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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1931, p. 221, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5; Code 1933, §§ 95-2002, 95-2004, 95-2005, 95-2006; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 38; Code 1933, § 95A-902, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1861, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1504, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1732, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, Ex. Sess., p. 335, § 5; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 3/SB 160; Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 3-10/HB 1320; Ga. L. 2009, p. 302, § 2/HB 101; Ga. L. 2016, p. 148, § 1/SB 307; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 32/HB 323; Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 4-13/HB 930.)
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, in paragraph (d)(1), near the middle of subparagraph (d)(1)(B), inserted "or multiple media displays", and added subparagraph (d)(1)(C); in paragraph (g)(1), in subparagraph (g)(1)(A), substituted "media displays" for "message signs", added present subparagraph (g)(1)(B), and redesignated former subparagraphs (g)(1)(B) and (g)(1)(C) as present subparagraphs (g)(1)(C) and (g)(1)(D), respectively; and added subsection (h).
The 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, inserted a comma following "area of this state" in subparagraph (g)(1)(C).
The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, substituted "Atlanta-region Transit Link 'ATL' Authority" for "Georgia Regional Transportation Authority" near the end of subparagraph (g)(1)(C).
- Placement of election campaign posters, signs, and advertisements within right of way of public roads, § 21-1-1.
Further provisions regarding display of unauthorized traffic signs, signals, or other markings, § 40-6-25.
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, "federal-aid system" was substituted for "Federal-aid system" at the end of the first sentence in subparagraph (d)(2)(A).
- Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 1-1/HB 1320, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Comprehensive Litter Prevention and Abatement Act of 2006.'"
Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 5-1/HB 1320, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall become effective April 21, 2006, for purposes of adopting local ordinances to become effective on or after July 1, 2006.
- For article, "Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia," see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 381 (2005). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 381 (2005).
- When the charge in question does in fact state that the Department of Transportation (DOT) has "general responsibility to design, manage and improve the state highway system," it seems to capture the essence of the sections the defendant relies upon, which are in fact very broad, general descriptions of the duties of the DOT. The additional material used by the court is drawn from the more specific statutory description of the respective duties of the DOT and municipalities. Thus, O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2 does indeed mention the general duty of the DOT to "designate, improve, manage, control, construct, and maintain." Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).
Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50 or O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 prohibits the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) from delegating responsibility to erect and maintain traffic control signs to a private contractor through a construction contract; § 32-6-50 does not saddle DOT with ultimate responsibility for installing and maintaining traffic control devices on all county and municipal road systems. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766, 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005).
- Railroad's bridge, which partially blocked traffic lights at a nearby intersection, did not infringe on the public right-of-way, where the space provided by the bridge for the public right-of-way adequately allowed for the safe and unimpeded flow of traffic thereunder and the traffic lights were not part of the bridge's structure. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 188 Ga. App. 58, 372 S.E.2d 245, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 911, 372 S.E.2d 245 (1988).
- O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 did not prohibit a contractor from designing and establishing a detour route under a contract with the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), subject to DOT's approval and inspection. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766, 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005).
Party asserting that structure on private property is unauthorized must establish this fact by showing that the structure was erected or maintained in violation of some statute, code, or local ordinance. Smith v. Hiawassee Hdwe. Co., 167 Ga. App. 70, 305 S.E.2d 805 (1983); Whidby v. Mr. B's Food Mart, 182 Ga. App. 408, 356 S.E.2d 78 (1987).
- O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-50 and32-6-51 work in conjunction to abrogate a railroad's common law duty to install devices to warn of approaching trains at grade crossings. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).
Because the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-1 et seq., abrogated any common law duty on the part of defendant railroad to install adequate signal equipment at a railroad crossing where the driver's car was struck by a train, the common law negligence claim asserted by plaintiffs, the driver's survivors, was dismissed for failure to state a claim; under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51, the railroad company would have acted in violation of Georgia law if the company erected traffic signals on the public road unless the company was required or authorized to do so by O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-50 and32-6-51(d), or some "other law," and O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 delegated responsibility for the installation of protective devices on public roads to the appropriate governmental entity. Bentley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
- Structures on private property adjoining road rights-of-way only become unlawful if the structures both obstruct a clear view of roads in such a manner as to constitute a traffic hazard and are unauthorized. Smith v. Hiawassee Hdwe. Co., 167 Ga. App. 70, 305 S.E.2d 805 (1983).
- While the greenery may have caused some obstruction of vision, there existed no competent evidence that any possible obstruction in visibility did, in fact, cause or contribute to the collision; whereas, the evidence presented created a strong probability that a jury could find that the negligence of the driver was the sole proximate cause of the collision. Howard v. Gourmet Concepts Int'l, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 521, 529 S.E.2d 406 (2000).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of a landowner in a negligence suit brought by a parent, who asserted that overgrowth on the landowner's property at an intersection obscured the view of the parent's child and caused the accident that killed the child as the parent failed to establish that the landowner violated O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51(b) with regard to having overgrown foliage on the property at the intersection and, otherwise, failed to show any breach of duty on the landowner's part. Rachels v. Thompson, 290 Ga. App. 115, 658 S.E.2d 890 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 778 (Ga. 2008).
- Cases involving a landowner's liability for vision-obstructing objects on property abutting a railroad crossing are governed by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 and the statute applies to allegedly unauthorized vision-obstructing trees. United Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Emmer, 218 Ga. App. 865, 463 S.E.2d 535 (1995).
- Town was entitled to summary judgment in a survivor's action claiming damages from the survivor's decedent's fatal collision with a train because the allegedly vision-obstructing vegetation was located on the railroad's property, and, further, it was undisputed that the survivor failed to show that the vegetation was planted or maintained in violation of any statute, code, or local ordinance. Furthermore, although railroads could be liable under common law negligence principles, the failure to maintain a railroad right of way was addressed by the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, specifically by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51. Town of Register v. Fortner, 262 Ga. App. 507, 586 S.E.2d 54 (2003).
Town was not entitled to summary judgment on a decedent's nuisance claim as correspondence between the town and the railway indicated that in the months preceding a train-truck accident, the defendants were aware that the overgrown shrubbery needed to be cut back to prevent interference with the line of sight at a railroad crossing; further, photographs were also submitted from which a jury might conclude that the shrubs obscured visibility. Town of Register v. Fortner, 274 Ga. App. 586, 618 S.E.2d 26 (2005).
Genuine issue of material fact existed about whether there was an absence of governmental authorization for vegetation that allegedly obscured the decedent's view as the decedent drove a tractor-trailer across the town's railroad crossing and was struck by the railway's train and that issue precluded the appellate court's ruling that reversed the trial court's summary judgment to the town and the railway. Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625, 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004).
Cited in Zumbado v. Lincoln Property Co., 209 Ga. App. 163, 433 S.E.2d 301 (1993); Murray v. Ga. DOT, 284 Ga. App. 263, 644 S.E.2d 290 (2007); Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Herrera, 343 Ga. App. 424, 808 S.E.2d 416 (2017).
- Traffic on city streets which is not part of the State Highway System is under municipal control. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-45.
- An offense under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 is not one for which those charged with a violation are to be fingerprinted. 2007 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2007-1.
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