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O.C.G.A.Title 17Chapter 5

O.C.G.A. § 17-5-20 (2020)

Requirements for issuance of search warrant generally

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2020 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest cited 1983–2024 18citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 18 opinions since 1983, 3 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (1 case).

(a) A search warrant may be issued only upon the application of an officer of this state or its political subdivisions charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws or a currently certified peace officer engaged in the course of official duty, whether said officer is employed by a law enforcement unit of:

(1) The state or a political subdivision of the state; or

(2) A university, college, or school.

(b) A search warrant shall not be issued upon the application of a private citizen or for his aid in the enforcement of personal, civil, or property rights.

History

Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 14; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1980, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For note on 1990

amendment of this Code section, see 7 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 261 (1990).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Only a law enforcement officer may successfully apply for a search warrant. Holstein v. State, 183 Ga. App. 610, 359 S.E.2d 360, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 359 S.E.2d 360 (1987). When the officer who obtains a search warrant is not a certified police officer, the officer has no authority to obtain a search warrant, and evidence obtained as a result of that warrant is inadmissible. Rottenberg v. State, 184 Ga. App. 331, 361 S.E.2d 533 (1987). Lack of certification precluding application. - Noncompliance with the conditions of O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 35, by the express terms of O.C.G.A. § 35-8-17(a), renders the exercise of any powers of a law enforcement officer unauthorized. Thus, due to an officer’s lack of certification, the officer had no authority to apply for a search warrant, and the evidence seized pursuant to the execution of the illegal warrant should have been suppressed. Holstein v. State, 183 Ga. App. 610, 359 S.E.2d 360, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 359 S.E.2d 360 (1987). Warrant application. - City of Atlanta police officer, who is also a deputy sheriff of Fulton County, has the authority to apply for, obtain, and execute a search warrant in Clayton County. Bruce v. State, 183 Ga. App. 653, 359 S.E.2d 736 (1987). Absence of signature on affidavit did not invalidate search warrant. - Absence of a signature on the affidavit left in the magistrate court’s file did not invalidate a search warrant for vehicles because there were multiple original affidavits, only one of which was unsigned, and the warrant actually served contained the

affiant’s signature; the affiant explained that the affiant took three identical search warrants to the magistrate, that the affiant signed two of the affidavits but inadvertently failed to sign the third one and that the affiant served the defendants with the warrants by leaving copies for the defendants at the jail. Prado v. State, 306 Ga. App. 240, 701 S.E.2d 871 (2010). Section inapplicable to disposition of seized property. - O.C.G.A. § 17-5-20 deals with the requirements for the issuance of search warrants generally and does not deal in any way with the disposition of the seized property. Wallace v. State, 165 Ga. App. 804, 302 S.E.2d 718 (1983). Juvenile court probation officer has no authority to apply for a search warrant. Huff v. Walker, 125 Ga. App. 251, 187 S.E.2d 343 (1972). Private litigants not entitled to search warrant. - Search warrants are criminal in nature, having no relation to civil process and are unavailable to an individual for the maintenance of a mere private right. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965). Temporary protective order not substitute for search warrant. - Temporary protective order (TPO) obtained by the defendant’s girlfriend did not constitute a valid search warrant and was not a substitute for a search warrant authorizing entry into the defendant’s home and, therefore, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the TPO did not meet the warrant and probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment and O.C.G.A. § 17-5-20 and the state did not articulate

a need to deviate from the requirement of obtaining a warrant to search the defendant’s home. State v. Burgess, 349 Ga. App. 486, 826 S.E.2d 352 (2019). Sufficient particularity in warrant. - Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence police officers found at a residence because the fact that the investigator who submitted the affidavit for the search warrant did not leave a copy of the affidavit with the warrant at the premises did not render the warrant invalid; the warrant satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII on the warrant’s face because the warrant listed the address of the place to be searched and contained a description of the home, and the warrant also listed items to be seized, including marijuana, weighing devices, and other paraphernalia used in the distribution of drugs. Pass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 440, 710 S.E.2d 641 (2011). Sufficient probable cause. - Because the magistrate was presented with a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of child molestation would be found in the cameras and film located in the defendant’s car, and such provided probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant. Manders v. State, 281 Ga. App. 786, 637 S.E.2d 460 (2006). With regard to a defendant’s convictions on drug-related offenses, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the defendant’s apartment upon execution of a search warrant since the affidavit of a deputy, which was based on an informant’s tip, sufficiently established probable cause as the informant had been in the defendant’s apartment and had personally viewed the drugs. Rocha v. State, 284 Ga. App. 852, 644 S.E.2d 921 (2007). Trial court properly found that under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit in support of a search warrant for a residence suspected of being a marijuana ‘‘grow house’’ gave the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed because the affidavit set

forth the fact that similar investigations and seizures had taken place in several grow houses in the area, the house under surveillance had characteristics similar to those houses, and two men fled from the residence and were apprehended with large amounts of cash; the information from the stop was not excludable as ‘‘stale’’ because there was a substantial basis for believing that the electrical ballasts and light fixtures identified in the search warrant could still be found at the residence and the items were not perishable. Prado v. State, 306 Ga. App. 240, 701 S.E.2d 871 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a detective found in the defendant’s home because given the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate who issued the search warrant was authorized to conclude that there was a fair probability that contraband would be found at the defendant’s home; the detective’s affidavit in support of the warrant contained ample facts by which the magistrate could independently evaluate the veracity and reliability of anonymous informants and their information, and a confidential informant’s controlled buy of marijuana from the defendant at the defendant’s residence on the day the detective applied for the warrant independently confirmed that illegal drug activities were taking place at the home. Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. App. 175, 702 S.E.2d 28 (2010). Trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the defendant’s hospital records, which showed that the defendant used drugs on the day the defendant shot the victim, because on the evidence’s face, the affidavit for the search warrant issued for the records demonstrated a fair probability that evidence of the defendant’s drug use would be found in the hospital records; the alleged omissions in the affidavit, which was based on the statements of the defendant’s spouse, had the potential to impeach the statements made by the spouse, but the omissions did not eliminate the existence of probable cause because if the omitted material were included in the warrant, probable cause would still exist. Herrera v. State, 288 Ga. 231, 702 S.E.2d 854 (2010).

Cited in Fowler v. State, 128 Ga. App. 501, 197 S.E.2d 502 (1973); Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973); Baxter v. State, 134 Ga. App. 286, 214 S.E.2d 578 (1975); State v. Harber, 198 Ga. App. 170, 401 S.E.2d 57 (1990);

Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 382, 405 S.E.2d 648 (1991); Hightower v. State, 205 Ga. App. 305, 422 S.E.2d 28 (1992); White v. Traino, 244 Ga. App. 208, 535 S.E.2d 275 (2000).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Constable or small claims court bailiff is not charged with the general duty of enforcing the criminal laws of this state. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U75-17. Authority of ‘‘registered’’ or ‘‘exempt’’ peace officers. - ‘‘Registered’’ or ‘‘exempt’’ peace officer who is in compliance with the requirements for certifica-

tion under the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq., has the same authority and limitations as that of a ‘‘certified’’ peace officer in all respects relevant to law enforcement duties, including the ability to apply for a search warrant. 1999 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 99-7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Searches and Seizures, §§ 179, 183, 187, 193. ALR. - Sufficiency of affidavit for search warrant based on affiant’s belief, based in turn on information and investigation by one whose name is not disclosed, 14 A.L.R.2d 605. Search warrant: sufficiency of showing as to time of occurrence of facts relied on, 100 A.L.R.2d 525. Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit in support of search warrant - modern cases, 24 A.L.R.4th 1266. Lawfulness of search of person or personal effects under medical emergency

exception to warrant requirement, 11 A.L.R.5th 52. Search conducted by school official or teacher as violation of fourth amendment or equivalent state constitutional provision, 31 A.L.R.5th 229. Validity of anticipatory search warrants - state cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361. Civilian participation in execution of search warrant as affecting legality of search, 68 A.L.R.5th 549. When is consent voluntarily given so as to justify search conducted on basis of that consent - Supreme Court cases, 148 A.L.R. Fed. 271.

The 18 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 17-5-20 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Harber, 401 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 17-5-20 28×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“Former OCGA § 17-5-20 is the relevant statute with regard to the authority to obtain a search warrant.”
2
GREENHynes v. State, 801 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 17-5-20 4×cited by 8 cases
Later courts cite it for
“the case law interpreting implied consent laws demonstrates that the judiciary overwhelmingly sanctions the use of civil penalties and evidentiary consequences against dui suspects who refuse to comply.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENKing v. State, 577 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. 2003).
cites § 17-5-20 4×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“10 See OCGA §§ 17-5-20 to 17-5-32 (governing searches with warrants).”
The case’s holding
The state must demonstrate a compelling interest and narrow tailoring when justifying an intrusion into an individual's fundamental right to privacy.
Later courts cite it for
“when an individual challenges the state's action for violating the fundamental right to privacy, the state must show that its intrusion into the individual's private life serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENFortson v. State, 587 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. 2003).
cites § 17-5-20 4×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“[10] OCGA §§ 17-5-20 to 17-5-32 (governing search warrants).”
The case’s holding
Trial counsel's use of a peremptory strike on a juror already excused for cause, due to neglect, is per se harmful error establishing actual prejudice for an ineffective assistance claim.
Later courts cite it for
“causing a defendant to unnecessarily use a peremptory strike on a juror that should have been excused for cause is per se harmful error.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENWillingham v. State, 401 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 17-5-20 12×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“Since the searches at issue were conducted prior to the effective date of the 1990 amendments to OCGA §§ 17-5-20; 17-5-21 (Ga. L. 1990, p.”
6
GREENState v. LEDBETTER (& Vice Versa), 899 S.E.2d 222 (Ga. 2024).
cites § 17-5-20 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“28 (iv) Finally, Ledbetter argues that the affidavit does not establish that the affiant, identified as “Investigator Bernice Higgins, an officer charged with the duty of enforcing the Criminal Laws,” satisfies OCGA § 17-5-20 (a), which says: 28 Ledbetter also argues in passing…”
Later courts cite it for
“imperiled and untenable position in our law” · 1 citing court
7
GREENSteve Burgess v. State, 826 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 17-5-20 8×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“Neither briefing nor independent research have revealed a case in which the courts of this State have approved the use of a TPO in place of a search warrant issued according to the procedure in OCGA § 17-5-20. King v. State , 16 addressed a right to privacy challenge to the…”
8
GREENGates v. State, 896 S.E.2d 536 (Ga. 2023).
cites § 17-5-20 4×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“See OCGA §§ 17-5-20 to 17-5-32 (governing searches pursuant to warrants).”
9
GREENHolstein v. State, 359 S.E.2d 360 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 17-5-20 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“Under Georgia law, only a law enforcement officer may successfully apply for a search warrant, for OCGA § 17-5-20 provides: “A search warrant may be issued only upon the application of an officer of this state or its political subdivisions charged with the duty of enforcing the…”
Later courts cite it for
“a search warrant may be issued only upon the application of an officer of this state or its political subdivisions charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENDavis v. State, 405 S.E.2d 648 (Ga. 1991).
cites § 17-5-20 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“OCGA § 17-5-24 also provides that “[t]he search warrant. . . shall be directed for execution to all peace officers of this state.”
Later courts cite it for
“does not require the pre-trial disclosure of exculpatory evidence,” · 1 citing court
11
GREENBrundige v. State, 735 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 2012).
cites § 17-5-20 4×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“OCGA § 17-5-21 reads: (a) Upon the written complaint of any certified peace officer of this state or its political subdivisions charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws and otherwise as authorized in Code Section 17-5-20 under oath or affirmation, which states facts…”
Later courts cite it for
“when faced with potentially improperly obtained evidence, the question becomes whether, excising the evidence improperly obtained, probable cause nonetheless exists to issue a warrant.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENBruce v. State, 359 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 17-5-20 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“OCGA §§ 17-5-20 and 17-5-21 provide that any officer of this state or its political subdivisions charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws may apply for a search warrant.”
13
GREENGiles v. State, 400 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 17-5-20 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“13 of the Georgia Constitution and also violates OCGA § 17-5-20 and the due process clause of both the state and federal constitutions and a conviction based solely on evidence seized thereby must be set aside.”
14
GREENHightower v. State, 422 S.E.2d 28 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 17-5-20 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“In the trial transcript, the pertinent sentence reads “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence alone the proven facts must not only be consistent with the theory of guilt, but must include every other reasonable theory other than the guilt of the accused.”
15
GREENRottenberg v. State, 361 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 17-5-20 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“OCGA § 17-5-20 provides: “A search warrant may be issued only upon the application of an officer of ths state or its political subdivisions charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws.”
16
PROCEDURALHill v. State, 387 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 17-5-20 4×cited by 9 cases
Procedural disposition (e.g. cert. denied / appeal dismissed) noted by 1 citing opinion.
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“However, it contends that, as duly certified peace officers, they were nevertheless empowered pursuant to OCGA §§ 17-5-20 and 17-5-21 to obtain and execute the search warrant and that having done so, and having thereby determined that the appellants were in possession of illicit…”
Later courts cite it for
“he left shortly after entry was gained into the residence, and neither he nor any other local law enforcement officer was involved in obtaining the warrant or in conducting the investigation which led to its issuance.” · 1 citing court
17
NO FLAGWallace v. State, 302 S.E.2d 718 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 17-5-20 3×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“” OCGA § 17-5-20 (Code Ann. § 27-314) deals with the requirement for the issuance of search warrants generally and does not deal in any way with the disposition of the seized property.”
18
NO FLAGDustin Orr v. Deputy James Rogers, No. 21-10397 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2021).
cites § 17-5-20 1×subsections: (b)cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 17-5-20
“” Ga. Code § 17-5-20(b) (emphasis added). As a Georgia court has pointed out, protective orders issued pursuant to Ga.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320032024

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1987. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.11Ga.611th Cir.1
By subsection
(b)1 case
Dustin Orr v. Deputy James Rogers, No. 21-10397 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2021).“” Ga. Code § 17-5-20(b) (emphasis added). As a Georgia court has pointed out, protective orders issued pursuant to Ga.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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