Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 19-7-22 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 19 DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Section 7. Parent and Child Relationship Generally, 19-7-1 through 19-7-54.

ARTICLE 2 LEGITIMACY

19-7-22. Petition for legitimation of child; requirement that mother be named as a party; court order; effect; claims for custody or visitation; third-party action for legitimation in response to petition to establish paternity.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Biological father" means the male who impregnated the biological mother resulting in the birth of a child.
    2. "Legal father" means a male who has not surrendered or had terminated his rights to a child and who:
      1. Has legally adopted such child;
      2. Was married to the biological mother of such child at the time such child was born or within the usual period of gestation, unless paternity was disproved by a final order pursuant to Article 3 of this chapter;
      3. Married the legal mother of such child after such child was born and recognized such child as his own, unless paternity was disproved by a final order pursuant to Article 3 of this chapter; or
      4. Has legitimated such child pursuant to this Code section.
  2. The biological father of a child born out of wedlock may render his relationship with the child legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of the residence of the child's mother or other party having legal custody or guardianship of the child; provided, however, that if the mother or other party having legal custody or guardianship of the child resides outside this state or cannot, after due diligence, be found within this state, the petition may be filed in the county of the biological father's residence or the county of the child's residence. If a petition for the adoption of the child is pending, the biological father shall file the petition for legitimation in the county in which the adoption petition is filed.
  3. A legitimation petition shall set forth the name, age, and sex of the child, the name of the mother, and, if the biological father desires the name of the child to be changed, the new name. If the mother is alive, she shall be named as a party and shall be served and provided an opportunity to be heard as in other civil actions under Chapter 11 of Title 9, the "Georgia Civil Practice Act." If there is a legal father who is not the biological father, he shall be named as a party by the petitioner and shall be served and provided an opportunity to be heard as in other civil actions under Chapter 11 of Title 9, the "Georgia Civil Practice Act."
    1. Upon the presentation and filing of a legitimation petition, and after a hearing for which notice was provided to all interested parties, the court may issue an order declaring the biological father's relationship with the child to be legitimate, provided that such order is in the best interests of the child. If such order is issued, the biological father and child shall be capable of inheriting from each other in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock. Such order shall specify the name by which the child shall be known.
      1. If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the father caused his child to be conceived as a result of having nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the mother of his child or when the mother is less than ten years of age, or an offense which consists of the same or similar elements under federal law or the laws of another state or territory of the United States, it shall create a presumption against legitimation.
      2. Notwithstanding Code Section 53-2-3, if the court denies a legitimation petition under this paragraph, the child shall be capable of inheriting from or through his or her father. Notwithstanding Code Section 53-2-4, if the court denies a legitimation petition under this paragraph, the father shall not be capable of inheriting from or through his child.
      3. If there is a pending criminal proceeding in connection with an allegation made pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the court shall stay discovery in the legitimation action until the completion of such criminal proceeding.
  4. A legitimation petition may be filed, pursuant to Code Section 15-11-11, in the juvenile court of the county in which a dependency proceeding regarding the child is pending; provided, however, that if either parent has demanded a jury trial as to child support, that issue of the case shall be transferred to superior court for a jury trial. Such petition shall contain the same information and require the same service and opportunity to be heard as set forth in subsection (c) of this Code section. After a hearing, the juvenile court may issue the same orders as set forth in subsection (d) of this Code section.
  5. A superior court shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order establishing the obligation to support a child as provided under Code Section 19-6-15.
  6. A legitimation petition may also include claims for visitation, parenting time, or custody. If such claims are raised in the legitimation action, the court may order, in addition to legitimation, visitation, parenting time, or custody based on the best interests of the child standard. In a case involving allegations of family violence, the provisions of paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of Code Section 19-9-3 shall also apply.
  7. In any petition to establish paternity pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of Code Section 19-7-43, the alleged biological father's response may assert a third-party action for the legitimation of the child born out of wedlock if the alleged biological father is, in fact, the biological father. Upon the determination of paternity or if a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity has been made and has not been rescinded pursuant to Code Section 19-7-46.1, the court or trier of fact as a matter of law and pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 19-7-51 may enter an order or decree legitimating a child born out of wedlock, provided that such is in the best interests of the child. In determining the best interests of the child, the court should ensure that the petitioning alleged biological father is, in fact, the biological father and may order the mother, the alleged biological father, and the child to submit to genetic testing in accordance with Code Section 19-7-45. Whenever a petition to establish the paternity of a child is brought by the Department of Human Services, issues of name change, visitation, and custody shall not be determined by the court until such time as a separate petition is filed by one of the parents or by the legal guardian of the child, in accordance with Code Section 19-11-8; if the petition to establish paternity is brought by a party other than the Department of Human Services or if the alleged biological father seeks legitimation, the court may determine issues of name change, visitation, and custody in accordance with subsections (c) and (g) of this Code section. Custody of the child shall remain in the mother unless or until a court order is entered addressing the issue of custody.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 1738; Code 1868, § 1778; Code 1873, § 1787; Code 1882, § 1787; Civil Code 1895, § 2494; Civil Code 1910, § 3013; Code 1933, § 74-103; Ga. L. 1985, p. 279, § 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1720, § 5; Ga. L. 1989, p. 441, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1613, § 14; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1681, § 5; Ga. L. 2000, p. 20, § 10; Ga. L. 2005, p. 1491, § 1/SB 53; Ga. L. 2007, p. 554, § 6/HB 369; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 2-2/HB 228; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-24/HB 242; Ga. L. 2016, p. 219, § 2/SB 331; Ga. L. 2016, p. 304, § 3/SB 64.)

The 2016 amendments. The first 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, added the paragraph (c)(1) (now paragraph (d)(1)) designation; substituted present paragraph (c)(1) (now paragraph (d)(1)) for former subsection (c), which read: "Upon the presentation and filing of the petition, the court may pass an order declaring the father's relationship with the child to be legitimate, and that the father and child shall be capable of inheriting from each other in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and specifying the name by which the child shall be known."; and, added paragraph (c)(2) (now paragraph (d)(2)). The second 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, rewrote this Code section.

Cross references.

- Effect of legitimation on vital records, §§ 31-10-12,31-10-14.

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1997, subsection (b), as enacted by Ga. L. 1997, p. 1613, § 14, was redesignated as subsection (g) (now subsection (h)).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2016, a portion of the amendment of paragraph (c)(1) (now paragraph (d)(1)) of this Code section by Ga. L. 2016, p. 219, § 2/SB 331, was treated as impliedly repealed and superseded by Ga. L. 2016, p. 304, § 3/SB 64, due to irreconcilable conflict.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L 2007, p. 554, § 1/HB 369, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The General Assembly of Georgia declares that it is the policy of this state to assure that minor children have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interests of their children and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of rearing their children after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage or relationship."

Ga. L. 2007, p. 554, § 8/HB 369, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 2007 amendment shall apply to all child custody proceedings and modifications of child custody filed on or after January 1, 2008.

Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date. Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions."

Ga. L. 2016, p. 304, § 18/SB 64, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall not be construed to affect a voluntary acknowledgment of legitimation that was valid under the former provisions of Code Section 19-7-21.1, nor any of the rights or responsibilities flowing therefrom, if it was executed on or before June 30, 2016."

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of law of wills, trusts, and administration of estates, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 417 (1986). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 121 (1997). For survey article on domestic relations cases for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 223 (2003). For annual survey of wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 403 (2005). For survey article on domestic relations law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2007). For survey article on domestic relations law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 121 (2008). For survey article on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 417 (2008). For article on domestic relations, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 65 (2014). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 47 (2015). For annual survey on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 273 (2015). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 127 (2016). For annual survey on domestic relations, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2017). For note discussing the admissibility of husband and wife's testimony concerning nonaccess in determining the legitimacy of a child, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 448 (1970). For a note on the role of a judicial determination of paternity in the inheritance rights of illegitimate children in Georgia, see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 171 (1981). For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 234 (1989). For comment on statutes requiring consent of mother, but not of father, as prerequisite to adoption of illegitimate child, violating the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, see 29 Emory L.J. 833 (1981). For case comment, "In re Baby Girl Eason: Balancing Three Competing Interests in Third Party Adoptions," see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1217 (1988). For comment, "The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers in Georgia: In re Baby Girl Eason," see 5 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 591 (1989).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 does not violate constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Pruitt v. Lindsey, 261 Ga. 540, 407 S.E.2d 750 (1991).

Rights afforded a mother in the scheme for legitimating the mother's child render the mother a defendant within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; thus, that portion of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a) that provides for venue in the county of the putative father, when different from the county of the mother, offends the Georgia Constitution. If one portion of a statute is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Georgia has the power to sever that portion of the statute and preserve the remainder if the remaining portion of the act accomplishes the purpose the Georgia General Assembly intended; accordingly, severance of this venue provision does not affect the purpose of the remainder of the statute, and the remaining provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a) are to be given full effect. Holmes v. Traweek, 276 Ga. 296, 577 S.E.2d 777 (2003).

Application of amended statute.

- As there were no vested substantive rights that would have been impaired by application of the current version of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(b) to an appeal by a putative father, although the prior version was in effect at the time of the juvenile court's ruling, the current version was used for appellate review of the issues raised. In the Interest of A.H., 279 Ga. App. 77, 630 S.E.2d 587 (2006).

Effect of legitimation order.

- Because the juvenile court erred in the court's application of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), as a child's legal father was not one of the limited number of related third parties who could seek custody from a legal parent, and in light of the superior court's grant of a legitimation petition to the child's biological father, which the legal father did not challenge by way of an appeal, the legal father lacked standing to challenge the biological father's custody under present Georgia law, and therefore no longer had rights to the custody of the child. In the Interest of C.L., 284 Ga. App. 674, 644 S.E.2d 530 (2007).

No absolute right to legitimate child.

- Because the juvenile court failed to determine if one parent abandoned their opportunity interest to develop a relationship with the subject child, and failed to conduct a test of that parent's fitness or make a determination based upon the best interests of the child, the court's speculative conclusions were not equivalent to an examination of the benefit that might flow to the child if legitimated. Thus, the court, in essence, interpreted the parent's right to legitimate the child as absolute, without qualification, which was erroneous, requiring reversal. In the Interest of M.K., 288 Ga. App. 71, 653 S.E.2d 354 (2007).

Construction of section.

- Being in derogation of common law, statute must be strictly construed. In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 205 S.E.2d 522 (1974).

Construction with

§ 15-11-96. - Because a father failed to give written notice to the juvenile court that a legitimation petition was filed, as required by O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(h), within 30 days of receiving notification of a termination proceeding, the juvenile court properly entered an order terminating the father's parental rights, and the father was thus denied the right to object. In the Interest of S.M.R., 286 Ga. App. 139, 648 S.E.2d 697 (2007).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 19-9-61. - O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(f.1) effected a change in the prior rule of standing under which a putative father could not assert custody claims in a legitimation proceeding but did not create an exception to jurisdictional rules that apply in interstate custody cases under O.C.G.A. § 19-9-61 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq. Slay v. Calhoun, 332 Ga. App. 335, 772 S.E.2d 425 (2015).

Jurisdiction over legitimation petition and for placement.

- Contrary to a mother's contention, the custody order showed on the order's face such facts as were necessary to give the juvenile court jurisdiction of the person and subject matter because the order referenced and incorporated the legitimation order entered days earlier, reflected on the order's face that all parties were served with a copy of the pleadings and were present, along with their counsel, and the mother did not contest the juvenile court's personal jurisdiction. In the Interest of B. H.-W., 332 Ga. App. 269, 772 S.E.2d 66 (2015).

There is no statutory provision for inheritance by illegitimates, per se, from their fathers. Savage v. Blanks, 117 Ga. App. 316, 160 S.E.2d 461 (1968).

Section provides exclusive procedure for legitimizing children.

- Exclusive procedure by which fathers may render children legitimate was set forth in the statute. Savage v. Blanks, 117 Ga. App. 316, 160 S.E.2d 461 (1968).

Only a father can by voluntary unilateral action make an illegitimate child legitimate. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 99 S. Ct. 1742, 60 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1979).

Right is with father only.

- Clear language of statute showed legislative intent to be that father alone has right to legitimate a child, whether father was married or single. In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 205 S.E.2d 522 (1974).

It was not intent of legislature that legitimation proceedings be only available to unmarried fathers. In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 205 S.E.2d 522 (1974).

Qualification on father's right to legitimate child.

- Under statute, father's right to legitimate was absolute, subject only to qualification that natural mother may object and if she showed valid reasons why petition should not be granted, judge may deny the petition. In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 205 S.E.2d 522 (1974).

Mother's rights.

- Mother of illegitimate child is entitled to file objections to a petition brought by putative father to legitimate such child. Murphy v. Thomas, 89 Ga. App. 687, 81 S.E.2d 26 (1954).

Complaint for legitimation under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 cannot be maintained by the mother. Pruitt v. Lindsey, 261 Ga. 540, 407 S.E.2d 750 (1991).

Putative father who filed a legitimation petition pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-22 had to serve the mother with the petition in a timely manner, pursuant to the service requirements under § 17-9-22(b), as the juvenile court which was ruling on a county agency's petition to terminate parental rights over the child had only orally and provisionally terminated the mother's rights at the time that the putative father's petition for legitimation was filed and, accordingly, the mother was entitled to service. In the Interest of A.H., 279 Ga. App. 77, 630 S.E.2d 587 (2006).

Juvenile court properly granted a father's petition to legitimate the child, then ten months old, and granted placement to the father because the evidence established that the father did not abandon the child and had cared for and remained in contact as did the paternal grandmother, the court applied the parental fitness test, and once the court determined that the father had not abandoned his opportunity interest, the court was not required to apply the best interest of the child standard. In the Interest of B. H.-W., 332 Ga. App. 269, 772 S.E.2d 66 (2015).

Children born through adulterous relationships.

- Statute did not deny legitimization to children born through adulterous relationships. In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 205 S.E.2d 522 (1974).

If a father wants to gain the right to custody or visitation, he must take the steps required by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 to "legitimate the child," or, more correctly, to legitimate the relationship between himself and the child. Pruitt v. Lindsey, 261 Ga. 540, 407 S.E.2d 750 (1991).

Father of illegitimate child, legitimated by court order has claim to parental and custodial rights with respect to his child. Mitchell v. Ward, 231 Ga. 671, 203 S.E.2d 484 (1974).

Because an alleged legal father failed to provide the juvenile court with sufficient evidence that the father legitimated the child at issue, the father lacked standing to contest both the custody of the child and the court's order granting custody to DFCS; thus, the custody order was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings in which the father could legitimate the child, and if that occurred the court should enter a further order addressing the father's request for custody. In the Interest of A.D., 286 Ga. App. 352, 648 S.E.2d 786 (2007).

Legitimation does not immunize father against loss of custody.

- Fact that children have been legitimated does not ipso facto immunize their father from proper showing that children should be removed from his custody. Sims v. Pope, 228 Ga. 289, 185 S.E.2d 80 (1971).

Scope of rights conferred upon legitimated child.

- Legitimation under statute did not render illegitimate child legitimate according to full significance of that term, but only renders him so far legitimate as will enable him to inherit from his father. Hicks v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809, 22 S.E. 153 (1895).

Statute did not have effect of rendering legitimate an illegitimate child according to full significance of that term, but only to legitimate so as to enable child to inherit from father, to enjoy his name and like amenities. The authorized right to inherit does not extend to his father's wife who is not his mother nor to his half brothers and sisters. In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 205 S.E.2d 522 (1974).

Legitimation of illegitimate child gives the child no more right to support, and no more right than he already had not to be discriminated against because of his birth. Mabry v. Tadlock, 157 Ga. App. 257, 277 S.E.2d 688 (1981).

Visitation rights not at issue upon petition to legitimate.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 contains no language which can be read as requiring a trial court to consider a visitation issue when determining the merits of a petition to legitimate. In re J.B.K., 169 Ga. App. 450, 313 S.E.2d 147 (1984).

By asserting a counterclaim for paternity, the mother of a child born out of wedlock converted the putative father's legitimation action into a paternity suit; therefore, the trial court did not have the authority to consider an award of visitation to the putative father. Petersen v. Tyson, 253 Ga. App. 431, 559 S.E.2d 164 (2002).

Biological father had no absolute right to grant of legitimacy for purpose of obtaining visitation privileges with his children, and trial judge did not abuse the judge's inherent discretion in refusing to legitimate such children on ground that best interests of children would be served by maintaining status quo in stable family unit of children's mother and mother's present husband. Mabry v. Tadlock, 157 Ga. App. 257, 277 S.E.2d 688 (1981).

Mother is entitled to notice of petition to legitimate and may voice objection. Gregg v. Barnes, 203 Ga. App. 549, 417 S.E.2d 206, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 206 (1992).

Father's legitimacy order was properly granted as the father never abandoned his opportunity interest in forming a bond with his child; the father loved the child, continued to make efforts to contact him, and financially supported him. Carden v. Warren, 269 Ga. App. 275, 603 S.E.2d 769 (2004).

Out of state paternity order substantially equivalent to Georgia legitimation order and resulted in adoption denial.

- Trial court properly denied the applicants' motion to terminate a father's parental rights and denied the applicants' adoption petition because a State of Alabama paternity order obtained by the father was substantially equivalent to a Georgia legitimation order such that the father had not lost his right to contest the adoption and the father properly domesticated the Alabama order with the trial court. Park v. Bailey, 329 Ga. App. 569, 765 S.E.2d 721 (2014).

Cited in Bennett v. Day, 92 Ga. App. 680, 89 S.E.2d 674 (1955); Hobby v. Burke, 227 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1955); Chambers v. Lee, 215 Ga. 629, 112 S.E.2d 614 (1960); Blakemore v. Blakemore, 217 Ga. 174, 121 S.E.2d 642 (1961); Kersey v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 887 (M.D. Ga. 1967); Pettiford v. Frazier, 226 Ga. 438, 175 S.E.2d 549 (1970); Dobyns v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 227 Ga. 253, 179 S.E.2d 915 (1971); Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978); Woodes v. Morris, 247 Ga. 771, 279 S.E.2d 704 (1981); Williams v. Davenport, 159 Ga. App. 531, 284 S.E.2d 45 (1981); Craighead v. Davis, 163 Ga. App. 145, 290 S.E.2d 358 (1982); Pruitt v. Hooks, 163 Ga. App. 892, 296 S.E.2d 193 (1982); In re M.A.F., 254 Ga. 748, 334 S.E.2d 668 (1985); Prince v. Black, 256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986); Hardy v. Arcemont, 213 Ga. App. 243, 444 S.E.2d 327 (1994); In re Adventure Bound Sports, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ga. 1994); In the Interest of S.H., 251 Ga. App. 555, 553 S.E.2d 849 (2001); In the Interest of D.W., 264 Ga. App. 833, 592 S.E.2d 679 (2003); Allen v. State, 284 Ga. 310, 667 S.E.2d 54 (2008); Ray v. Hann, 323 Ga. App. 45, 746 S.E.2d 600 (2013).

Procedural Issues

Delay in filing petition.

- After the lapse of thirteen years, public policy forbids the court from becoming involved in a paternity suit when the plaintiff had an opportunity in 1983 to establish paternity even though the plaintiff alleges that the delay was partially a result of his reliance on counsel's correspondence. Grice v. Detwiler, 227 Ga. App. 280, 488 S.E.2d 755 (1997).

Delay based on genetic testing.

- Appellate court rejected a father's contention that the juvenile court erred in holding that a delay in instituting legitimation proceedings justified a finding that the father abandoned his opportunity interest, as the father's reason for the delay, specifically, waiting to obtain the results of genetic testing, was not a condition precedent to filing a legitimation petition; moreover, even with the delay, the father could have filed his legitimation petition and then sought court-ordered genetic testing. In the Interest of J.L.E., 281 Ga. App. 805, 637 S.E.2d 446 (2006).

Order terminating a biological parent's parental rights was upheld on appeal, as the parent failed to file for legitimation of the affected children within 30 days of being notified of the termination petition, despite repeatedly being notified to do so, and despite the appointment of an attorney in the termination proceedings. In the Interest of S.M.G., 284 Ga. App. 64, 643 S.E.2d 296 (2007).

Trial court properly terminated a parent's parental rights to a child as a result of the parent failing to timely file a notice of the petition to legitimate the child with the juvenile court within 30 days. The fact that the termination petition misstated relevant statutes did not relieve the parent of the obligation to file both a petition to legitimate and a notice. In the Interest of M.D., 293 Ga. App. 700, 667 S.E.2d 693 (2008).

Failure to file civil case filing form not fatal to legitimation petition.

- Putative biological father's failure to pay a filing fee and a civil case filing form required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3(b) was not fatal to the father's legitimation claim because the clerk, when asked by the father, did not require payment of a filing fee, and the father's attorney merely followed the procedure suggested by the clerk. Brewton v. Poss, 316 Ga. App. 704, 728 S.E.2d 837 (2012).

Continuance to complete service.

- Within the context of a parental rights termination proceeding, a juvenile court had the discretion to determine whether to grant an extension of time for a putative father to serve the legitimation petition on the mother, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-96(i),19-7-22(b), and Georgia case law that allowed application of the procedural rules set out in the Civil Practice Act, including O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c) relating to service and extensions thereto; accordingly, the juvenile court's refusal to hear the legitimation petition was error as was the decision to terminate the putative father's parental rights under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 without first determining that he had standing or not under the legitimation action. In the Interest of A.H., 279 Ga. App. 77, 630 S.E.2d 587 (2006).

Denial of motion to sever improper.

- Trial court abused the court's discretion by denying a putative biological father's motion to sever his petition for legitimation of a son from a husband's adoption proceeding because the father's petition substantially complied with the substance of the legitimation statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22; the petition contained the requisite information, it was served on the wife, and it was timely filed in the proper court, and the father's failure to file his petition as a separate civil action caused no prejudice to anyone. Brewton v. Poss, 316 Ga. App. 704, 728 S.E.2d 837 (2012).

Father's wife has no legal status to object to legitimation even though child was conceived by another woman during wife's marriage to father. In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 205 S.E.2d 522 (1974).

Standing of legitimated father as to challenges to custody.

- Upon legitimation, father stands in same position as any other parent regarding challenges to custody for good and legal cause. Sims v. Pope, 228 Ga. 289, 185 S.E.2d 80 (1971).

Right to file objections to petition.

- Although O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 only provides for notice to the mother, this notice implies a right to file objections to the petition. In re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194, 293 S.E.2d 457 (1982); Adamavage v. Holloway, 206 Ga. App. 156, 424 S.E.2d 837 (1992).

Georgia Civil Practice Act rules applicable.

- Court of Appeals of Georgia, First Division interprets the language of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(b) to mean that the procedural rules set out in the Georgia Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, and Georgia case law interpreting those rules should apply to the service of a legitimation petition; accordingly, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, First Division concluded that a juvenile court has discretion to grant a putative biological father a continuance of a legitimation or parental rights termination hearing in order to allow him additional time to perfect service of his legitimation petition upon the biological mother, irrespective of whether the 30-day limitation period set out in O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) has passed. In the Interest of A.H., 279 Ga. App. 77, 630 S.E.2d 587 (2006).

Right to trial by jury.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-40 expressly prohibited jury trials in paternity actions, and since the mother and former boyfriend consolidated a paternity action with a legitimation proceeding, which did allow for a jury trial, the right to a jury trial under the legitimation statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22, had to give way because otherwise the goals of the paternity statute would be thwarted; accordingly, the mother had no right to a jury trial in the consolidated action. Banks v. Hopson, 275 Ga. 758, 571 S.E.2d 730 (2002).

Petitions for legitimation separate civil actions.

- Father's petition for legitimation should have been filed as a separate civil action because the language within O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 suggested that legitimation petitions were separate civil actions; the absence of language explicitly providing for a similar avenue in the adoption context implies that the legislature intended legitimation petitions to be stand-alone actions. Brewton v. Poss, 316 Ga. App. 704, 728 S.E.2d 837 (2012).

Application

Evidence supported denial of legitimation petition.

- Because the evidence presented before the juvenile court showed that a biological father: (1) initially refused to take a DNA test to establish paternity; (2) was hostile toward the child's case worker; (3) waited over two years after the child's birth to file a legitimation petition; (4) never visited the child and apparently spoke to the child only once on the telephone after the child was placed in foster care; and (5) failed to provide financial support for the child, the evidence was sufficient to allow the juvenile court to determine that the father abandoned any opportunity and interest to develop a relationship with the child and to deny the father's legitimation petition. In the Interest of L.S.T., 286 Ga. App. 638, 649 S.E.2d 841 (2007).

Husband could not legitimize child.

- Former husband was improperly awarded the former wife's biological child; the husband was unable to legitimize the child under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-22 and19-7-25, as those legitimation procedures only applied to biological fathers, and the husband and wife always acknowledged that the child, born before the parties' marriage, was not the husband's biological father. Veal v. Veal, 281 Ga. 128, 636 S.E.2d 527 (2006).

Petition for legitimation denied when not filed in good faith.

- When gist of mother's objections to father's petition to legitimate child was that he had no paternal interest in the child but sought only to deprive her of the child by delivering the child into the possession of his mother and father, which if true would authorize the trial court in the exercise of the court's discretion to find that the petition was not filed in good faith and to deny the application for legitimation, the trial court did not err in overruling demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to the mother's objections. Murphy v. Thomas, 89 Ga. App. 687, 81 S.E.2d 26 (1954).

Denial of petition improperly set aside.

- Trial court erred by setting aside the denial of a biological father's petition for legitimation because the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity preempted the denial as the father failed to make the trial court aware of the acknowledgment and could not subsequently use the document to set aside the trial court's final judgment. Allifi v. Raider, 323 Ga. App. 510, 746 S.E.2d 763 (2013).

Evidence did not support denial of legitimation petition.

- Trial court erred in denying a parent's petition to legitimate a child because the parent's constant payment of financial support coupled with the parent's avowed interest in establishing and maintaining a relationship with the child mitigated against a finding of abandonment. Binns v. Fairnot, 292 Ga. App. 336, 665 S.E.2d 36 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1848, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 876 (Ga. 2008).

New trial after mother participated in fraudulent scheme.

- Trial court erred in denying a child's extraordinary motion for new trial based on the mother's participation in a fraudulent scheme to have the child legitimated by someone other than the child's father. Clements v. Phillips, 235 Ga. App. 588, 510 S.E.2d 311 (1998).

Stepfather could not be awarded custody.

- It was error for a trial court to award a child's legal and physical custody to the child's stepfather because: (1) the child's mother was permitted to exercise all parental power over the child since the child's father had not legitimated the child under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22; (2) the stepfather had not adopted the child; and (3) as a result, the stepfather did not have the same status as any of the nonparents specified in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), leaving the trial court with no discretion to award the child's custody to the stepfather. Phillips v. Phillips, 316 Ga. App. 829, 730 S.E.2d 548 (2012).

Grandparents' rights to bring action for custody not dependent on legitimation.

- Paternal grandparents' right to bring an action for custody of a child was controlled by a showing that their son was the parent of the child, not by their son legitimating that child; a trial court's order dismissing the paternal grandparents' custody action for lack of standing due to a void legitimation of the child was reversed. Reeves v. Hayes, 266 Ga. App. 297, 596 S.E.2d 668 (2004).

Legitimation judgment authorized.

- When the mother had notice and had additionally consented to try all issues between the parties, which included competing claims for custody of the child, and when no objection to the legitimation appears of record, the judgment of legitimation was authorized. Gregg v. Barnes, 203 Ga. App. 549, 417 S.E.2d 206, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 206 (1992).

Intervention by adoption agency and adoptive parents.

- As legal custodians of the child, adoption agency and adoptive parents had an interest in the father's petition to legitimate the child, and when their rights were not represented, they had a right to intervene. In re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194, 293 S.E.2d 457 (1982).

Adoptive parents need not reveal their true identity in their objections to the father's petition to legitimate the child they seek to adopt. In re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194, 293 S.E.2d 457 (1982).

Modification of support in context of legitimation proceeding.

- Even though a petition for modification of child support could be brought in the context of a legitimation proceeding, a showing of changed circumstances is required before an existing award may be modified. Department of Human Resources v. Jones, 215 Ga. App. 322, 450 S.E.2d 339 (1994).

Order granting legitimation overturned.

- It was error to grant the petition of the probable biological father to legitimate a minor child whom the legal father had been raising since birth as his own son since the biological father had abandoned his opportunity by failing to take action for nearly three years, the court did not inquire into and apply the best interests of the child standard, and the court did not consider the legal father's prior order. LaBrec v. Davis, 243 Ga. App. 307, 534 S.E.2d 84 (2000).

Termination of parental rights.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C), the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the husband's parental rights because the biological father's petition to legitimate a child who was born in wedlock was a petition to terminate the parental rights of the legal father; after the superior court determined that the biological father had not abandoned his opportunity interest, the issue became whether the superior court could grant the petition to legitimate the child, and to grant the legitimation petition required the superior court to first terminate the parental rights of the husband, who was the legal father. Brine v. Shipp, 291 Ga. 376, 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012).

Name change.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting a father's name change petition, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(g)(1), when he filed a legitimation petition because the evidence supported the trial court's ruling that it was in the child's best interest, would strengthen the father and son bond, and the child and mother no longer shared the same surname. Riggins v. Stirgus, 319 Ga. App. 790, 738 S.E.2d 635 (2013).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Illegitimate child defined.

- Illegitimate child, or bastard, is a child born out of wedlock and whose parents do not subsequently intermarry. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 138.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Illegitimate Children, § 113 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 14 C.J.S., Children Out-of-Wedlock, § 16 et seq.

ALR.

- Attempt to bastardize child as affecting right to custody of the child, 37 A.L.R. 531.

Statute regarding status or rights of children born out of wedlock as applicable to children born before it became effective, 140 A.L.R. 1323.

What amounts to recognition within statutes affecting the status or rights of illegitimates, 33 A.L.R.2d 705.

Right of putative father to visitation with child born out of wedlock, 58 A.L.R.5th 669.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22

Total Results: 17  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Hood v. Todd, 695 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 17, 2010 | 287 Ga. 164, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 1615

...I am authorized to state that Justice THOMPSON joins in this dissent. NOTES [1] Though Todd asserts that she has been legitimated under OCGA § 53-2-3(2)(A)(iii) and (v), this assertion is incorrect. OCGA § 53-2-3 does not set forth legitimation procedures (which are instead prescribed in OCGA § 19-7-22) but merely addresses the inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock....
Copy

Davis v. LaBrec, 549 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 25, 2001 | 274 Ga. 5, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 1988

...irth to a child in 1995. LaBrec was present at the child's birth and is named on the birth certificate as the child's father. In July 1996, LaBrec became the child's legal father when he obtained a court order legitimating the child pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-22....
...We made clear, however, that absent the State's involvement and under other circumstances, the best interests of the child standard would be adequate. Id. The facts of this case are distinguishable from Eason in two important respects. First, LaBrec is the child's legal father. See OCGA § 19-7-22....
...Under these circumstances, we find that Davis's interests as the biological father are adequately protected by the best interests of the child standard. See In re the Matter of J.M.S., 257 Ga. 630, 362 S.E.2d 56 (1987) (applying best interests of child test to petition to legitimate under OCGA § 19-7-22); *78 Ghrist v....
Copy

Prince v. Black, 344 S.E.2d 411 (Ga. 1986).

Cited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 1986 | 256 Ga. 79

...their lifetimes pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-8. Likewise the father of an illegitimate child who intends to have his child legally recognized so that the child may inherit from his estate as his lawful heir may accomplish his objective pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-22....
Copy

Pruitt v. Lindsey, 407 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 6, 1991 | 261 Ga. 540

...t Guidelines," are the expression of the legislative will regarding the calculation of child support and must be considered by any court setting child support. 2. Ms. Pruitt next argues that the dismissal of her complaint for legitimation under OCGA § 19-7-22 violates constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. We disagree. OCGA § 19-7-22 states that "[a] father of a child born out of wedlock may render the same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence...." Under the plain language of the statute, the procedure applies only to fathers....
...In spite of this change, however, the statute providing for "legitimation" was not deleted. This is so because the law provides that only the mother of a child born out of wedlock is entitled to custody of the child "unless the father legitimates him as provided in Code Section 19-7-22." OCGA § 19-7-25. Under the current legislative scheme, if a father wants to gain the right to custody or visitation, he must take the steps required by OCGA § 19-7-22 to "legitimate the child," or, more correctly, to legitimate the relationship between himself and the child. Thus, if paternity has been established, the only rights affected by OCGA § 19-7-22, are the rights of the father....
...its its power.... Heedless of Truth and Mercy the majority forfeits its power to protect this child and other illegitimate children by refusing to strike the statute as unconstitutional and erroneously declaring that the only rights affected by OCGA § 19-7-22 are the father's rights....
...itimate the child, and yet this father refuses to legitimate his son. [1] The very important right of the child to be rendered legitimate is the issue, and under our statutory law, that exclusive power and control is in the hands of the father. OCGA § 19-7-22....
...r subsequently marries the mother and "recognizes" the child as his own. OCGA § 19-7-20(c). Alternatively, a child who is not legitimate may be "rendered" legitimate if his father files a petition in the Superior Court to legitimate his child. OCGA § 19-7-22....
...[3] The most any court can do is to grant certain rights to the illegitimate child. It cannot declare legitimacy despite overwhelming evidence that the reputed father is the biological father. Similarly, the wishes of the child or of the mother mean nothing if the father refuses to legitimate the child. The statute, OCGA § 19-7-22, should be declared unconstitutional because by granting the father the exclusive right to legitimate his child, it simultaneously grants to him the exclusive privilege to deny his child the right to be called legitimate....
Copy

Mathenia v. Brumbelow, 843 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 18, 2020 | 308 Ga. 714

...Mathenia was married to a different man at the time that she became pregnant with Brumbelow’s child,4 and she remained married to her husband after E. M. was born. Thus, there is a statutory presumption that Mathenia’s husband is E. M.’s legal father. See OCGA § 19-7-22 (a) ability of appellate courts to notice some undisputed facts not rejected by a trial court.” Dissent at 728....
...dissent contends, but one in which we are clarifying the appropriate standard of review to be utilized by appellate courts. 4 The superior court expressly found, and the parties do not dispute, that Brumbelow is the biological father of E. M. See OCGA § 19-7-22 (a) (1) (“‘Biological father’ means the male who impregnated the biological mother resulting in the birth of a child.”). (2) (B) (“‘Legal father’ means a male who has not surrendered or had terminated his rights to a child and who ....
...“This opportunity interest begins at conception and endures probably throughout the minority of the child. But it is fathers by requiring that they be served with the legitimation petition and named as a party, allowing their parental rights to be adjudicated. See OCGA § 19-7-22 (c) (“If there is a legal father who is not the biological father, he shall be named as a party by the petitioner and shall be served and provided an opportunity to be heard as in other civil actions under Chapter 11 of Title 9, the ‘Georgia Civil Practice Act.’”)....
...standard of review. See, e.g., Hughes, supra, 296 Ga. at 744-745. Appeals did not consider an important statutory matter in its analysis, we address the issue. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals did not consider the application of OCGA § 19-7-22 (d) (1)....
...the standard which must be used to determine [the biological father’s] right to legitimate the child is his fitness as a parent to have custody of the child [rather than the best interests of the child standard]”). However, effective July 1, 2016, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 19-7-22 (d) (1) to require a different test, specifically, that legitimation petitions be decided under the “best interests of the child” standard: Upon the presentation and filing of a legitimation petition, and after a hearing f...
...involving the “best interests” standard, but cited only OCGA § 19-7- 1 (b.1) (discussing “best interests” standard in certain custody matters involving a parent and certain enumerated third parties) in an effort to explain why the “fit parent” standard applied, not OCGA § 19-7-22 (d) (1), which specifically directs that the “best interests of the child” standard apply in legitimation cases. But, regardless of whether OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1) could be applicable in this case, the tension identified by the Court of Appeals exists between Eason and the statute that is directly applicable in this case, OCGA § 19-7-22 (d) (1). Whether OCGA § 19-7-22 (d) (1) is unconstitutional as applied in this case due to Eason’s holding is not a question that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to answer....
...shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction in . . . all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision has been drawn in question.”). However, the Court of Appeals could, in some future case, decide whether OCGA § 19-7-22 (d) (1) may be reasonably construed to avoid constitutional concerns. 15 See 15 By its plain terms, OCGA § 19-7-22 (d) (1) would seem to apply in this case, and the statute has never been declared unconstitutional....
...ible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that [the legislature] did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”). But it is not at all clear that a reasonable interpretation of OCGA § 19-7-22 (d) (1) would essentially allow an appellate court to graft “fit parent” language onto the statute when the statute only mentions the “best interests of the child” standard....
Copy

Allen v. State, 667 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 22, 2008 | 284 Ga. 310, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2968

...State, 282 Ga. 792, 795(6), 653 S.E.2d 435 (2007). The evidence was that Markell was born to Van Eeden and Allen when they were not married, and that they were never married to each other. Nor was there evidence that Allen legitimated the child. See OCGA § 19-7-22....
...Consequently, the evidence was that Markell was a child born out of wedlock. OCGA § 19-7-23(1). A child born out of wedlock who is not legitimated by the father is in the sole custody of the mother, who has all parental power over the child. OCGA §§ 19-7-22; 19-7-25....
Copy

Holcomb v. Ellis, 385 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 1989).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 30, 1989 | 259 Ga. 625

...hat he was not the father of the child or, if it should be determined that he was the biological father, that the court enter an order declaring with specificity his support obligation and his visitation rights and to legitimate the child under OCGA § 19-7-22....
Copy

In re M. A. F., 254 Ga. 748 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 1985 | 334 S.E.2d 668

...Once the termination order was entered the court was of the opinion that it was required to award custody to the NCDFCS under the language of OCGA § 15-11-54.4 It is from that order that the appellant brings this appeal. Case Nos. 42128 and 42171 1. The biological mother, the only parent entitled to custody of MAF, OCGA § 19-7-22, and the only parent with parental control, OCGA § 19-7-25, made a voluntary contract, OCGA § 19-7-1 (b) (1), that was clear, definite, and certain, Blackburn v....
Copy

Veal v. Veal, 281 Ga. 128 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 2006 | 636 S.E.2d 527, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 3171

...welfare of H. and awarded full custody to husband.1 Wife appeals. H. was born prior to the parties’ marriage. “Only the mother of a child born out of wedlock is entitled to [her] custody, unless the father legitimates [her] as provided in Code Section 19-7-22. Otherwise, the mother may exercise all parental power over the child.”2 Under OCGA § 19-7-22, the biological father of a child born out of wedlock may legitimate his parental relationship with the child by petitioning the superior court of the county of the residence of the chil d’s mother (or other party having legal custody) o...
...father of the child as his shall render the child legitimate.”5 Contrary to husband’s contention, this Code section does not provide a means for a step-parent to legitimate a child. Rather, the Code section provides an alternative method to OCGA § 19-7-22 by which a reputed biological father may formalize the legal ties between himself and his child by marrying the child’s mother and treating the child as his own....
...of the child. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. The trial court was particularly concerned with the fact that wife had degraded husband in H.’s presence and had interfered with husband’s visitation rights. OCGA § 19-7-25. OCGA § 19-7-22. 235 Ga....
Copy

In re C. N. W., 274 Ga. 765 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 11, 2002 | 560 S.E.2d 1, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 417

...a final order pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 7 of this title; (D) Has been determined to be the father by a final paternity order pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 7 of this title; or (E) Has legitimated the child by a final order pursuant to Code Section 19-7-22, and who has not surrendered or had terminated his rights to the child. OCGA § 19-8-1 (8) states: “ ‘Parent’ ” means either the legal father or the legal mother of the child.” OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) provides: Except as oth...
Copy

In re J. M. S., 257 Ga. 630 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 24, 1987 | 362 S.E.2d 56

Gregory, Justice. In October 1984, petitioner filed a petition to legitimate JMS under the authority of OCGA § 19-7-22....
Copy

Banks v. Hopson, 571 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2002 | 275 Ga. 758, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2967

...[1] In his answer, Hopson admitted that he was named as the biological father on the child's birth certificate and that he was paying $750 per month in child support. Eight months later, Hopson filed a complaint for legitimation and Banks filed a counterclaim for child support, demanding a trial by jury under OCGA § 19-7-22(f)....
...Banks filed an application for a discretionary appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the State of Georgia denied. This Court granted her petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict between OCGA § 19-7-40(a), which prohibits jury trials in paternity actions, and OCGA § 19-7-22(f), which allows jury trials on child support in legitimation proceedings....
...ld relationship in juvenile court. [8] Of relevance *732 in this appeal are the act's provisions giving the juvenile court jurisdiction to hear legitimation petitions and either parent the right to a jury trial in superior court on support. [9] OCGA § 19-7-22(f) provides: "After a petition for legitimation is granted, if a demand for a jury trial as to support has been properly filed by either parent, then the case shall be transferred to superior court for such jury trial." [10] In construing...
...after Hopson stipulated to paternity; therefore, the ban on jury trials in OCGA § 19-7-40(a) no longer controlled; the remaining issues before the trial court were legitimation, which Banks did not oppose, visitation, and child support; under OCGA § 19-7-22(f), she had an express statutory right to a jury trial on child support....
...Laws 1681 (amending statutory provisions in code titles on courts and domestic relations related to biological fathers who are not legal fathers, termination of parent-child relationships, and legitimation proceedings). [9] See OCGA §§ 15-11-28(e) (2001); 19-7-22(a)(f) (1999)....
Copy

Holmes v. Traweek, 276 Ga. 296 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 10, 2003 | 577 S.E.2d 777, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 787

Hines, Justice. This Court granted an application for interlocutory review to determine whether there is a conflict between OCGA § 19-7-22 (a)’s provision that a father seeking to legitimate a child may file a petition to do so in “the superior court of the county of his residence ....
....” and Article VI, Section II, Paragraph VI, of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, which declares that venue in a civil case is in the county where the defendant resides, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. Finding that there is a conflict, we find that portion of OCGA § 19-7-22 (a) to be unconstitutional. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V. Traweek is the father of a minor child born to Holmes. Traweek resides in Houston County; the child resides with Holmes in Dooly County. OCGA § 19-7-22 (a) reads: “A father of a child born out of wedlock may render the same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence, the county of residence of the child, or, if a petition for the adoption of the child is...
...roduce evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal. See 59 AmJur2d, Parties, § 41. The legitimation statute does not refer to the mother as a “defendant,” but it does require that she be given notice of the petition for legitimation, OCGA § 19-7-22 (b), that she have notice of any support obligations the court imposes upon the father, OCGA § 19-7-22 (e), and it gives the mother the power to demand a jury trial on the question of support, OCGA § 19-7-22 (f)....
...The mother may appeal an award of legitimacy. See Adamavage v. Holloway, 206 Ga. App. 156 (424 SE2d 837) (1992). Further, “[o]nly the mother of a child bom out of wedlock is entitled to [the child’s] custody, unless the father legitimates [the child] as provided in Code Section 19-7-22....
...ringe. We therefore conclude that the rights afforded the mother in the scheme for legitimating her child render her a defendant within the meaning of Article VI, Section II, Paragraph VI, of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. Thus, that portion of OCGA § 19-7-22 (a) that provides for venue in the county of the putative father, when different from the county of the mother, offends the Georgia Constitution....
...mplishes the purpose the legislature intended. [Cits.]” Nixon v. State, 256 Ga. 261, 264 (3) (347 SE2d 592) (1986). Severance of this venue provision does not affect the purpose of the remainder of the statute, and the remaining provisions of OCGA § 19-7-22 (a) are to be given full effect. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. Roberts, Rainwater & Ingram, David N....

Marquez v. Aguirre (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2025 | 577 S.E.2d 777, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 787

...existing legal father, and the trial court is required to consider the best interests of the child”). Through the process of legitimation, Georgia law provides biological fathers with the opportunity to assert their claim to legal fatherhood. See OCGA § 19-7-22....
...to be considered the legal child of the husband, meaning that a child born to a married couple appears to be legitimate at birth. On the other hand, petitions for legitimation can be brought by biological fathers of children “born out of wedlock.” See OCGA § 19-7-22....
...6 To be clear, I am not suggesting a conclusive reading of OCGA § 19-7- 22. There are suggestions in the text, like the requirement that the petition name a non-biological legal father as a party, that may suggest authority for this sort of claim. See OCGA § 19-7-22(c). There are, of course, additional definitions of legal fathers. See OCGA § 19-7-22(a)(2)....
Copy

In Re Cnw, 560 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2002).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 11, 2002 | 274 Ga. 765

...a final order pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 7 of this title; (D) Has been determined to be the father by a final paternity order pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 7 of this title; or (E) Has legitimated the child by a final order pursuant to Code Section 19-7-22, and who has not surrendered or had terminated his rights to the child....
Copy

In Matter of Jms, 362 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. 1987).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 24, 1987 | 257 Ga. 630

...630 (1987) 362 S.E.2d 56 IN THE MATTER OF J. M. S. 44740. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided November 24, 1987. R. Glen Galbaugh, for appellant. Gail Tusan Joyner, for appellee. GREGORY, Justice. In October 1984, petitioner filed a petition to legitimate JMS under the authority of OCGA § 19-7-22....
Copy

In Re Maf, 334 S.E.2d 668 (Ga. 1985).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 1985 | 254 Ga. 748

...Once the termination order was entered the court was of the opinion that it was required to award custody to the NCDFCS under the language of OCGA § 15-11-54. [4] It is from that order that the appellant brings this appeal. Case Nos. 42128 and 42171 1. The biological mother, the only parent entitled to custody of MAF, OCGA § 19-7-22, and the only parent with parental control, OCGA § 19-7-25, made a voluntary contract, OCGA § 19-7-1 (b) (1), that was clear, definite, and certain, Blackburn v....