O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-9-66 (2019)

Procedure when proceedings pending in another state

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 19-9-64, a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this part if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this article; unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under Code Section 19-9-67. (b) Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 19-9-64, a court of this state, before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to Code Section 19-9-69. If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this article, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this article does not determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding. (c) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to

enforce a child custody determination has been commenced in another state, the court may: (1) Stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement; (2) Enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or (3) Proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.

History

Code 1981, § 19-9-66, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 129, § 1.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, former Code 1933, §§ 74-501 through 74-525, subsequently codified as §§ 19-9-40 through 19-9-64, are included in the annotations for this Code section. Purpose of former § 19-9-46 was prevention of jurisdictional conflicts between states. Webb v. Webb, 245 Ga. 650, 266 S.E.2d 463, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 882 (1980) (decided under former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act). Informational requirements of former § 19-9-49 were necessary to effective functioning of former § 19-9-46. Youmans v. Youmans, 247 Ga. 529, 276 S.E.2d 837, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 716 (1981) (decided under former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act). Jurisdiction in Georgia disallowed when proceeding pending in another state. - Wisconsin court was exercising jurisdiction in child custody proceeding substantially in conformity with the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act when Wisconsin had significant connections with both parents and child, was marital home of parties, and was state where child in question was born and in which parties’ divorce was obtained and all earlier child custody determinations were made. Consequently, it was improper for the Georgia court to exercise

the Georgia court’s jurisdiction in a proceeding brought by child’s mother, who had removed the child from Wisconsin and was residing in Georgia. Steele v. Steele, 250 Ga. 101, 296 S.E.2d 570, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1012 (1982) (decided under former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act). Florida court’s award of custody to the father was not entitled to recognition in Georgia since the Florida court assumed jurisdiction over issues of child custody in disregard of the requirement imposed by subsection (c) of former § 19-9-46 and since Georgia was the home state of the children at the time of the Florida court’s action. Thompson v. Thompson, 241 Ga. App. 616, 526 S.E.2d 576, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1593 (1999) (decided under former Code Section 19-9-46). No requirement to confer with foreign court that lacked jurisdiction. - As Georgia was a child’s home state and South Carolina did not have jurisdiction over child custody under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq., the Georgia trial court was not required by O.C.G.A. § 19-9-66(b) to confer with a South Carolina trial court where a parent had filed a custody action. Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303, 680 S.E.2d 150, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 676 (2009). Jurisdiction properly exercised by Georgia court. - Record demonstrated that the North Carolina court was not

exercising jurisdiction under the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act because at the time of the former husband’s motion for change of custody, North Carolina had not been the child’s home state within six months before commencement of the custody proceedings; thus, the Georgia court did not err in assuming jurisdiction in these proceedings brought by the natural mother’s new husband for permanent adoption. Kelly v. Silverstein, 207 Ga. App. 381, 427 S.E.2d 851, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 211 (1993) (decided under former Code Section 19-9-46). Trial court erred in dismissing a husband’s divorce complaint on the ground that jurisdiction was properly with the Italian court because the trial court had jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 19-9-61(a) and (b), and no other court did since Georgia was the only state, including Italy, that could qualify as the “home state” of the parties’ child pursuant to the UCCJEA, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-41(7), at the time either the Italian custody proceeding or the Georgia proceeding was commenced and at the time the trial court entered the court’s initial child custody order; under the UCCJEA, the jurisdictional inquiry entered into by the Italian court was insufficient because the Italian court undertook no analysis of the home state of the child or of any other factors that could be

considered a substitute for such but simply found that the prerequisites for jurisdiction over a divorce action were met. Bellew v. Larese, 288 Ga. 495, 706 S.E.2d 78, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 91 (2011). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by denying a wife’s motion to stay the Georgia divorce proceeding commenced by the husband in lieu of the State of New York proceeding the wife filed because the record showed that the wife and children had lived in Georgia with the husband since 2000 and continued to live in Georgia until sometime after the couple filed their respective petitions for divorce; thus, Georgia was the home state of the children for the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq., and New York was not. Black v. Black, 292 Ga. 691, 740 S.E.2d 613, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 301 (2013). Attempt to retain perpetual jurisdiction unconstitutional. - Ohio court’s attempt to retain perpetual jurisdiction of children by an initial decree allowing the mother to move to Georgia only on condition that she submit eternally to the jurisdiction of Ohio was essentially unconstitutional for preventing the mother and her children from living wherever the mother who had legal custody chose. Gouse v. Wilson, 207 Ga. App. 574, 428 S.E.2d 571, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 279 (1993), aff’d in part, 263 Ga. 887, 441 S.E.2d 57, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 133 (1994) (decided under former Code Section 19-954).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abatement, Survival and Revival, §§ 18, 19, 33. 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 142 et seq. C.J.S. 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival, §§ 38, 53. 27A C.J.S., Divorce, § 141 et seq. 27C C.J.S., Divorce, § 1385 et seq. U.L.A. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.L.A.) § 6. ALR. What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)

or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 78 A.L.R.4th 1028. Significant connection jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(2) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(B), 5 A.L.R.5th 550; 67 A.L.R.5th 1. Abandonment and emergency jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(3) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(C), 5 A.L.R.5th 788. Pending proceeding in another state as

ground for declining jurisdiction under § 6(a) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental

Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g), 20 A.L.R.5th 700.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2009–2026 · leading case: Bellew v. Larese, 706 S.E.2d 78 (Ga. 2011).
Bellew v. Larese, 706 S.E.2d 78 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 8× “OCGA § 19-9-66 (a). 7 (Emphasis supplied.”
Black v. Black, 740 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 6× “*694 (a) Generally speaking, a Georgia court cannot exercise jurisdiction to determine child custody “if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction…”
Croft v. Croft, 680 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “The father also argues that the trial court erred in failing to confer with the trial court in South Carolina before exercising jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 19-9-66. This argument is without merit.”
Lopez v. Olson, 724 S.E.2d 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 19-9-66. On May 12, 2010, the Alaska court entered an interim order in Lopez’s pending custody proceeding granting joint legal custody of the children to Lopez and the Olsons with temporary placement of the children with the Olsons.”
Shannon Newsome v. Ryan Hawkins (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 10× “See OCGA § 19-9-66. That procedures requires that, once another state has commenced custody proceedings, a Georgia court may not exercise jurisdiction unless the other state’s proceeding has been terminated or stayed because Georgia is the more convenient forum.”
Paul E. Sprenkle, Jr. v. Kathleen M. Sprenkle (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 4× “In addition, we note that OCGA § 19-9-66, governing simultaneous proceedings under the UCCJEA, pertinently provides: 5 We note that — as we have previously stated and as required by the Act itself — in applying and construing the provisions of the UCCJEA as codified in Georgia,…”
— 19-9-66(a) — 1 case
Shannon Newsome v. Ryan Hawkins (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “See OCGA § 19-9-66. That procedures requires that, once another state has commenced custody proceedings, a Georgia court may not exercise jurisdiction unless the other state’s proceeding has been terminated or stayed because Georgia is the more convenient forum.”
— 19-9-66(b) — 1 case
Shannon Newsome v. Ryan Hawkins (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “See OCGA § 19-9-66. That procedures requires that, once another state has commenced custody proceedings, a Georgia court may not exercise jurisdiction unless the other state’s proceeding has been terminated or stayed because Georgia is the more convenient forum.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.