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O.C.G.A.Title 9Chapter 10

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-167 (2023)

Continuance in discretion of court; countershowing to motion for continuance

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2023 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest cited 1983–2019 29citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 29 opinions since 1983.

(a) All applications for continuances are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of justice may require.

(b) In all cases the presiding judge may, in his discretion, admit a countershowing to a motion for a continuance and, after a hearing, may decide whether the motion shall prevail.

History

Orig. Code 1863, § 3460; Code 1868, § 3480; Ga. L. 1871-72, p. 49, § 1; Ga. L. 1872, p. 41, § 1; Code 1873, § 3531; Code 1882, § 3531; Civil Code 1895, § 5138; Penal Code 1895, § 966; Civil Code 1910,

§ 5724; Penal Code 1910, § 992; Code 1933, § 81-1419.

Annotations

Cross references. Corresponding provision relating to criminal procedure, § 17-8-22.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Order granting or denying continuance not reversible absent clear abuse of discretion. - Trial court has a right to exercise sound discretion in passing on motions for continuance, and an order granting or denying a continuance will not be reversed unless such discretion has been manifestly abused. Gaines v. Alexander, 69 Ga. App. 512, 26 S.E.2d

130, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 127 (1943); State Hwy. Dep’t v. Peavy, 77 Ga. App. 308, 48 S.E.2d 478, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 542 (1948); Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297, 53 S.E.2d 568, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 641 (1949); Nichols v. Heffner, 222 Ga. 706, 152 S.E.2d 393, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 608 (1966); Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 175 S.E.2d 28, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1323

(1970); McCorquodale v. Stynchcombe, 239 Ga. 138, 236 S.E.2d 486, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 843, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S. Ct. 534, 54 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1977); Keno v. Alside, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 549, 251 S.E.2d 793, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 3215, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 3242 (1978). The continuance or postponement of a case is a discretionary matter and will not be controlled unless manifestly abused. Davis v. Barnes, 158 Ga. App. 89, 279 S.E.2d 330, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2085 (1981). A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a showing that it has been abused, that discretion will not be controlled. Clark v. State, 159 Ga. App. 438, 283 S.E.2d 666, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2632 (1981); Turner v. City of Nashville, 177 Ga. App. 649, 340 S.E.2d 619, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1505 (1986). All continuances for which express provision has not been made are granted or denied in the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will not reverse such decisions absent a clear abuse of discretion. This rule holds true in situations where a person is both a criminal and civil defendant. Payton v. Green, 179 Ga. App. 438, 346 S.E.2d 884, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1928 (1986). In the absence of the transcript of the hearing on appellant’s motion for a continuance or other showing by appellant that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion, the decision will not be reversed. Payton v. Green, 179 Ga. App. 438, 346 S.E.2d 884, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1928 (1986); Matthews v. Dorsey, 218 Ga. App. 545, 462 S.E.2d 452, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 815 (1995). In a proceeding to legitimate a child, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by denying the petitioning parent’s motion for a continuance as seven continuances had already been granted in the case, five of which were attributable to the petitioning parent, and the trial court had scheduled the trial to accommodate the petitioning parent’s surgery schedule, which was to have occurred after the trial. Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 670 S.E.2d 795, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1146 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by denying a defendant’s motion for a continuance because the court instructed the plaintiff to ensure that the plaintiff’s experts were made available to the defendant for interviewing, and the defendant indicated that the defendant would be able to accomplish the interviews on the evening of the first day of trial. LN West Paces Ferry Assocs., LLC v. McDonald, 306 Ga. App. 641, 703 S.E.2d 85, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1016 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0454, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 237 (Ga. Mar. 7, 2011). In a professional malpractice claim against a dentist, although the patient argued that the trial court should have recessed the trial until the following day because an expert witness was in route, the record showed that the expert was flying standby, and there was no evidence that the expert ever boarded a flight. Given the patient’s inability to inform the court when or if the expert would arrive at trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for continuance. Cave v. Sachdeva, No. A21A1033, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 589 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 446, 214 L. Ed. 2d 254, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 5071 (2022). Military orders. - Injured party did not attach the military orders to the motion, and the counsel’s assertion that the injured party had received orders to report for military duty were not evidence of any service requirements. King v. Irvin, 273 Ga. App. 64, 614 S.E.2d 190, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 414 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1399, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 585 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005). Proof that absent party providentially prevented from attending trial required for continuance. - To entitle a party to a continuance, evidence of some character under oath must be presented that the absent party was in fact providentially prevented from attending the trial. Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297, 53 S.E.2d 568, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 641 (1949). Denial of continuance for absent defendant after two verdicts in defendant’s favor not error. - Where defendant, having had two verdicts rendered in

the defendant’s favor, did not appear at the third (new) trial, even after a continuance had been granted, as the defendant had left the county and defense counsel was unable to locate the defendant, it was not error for the trial judge to deny another motion to continue and, after a verdict for the plaintiff, enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor. Smith v. Randall, 52 Ga. App. 692, 184 S.E. 360, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 227 (1936). Denial of motion not error where defendant’s absence would not hurt defense. - Where defendant was very old and helpless on account of sickness, which was the defendant’s last illness, would never be able to attend court or to give depositions, and would be of no help to defense counsel were the defendant present in court at the trial, the court did not err, in the exercise of sound discretion, in denying the defendant’s motion to continue based on the ground of the absence of the defendant. Gaines v. Alexander, 69 Ga. App. 512, 26 S.E.2d 130, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 127 (1943). Refusal to grant continuance not error where movant lacked due diligence. - Where a period of two hours and a half elapsed after the emergency involving a party seeking a continuance and before the case was called, during which time the party’s counsel did not communicate with the client, nor the client with the attorney, or make any effort to make a legal showing for continuance in accordance with previous notice given them by the court requiring strict legal presentation at proof under oath for continuance, it was not error to refuse to grant a continuance. Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297, 53 S.E.2d 568, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 641 (1949). Where the defense counsel’s moves for a continuance were based on the fact that defense counsel did not receive a tape or transcript of the committal hearing until approximately 24 hours before the trial and as a consequence defense counsel was unable adequately to prepare to crossexamine or impeach the prosecution’s witnesses, but defense counsel was informed some days earlier that defense counsel might pick up the tape and transcript at defense counsel’s convenience, and de-

fense counsel did not do so until the day preceding the trial, and by defense counsel’s own admission defense counsel was present at the committal hearing and therefore can be presumed to know what took place there, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Gaskin v. State, 166 Ga. App. 331, 303 S.E.2d 778, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2157 (1983). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a subcontractor’s motion for a continuance of a summary judgment hearing as a surety raised a statute of limitations defense more than three months before the hearing and the subcontractor did not attempt to conduct further discovery after the defense was raised. Masonry Specialists of Ga., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 273 Ga. App. 774, 616 S.E.2d 103, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 443 (2005). Continuance properly denied where sole ground was lack of opportunity for leading counsel to prepare. - Judge did not abuse judicial discretion in overruling a motion for a continuance of a contempt hearing based solely on an alleged lack of opportunity of leading counsel to prepare for trial, nothing being shown as to inability or lack of opportunity of other attorneys in the case to prepare for such trial. Alred v. Celanese Corp. of America, 205 Ga. 499, 54 S.E.2d 225, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 395 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 937, 70 S. Ct. 346, 94 L. Ed. 578 (1950). Attorney’s delay in going to wrong courthouse. - It was not an abuse of discretion to deny plaintiff’s request for a continuance because plaintiff’s attorney went to the wrong courthouse for a hearing on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Purvis v. Ballantine, 226 Ga. App. 246, 487 S.E.2d 14. Continuance properly denied where intervenor claimed insufficient notice of action involving state. - All applications for a continuance are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court, and in all cases the party making the application for a continuance must show that the party has exercised due diligence; accordingly, in a civil action to which the state is a party, and which is

thus entitled to priority of hearing, the court did not err in failing to grant a continuance on motion of the intervenor, based on the sole ground that the intervenor had been absent from the state and had not heard of the case in time to make preparation for the hearing. Beazley v. De Kalb County, 87 Ga. App. 910, 75 S.E.2d 657, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 879, rev’d, 210 Ga. 41, 77 S.E.2d 740, 1953 Ga. LEXIS 479 (1953). Refusal to set aside order dismissing motion for new trial proper. - Where plaintiff fails to present a brief of evidence on the hearing of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, and there is no merit to plaintiff’s allegations as to an agreement to postpone the hearing, the trial judge properly refuses to set aside an order dismissing the plaintiff’s motion for new trial. Davenport v. Davenport, 218 Ga. 475, 128 S.E.2d 772, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 537 (1962). Refusal to grant continuance for second attempt at arbitration. - Where an initial attempt at arbitration, as provided for by the lease agreement in question, was unsuccessful, the court was within its discretion to deny a motion for continuance which requested an opportunity for a second attempt at arbitration. Nunn v. Taylor, 177 Ga. App. 44, 338 S.E.2d 453, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2467 (1985). Continuance denied for lack of diligence. - Where appellants were not diligent in obtaining desired discovery, their failure to obtain discovery did not entitle them to a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. Dobbs v. Cobb E.N.T. Assocs., 165 Ga. App. 238, 299 S.E.2d 141, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1828 (1983). Denial of continuation of parental rights termination proceeding proper. - Trial court’s denial of a parent’s motion for a continuance of a paren-

tal rights termination proceeding was not shown to be erroneous where the parent was served with a copy of the petition to terminate approximately four months before the termination hearing, an amended petition merely added the name of the paternal grandparent because the grandparent had legal custody of the child at the time, and the trial court indicated that it would not hear anything not included in the original petition; the parent was unable to show any harm suffered as a result of the trial court’s failure to grant the continuance. In the Interest of A.S.R.H., 265 Ga. App. 30, 593 S.E.2d 59, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 3 (2004). A father’s motion for a continuance so that he could obtain the results of a paternity test was properly denied, as the father failed to show harm from the decision; this was particularly true in light of a holding affirming the termination of the father’s parental rights. In the Interest of S.S.G.A., 285 Ga. App. 276, 645 S.E.2d 724, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 508 (2007). A parent’s potential for overcoming alcoholism, which had existed throughout the four years the children had been in foster care, was insufficient to require the grant of a continuance in a parental rights termination proceeding. In re C.M., 179 Ga. App. 508, 347 S.E.2d 328, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1943 (1986). Petitioner’s attorney’s motion to continue habeas corpus proceeding properly granted. - Where, in a habeas corpus action, petitioner’s attorney has been unable to confer with the client and is unprepared for lack of time due to the unlawful transfer of and improper delay in returning the client to the proper prison, the attorney’s request for a continuance should be granted. Hardwick v. Gooding, 233 Ga. 322, 210 S.E.2d 794, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 752 (1974).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Continuance, § 13. C.J.S. 17 C.J.S., Continuances, § 6. ALR. Physical condition or conduct of party,

his family, friends, or witnesses during trial, tending to arouse sympathy of jury, as ground for continuance or mistrial, 131 A.L.R. 323. Appealability of order granting or refusing stay or continuance under federal civil

relief act because of litigant’s military service, 34 A.L.R.2d 1149. Party litigant’s absence in civil case because of illness of relative or member of family, as ground for continuance, 47 A.L.R.2d 1058. Stay of civil proceedings pending determinations of action in federal court in same state, 56 A.L.R.2d 335. Amendment of pleading before trial with respect to amount or nature of relief sought as ground for continuance, 56 A.L.R.2d 650.

Continuance of civil case because of illness or death of party, 68 A.L.R.2d 470. Hostile sentiment or prejudice as ground for continuance in civil case, 68 A.L.R.2d 540. Admissions to prevent continuance sought to secure testimony of absent witness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. Continuance of case because of illness of expert witness, 18 A.L.R.6th 509.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 9-10-167 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENGen. Motors Corp. v. Blake, 515 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 9-10-167 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“In its first enumeration of error, General Motors (GM) claims the court erred by denying a continuance sought again by GM on the day of trial, on the basis that it was surprised and prejudiced by Blake's identification of an expert witness the week before, *167 which witness…”
Later courts cite it for
“fully aware that the issue was why did the seatbelt not restrain plaintiff, if it did not do so, gm apparently tactically decided not to conduct a fuller and more complete investigation of the apparatus. defendant should not be permitted to avoid learning the facts by lack of thoroughness and then claim surprise.” · 1 citing court
2
GREENLN West Paces Ferry Assocs., LLC v. McDonald, 703 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“See OCGA § 9-10-167 (a); Haygood v. Tilley, 295 Ga.”
The case’s holding
A defendant who knowingly and willfully trespasses on another's land without an easement or permission may be assessed attorney fees under OCGA 13-6-11, since the intentional conduct reflects bad faith.
3
GREENHill v. State, 385 S.E.2d 404 (Ga. 1989).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“(b) OCGA § 9-10-167 provides in part as follows: All applications for continuances are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of justice may require.”
The case’s holding
A requested jury charge must be legal, apt, precisely adjusted to a principle involved in the case, and authorized by the evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“legal, apt and precisely adjusted to some principle involved in the case and be authorized by the evidence.” · 6 citing courts
4
GREENPayton v. Green, 346 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 9-10-167 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“He contends that his civil trial testimony might have incriminated him in the criminal case which, he alleges, arose out of the same factual circumstances.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is well established that all continuances for which express provision has not been made by statute are granted or denied in the discretion of the trial court, and this court will not reverse such decisions absent a clear abuse of discretion. cits.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENAppling v. Tatum, 670 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“183, 184 ( 453 SE2d 696 ) (1995), citing OCGA § 9-10-167 (a). 2 See id. 3 See Bomar v.”
Later courts cite it for
“the grant of attorney's fees . . . made at any time during the pendency of the litigation, whether the action is for alimony, divorce and alimony, or contempt of court arising out of either an alimony case or a divorce and alimony case . . . shall be . . .” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENCapital Floors, LLC v. Furman, 831 S.E.2d 522 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“See OCGA § 9-10-167 (a) ("All applications for continuances are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of justice may require.”
7
GREENShamsai v. Coordinated Props., Inc., 576 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“OCGA § 9-10-167; Purvis v. Ballantine, 226 Ga.”
8
GREENKing v. Irvin, 614 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“He has presented no argument or citation of authority supporting a separate claim of error relating solely to the dismissal. Accordingly, we deem this claim of error abandoned.”
9
GREENPurvis v. Ballantine, 487 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“(a) The grant or denial of a request for continuance lies within the discretion of the trial court, see OCGA § 9-10-167 (a), and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”
10
GREENHilliard v. J. C. Bradford & Co., 494 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“also contend that the trial court erred by failing to vacate the arbitration award due to the failure of the arbitrators to grant a continuance upon sufficient cause shown.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is the law in georgia that a trial court's ruling confirming an arbitration award should not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous and not supported by any evidence in the record.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENHawkins v. Grady Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 350 S.E.2d 790 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“OCGA § 9-10-167 (a). In the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion, the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed on appellate review.”
Later courts cite it for
“the burden of proof in the superior court was on the taxpayers, as the parties who initiated the appeal to that court.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENDavis v. Osinuga, 767 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“1 OCGA § 9-10-167 (a) provides: “All applications for continuances are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of justice may require.”
Later courts cite it for
“under georgia law, an application for a continuance based upon the absence of a witness shall set forth eight different requirements.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENIn re Est. of Jackson, 526 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“Ira Jackson requested a continuance of the hearing until after his anticipated July 23, 1999 release date so that he could personally appear and present documentary evidence.”
Later courts cite it for
“the discretionary powers of the probate court under ocga 53-7-55 are very broad and may be exercised whether the violation of law under consideration is a minor or major matter” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENWork Clothes Outlet, Inc. v. M & S Purchasing, Inc., 372 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“OCGA § 9-10-167 (a); [Cit.]” Payton v. Green, 179 Ga.”
15
GREENAdams v. Hill, 340 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“In all cases, the grant of a continuance is in the discretion of the trial judge (OCGA § 9-10-167), but where the statute is not complied with, no grounds for continuance exist.”
Later courts cite it for
“where the statute is not complied with, no grounds for continuance exist,” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENCollins v. Kiah, 462 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“OCGA § 9-10-167 (a). That discretion will not be controlled absent a showing of abuse.”
17
GREENSimmons v. Simmons, 453 S.E.2d 696 (Ga. 1995).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“All applications for continuances are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of justice may require.”
18
GREENClifton v. Gillis, 394 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“Clifton now appeals because he contends the trial court erred by not granting a continuance so he could secure replacement counsel, by not inquiring about the availability of the new witness when the court learned of the new witness, and by denying the motion for new trial.”
19
GREENFrancis v. Reynolds, 450 S.E.2d 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“Clearly, there can be no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff’s requests for a stay if the findings of the Board would not have been admissible even if they had been available at the time of trial. Although this issue appears to be one of first impression in this state, a…”
20
GREENCarter v. Murphey, 526 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 9-10-167 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-167
“Murphey asserts that the subpoena was not valid because it did not specifically mention August 24,1998, as the appropriate term of court and because the Carters did not show that the proper witness fee had been paid to Belangia.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320012019

One bar per year. Tallest: 7 cases in 1986. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Enactment and amendments

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Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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