O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-8-9 (2019)

Revocation of surrender of rights; time limit; effect of voluntary surrender of rights by legal mother

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of Code Section 9-10-12 which authorizes the use of certified mail, an individual signing a surrender of rights pursuant to Code Section 19-8-4, 19-8-5, 19-8-6, or 19-8-7 shall have the right to revoke such surrender by written notice delivered in person or mailed by registered mail or statutory overnight delivery within four days after signing such surrender; and such surrender document shall not be valid unless it so states. The four-day revocation period shall be counted consecutively beginning with the day immediately following the date the surrender of rights is executed; provided, however, that, if the fourth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the last day on which such surrender may be revoked shall be the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. After the four-day period, a surrender of rights cannot be revoked. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of Code Section 9-10-12 which authorizes the use of certified mail, the notice of revocation of a surrender of rights shall be delivered in person or mailed by registered mail or statutory overnight delivery to the address designated in the surrender document. If delivered in person, it shall be delivered to the address shown in the surrender document not later than 5:00 P.M. eastern standard time or eastern daylight time, whichever is applicable, on the fourth day. If mailed by registered mail or delivered by statutory overnight delivery, it shall be addressed to the address shown in the surrender document and submitted to the United States Postal Service or to the statutory overnight delivery carrier not later than 12:00 Midnight eastern standard time or eastern daylight time, whichever is applicable, on the fourth day. (b) If a legal mother has either voluntarily and in writing surrendered all of her parental rights pursuant to Code Section 19-8-4, 19-8-5, 19-8-6, or 19-8-7 or pursuant to the corresponding provisions of the laws of another state, and has not revoked her surrender as allowed by applicable law, or has had her parental rights involuntarily terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction, she shall have no right or authority to sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to Code Section 19-7-46.1 or consent to the granting of a petition for legitimation filed pursuant to Code Section 19-7-22 regarding the same child.

History

Code 1981, § 19-8-9, enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 1572, § 5; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 4; Ga. L. 2007, p. 342, § 7/HB 497; Ga. L. 2016,

p. 304, § 13/SB 64; Ga. L. 2018, p. 19, § 11/HB 159; Ga. L. 2021, p. 151, § 4/HB 154. The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, added the last sentence of subsec-

tion (a); and rewrote subsection (b), which read: “If a legal mother has voluntarily and in writing surrendered all of her parental rights pursuant to Code Section 19-8-4, 19-8-5, 19-8-6, or 19-8-7 and has not revoked her surrender within the fourday period after signing as permitted by subsection (a) of this Code section, she shall have no right or authority to sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to Code Section 19-7-46.1 or consent to the granting of a petition for legitimation filed pursuant to Code Section 19-7-22 regarding the same child.”

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2016, p. 304, § 18/SB 64, not

codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall not be construed to affect a voluntary acknowledgment of legitimation that was valid under the former provisions of Code Section 19-7-21.1, nor any of the rights or responsibilities flowing therefrom, if it was executed on or before June 30, 2016.” Law reviews. For article, “Who is Georgia’s Mother? Gestational Surrogacy: A Formulation for Georgia’s Legislature,” see 38 Ga. L. Rev. 395 (2003).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Revocation of consent. - Even though revocation of consent may be allowed more than ten days after consent is given, when the mother had acted freely and voluntarily and the trial court found her competent, the court did not err in finding that she failed to establish good and sufficient cause to void the surrender. Schumacher v. Sexton, 216 Ga. App. 628, 455 S.E.2d 348, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 270 (1995), overruled in part, In the Interest of B.G.D., 224 Ga. App. 124, 479 S.E.2d 439, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1320 (1996). Parent may not revoke his or her valid surrender after 10 days; such limitation does not limit the right of a surrendering parent to establish that there was no valid, voluntary consent given initially. In re B.G.D., 224 Ga. App. 124, 479 S.E.2d 439, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1320 (1996), cert. denied, No. S97C0604, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 408 (Ga. Apr. 24, 1997). Parent seeking to withdraw consent to adoption after 10 days must show duress, fraud, or incapacity, and then, as with all contracts, the consent is invalidated and the surrender becomes voidable. Hicks v. Stargel, 226 Ga. App. 639, 487 S.E.2d 428, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 721 (1997). Mother did not revoke her surrender within the 10 days provided under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-9(b) (now (a)), and a later attempt to revoke her surrender was inef-

fective; without the transcript of the trial, the appellate court assumed that the evidence supported the trial court’s factual finding that the mother showed no cause for invalidating the surrender. Ueal v. AAA Ptnrs. in Adoption, Inc., 269 Ga. App. 258, 603 S.E.2d 672, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1053 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0136, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 99 (Ga. Jan. 24, 2005). Surrender of parental rights voidable based on caseworker misconduct. - Based upon newly discovered evidence that the caseworker of a parent who surrendered parental rights was a friend of the foster parents and had engaged in fraud and other illegalities, the trial court properly restored the parent’s parental rights pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(a)(3). Thus, O.C.G.A. § 198-9, requiring a parent to revoke a surrender within 10 days, did not prevent the surrenders from being voidable. In the Interest of K.W., 291 Ga. App. 623, 662 S.E.2d 255, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 554 (2008), cert. dismissed, No. S08C1642, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 767 (Ga. Sept. 22, 2008). Duress not shown. - Even though the mother was under emotional and financial pressure when she made the decision to surrender her parental rights, that pressure did not constitute legal duress. Mabou v. Eller, 232 Ga. App. 635, 502 S.E.2d 760, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 772 (1998).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases, 1995–2011 · leading case: In the Interest of B. G. D., 479 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
In the Interest of B. G. D., 479 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 32× “Language from older cases decided under a former version of OCGA § 19-8-9, which did not contain a ten-day limitation of the right to withdraw a voluntary surrender of parental rights, has been included in cases decided after 1977, when the limitation was first imposed.”
Hicks v. Stargel, 487 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 8× “The Hickses attempted to revoke their consent to the adoption, even though this revocation was outside the ten-day limit provided for in OCGA § 19-8-9. The trial court found the Hickses had shown no legal reason for revoking their surrender of parental rights and consent to…”
Mabou v. Eller, 502 S.E.2d 760 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 8× “Although deciding adoption cases by summary judgment is unusual, each of the parties sought resolution by summary judgment and OCGA § 19-8-9 (b) narrowly limits the grounds for withdrawing a surrender of parental rights after the statutory ten-day period.”
Ueal v. AAA Partners in Adoption, Inc., 603 S.E.2d 672 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 4× “It is undisputed that she did not revoke her surrender within the ten days provided under OCGA § 19-8-9 (b). Unless the surrender is invalidated by duress, fraud, or incapacity, a mother may not revoke her surrender after ten days.”
In the Interest of T. C. D., 636 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “, OCGA § 19-8-9 (b) (expressly allowing ten-day grace period to withdraw consent to surrender of parental rights in adoption proceedings).”
Schumacher v. Sexton, 455 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 4× “The Schumachers do not deny that the mother did not attempt to withdraw her surrender within ten days as required by OCGA § 19-8-9 (b), but contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the mother had not shown good and sufficient cause why the surrender should be voided.”
McCann v. Doe, 660 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. 2008). “See Ga.Code Ann. § 19-8-9(b) (Supp.2007) (giving a biological parent a ten-day period within which he or she can withdraw the consent for adoption); N.”
In the Interest of K. W., 662 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “The father contends that the juvenile court erred in setting aside its February 2004 order because (i) its May 2007 order was unsupported by newly discovered evidence for failure to hear any testimony or receive any documentary evidence, (ii) pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-9 (b),…”
In re A. C., 642 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “at 128-129 (2); see also OCGA§ 19-8-9 (b) (after ten days, a surrender may not be withdrawn).”
In the Interest of A. B., 716 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 19-8-9 (b). Since the instant case did not include adoption proceedings, however, this provision is inapplicable here.”
In Re Kw, 662 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “The father contends that the juvenile court erred in setting aside its February 2004 order because (i) its May 2007 order was unsupported by newly discovered evidence for failure to hear any testimony or receive any documentary evidence, (ii) pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-9(b), absent…”
In Re Ab, 716 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 19-8-9(b). Since the instant case did not include adoption proceedings, however, this provision is inapplicable here.”
— 19-8-9(b) — 5 cases
In the Interest of B. G. D., 479 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). “Language from older cases decided under a former version of OCGA § 19-8-9, which did not contain a ten-day limitation of the right to withdraw a voluntary surrender of parental rights, has been included in cases decided after 1977, when the limitation was first imposed.”
McCann v. Doe, 660 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. 2008). “See Ga.Code Ann. § 19-8-9(b) (Supp.2007) (giving a biological parent a ten-day period within which he or she can withdraw the consent for adoption); N.”
Hicks v. Stargel, 487 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). “The Hickses attempted to revoke their consent to the adoption, even though this revocation was outside the ten-day limit provided for in OCGA § 19-8-9. The trial court found the Hickses had shown no legal reason for revoking their surrender of parental rights and consent to…”
In Re Kw, 662 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). “The father contends that the juvenile court erred in setting aside its February 2004 order because (i) its May 2007 order was unsupported by newly discovered evidence for failure to hear any testimony or receive any documentary evidence, (ii) pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-9(b), absent…”
In Re Ab, 716 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). “See OCGA § 19-8-9(b). Since the instant case did not include adoption proceedings, however, this provision is inapplicable here.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.