Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under former Code 1933, §§ 58-206, Ga. L. 1935, p. 73, and Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Evidence sufficient to support conviction of manufacture of nontax-paid distilled spirits.

- See Hall v. State, 189 Ga. App. 824, 377 S.E.2d 907 (1989).

Ga. L. 1935, p. 73 clearly provides that it is a misdemeanor to sell malt beverages without having secured a license to do so. Hudon v. North Atlanta, 108 Ga. App. 370, 133 S.E.2d 58 (1963) (decided under Ga. L. 1935, p. 73).

Operation of distillery in dry county a felony.

- Person found operating distillery making alcoholic liquors in dry county is guilty of unlawful manufacture of such liquor which is a felony. Shuman v. State, 82 Ga. App. 130, 60 S.E.2d 521 (1950) (decided under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Not criminal act to violate Department of Revenue regulation.

- O.C.G.A. §§ 3-3-9 and3-3-27(c)(2) provide that it is a misdemeanor to violate a prohibition or provision of the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code, but these provisions do not make it a criminal act to violate a Georgia Department of Revenue regulation; although the parties intended to circumvent Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-2-2-.38 by issuing corporate stock to an employee's wife, the stock agreement was not illegal or immoral; thus, a trial court erred in voiding the stock interest of the employee's wife, and summary judgment in favor of the corporation in the wife's action for an accounting, dissolution, and other relief was reversed. Edwards v. Grapefields, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 399, 599 S.E.2d 489 (2004).

Irrelevant allegation in indictment mere surplusage.

- Where indictment sufficiently charged manufacture of liquor in dry county, allegation that this was done without having first obtained a manufacturer's license as required by law would be treated as mere surplusage. Tanner v. State, 90 Ga. App. 789, 84 S.E.2d 600 (1954) (decided under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Burden of proof.

- It need only be proven that the defendant is guilty of manufacturing one particular brand of liquor, but the state must prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. Hobbs v. State, 98 Ga. App. 816, 107 S.E.2d 253 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Presence at still sufficient to support conviction for manufacturing.

- One who is present at a distillery when liquor is being manufactured and personally assists in any way in the manufacture is guilty of manufacturing liquor, and it is immaterial whether or not one owns the distillery, and whether or not one is hired to work there. Tanner v. State, 90 Ga. App. 789, 84 S.E.2d 600 (1954) (decided under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Presence of person at distillery where intoxicating liquor is being made, and the person's flight on seeing an officer approaching, may, when not satisfactorily explained, authorize the jury to find the person guilty of making such liquor. Smith v. State, 46 Ga. App. 351, 167 S.E. 714 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Presence at still sufficient to support conviction for possession.

- Since the presence of the defendant at a place where a still was in operation and the defendant's flight from it would have been sufficient to have convicted the defendant of manufacturing whiskey and since the same rule as to sufficiency must apply where one is charged with possession of whiskey stored at such a distillery, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty. Johnson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 210, 53 S.E.2d 498 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Mere presence at still not unlawful.

- While it is not unlawful for one to be present at a liquor still while it is in operation, where the jury finds that the defendant was not only at the still, but assisted in its operation in some manner, the defendant's conviction would be authorized. Brown v. State, 87 Ga. App. 244, 73 S.E.2d 502 (1952) (decided under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

One's presence at a still is not alone sufficient to sustain a conviction of manufacturing intoxicating liquor. In addition there must be shown some act or acts essential to illegal manufacture of the liquor. Harris v. State, 119 Ga. App. 684, 168 S.E.2d 337 (1969) (decided under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction for making whiskey.

- Testimony of two witnesses for the state that the defendant admitted to them that the defendant had been helping to make whiskey at the time and place in question, together with undisputed evidence that the defendant was present at the time of the raid at a still then in operation and where whiskey was being made, was sufficient to support the conviction for manufacturing whiskey. Lastinger v. State, 84 Ga. App. 760, 67 S.E.2d 411 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

While there was no evidence that whiskey had been distilled, since raid apparently occurred at a time when operation was just beginning and whiskey had not yet had time to run off, evidence was nevertheless sufficient to support verdict of illegal manufacture of alcohol. Bryant v. State, 88 Ga. App. 208, 76 S.E.2d 446 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Evidence that two men, one of whom was the defendant, were found at a still pumping up the tank, that they ran when the officers approached and the defendant was apprehended, and that the still was in operation at the time and over 20 gallons of liquor had already been run is sufficient to sustain a conviction of manufacturing intoxicating liquor. Peebles v. State, 96 Ga. App. 836, 101 S.E.2d 726 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Evidence of making beer sufficient to support conviction.

- The act of making intoxicating beer, through fermentation of syrup, cornmeal, and water mixed for that purpose, is of itself an offense as complete and distinct as the further act of distilling from such beer a quantity of alcohol, whiskey, or rum, and failure of evidence to show distillation of any quantity of whiskey does not, therefore, leave conviction of accused without any evidence to show that the accused was guilty of making such beer. Bryant v. State, 88 Ga. App. 208, 76 S.E.2d 446 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Indictment broader than actual offense.

- Where evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the defendant was manufacturing alcoholic beer, an offense under this section, indictment for unlawfully manufacturing alcoholic liquors, spirituous liquors, whiskey, and rum was broad enough in its terms to include that offense, and the verdict finding the defendant guilty and recommending that the defendant be punished as for a misdemeanor was supported by evidence. Cook v. State, 88 Ga. App. 330, 76 S.E.2d 629 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Purchase of vast quantity of sugar admissible in evidence.

- The purchase by the defendant a short time prior to the defendant's apprehension of almost 25,000 pounds of sugar in less than two months, being a quantity vastly in excess of the requirements of an average person, but a quantity which suited capacity of a still, was a circumstance, together with others, tending to identify the defendant with illegal manufacture of alcohol and was for that reason admissible in evidence. Bryant v. State, 88 Ga. App. 208, 76 S.E.2d 446 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Evidence of county's wet or dry status unnecessary.

- Conviction under former Code 1933, § 58-206 was not without evidence to support it merely because there was no probative evidence that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages had not been legalized in the county of the still's situs under former Code 1933, Ch. 58-10 (see now O.C.G.A. § 3-4-1 et seq.). Peebles v. State, 96 Ga. App. 836, 101 S.E.2d 726 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Jury entitled to disbelieve defendant's contention.

- Where the defendant admitted that the defendant manufactured the beer which the sheriff found within curtilage of the defendant's dwelling house and sought to excuse the defendant on the ground that the defendant made it for hog feed, it was within the province of the jury to disbelieve this contention of the defendant. Jackson v. State, 78 Ga. App. 36, 50 S.E.2d 165 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

The reasonableness or unreasonableness of an explanation given by the defendant for the defendant's presence at a still was for the jury. Brown v. State, 87 Ga. App. 244, 73 S.E.2d 502 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 58-206).

Permissible quantity of out-of-state purchased liquor.

- The Code allows possession of up to one-half gallon of distilled spirits purchased by the possessor outside of this state in accordance with the laws of the place where purchased and brought into this state by the purchaser. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-16.

Illegal to possess untaxed liquor.

- It is illegal to possess in a wet county any quantity of distilled spirits on which no Georgia alcohol taxes and no alcohol taxes of another state have been paid, including among other things, all distilled spirits illegally manufactured in Georgia. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-16.

Illegal to possess liquor for sale without license.

- It is illegal to possess Georgia-tax-paid distilled spirits in a wet county for the purpose of sale when the possessor/seller does not hold a valid license authorizing such sale. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-16.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 35 et seq., 110, 195, 221, 300, 341, 356 et seq., 381, 445 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 34, 36, 47, 194, 199 et seq., 232, 235, 237 et seq., 312, 313, 324. 48A C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 367 et seq., 398 et seq.

ALR.

- What amounts to attempt to manufacture intoxicating liquor within criminal law, 22 A.L.R. 225.

Right of state to interfere with shipment of liquor through its territory, 27 A.L.R. 108.

Possessing liquor and transporting liquor as a single offense or as separate offenses, 74 A.L.R. 411.

Constitutionality of statutes or ordinances prohibiting or regulating the sale of articles that may be used in production of alcohol or intoxicating liquor, 84 A.L.R. 714.

Contributory negligence allegedly contributing to cause of injury as defense in Civil Damage Act proceeding, 64 A.L.R.3d 849.

Proof of causation of intoxication as a prerequisite to recovery under Civil Damage Act, 64 A.L.R.3d 882.

Liability of one who furnishes liquor to another for consumption by third parties, for injury caused by consumer, 64 A.L.R.3d 922.

What constitutes such discriminatory prosecution or enforcement of laws as to provide valid defense in state criminal proceedings, 95 A.L.R.3d 280.