Discretion of court.

- Motions for continuance generally lie within the discretion of the trial judge. Hulett v. State, 150 Ga. App. 367, 258 S.E.2d 48 (1979); Cole v. Jordan, 158 Ga. App. 200, 279 S.E.2d 497 (1981).

Grant or denial of a continuance to a criminal defendant is in the sound discretion of the court, especially when the defendant is in jail. Gann v. State, 166 Ga. App. 172, 303 S.E.2d 510 (1983); Davis v. State, 190 Ga. App. 178, 378 S.E.2d 519 (1989).

Motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the Court of Appeals will not interfere unless it is clearly shown that the court abused the court's discretion. Gignilliat v. State, 196 Ga. App. 773, 397 S.E.2d 52 (1990).

Judge must weigh facts and circumstances of each case.

- Trial judge, in the exercise of the judge's discretion to grant or refuse a continuance, has to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine what the ends of justice require. Foster v. State, 213 Ga. 601, 100 S.E.2d 426 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 967, 78 S. Ct. 559, 2 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1958).

Movant must show some legal ground for a continuance. James v. State, 158 Ga. 524, 123 S.E. 880 (1924).

Failure to make continuance.

- If no motion for continuance is made, and no testimony under oath as to the necessity of a continuance is offered, a new trial will not be granted for failure to grant a continuance. Beavers v. State, 132 Ga. App. 94, 207 S.E.2d 550 (1974).

Objection to jurors as grounds for continuance.

- It is not a ground for continuance that some of the jurors impaneled to try a second case against the defendant were present at a part of the first trial. This point should have been made by a challenge to the polls. Crider v. State, 98 Ga. App. 164, 105 S.E.2d 506 (1958).

This section applies when there have been prior continuances of the case. Nail v. State, 142 Ga. 595, 83 S.E. 226 (1914); Paulk v. State, 148 Ga. 304, 96 S.E. 417 (1918).

Defendant's inaction with respect to retained counsel.

- Trial court's refusal to continue trial was not an abuse of discretion when it was justified by the defendant's inaction with respect to counsel, since at arraignment and subsequently, the defendant insisted on retained counsel but none ever appeared and the defendant never showed the defendant had made arrangements for counsel. Vincent v. State, 210 Ga. App. 6, 435 S.E.2d 222 (1993), aff'd, 264 Ga. 234, 442 S.E.2d 748 (1994).

Continuance to retain private counsel.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the second defendant's motion for a continuance to hire counsel as the trial began 10 months after the indictment and seven weeks after the defendant requested appointed counsel, yet the first day of trial was the first time the defendant expressed an intention to retain private counsel. Partlow v. State, 346 Ga. App. 473, 816 S.E.2d 474 (2018).

Cited in Malone v. State, 49 Ga. 210 (1873); Johnson v. State, 65 Ga. 94 (1880); Kimberly v. State, 4 Ga. App. 852, 62 S.E. 571 (1908); Johnson v. State, 16 Ga. App. 287, 85 S.E. 204 (1915); Smith v. State, 21 Ga. App. 237, 94 S.E. 265 (1917); Parks v. State, 21 Ga. App. 506, 94 S.E. 628 (1917); Fordham v. State, 148 Ga. 758, 98 S.E. 267 (1919); Kelley v. State, 151 Ga. 551, 107 S.E. 488 (1921); Boatright v. State, 27 Ga. App. 292, 108 S.E. 130 (1921); Sims v. State, 177 Ga. 266, 170 S.E. 58 (1933); Walker v. State, 52 Ga. App. 108, 182 S.E. 524 (1935); Roth v. State, 70 Ga. App. 93, 27 S.E.2d 473 (1943); Bentley v. State, 70 Ga. App. 494, 28 S.E.2d 658 (1944); Cochran v. State, 212 Ga. 245, 91 S.E.2d 601 (1956); Jones v. State, 214 Ga. 828, 108 S.E.2d 327 (1959); Jones v. State, 101 Ga. App. 851, 115 S.E.2d 576 (1960); Britten v. State, 221 Ga. 97, 143 S.E.2d 176 (1965); Neal v. State, 119 Ga. App. 218, 166 S.E.2d 740 (1969); Terrell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 645, 222 S.E.2d 641 (1975); Shaw v. State, 239 Ga. 690, 238 S.E.2d 434 (1977); Corn v. State, 240 Ga. 130, 240 S.E.2d 694 (1977); Campbell v. State, 240 Ga. 352, 240 S.E.2d 828 (1977); Finney v. State, 242 Ga. 582, 250 S.E.2d 388 (1978); Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979); Lakes v. State, 244 Ga. 217, 259 S.E.2d 469 (1979); McEachin v. State, 245 Ga. 606, 266 S.E.2d 210 (1980); Park v. State, 154 Ga. App. 348, 268 S.E.2d 401 (1980); Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 319 S.E.2d 484 (1984); O'Neal v. State, 254 Ga. 1, 325 S.E.2d 759 (1985); Heaton v. State, 175 Ga. App. 735, 334 S.E.2d 334 (1985); Brock v. State, 177 Ga. App. 430, 339 S.E.2d 403 (1986); Green v. State, 178 Ga. App. 203, 342 S.E.2d 386 (1986); Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 343 S.E.2d 684 (1986); McGuire v. State, 185 Ga. App. 233, 363 S.E.2d 850 (1987); Turner v. State, 258 Ga. 97, 365 S.E.2d 822 (1988); Johnson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 475, 364 S.E.2d 609 (1988); Rhodes v. State, 200 Ga. App. 193, 407 S.E.2d 442 (1991); Roberts v. State, 208 Ga. App. 64, 430 S.E.2d 175 (1993); Stocks v. State, 224 Ga. App. 433, 481 S.E.2d 230 (1997); McTaggart v. State, 225 Ga. App. 359, 483 S.E.2d 898 (1997); Haselrigs v. State, 225 Ga. App. 873, 485 S.E.2d 555 (1997); Minor v. State, 232 Ga. App. 246, 501 S.E.2d 576 (1998); Mays v. State, 238 Ga. App. 507, 519 S.E.2d 290 (1999); Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (1999); Roberts v. State, 272 Ga. 822, 537 S.E.2d 86 (2000); Roberts v. State, 272 Ga. 822, 537 S.E.2d 86 (2000); Choat v. State, 246 Ga. App. 475, 540 S.E.2d 289 (2000); Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 555 S.E.2d 440 (2001); Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 680 S.E.2d 850 (2009); Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892 (2012); Danenberg v. State, 291 Ga. 439, 729 S.E.2d 315 (2012).

Continuance based on witness' absence.

- Section applies to a continuance based on absence of witnesses. Woolfolk v. State, 85 Ga. 69, 11 S.E. 814 (1890); McCain v. State, 23 Ga. App. 320, 98 S.E. 191 (1919).

Continuance based on counsel's illness.

- This section applies to a continuance based on the illness of counsel. Siegel v. State, 79 Ga. App. 410, 53 S.E.2d 686, aff'd on other grounds, 206 Ga. 252, 56 S.E.2d 512 (1949).

When counsel personally makes a motion for continuance on account of counsel's own illness, the court may take into consideration counsel's physical appearance and all circumstances which may appear regarding the court's judgment as to the physical condition of such attorney, and when the motion is overruled, the Court of Appeals will not reverse the judgment of the lower court unless it clearly appears that the court abused the court's discretion. Siegel v. State, 79 Ga. App. 410, 53 S.E.2d 686, aff'd on other grounds, 206 Ga. 252, 56 S.E.2d 512 (1949).

Defendant's voluntary decision to substitute new counsel.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a continuance sought on the ground that the defendant's new counsel had insufficient time to prepare when the short time period arose from the defendant's voluntary decision to substitute new counsel. Cunningham v. State, 244 Ga. App. 231, 535 S.E.2d 262 (2000).

Continuance for recently hired counsel.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a motion for a continuance made by recently hired cocounsel minutes before jury selection, particularly given that counsel was assisted at trial by an attorney who had been involved in the case for several months. Burrowes v. State, 296 Ga. App. 629, 675 S.E.2d 518 (2009).

Continuance to obtain presence of absent witness.

- It is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to grant a continuance upon the ground of the absence of a witness, if it appears that the absent witness was not subpoenaed, and that the applicant by exercise of due diligence, could have had the witness subpoenaed. Clark v. State, 52 Ga. App. 61, 182 S.E. 195 (1935).

Continuance requested by the defendant in order to obtain the presence at trial of a material witness is properly denied if the defendant has not been diligent in attempting to procure the attendance of the absent witness. Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 257 S.E.2d 543, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970, 100 S. Ct. 463, 62 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1979).

One hour continuance for state's witness.

- In a prosecution for driving under the influence, when at least one of two absent law enforcement witnesses for the state had been issued a subpoena, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting a one-hour postponement due to the absence of the witness. Minicucci v. State, 214 Ga. App. 468, 448 S.E.2d 34 (1994).

Court properly denied a continuance based on the absence of witnesses when it appeared that the defendant did not exercise due diligence in securing the presence of the witnesses. Halthon-Howard v. State, 234 Ga. App. 229, 506 S.E.2d 415 (1998).

In a child molestation case, the trial court properly denied the defendant a continuance under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-22 based on the absence of the defendant's mother overseas; the defendant did not comply with several of the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-25, including the materiality requirement, and other witnesses testified that the witnesses saw no improper contact between the defendant and the teenagers involved. Krirat v. State, 286 Ga. App. 650, 649 S.E.2d 786 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1788, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 745 (Ga. 2007).

Continuance to review witness' statements.

- That the state had not produced copies of its witnesses' written statements to police, which defense counsel discovered shortly before voir dire, did not oblige the trial court to grant the defendant a continunace, as: (1) the state did not withhold the evidence; (2) the case was recessed so counsel could examine the statements; and (3) the defendant did not show what the defendant would have accomplished if the defendant had been provided more time. Burrowes v. State, 296 Ga. App. 629, 675 S.E.2d 518 (2009).

Continuance request for absent physician denied.

- When the defendant's attorney was unable to show the actual existence, much less the identity, of the doctor sought as a witness and was unable to show whether the doctor was within the jurisdiction of the court, and the trial court tried to accommodate the defendant by offering to take a recess at some point in the proceeding so that the attorney could contact another source for any information regarding the other doctor, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the motion for continuance. Payne v. State, 207 Ga. App. 312, 428 S.E.2d 103 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 418, 467 S.E.2d 576 (1996).

Witness residing beyond jurisdiction of court.

- It is not error to refuse to continue a case in order to procure the testimony of a witness who resides beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Smith v. State, 193 Ga. App. 208, 387 S.E.2d 419 (1989).

Continuance to interview witnesses.

- Even though counsel learned of a supplemental list of additional witnesses only the day before trial, denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion because the trial court gave counsel the opportunity to interview the witnesses prior to trial. Downs v. State, 240 Ga. App. 740, 524 S.E.2d 786 (1999).

Continuance to obtain expert witness.

- Defendant contended that a continuance should have been granted for the defendant to obtain an expert witness; however the defendant failed to show that the defendant could not have obtained an expert to examine the photographs at an earlier date. Strickland v. State, 212 Ga. App. 170, 441 S.E.2d 494 (1994).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's request for a continuance on the ground that an expert witness was not available, and the defendant needed to find another witness because the record did not demand a finding that the defendant exercised diligence under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-20 in light of the fact that trial counsel was appointed some months before the trial; the defendant made no showing as to the expert's identity, no proffer of the expected testimony, and no showing of how that testimony would benefit the defendant. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Continuance in child molestation cases.

- In a prosecution for child molestation, when the defendant failed to identify a theory under which a prior act of molestation of the victim would be admissible, the court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to grant a continuance. Gilstrap v. State, 215 Ga. App. 180, 450 S.E.2d 436 (1994).

Late notice of a scientific report.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a motion for a continuance based on the time remaining before presentation of the state's case and measures taken to permit the defense to prepare for the state's anticipated scientific evidence. Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 121 S. Ct. 101, 148 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2000).

Continuance to review officer's personnel file not permitted.

- With regard to a defendant's trial for obstruction of a police officer and other related crimes, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a continuance to review the personnel file of the officer involved after defense counsel announced ready as, in response, the trial court reviewed the officer's personnel file in camera and determined that the file did not contain any evidence relevant to the defendant's defense. Whatley v. State, 296 Ga. App. 72, 673 S.E.2d 510 (2009).

Insufficient time for preparation of counsel.

- Motion for a continuance predicated on the basis that counsel has not had sufficient time to prepare for trial addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and a ruling denying such a motion will not be interfered with unless the judge has abused the judge's discretion in denying the motion. Cantrell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 725, 270 S.E.2d 12 (1980); Snow v. State, 178 Ga. App. 842, 344 S.E.2d 762 (1986).

Motion for continuance for additional time to adequately prepare a defense addresses itself to the discretion of the trial court and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion has been clearly abused. Babb v. State, 157 Ga. App. 757, 278 S.E.2d 495 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Motes v. State, 161 Ga. App. 173, 288 S.E.2d 256 (1982).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance after defense counsel learned that a plea offer would not be accepted; defense counsel claimed that counsel had not had insufficient time to investigate and to prepare the defense, but counsel did not specifically state what else counsel would have done to prepare for trial, other than to set up a trial notebook, which the trial court gave counsel time to do when the court denied the continuance. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 866, 648 S.E.2d 183 (2007).

As the charges against the defendant had been pending for more than two years before trial; defense counsel had early access to both the list of state's witnesses and the autopsy report when it was completed more than ten months prior to trial; and hospital and emergency medical technician reports not contained in the state's file were provided to defense counsel when they were requested, the defendant failed to demonstrate any harm from the denial of a motion for continuance to give counsel more time to examine those reports. Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 394, 677 S.E.2d 71 (2009).

Defendant showed no harm resulting from the trial court's denial of the defendant's motions for a continuance on the ground that the defendant had insufficient time to prepare for trial because the defendant did not identify any additional witnesses or evidence in mitigation that the defendant could have presented had the defendant been granted a continuance; the trial court authorized additional time and funds to enable defense counsel to obtain the assistance of a third attorney, at least three investigators, and a secretary and/or a paralegal devoted to the defendant's case. Loyd v. State, 288 Ga. 481, 705 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 474, 181 L. Ed. 2d 309 (U.S. 2011).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance because the record did not indicate that the state played a role in delaying the production of medical records; the defendant's expert witness testified that the expert had reviewed all of the medical records that the expert had been given, including those produced in preparing for the trial, and while the defendant asserted that a continuance would have afforded trial counsel more time to work with the expert witness to thoroughly prepare cross-examinations of the state's witnesses, the defendant made no showing that trial counsel's cross-examinations were somehow inadequate, nor did the defendant point to any additional challenges or defenses that could have been presented on the defendant's behalf. Eskew v. State, 309 Ga. App. 44, 709 S.E.2d 893 (2011).

Lack of preparedness by counsel.

- For case when lack of preparedness did not justify continuance, see Trammell v. State, 183 Ga. 711, 189 S.E. 529 (1937).

Sudden withdrawal of counsel.

- Neither sudden withdrawal of retained counsel nor lack of preparation of new counsel is ipso facto a ground for continuance. Horton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 407, 208 S.E.2d 186 (1974).

Time to permit appointed counsel to prepare for trial.

- If counsel is appointed by the state to defend the accused, a continuance should be granted to permit preparation for trial. Harris v. State, 119 Ga. 114, 45 S.E. 973 (1903); Cummings v. State, 151 Ga. 593, 107 S.E. 771 (1921).

Counsel unprepared because counsel had been handling other cases.

- Trial judge does not abuse the judge's discretion in refusing a continuance when counsel has been employed for two weeks and is unprepared because counsel had been handling other cases. Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231, 91 S.E.2d 764, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 987, 76 S. Ct. 1057, 100 L. Ed. 1501 (1956).

Physical beating of counsel.

- When a deputy sheriff threatens and beats an attorney representing a defendant and the attorney moves for postponement, and states that due to the beating the attorney is unable to represent the client on that day, the ends of justice require that the motion be granted. Smith v. State, 239 Ga. 477, 238 S.E.2d 116 (1977).

Review of police radio transmissions as justification for continuance.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance of the trial, given that trial counsel had several days to review copies of police radio transmissions before trial, but did not do so, characterizing the transmissions only as a "lead," and hence such did not present a compelling reason for a continuance. Hartley v. State, 283 Ga. App. 388, 641 S.E.2d 607 (2007).

Continuance to obtain transcript denied.

- Although the defendant stated that obtaining the trial transcript from the defendant's prior counsel was necessary for an adequate and effective review of the sentencing issues involved, the defendant did not contend or show that the defendant was harmed at the resentencing hearing by the denial of a continuance and not having access to the transcript, and there could be no reversible error when no harm was shown. Levin v. State, 334 Ga. App. 71, 778 S.E.2d 238 (2015).

Party must show record of motion in order to complain of motion's denial.

- In order for a party successfully to complain of a ruling which the party contends to have been a denial of a continuance, the party must be able to show a formal and proper motion in the record as the basis of the asserted error. This rule is technically construed. Horton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 407, 208 S.E.2d 186 (1974).

Motion to obtain access to papers in possession of attorney hired by prosecutrix.

- When the defense complains of the overruling of an "omnibus motion" which requested access to unidentified papers allegedly in the possession of an attorney hired by the prosecutrix, and the solicitor (now district attorney) states in the solicitor's place that the solicitor does not want or accept assistance from that attorney, does not know what, if anything, the attorney has in the attorney's file, and makes no use of any papers which that attorney may have, any error in overruling the motion is under these circumstances harmless, and no cause is shown requiring the grant of a continuance. Lancette v. State, 151 Ga. App. 740, 261 S.E.2d 405 (1979).

Possibility of finding evidence of defendant's insanity as grounds for continuance.

- Trial judge does not abuse the judge's discretion in refusing to grant a continuance when the only reason offered by counsel is counsel's information and belief that counsel might be able to find evidence to show the defendant insane and no showing is made that the defendant was possibly insane. Harris v. State, 211 Ga. 327, 85 S.E.2d 770 (1955).

Continuance to allow state to obtain mental evaluation and IQ test of defendant proper.

- Trial court's grant of an eight-day continuance to the state in a trial for murder and related crimes was proper because the defense counsel retained a psychologist to test and evaluate the defendant with regard to mental retardation, and the continuance was to permit the state to retain the state's own expert to evaluate the defendant's mental state and to administer an IQ test. Perkinson v. State, 279 Ga. 232, 610 S.E.2d 533, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 896, 126 S. Ct. 229, 163 L. Ed. 2d 214 (2005).

Quashing of indictment and issuance of new indictment as grounds for continuance.

- When the defendant on the morning of the trial announced ready as to an indictment, and where, during the morning, this indictment was quashed and another returned identical in all respects with the first, except that certain facts were described in technical rather than their colloquial terminology, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a continuance on the ground that sufficient time has not been granted counsel to examine the new indictment and prepare a defense thereunder. Guinn v. State, 91 Ga. App. 869, 87 S.E.2d 367 (1955).

Cross-examination of defendant on motion.

- It is not reversible error to permit the defendant to be cross-examined on the defendant's motion for a continuance. Bell v. State, 36 Ga. App. 111, 135 S.E. 521 (1926).

Change by state in date of alleged commission of crime.

- If the state in the indictment changes the date that the alleged offense was committed, thereby destroying the defendant's alibi defense, the defendant is entitled to a continuance affording the defendant sufficient time to prepare a defense to meet the new date. Geckles v. State, 177 Ga. App. 70, 338 S.E.2d 473 (1985).

Amount of time necessary to prepare case.

- There is no fixed rule as to the number of days that should, of right, be allowed counsel for the defendant after counsel's employment or appointment in a criminal case to prepare the case for trial, but the trial judge, in the exercise of the judge's discretion to grant or refuse a continuance, has to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine what the ends of justice require. Babb v. State, 157 Ga. App. 757, 278 S.E.2d 495 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Motes v. State, 161 Ga. App. 173, 288 S.E.2d 257 (1982).

Trial court properly denies continuance when party shows lack of diligence.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying continuance of a summary judgment hearing when fault lay in the appellants' lack of diligence in obtaining evidence to oppose the motions, and appellants had done essentially no discovery prior to the hearing. Cole v. Jordan, 158 Ga. App. 200, 279 S.E.2d 497 (1981).

Motion for continuance denied.

- Defendant's motion for continuance was properly denied since the defendant presented no evidence regarding the automobile accident or the resulting medical treatment at the time defendant made the motion for continuance. Smalls v. State, 242 Ga. App. 39, 528 S.E.2d 560 (2000).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance to obtain experts because the defendant did not provide details sufficient for the court to assess the need for the witnesses and the delay. Manning v. State, 273 Ga. 744, 545 S.E.2d 914 (2001).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's request for a continuance; pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-22, applications for continuances were addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court, and the defendant failed to show a compelling reason why more time to prepare for trial should have been granted as the trial court granted additional time to prepare for the cross-examination of one witness and additional time to interview supplemental witnesses listed by the state. Gilbert v. State, 259 Ga. App. 371, 577 S.E.2d 35 (2003).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance because, after the defendant's first request for a continuance was denied, the defendant had 13 days to subpoena witnesses or to reconstruct a transcript from the pre-arrest warrant hearing; further, the second application for a continuance was based on speculation about a witness's testimony. Kuykendoll v. State, 278 Ga. App. 369, 629 S.E.2d 32 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motions for continuance. The out-of-state witnesses whose attendance the defendant sought to secure ultimately appeared and testified at trial, and the defendant did not show any reason for the defendant's failure to prepare the witnesses during the lengthy period of time in which the case remained pending, over a year. French v. State, 288 Ga. App. 775, 655 S.E.2d 224 (2007).

Trial court properly denied a defendant a continuance after the defense learned that a witness would testify for the state: because the witness had been named in the indictment, the defendant had notice that the witness might be called by the state; moreover, defense counsel interviewed the witness, thoroughly cross-examined the witness, and impeached the witness. Gassett v. State, 289 Ga. App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court denied the defendant's motion for a continuance because the state did not call the witness whose identity was not made known to trial counsel until the day before trial, and the defendant was given the opportunity to interview the witness before the trial commenced. Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 706, 715 S.E.2d 85 (2011).

Defendant failed to show prejudice as a result of the denial of a motion for a continuance under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-22 as there was no showing that the defense would have benefitted in any way by further questioning of an officer about what the officer did with a particular shirt or the whereabouts of the shirt at the time of trial; accordingly, it was not shown to have been a material piece of evidence that was missing. Williams v. State, 317 Ga. App. 248, 730 S.E.2d 726 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a continuance because the defendant failed to present any evidence or testimony at the motion for new trial hearing implicating a different perpetrator nor specifically identified what evidence or witnesses the defendant would have put forth in defense if counsel had been given more time to prepare as speculation and conjecture were not enough. Calhoun v. State, 327 Ga. App. 683, 761 S.E.2d 91 (2014).

Defendant's request for a continuance on the day of trial after the defendant fired a fourth attorney was properly denied because the defendant was offered time to review the victim's medical records, which the discharged attorney had handed to the defendant at the beginning of the proceeding, and the defendant did not explain how more time would have helped; although the defendant argued for a motion for continuance to obtain witnesses, the defendant did not make the required proffer of what the witnesses would testify about or who the witnesses were; and, although the defendant argued for a continuance based on the defendant's mental illness, the defendant pointed to no record evidence supporting the assertion that the defendant was mentally ill. Lewis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 650, 768 S.E.2d 821 (2015).

Suicide of witness.

- It was not error to deny a motion for continuance in order to allow defense counsel an opportunity to get other witnesses after a potential witness committed suicide since defense counsel failed to show the names of any witnesses who might be obtained and whether or not the witnesses would be subject to subpoena. Wilcoxen v. State, 162 Ga. App. 800, 292 S.E.2d 905 (1982).

Errors in issuing subpoena.

- When a witness was under a subpoena that did not specify a date for trial, but obligated the witness to be ready to testify at any time in the indefinite future, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in excusing the witness from the requirements of the subpoena and denying the defendant's motion for a continuance to secure the witness's attendance. Clark v. State, 225 Ga. App. 851, 485 S.E.2d 543 (1997).

Abuse of discretion generally.

- Continuances being for the determination of the trial judge in the exercise of the judge's discretion will not be controlled unless manifestly abused. Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598 (1873); Smith v. State, 7 Ga. App. 252, 66 S.E. 556 (1909), later appeal, 7 Ga. App. 802, 68 S.E. 334 (1910); Tucker v. State, 133 Ga. 470, 66 S.E. 250 (1909); Hightower v. State, 9 Ga. App. 236, 70 S.E. 1022 (1911); Tyree v. State, 74 Ga. App. 229, 39 S.E.2d 441 (1946); Manners v. State, 77 Ga. App. 843, 50 S.E.2d 158 (1948); Powell v. State, 85 Ga. App. 208, 68 S.E.2d 177 (1951).

Refusal of a motion to continue will not be reversed unless it is manifest that there has been an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. Anderson v. State, 190 Ga. 455, 9 S.E.2d 642 (1940); McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 52 S.E.2d 294 (1949); Blackston v. State, 209 Ga. 160, 71 S.E.2d 221 (1952); Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16, 83 S.E.2d 610 (1954); Harris v. State, 211 Ga. 327, 85 S.E.2d 770 (1955); Anderson v. State, 222 Ga. 561, 150 S.E.2d 638 (1966); McLendon v. State, 123 Ga. App. 290, 180 S.E.2d 567 (1971); Marshall v. State, 239 Ga. 101, 236 S.E.2d 58 (1977); Kelly v. State, 241 Ga. 190, 243 S.E.2d 857 (1978); Callahan v. State, 148 Ga. App. 555, 251 S.E.2d 790 (1978); Felts v. State, 244 Ga. 503, 260 S.E.2d 887 (1979); Howard v. Harn, 163 Ga. App. 771, 295 S.E.2d 349 (1982).

All applications for continuances are addressed to the trial judge's sound discretion, which will not be controlled except for flagrant abuse. Terhune v. State, 117 Ga. App. 59, 159 S.E.2d 291 (1967).

Motions for a continuance are addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and the judge's discretion will not be controlled unless grossly abused. Atkins v. State, 228 Ga. 578, 187 S.E.2d 132 (1972).

Motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the refusal to grant a continuance will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Young v. State, 237 Ga. 852, 230 S.E.2d 287 (1976), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123, 106 S. Ct. 1991, 90 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1986).

Granting of a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the Court of Appeals will not interfere unless it is clearly shown that the judge has abused the judge's discretion. Hammonds v. State, 157 Ga. App. 393, 277 S.E.2d 762 (1981).

Grant or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 174, 279 S.E.2d 345 (1981); Hammock v. State, 201 Ga. App. 614, 411 S.E.2d 743, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 903, 411 S.E.2d 743 (1991).

Appellate courts reluctant to find error in denial because of interests which must be balanced.

- Counterbalancing the court's duty to ensure that the defendant is not brought to trial with unnecessary haste and with possible prejudice to the defendant's defense is the obligation to prevent the defendants from trifling with the operation of the trial courts in an attempt to obtain delay or some other perceived advantage. For this reason, the appellate courts will find the denial of requests for continuance to be error only with great reluctance. Williams v. State, 144 Ga. App. 410, 241 S.E.2d 261 (1977).

Review of trial judge's ruling when there is no conflict in the evidence.

- Although the discretion of the trial judge will not be controlled unless manifestly abused, when there is no conflict in the evidence, and only legal rules as declared by the laws and the principles of justice stated by the Bill of Rights of the federal and state Constitutions are to be applied, an erroneous application of such rules and principles will be reviewed and corrected. Edwards v. State, 204 Ga. 384, 50 S.E.2d 10 (1948).

Review of denial of continuance based on unpreparedness and inability to use a witness.

- Court of Appeals will not interfere with the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to grant a continuance on a motion based generally on two grounds: inadequate time for counsel to prepare for trial; and the inability to use a witness present at the scene of the crime who was accused of participating. Mack v. State, 125 Ga. App. 639, 188 S.E.2d 828 (1972).

Denial of motion upheld.

- Trial court did not err in failing to grant a motion for continuance because, several hours prior to the call of the case for trial, defense counsel was served by the state with a supplemental list of witnesses, one of whom, during the trial, defense counsel objected to, when defense counsel had been allowed the opportunity to interview the witness. Saylors v. State, 251 Ga. 735, 309 S.E.2d 796 (1983).

Trial court did not err in denying a request for continuance. See Harrison v. State, 251 Ga. 837, 310 S.E.2d 506 (1984).

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for continuance when appellant was arrested and tried within eight days because denial of a continuance merely because of shortness of time will not reflect an abuse of discretion, and appellant did not show that appellant was prevented from obtaining and producing any witnesses or evidence, nor that the case was complicated and required more time in preparation, or that further delay would have gained the appellant any palpable advantage. Tucker v. State, 172 Ga. App. 86, 321 S.E.2d 817 (1984).

When the basis for a requested continuance was counsel's claim that counsel had insufficient time to show the defendant was either not competent to stand trial or to appreciate the criminal nature of the defendant's alleged acts, but counsel offered only counsel's belief that further investigation would yield supporting evidence, based upon information that the defendant had in the past received drug/psychological counseling in three different cities, there was an insufficient showing of a necessity for a continuance. Lucas v. State, 174 Ga. App. 580, 330 S.E.2d 792 (1985).

When there is no indication that the continuance would have benefited the defendant, it cannot be said to be necessary. Johnson v. State, 255 Ga. 703, 342 S.E.2d 312 (1986); Martin v. State, 268 Ga. 682, 492 S.E.2d 225 (1997).

When the record did not appear to include the purportedly illegible documents produced and the defendant did not show how those documents would have assisted the defendant in the preparation of the defendant's case and the record does not show that the documents were subject to disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 [repealed] or O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 [repealed], that the documents were provided by the state, or that the state delayed the documents' production in any way; there was no showing of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying a motion for continuance on this ground. Strickland v. State, 212 Ga. App. 170, 441 S.E.2d 494 (1994).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance, or in the alternative, for a mistrial, which the defendant requested as a remedy for the state's failure to disclose an officer who took the drugs to the crime lab and whose testimony and the admission of a new crime lab report was not provided to the defendant because the officer's name was not previously provided on the state's witness list, in violation of discovery rules. The trial court found that the state apparently did not know about the officer's involvement in the case prior to trial, as the issue was raised during cross-examination of another officer, and the defendant presented no evidence of bad faith, therefore, it was within the trial court's discretion to allow defense counsel the opportunity to talk to the officer before the officer testified as a remedy for the discovery violation as opposed to granting a new trial or a mistrial. Scott v. State, 298 Ga. App. 376, 680 S.E.2d 482 (2009).

Trial court did not deprive the defendant of the defendant's constitutional right to testify because the defendant consulted with the defendant's lawyer and the defendant fully understood the benefits and consequences of testifying; after engaging the defendant in a colloquy about the defendant's right, the trial court gave the defendant a full opportunity to do so, and the defendant voluntarily chose not to testify at that time; and the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to grant a continuance to the defendant until the next morning as the defendant did not explain to the trial court why a continuance was necessary, and the trial court reasonably could have believed that any delay would have been fruitless. Terrell v. State, Ga. , 815 S.E.2d 66 (2018).

State's failure to comply with discovery obligations did not necessitate a continuance since the state provided the newly discovered evidence to defendant as soon as practicable, the defendant was given time to interview the witnesses before the witnesses testified, and there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the state of prejudice to the defense. Browner v. State, 265 Ga. App. 788, 595 S.E.2d 610 (2004).

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's motion for a continuance as the defendant had twice stated that the defendant was ready for trial and, in lieu of a continuance of the entire trial, the trial court allowed the attorneys to pick a jury and then continue the case until the next morning. Walker v. State, 268 Ga. App. 669, 602 S.E.2d 351 (2004).

C.J.S.

- 17 C.J.S., Continuances, § 5.

ALR.

- Refusal of continuance in criminal trial, asked for on account of occurrences during trial, as abuse of discretion, 5 A.L.R. 914.

Physical condition or conduct of party, his family, friends, or witnesses during trial, tending to arouse sympathy of jury, as ground for continuance or mistrial, 131 A.L.R. 323.

Admissions to prevent continuance sought to secure testimony of absent witness in criminal case, 9 A.L.R.3d 1180.

Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for continuance, 73 A.L.R.3d 725.