O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-36-10 (2019)

Legislative intent

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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It is the express intent of the General Assembly in enacting the provisions of this chapter to provide for alternative methods for annexing or deannexing an area or areas into or from the corporate limits of a municipality. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no provision of this chapter relating to annexation or deannexation by any such alternate method is intended to or shall be construed to in any way restrict, limit, or otherwise impair the authority of the General Assembly to annex or deannex by local Act.

History

Code 1981, § 36-36-10, enacted by Ga. L. 1997, p. 540, § 1.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - Provisions of former O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-11 and 36-70-24(4)(c), pertaining to the establishment of a dispute resolution process when a bona fide land use dispute arises between a city and county over the use of land which is the subject of annexation, do

not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IV. Higdon v. City of Senoia, 273 Ga. 83, 538 S.E.2d 39 (2000) (decided prior to 2004 amendment of O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-11 and 36-70-24.). Authority of municipality to annex during referendum process. - Trial

court properly held that a municipality did not have the authority under O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21 to annex land that the Georgia General Assembly designated for annexation to another municipality, subject to a referendum, before the referendum took place; thus, a city was prohibited from attempting to annex property during the referendum process. City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014). Municipality without authority to annex land during referendum process. - Municipality does not have the authority pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21 to annex land that the Georgia General Assembly has designated for an-

nexation to another municipality, subject to a referendum, before the referendum takes place. City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014). Georgia General Assembly did not intend the alternative methods of annexation under O.C.G.A. § 36-36-10 to establish a system for municipalities to race the legislature to annex land that it already had designated for annexation under local law. City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014). Cited in City of Atlanta v. Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 801 S.E.2d 1 (2017).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 2000–2017 · leading case: City of Brookhaven Et Al. v. City of Chamblee, 765 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
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City of Brookhaven Et Al. v. City of Chamblee, 765 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 16× “” OCGA § 36-36-10. 4 See also OCGA § 36-36-16.”
City of Atlanta v. Mays, 801 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 6× “However, the field that the Municipal Annexation Statutes occupy is not how all city boundaries are established, but rather only how the boundaries of existing cities may be changed by those cities under the limited annexation powers delegated to them by the General Assembly…”
Higdon v. City of Senoia, 538 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. 2000). · cites it 4× “In OCGA § 36-36-10, the General Assembly explained the governmental interest furthered by OCGA § 36-36-11: It is the express intent of the General Assembly in enacting the provisions of this chapter to provide for alternative methods for annexing or deannexing an area or areas…”
City of Buford v. Gwinnett Cnty., 585 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “” As the parties and court discussed in this case, if the City were not able to move across these categories of property to annex property, then its limits would be forever bound by any river, creek, utility or railroad right-of-way, or any state or county property or street.”
City of Atlanta v. Mays (Ga. 2017). · cites it 6× “Indeed, OCGA § 36-36-10 ensures that the Municipal Annexation Statutes cannot be misinterpreted to limit the General Assembly’s primary power over annexation, saying: Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no provision of this chapter relating to annexation or…”
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