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2018 Georgia Code 17-7-70.1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 17 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 7. Pretrial Proceedings, 17-7-1 through 17-7-211.

ARTICLE 4 ACCUSATIONS

17-7-70.1. Trial upon accusations in certain felony and misdemeanor cases; trial upon plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

    1. In felony cases involving violations of the following:
      1. Code Sections 16-8-2, 16-8-14, 16-8-18, 16-9-1, 16-9-20, 16-9-31, 16-9-33, 16-9-37, 16-10-52, and 40-5-58;
      2. Article 1 of Chapter 8 of Title 16, relating to theft;
      3. Chapter 9 of Title 16, relating to forgery and fraudulent practices;
      4. Article 3 of Chapter 10 of Title 16, relating to escape and other offenses related to confinement; or
      5. Code Section 16-11-131, relating to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon or first offender probationer,

        in which defendants have either been bound over to the superior court based on a finding of probable cause pursuant to a commitment hearing under Article 2 of this chapter or have expressly or by operation of law waived a commitment hearing, the district attorney shall have authority to prefer accusations, and the defendants shall be tried on such accusations according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury.

    2. All laws relating to rights and responsibilities attendant to indicted cases shall be applicable to cases brought by accusations signed by the district attorney.
    3. The accusation need not be supported by an affidavit except in those cases in which the defendant has not been previously arrested in conjunction with the transaction charged in the accusation.
  1. Judges of the superior court may open their courts at any time without the presence of either a grand jury or a trial jury to receive and act upon pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in felony and misdemeanor cases. The judge of the superior court may try the issues in such cases without a jury upon an indictment or upon an accusation filed by the district attorney where the defendant has waived trial by jury.
  2. An accusation substantially complying with the form provided in subsections (d) and (e) of Code Section 17-7-71 shall in all cases be sufficient.
  3. The district attorney may not bring an accusation pursuant to this Code section in those cases where the grand jury has heard evidence or conducted an investigation or in which a no bill has been returned.
  4. Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (d) of this Code section, nothing in this Code section shall affect the rights of public officials to appear before a grand jury as provided in Code Sections 45-11-4 and 45-15-11 or peace officers to appear before a grand jury as provided in Code Section 17-7-52.

(a.1)The provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall apply to violations of Code Section 16-13-30 whenever there has been a finding of probable cause pursuant to a commitment hearing under Article 2 of this chapter or the accused has waived either expressly or by operation of law the right to this hearing.

(Code 1981, §17-7-70.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 1808, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 678, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 208, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 8-9/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2016, p. 186, § 7/HB 941.)

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, deleted "16-9-2," following "16-9-1," in subparagraph (a)(1)(A). See editor's note for applicability.

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted the present provisions of subsection (e) for the former provisions, which read: "Notwithstanding the above provisions, nothing in this Code section shall affect the rights of police officers and public officials to appear before a grand jury as provided in Code Sections 17-7-52, 45-11-4, and 45-15-11."

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1996, p. 678, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by that Act is applicable to violations occurring on or after July 1, 1996.

Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1(a)/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act."

Law reviews.

- For review of 1998 legislation relating to criminal procedure, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 96 (1998). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 290 (2012). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 79 (2016). For note, "Give It to Me, I'm Worth It: The Need to Amend Georgia's Record Restriction Statute to Provide Ex-Offenders with a Second Chance in the Employment Sector," see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 267 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- Substitution of accusation for indictment for the specific felonies enumerated in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70.1 does not violate due process since statutory procedures exist to safeguard against criminal prosecution without probable cause, and to further protect all defendants equally, whether indicted or formally accused. Lamberson v. State, 265 Ga. 764, 462 S.E.2d 706 (1995).

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70.1 was not an ex post facto law with respect to defendant charged with forgery when the defendant entered a plea of not guilty on the accusation without having first entered a written objection to the proceeding and when the defendant was arrested after the effective date of the section. Crowder v. State, 218 Ga. App. 630, 462 S.E.2d 754 (1995).

Trial on accusation preferred by district attorney.

- Felony charge of driving after having been declared a habitual violator may be tried on an accusation preferred by a district attorney rather than on an indictment returned by a grand jury. State v. Gilstrap, 230 Ga. App. 281, 495 S.E.2d 885 (1998).

Defendant charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute could be tried by accusation because the defendant waived the right to a grand jury indictment when the defendant posted bond following arrest. McNair v. State, 240 Ga. App. 324, 523 S.E.2d 392 (1999).

Because the defendant waived the right to a commitment hearing when the defendant posted bond, the state was authorized to proceed to trial on the accusation charging theft by taking despite the defendant's objection. Pruitt v. State, 245 Ga. App. 801, 538 S.E.2d 874 (2000).

Accusation not same as indictment.

- After the trial court quashed an indictment and a later accusation, both of which charged the defendant with misdemeanors, due to the state's failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-7-52, O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70.1 did not make a quashed accusation similar or equivalent to an indictment for the purposes of the prosecutory bar under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-53.1. Additionally, § 17-7-70.1 relates primarily to felonies charged by accusation, and the district attorney could not bring the accusation, as was required for § 17-7-70.1, due to the fact that the grand jury heard evidence in the case. State v. Allen, 262 Ga. App. 724, 586 S.E.2d 378 (2003).

Accusation was a proper charging document in a theft by receiving case, and the defendant's appellate argument that a trial court should have instructed the jury that the indictment was not evidence proving guilt failed because there was no indictment in the case, only an accusation. Brown v. State, 265 Ga. App. 613, 594 S.E.2d 770 (2004).

Waiver of indictment.

- Trial court had jurisdiction to try the defendant for the offense of theft by receiving stolen property as the criminal code permitted that offense to be tried upon accusation even when the defendant had not waived the indictment. Gerrard v. State, 252 Ga. App. 767, 556 S.E.2d 131 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077, 122 S. Ct. 1960, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1021 (2002).

Defendant waived the right to a commitment hearing when defendant posted bond; thus, the state was authorized to try the charge of forgery in the first degree by accusation. Watson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 41, 589 S.E.2d 867 (2003).

Indictment required.

- Defendant was initially charged by accusation with terroristic threats and aggravated stalking, which were not properly prosecuted without an indictment or a written waiver thereof pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-70.1 and17-7-70(a), the dismissal of the accusation after the jury was sworn and the indictment of the same charges was proper and there was no former jeopardy bar under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(d)(1), as the former prosecution under the indictment was void and of no effect. Armstrong v. State, 281 Ga. App. 297, 635 S.E.2d 880 (2006).

Cocaine possession.

- State was authorized to try a cocaine possession charge by accusation when there was a commitment hearing and a finding of probable cause. Brackins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 788, 549 S.E.2d 775 (2001).

Felony obstruction of officer.

- Charge of felony obstruction of an officer by accusation instead of by grand jury indictment was not authorized because of the state's failure to obtain the defendant's waiver of an indictment in writing as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70. Brackins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 788, 549 S.E.2d 775 (2001).

Sentence not impacted by use or accusation rather than indictment.

- When the defendant was charged and convicted of felony theft by shoplifting, the trial court was not required to sentence the defendant as a misdemeanant simply because the state utilized an accusation rather than an indictment. Hood v. State, 223 Ga. App. 573, 479 S.E.2d 400 (1996).

When felony not one listed in statute.

- When one count of the accusation filed by the district attorney recited that it was charged under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, which is a felony which may not be brought by accusation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70 without the assent of the accused, not on record in the case, nor was it one of those felonies listed in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70.1 which, under circumstances not present in the case, may be pursued by accusation, the count was considered by the court to be brought under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b), misdemeanor possession of less than an ounce of marijuana. Chadwick v. State, 236 Ga. App. 199, 511 S.E.2d 286 (1999).

Pretrial amendment of accusation did not start new prosecution.

- Pretrial amendment of accusation did not start a new prosecution as the previous arraignment of the defendant was sufficient and jeopardy attached before the nolle prosequi was entered over the defendant's objection; consequently, a later prosecution of the offenses charged in the accusation was barred by former jeopardy. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 396, 614 S.E.2d 79 (2005).

No accusation found.

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal on statutory speedy trial grounds pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170(a) because the defendant's speedy trial demand was premature and a nullity since the "complaint" was filed after the defendant's arrest, was not an accusation pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-70 and17-7-70.1, and the prosecution did not proceed on the "complaint." Campbell v. State, 294 Ga. App. 166, 669 S.E.2d 190 (2008).

Cited in McBride v. State, 213 Ga. App. 857, 446 S.E.2d 193 (1994); Sanderson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 51, 456 S.E.2d 667 (1995); Ingram v. State, 224 Ga. App. 271, 480 S.E.2d 302 (1997); Singleton v. State, 240 Ga. App. 240, 522 S.E.2d 734 (1999).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70.1

Total Results: 5  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Lamberson v. State, 462 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 1995 | 265 Ga. 764

...Atty., Debra Halpern Bernes, Frank R. Cox, Nancy I. Jordan, Asst. Dist. Attys., Marietta, for State. HINES, Justice. Lamberson was arrested July 31, 1994, and charged with felony theft by taking and financial transaction card fraud. Acting pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-70.1, the Cobb County District Attorney instituted criminal prosecution against Lamberson by felony accusation, rather than seeking an indictment by the grand jury....
...Lamberson filed what she styled a "Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus" asserting that this statute violates both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm the trial court's decision denying her "Motion." 1. OCGA § 17-7-70.1 authorizes the district attorney to proceed to trial upon accusation for certain enumerated felonies without obtaining a waiver of indictment....
...Moreover, the filing of an accusation "is merely a preliminary proceeding, and can result in no final judgment, except as the consequence of a regular judicial trial, conducted precisely as in cases of indictments." Hurtado, supra at 538, 4 S.Ct. at 122. Additionally, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 contains restrictive provisions: The accusation must be supported by affidavit where the defendant has not been previously arrested in conjunction with the offense charged. OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a). The district attorney may not proceed by accusation where the grand jury has heard evidence or conducted an investigation and returned a "no bill." OCGA § 17-7-70.1(d)....
...according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury. All laws relating to rights and responsibilities attendant to indicted cases shall be applicable to cases brought by accusations...." OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a). Accordingly, the substitution of accusation for indictment for the specific felonies enumerated in OCGA § 17-7-70.1 does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Statutory procedures safeguard against criminal prosecution without probable cause, and further protect all defendants equally, whether indicted or formally accused. 2. Lamberson also contends that OCGA § 17-7-70.1 violates Article I, Section I, Paragraphs I and XXVIII of the Georgia Constitution....
...A transcript of the November 29, 1994, habeas corpus hearing reveals that the state constitutional claim was not raised below; therefore, it is not preserved for appeal. Meders v. State, 260 Ga. 49, 389 S.E.2d 320 (1990). 3. Lamberson's final contention, that OCGA § 17-7-70.1 seeks to make accusations the functional equivalent of warrants, need not be considered because this issue was not raised in the habeas court. See Meders, supra. However, in light of our determination in Division 1, we find this contention to be without merit. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 17-7-70.1 became effective July 1, 1992....
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Higdon v. State, 291 Ga. 821 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 29, 2012 | 733 S.E.2d 750, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3353

...document on which the State must proceed, as to which the defendant goes to trial and verdict or enters a guilty or nolo contendere plea, and as to which the court enters a written judgment that the defendant may then appeal. See OCGA §§ 17-7-70, 17-7-70.1, 17-7-71 (providing for prosecutors *825to proceed on indictments and accusations for various types of felony and misdemeanor offenses); Keller v....
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Smith v. State, 614 S.E.2d 79 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 6, 2005 | 279 Ga. 396, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 1768

...461(1), 523 S.E.2d 44 (1999)), the amendment of the accusation in this case did not create a superseding charging instrument, which is as noted above, a new charging instrument issued without dismissal of a prior charging instrument. The State and the dissent argue that because the accusation included one felony count, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (the statutory authority for charging certain felonies by accusation rather than indictment) prevented amendment of one of the misdemeanor counts because an indictment cannot be similarly amended....
...the defendant was indicted," citing Lamberson v. State, 265 Ga. 764, 766(1), 462 S.E.2d 706 (1995). Were the strained interpretation put on the statute by the State and the dissent to be the law, it would undo the good done by the enactment of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 in 1992 to give district attorneys authority to charge certain felonies by accusation rather than by indictment....
...Such an unreasonable result would be particularly absurd in the context of the present case where the amendment to the accusation related solely to one of the misdemeanor counts and did not affect the felony count of the accusation at all. We conclude, therefore, that OCGA § 17-7-70.1 does not import into prosecutions based on accusations all the procedural rules applicable to indictments, as the State and the dissent argue, and that the amendment of one of the misdemeanor counts, permissible under OCGA § 17-7-71, was not forbidden by OCGA § 17-17-70.1....
...State, 241 Ga.App. 871, 874(2)(a), 528 S.E.2d 312 (2000); Prindle v. State, 240 Ga.App. 461(1), 523 S.E.2d 44 (1999). However, the accusation charged him with felony shoplifting, as well as misdemeanors. Accordingly, the applicable provision is OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a) (1, 2), which provides, in relevant part, that defendants shall be tried on such accusations [as charge certain enumerated felonies, including shoplifting,] according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury....
...Indeed, it is reversible error for a trial court to require a defendant to go to trial on an indictment "when [he] was not formally arraigned and refused specifically to waive such arraignment." Presnell v. State, 159 Ga.App. 598, 284 S.E.2d 106 (1981). Thus, the express preservation in OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a) (1, 2) of the "same rules of substantive and procedural laws" and "[a]ll laws relating to rights and responsibilities" as are applicable in criminal cases pursued by way of indictment is significant....
...ght of formal arraignment attached. Thus, even though the prosecutor had the authority to amend the accusation under OCGA § 17-7-71(f), Smith nevertheless retained the right to a formal arraignment on that amended accusation in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a) (1, 2). It is undisputed that Smith did not waive that right, so the trial court properly granted the nolle prosequi. The majority seeks to avoid this result by concluding that the "language [of OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a) (1, 2)] refers to the trial of the case brought by accusation, not to the process by which the accusation is produced and the defendant is brought to trial. [Cit.]" P. 82. This interpretation is clearly contrary to the express terms of OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a)(1), which specifies that an accused "shall be tried .......
...according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury." (Emphasis supplied.) An arraignment is certainly a procedural right of the defendant who has been indicted. Moreover, OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a)(2) is not limited to the actual trial proceedings, but refers to "[a]ll laws relating to rights and responsibilities attendant to indicted cases ....
...er, nor waiver of it. There could, consequently, be no plea to the indictment. The empaneling of a jury then was, merely an irregularity. Bryans v. State, supra at 324. Therefore, absent Smith's waiver of his procedural right to an arraignment, OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a) (1, 2) precluded proceeding with his trial on the accusation charging him with one or more of the enumerated felonies. Furthermore, even assuming that, contrary to the unambiguous terms of the statute, the majority is otherwise correct when it holds on p. 82 that "OCGA § 17-7-70.1 does *84 not import into prosecutions based on accusations all the procedural rules applicable to indictments," it nevertheless appears that any error in this case was induced by Smith himself....
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State v. Riley, 321 Ga. 323 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2025

...grand jury, and an accusation, which is brought by a county district attorney. In Georgia, any criminal offense can be charged by indictment, and many offenses can be charged, in the alternative, by accusation, under certain conditions. See generally OCGA §§ 17-7- 70; 17-7-70.1; 17-7-71. For example, certain enumerated felonies can be charged by accusation when a defendant has waived indictment or a court has found probable cause to exist after a hearing. See OCGA §§ 17-7-70; 17-7-70.1 (a).1 1 That subsection provides that in felony cases involving violations of the enumerated felonies, and 2 The Georgia Code sets out certain requirements for accusations and indictmen...
...rney shall have authority to prefer accusations, and the defendants shall be tried on such accusations according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury. OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a). 2 OCGA § 17-7-54 provides, in full: (a) Every indictment of the grand jury which states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct....
...Riley also argued that because the crimes charged in Counts 1 to 4 and Count 6 could not lawfully be brought by accusation, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try those charges. See OCGA §§ 17-7-70 (indictments not waivable for crimes “punishable by death”); 17-7-70.1 (a) (1) (setting out the felony charges that, under certain circumstances, can be brought by accusation instead of indictment); Mayo v....
...uld properly be brought by 9 the charging document failed to meet the requirements for an indictment under OCGA § 17-7-54 and instead met the requirements of an accusation under OCGA §§ 17-7-70.1 and 17-7- 71. The trial court determined that because an accusation cannot, by law, charge an accused with the crimes of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and/or possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, see OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a), trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to challenge the indictment at Riley’s trial after jeopardy attached....
...sentences on Counts Four and Six, as all of these counts were brought before this Honorable Court without jurisdiction.” While we acknowledge that the charging document here is not unambiguously an indictment, it contains certain indications that it accusation, see OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a), and that Riley had completed his sentence for that crime. 10 is an indictment....

State v. Riley (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2025

...grand jury, and an accusation, which is brought by a county district attorney. In Georgia, any criminal offense can be charged by indictment, and many offenses can be charged, in the alternative, by accusation, under certain conditions. See generally OCGA §§ 17-7- 70, 17-7-70.1, 17-7-71. For example, certain enumerated felonies can be charged by accusation when a defendant has waived indictment or a court has found probable cause to exist after a hearing. See 2 OCGA §§ 17-7-70, 17-7-70.1 (a).1 The Georgia Code sets out certain requirements for accusations and indictments, including a requirement that the form of these charging documents substantially comply with prescribed statutory requirements....
...ll have authority to prefer accusations, and the defendants shall be tried on such accusations according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury. OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a). 2 OCGA § 17-7-54 provides, in full: (a) Every indictment of the grand jury which states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct....
...Riley also argued that because the crimes charged in Counts 1 to 4 and Count 6 could not lawfully be brought by accusation, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try those charges. See OCGA §§ 17-7-70 (indictments not waivable for crimes “punishable by death”); 17-7-70.1 (a) (1) (setting out the felony charges that, under certain circumstances, can be brought by accusation instead of indictment); Mayo v....
... 4 and Count 6.5 In so ruling, the trial court agreed with Riley that the charging document failed to meet the requirements for an indictment under OCGA § 17-7-54 and instead met the requirements of an accusation under OCGA § 17-7-70.1 and 17-7-71. The trial court determined that because an accusation cannot, by law, charge an accused with the crimes of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and/or possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, see OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a), trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to challenge the indictment at Riley’s trial after jeopardy attached....
...ns and sentences on Counts Four and Six, as all of these counts were 5 The trial court found, however, that the charge of possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer in Count 5 could properly be brought by accusation, see OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a), and that Riley had completed his sentence for that crime. 10 brought before this Honorable Court without jurisdiction.”6 While we acknowledge that the charging document here is not un...