openly on the desk and television. Glass v. State, 304 Ga. App. 414, 696 S.E.2d 140 (2010).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from a search warrant authorizing entry into the defendant's home because the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant provided a sufficient basis for the magistrate to make a practical, commonsense decision that there was a fair probability that evidence of sexual exploitation of children would be found at the defendant's residence; the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children forwarded the information it received from a security specialist employed by the host of the website to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), and the affidavit of a special agent with the GBI set forth facts that showed both the reliability and basis of knowledge of the specialist. James v. State, 312 Ga. App. 130, 717 S.E.2d 713 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0347, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 227 (Ga. 2012).
Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the admission of evidence of clothing, a mask, and a television seized from the defendant's apartment because probable cause existed for a search warrant as the magistrate had a substantial basis to determine that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in the defendant's apartment because the police caught the defendant peeping into a woman's apartment in the area where the police believed a serial sexual offender was operating, and the defendant lied, falsely claiming to be spying on a girlfriend; the first victim testified that the perpetrator stole a television; and the defendant matched the description of the perpetrator given by two of the victims. Baxter v. State, 329 Ga. App. 589, 765 S.E.2d 738 (2014).
Information from two neighbors that a jonboat had been stolen from another neighbor and that two men had been seen spray painting a jonboat and removing the jonboat's identifying numbers at the house next door, coupled with an officer's observation of the jonboat and the officer's comparison with a photo of the stolen boat, justified issuance of a search warrant. A tackle box that was improperly removed would have inevitably been discovered. State v. Kaulbach, 331 Ga. App. 610, 771 S.E.2d 245 (2015).
Motion to suppress was properly denied because, although an officer possibly could have provided the magistrate with more detail concerning the confidential informant's past reliability, considering the information about the informant's relationship with the defendant and how the informant came to be in the defendant's apartment; that the officer knew the informant and found the information from the informant to be reliable in the past; the recent time frame for when the informant had been in the apartment and viewed suspected drugs and paraphernalia; and the confirmation that the occupants were convicted felons, the information relayed to the magistrate provided a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Galloway v. State, 332 Ga. App. 389, 772 S.E.2d 832 (2015).
Although the agent's affidavit lacked any information by which the magistrate could evaluate the confidential informant's credibility and reliability, the controlled buy established more than a fair probability that evidence of drug offenses would be found at the defendant's residence and, thus, the magistrate was presented with probable cause to issue the search warrant. Johnson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 888, 785 S.E.2d 424 (2016).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the need for continued investigation in the circumstances surrounding the shooting justified the issuance of the warrant for that purpose, and the affidavit also contained information about the defendant's drug activities, which supplied a possible motive for the shooting. Jones v. State, 337 Ga. App. 545, 788 S.E.2d 132 (2016).
Officers plainly had probable cause to search the defendant's apartment as the affidavit accompanying the search warrant application stated that there were signs of a struggle in the victims' apartment, that there were two victims with stab wounds, that there were areas of blood spatter throughout the apartment, and that fresh blood was located on the entry door handle of the defendant's apartment. Bailey v. State, 301 Ga. 476, 801 S.E.2d 813 (2017).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress as the magistrate had sufficient information to find that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant because a confidential informant (CI) participated in a controlled purchase of crack cocaine from the defendant; and, during the motion to suppress hearing, the officer testified that the officer told the magistrate under oath that the CI was searched before walking to the defendant's residence to make the buy with money supplied by the police; the CI had a substance believed to be an illegal drug in the CI's possession after the CI left the defendant's residence; and the officer had used the CI on two previous occasions. Woods v. State, 346 Ga. App. 323, 816 S.E.2d 156 (2018).
- Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as a search warrant was based on probable cause because Clayton County investigators purchased an illegal video poker machine from a subject in Clayton County, who said that the machine was obtained from a particular address in DeKalb County, and both DeKalb and Clayton investigators observed "several other illegal video poker machines" at that address; while the investigators could not tell from looking at the machines whether the machines were legal or not, the test was only whether the evidence established a fair probability that contraband would be found. Jones v. State, 276 Ga. App. 810, 625 S.E.2d 4 (2005).
Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the search warrant affidavit outlined the information provided by a New Hampshire detective's investigation, including the fact that the defendant had electronically sent the detective sexually explicit photographs of young boys; (2) the officer's affidavit also included information regarding the detective's extensive background and vast experience in the investigation of child sexual exploitation cases; (3) the detective's investigation provided probable cause to search the defendant's residence wherever that was; (4) the warrant sought sexually explicit photographs and other sexually explicit visual depictions of children, as well as the computer hardware and software used to create, store, and distribute those depictions; and (5) the affidavit contained information based on the detective's contact and electronic correspondence with the defendant indicating the likelihood that the defendant's computer files would contain evidence of child sexual exploitation, given that the affidavit stated that those who sexually exploited children often kept sexually explicit photographs and other images in their possession and often stored those images in computer files. Walthall v. State, 281 Ga. App. 434, 636 S.E.2d 126 (2006).
- Probable cause existed to issue warrant for search of a defendant's residence on the basis of a controlled buy of 3.5 grams of cocaine from the residence, regardless of allegedly false additional statements that the defendant had possessed handguns and narcotics at the residence in the recent past. Daniel v. State, 306 Ga. App. 48, 701 S.E.2d 499 (2010).
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(a), a magistrate properly issued the search warrant for a home, notwithstanding that false and illegally obtained information in the search warrant affidavit had been deleted, there still was sufficient untainted information regarding the location of marijuana to support a finding of probable cause for issuance of the warrant. Martinez-Vargas v. State, 317 Ga. App. 232, 730 S.E.2d 633 (2012), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kazmierczak, 331 Ga. App. 817, 771 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
- To permit an officer to enter a home under a valid search warrant and then to extend the officer's search and seize every item in the house that the officer thinks might possibly be connected with a crime, when there is no substantiation by circumstance but just suspicion, would be contrary to constitutional guaranties of liberty. Dugan v. State, 130 Ga. App. 527, 203 S.E.2d 722 (1974).
- Officer cannot use a warrant as a pretext for launching a full scale investigation as to the origins of an item which is not incriminating on the item's face. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).
General searches are prohibited. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).
- Fact that a police officer seizes items not listed in the warrant does not render the search a general one nor make the search unlawful. Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 182 S.E.2d 779 (1971); Jarvis v. Rubiano, 244 Ga. 735, 261 S.E.2d 645 (1979); McBee v. State, 228 Ga. App. 16, 491 S.E.2d 97 (1997).
- Not only may contraband be seized if related to the crime in connection with which the search is made, but items related to other crimes may also be seized without prior enumeration in the warrant. Butler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 469, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973).
Evidence of another crime discovered while searching pursuant to a valid search warrant may be lawfully seized. Jefferson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 594, 405 S.E.2d 575 (1991).
- When peace officers entered a defendant's residence armed with an arrest warrant and a search warrant, arrested the defendant and searched the premises, certain articles in plain view having strong evidentiary value as to the crimes charged are not subject to a motion to suppress although not specifically named in the search warrant. Scott v. State, 122 Ga. App. 204, 176 S.E.2d 481 (1970).
Officer in the process of executing a lawful search warrant was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(b) to seize a defendant's tennis shoes, which appeared to the officer to be stained with blood, after performing a field test that confirmed the presence of blood because the shoes were in plain view as the officers lawfully searched the defendant's room for items stolen in a string of burglaries. Bryant v. State, 304 Ga. App. 456, 696 S.E.2d 439 (2010).
- When contraband was not discovered in the room named in a search warrant, but in an adjoining room, and the defendant was occupying the room and was named in the warrant as one of the persons believed to be concealing cocaine on the premises, the search of the room was authorized by the warrant. Smith v. State, 194 Ga. App. 870, 392 S.E.2d 56 (1990).
- Seizure of marijuana, which is contraband, from a closed van under a warrant for a stolen portable welder is authorized under subsection (b) of this section, which provides that while a peace officer is engaged in a lawful search the officer can seize anything, with the exception of private papers, which is unlawful or tangible evidence of the commission of a crime. Bradley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 271, 205 S.E.2d 463 (1974).
- Officer who is properly searching the accused's personal effects for weapons or contraband is not required to ignore the contents of papers which constitute personal effects. Culbreth v. State, 152 Ga. App. 867, 264 S.E.2d 315 (1980).
- Seizure of a personal paper of the defendant was harmless error in light of the defendant's admission of an offense relating to marijuana and the defendant's admission of other unlawful activity. Grant v. State, 198 Ga. App. 732, 403 S.E.2d 58, cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 403 S.E.2d 58 (1991).
- Trial court did not err in admitting the drug ledgers which were found during a search of the defendant's residence as the ledgers were clearly relevant to the drug trafficking charge. Ibekilo v. State, 277 Ga. App. 384, 626 S.E.2d 592 (2006).
- If private papers merely constitute "tangible evidence" of the commission of a crime, those papers are not seizable. But if the papers are the instrumentalities of the crime, the papers are properly seizable under this section. Tuzman v. State, 145 Ga. App. 761, 244 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 317, 58 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1978).
Seizure of papers to obtain a sample of defendant's handwriting did not violate the "private papers" exception to the permissible scope of search warrants under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21. Lowe v. State, 203 Ga. App. 277, 416 S.E.2d 750, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 750 (1992).
- There must be a bona fide search for the item sought to be found, but if, in the course of an authorized search, another contraband item is found on the party or premises searched, the officer is authorized to seize the item; for the search, though not productive of that which was sought, was legal. Dugan v. State, 130 Ga. App. 527, 203 S.E.2d 722 (1974).
- For constitutional purposes, there is no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant; given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52 (1980).
- Probable cause would exist for the warrantless search of a vehicle only if the facts and circumstances would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that contraband was present in the vehicle. Barlow v. State, 148 Ga. App. 717, 252 S.E. 214 (1979).
- In order to make a seizure, the officer effecting the seizure must have probable cause to believe that the articles seized were tangible evidence of the commission of the crime. Zimmerman v. State, 131 Ga. App. 793, 207 S.E.2d 220 (1974); Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).
- Rumor, suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is not sufficient to show probable cause. The police may not search and seize and then look for probable cause to justify police action. Probable cause must exist at the time of the search and seizure. Zimmerman v. State, 131 Ga. App. 793, 207 S.E.2d 220 (1974).
When the officer first viewed the rug, the officer only suspected that it was one of the stolen rugs, it was not immediately apparent to the officer that the rug was stolen property; thus, it cannot be said that the officer had probable cause to seize a rug when the rug was first seen by the officer. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).
- Statement by the defendant that the police could take the typewriters does not operate as consent to the seizure for this statement occurred after the seizure. Zimmerman v. State, 131 Ga. App. 793, 207 S.E.2d 220 (1974).
- Law does not require that the officer knows that goods are the stolen property at the time the goods are seized. It is enough that the officer has probable cause to believe that this is the case. Dugan v. State, 130 Ga. App. 527, 203 S.E.2d 722 (1974).
- Before a police officer may seize property in plain sight, it must be immediately apparent to the officer that the property to be seized is contraband. Copeland v. State, 162 Ga. App. 398, 291 S.E.2d 560 (1982).
- Officer in the process of executing a lawful search warrant is authorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(b) to seize any stolen property, contraband, or other item, other than private papers, which the officer has probable cause to consider tangible evidence of the commission of a crime, even though the property is not listed in the warrant. Whittington v. State, 165 Ga. App. 763, 302 S.E.2d 617 (1983).
- When, prior to a lawful search, a police officer had information from two sources that the defendant allegedly had a stolen gun, and the officer had a description of the gun, there was probable cause to seize the gun, and no rights were violated by the seizure of a gun hidden under a mattress. In re A.B., 194 Ga. App. 665, 391 S.E.2d 683 (1990).
- When officers lawfully conducting a search for marijuana ascertained that the contents of a bag was silverware of various patterns, one of the officers believed the patterns were consistent with certain silverware reported stolen and the fact that the silverware was concealed in a container which reasonably could hold marijuana and was located in a place where one does not expect to find silverware, this was sufficient to arouse the suspicion that the silverware was stolen and authorized seizure. Whittington v. State, 165 Ga. App. 763, 302 S.E.2d 617 (1983).
- Seizure of items in plain view suspected to have derived from recent area burglaries while executing a search warrant for documents proving theft of services was valid when the incriminating character of the items was immediately apparent and the officer had a lawful right to visual and physical access of the objects themselves. Nichols v. State, 210 Ga. App. 134, 435 S.E.2d 502 (1993).
- Trial court did not err in finding that an officer's search of the defendant's computer did not exceed the scope of the warrant seeking evidence of illegal drug transactions because the warrant permitted the search of personal computers at the subject address since electronic records of illegal drug transactions were included amongst those items to be searched; the officer searching the defendant's computer did not engage in a wholesale fishing expedition but was instead seeking files encompassed by the warrant when the officer stumbled across the images of child pornography, and the officer immediately halted the search until an additional warrant was obtained. Henson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 152, 723 S.E.2d 456 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1217, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 669 (Ga. 2012).
- Application for the warrant may properly be addressed only to a judicial officer in the county in which the search is to be conducted. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-172.
Probate judges have the authority to issue search warrants. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-13.
- If a warrant is to be obtained on basis of an informant's tip, the officer must set forth some of the underlying circumstances indicating that the informant is reliable. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U73-14.
- Any law enforcement official who has obtained a search warrant may lawfully search and seize prescriptions retained for inspection by a pharmacy as required by law. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-112.
Chief drug inspector of the State Board of Pharmacy and the inspector's assistants have the authority to make arrests for violations of Georgia Code Annotated T. 79A (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 16) and to search and seize evidence necessary for the presentation before courts or before the State Board of Pharmacy; the chief drug inspector and the inspector's assistants do not have the authority to seize prescriptions from a pharmacy without properly acquiring a valid search warrant. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-112.
- Campus police and security personnel are officers of the state within the meaning of this section and are authorized to execute the affidavits necessary for the procurement of a search warrant. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-69.
- Individuals who have been granted arrest powers on premises under the jurisdiction of the Board of Regents are authorized to conduct searches. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-172.
- 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Searches and Seizures, § 176 et seq.
- Power to issue warrant for search of train, 7 A.L.R. 121.
Admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, 24 A.L.R. 1408; 32 A.L.R. 408; 41 A.L.R. 1145; 52 A.L.R. 477; 88 A.L.R. 348; 134 A.L.R. 819; 150 A.L.R. 566: 50 A.L.R.2d 531.
Right to enforce production of papers or document by subpoena duces tecum or other process, as affected by unlawful means by which the knowledge of their existence was acquired, 24 A.L.R. 1429.
Civil liability for improper issuance of search warrant or proceedings thereunder, 45 A.L.R. 605.
Proceeding to obtain search warrant as judicial proceeding within rule of privilege in libel and slander, 58 A.L.R. 723.
Illustrations of distinction, as regards search and seizure, between papers or other articles which merely furnish evidence of crime, and the actual instrumentalities of crime, 129 A.L.R. 1296.
Sufficiency of affidavit for search warrant based on affiant's belief, based in turn on information, investigation, etc., by one whose name is not disclosed, 14 A.L.R.2d 605.
Sufficiency of description in search warrant of automobile or other conveyance to be searched, 47 A.L.R.2d 1444.
Search warrant: sufficiency of showing as to time of occurrence of facts relied on, 100 A.L.R.2d 525.
Propriety of considering hearsay or other incompetent evidence in establishing probable cause for issuance of search warrant, 10 A.L.R.3d 359.
Search warrant: sufficiency of description of apartment or room to be searched in multiple-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330.
Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit in support of search warrant - modern cases, 24 A.L.R.4th 1266.
Books, documents, or other papers: seizure under search warrant not describing such items, 54 A.L.R.4th 391.
Search conducted by school official or teacher as violation of fourth amendment or equivalent state constitutional provision, 31 A.L.R.5th 229.
Validity of anticipatory search warrants - state cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361.
No results found for Georgia Code 17-5-21.